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There is hardly anything in the world that someone can not make a little worse and sell a little 
cheaper. People who consider price alone are that person’s lawful prey. It is unwise to pay too 
much but it is worse to pay too little. When you pay too much, you lose a little money, that is all. 
When you pay too little, you some times lose everything because the thing you bought is incapable 
of doing the thing that it was bought to do. The common law of business balance prohibits paying a 
little and getting a lot. It cannot be done. If you deal with the lowest bidder, it is well to add 
something for the risk you run. And if you do that you will have enough to pay for something 
better.  
 
John Ruskin (1819-1900). 
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MANAGING A METRO RAIL PROJECT TO AVOID COST OVERRUNS  
By J. Heulyn Thomas  
 
While technical failures remain the most common triggers for overruns in metro projects, the 
causes have not typically been deficiencies in the underlying engineering principles but in project 
management.  This work involves the complementary use of requirements and risk management 
processes and real options theory.  The Crossrail project provides a case study with a scheme 
design for an underground station at Farringdon being considered in detail.   
  The requirements process documented in this research is capable of providing an 
interactive format for managing project requirements and importantly, any changes that are made to 
them.  This is achieved using commercial software (Telelogic DOORS®) and it is shown that this 
process is effective when working on multidisciplinary metro projects.  This process is then 
expanded to consider the interaction between risks on a project.  This is identified as being crucial 
given the impacts that technical, project and external risks can have on each other.  The developed 
risk process therefore allows the interactions between all risks to be recorded and provides a 
holistic view of all risks for management purposes.  The requirements and risk processes are 
complemented by a fuzzy logic methodology to evaluate global and elemental risks (such as 
political or client risks).  Over 50 external risk factors which are known to have caused overruns on 
previous projects are identified and the performance of Crossrail is evaluated against each risk 
factor by way of a questionnaire circulated to industry professionals.   
An approach to avoiding cost overruns is demonstrated by the application of real options 
theory where the chosen design for Farringdon station is developed alongside an alternative design.  
Real options theory is used to value the cost of implementing the design alternative should it be 
needed during the project construction cycle due to cost increases and the potential occurrence of 
major risks.  This implementation cost is presented as a fixed cost agreed prior to construction 
rather than being an added cost to the agreed budget once construction has started.  It is proposed 
that using real options in this context can avoid significant cost overruns by predetermining the 
value of payments to be made for changing from one design to another.   
This thesis will show how additions and adjustments to existing processes and the 
inclusion of real options valuation in the procurement of metro projects can help practitioners avoid 
cost overruns in a metro rail project.  
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1 Introduction and Research Objectives 
To satisfy the demand for urban transport, many cities in the world currently place great emphasis 
on the development and expansion of urban rail systems by constructing new systems or renovating 
old networks (Bruno et al., 2002).  Political support for urban rail systems is currently strong.  
Babalik (2000) noted that policy documents in most western countries have advised planners to 
adopt rail-based solutions to urban transport problems, stating that they were the most effective 
public transport alternative in attracting car users; reducing traffic congestion; reducing air 
pollution; and directing urban growth.  Small (2006) notes that researchers who have compared the 
costs of serving passenger trips in a given travel corridor via various modes consistently find that 
rail transit is the most economical where there are very high population densities, and as a result 
investment in urban rail systems is very likely to continue. 
Urban rail takes two general forms in surface rail and metro (underground) rail, the former 
being a lower cost alternative to the latter as it can be added on to existing rail infrastructure or 
constructed on previously disused rail corridors.  The East London Line Extension is a typical 
example.  However, it is near impossible to construct surface rail in compact city centres as space 
is often extremely limited and land costs are very high (e.g. Central London) and therefore metro 
systems are the only feasible rail transport solutions available to satisfy the transport demands in 
such areas.   
Given the large engineering complexities and the multiple constraints associated with 
constructing a railway underneath a city, modern metros often display the characteristics of 
megaprojects and generally have capital values of £500m or more. Cost overruns in metros and the 
associated fixed links (e.g. tunnels) are common where the actual cost is often 30-60 percent higher 
than the initial estimated investment cost (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a).   
The UK has experienced few rail infrastructure megaprojects with the Jubilee Line 
Extension (JLE) in London (1999), the West Coast Mainline Upgrade (2008) and the Channel 
Tunnel (1994) (including the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) (2007)) being the significant rail 
megaprojects to have been completed in the last fifteen years.  The Channel Tunnel and the JLE 
both experienced considerable cost and time overruns.  A study conducted by Flyvbjerg et al. 
(2003b) into the Channel Tunnel project identified the cause of cost increases as one of ‘risk 
negligence and lack of accountability in the decision making processes’ while an End of 
Commission Report (ARUP, 2000) stated that the serious cost and time overruns experienced by 
the JLE project largely emanated from the early strategy established for the project.  The proposed 
~£16 billion pound London Crossrail scheme is the latest megaproject to be proposed in the UK 
and along with the East London Line Extension and Thameslink creates a portfolio of urban rail 
megaprojects being planned or currently under construction in London and the south east of 
England.   Chapter 1  
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The need for effective processes to avoid cost overruns in metro projects is therefore clear. 
This is consistent with the statements made by the Department for Transport (DfT) (2004, 2007) 
where it is acknowledged that the rail industry must get its costs under control and operate within 
available budgets.  It is noted that the rail industry still has to deliver efficiency gains in order to 
provide value for money from the increased levels of investment.  The DfT anticipates that this can 
be achieved by better management of projects through improved procurement and planning.   
 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Modern metro projects are huge in scale and require the input of thousands of people to complete.  
The difficulties in managing such projects are compounded given the many working interfaces that 
exist; the often asymmetric interests between some of these interfaces; and the inherently uncertain 
underground environments in which such projects are built.  Given the large scale of these projects, 
the lack of communication of decisions regarding project scope; changes in this scope; the 
identification of risks and uncertainties; and the management of risks can cause significant cost and 
time overruns.    
Additionally, there is often a demonstrated, systematic tendency for project appraisers to be 
overly optimistic and to place a lack of realism in cost estimates which effectively results in the 
underestimating of project costs and the overestimating of project benefits (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003b; 
DfT, 2006).  When this is combined with the often poor execution of the many aspects of project 
management associated with developing a metro project, then the likelihood of cost overruns 
occurring is greatly increased.  Mott MacDonald (2002) identified lack of realism in initial cost 
estimates and contingencies being set too low as significant causes of cost overruns in a wide 
spectrum of engineering projects, while cost overruns could also materialise through the:  
•  Inadequate definition of project requirements;  
•  Insufficient consideration and subsequent management of changes in project scope and 
specifications;  
•  Insufficient project planning and decision making during the early stages of the project;  
•  Insufficient resources and planning being allocated to the identification of all risks 
associated with a design; and  
•  Inadequate attention being given to the mitigation of risks in any chosen designs.   
 
The occurrence of risks and uncertainties during construction can also present significant 
problems where the resolution of the problems presented by the risk occurrence can lead to conflict 
and the breakdown of relationships and communication.  Such conflict often results in significant 
overruns to the project.  The engineering costs of resolving the risk occurrence can also escalate 
beyond manageable financial limits.  This problem is compounded by problems with inadequate Chapter 1  
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risk contingencies being set.  This only confirms that many overruns are the result of management 
failures rather than technical or engineering failures.  The issues outlined in this section led to the 
objectives for this research, as set out in the following section.    
 
 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
The work carried out in this thesis seeks to provide processes which can be used by practitioners to 
manage project requirements; identify the relationships between risks associated with developing a 
metro project; and assess global and elemental risks.  These processes form a proactive approach to 
avoiding cost overruns.  A reactive approach to avoiding cost overruns is developed which uses 
real options theory as a tool to value and time the use of flexible designs to mitigate risks.  The use 
of these processes to procure and deliver metros within their planned budgets (and thus avoid cost 
overruns) is demonstrated by using the Crossrail project as a case study.   
 
The main objectives of the study can be listed as follows: 
1.  To understand how cost overruns occur in a metro development and identify the major cost 
overrun causing factors and issues. 
2.  To develop, apply and validate elements of management practice in the areas of project 
requirements management and project risk management which can be used to avoid cost 
overruns. 
3.  To develop and apply a process that can be used to mitigate risks through the introduction 
of flexibility in a design and thus to provide an opportunity to avoid cost overruns. 
4.  Derive the value of this flexibility and outline ways that this can be accounted for in risk 
contingencies.  
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1.3 Outline of the EngD Thesis 
The thesis is organised into eight chapters. The second chapter describes background details that 
led to the current research.  Attention is paid to the interests of various parties associated with a 
metro development, the impacts that asymmetric interests have on the success of a project and the 
importance of the management of risk and changes in scope is highlighted. It is understood that the 
interests of parties within the project lifecycle has a great influence on how cost overruns occur in 
metro projects; hence acknowledgement is given to a contractual measure that can be taken by a 
client to ensure that a metro development remains within budget. This chapter therefore places this 
work in the context of the sustainable development of metro projects.  
Metro projects are often huge undertakings displaying the characteristics of megaprojects.  
The timely identification and agreement of project scope between stakeholders and developers 
across a multi-organisation, multi-discipline project is often very difficult.  This difficulty often 
means that scope agreement is often inadequately addressed, which ultimately leads to changes to 
the project scope and thus cost and time overruns.  Chapter three describes the importance of the 
project wide understanding and communication of project scope, specifications and requirements.  
A requirements management process is developed which considers the needs of all parties involved 
with a project and operationalises a hierarchy based system for managing project requirements in a 
civil engineering context.  This provides an effective solution for management practitioners seeking 
to control project scope and ultimately manage a significant source of overruns in projects.   
Traditional project risk registers completed during the design and planning stage of a 
project ignore a critical aspect of risk which is that separate risk areas can be related to each other 
through a network of individual risks.  Chapter 4 recognises that the lack of identification and 
communication of the relationships between risks within and across different risk areas can cause 
failures, particularly in the multi-design team, multi-interface environment of a metro megaproject. 
A methodology is developed to network risks by linking and tracing the interactions of risks within 
and across strategic, programme, project, operational and safety risk areas.  Further work is 
suggested for the analysis of the risks within networks.    
It is established that risks and uncertainties external to the project can significantly increase 
project costs.  Some external risks and uncertainties are intrinsically related to the technical and 
programme aspects of the project while others are related to the political, regulatory, economic, 
client, working interfaces and the natural environments within which the project is developed.  
Chapter five documents the application of a risk methodology which uses fuzzy set theory and 
fuzzy reasoning techniques as a tool to give qualitative and quantitative information with regards to 
the global and elemental risks which arise during the design process of a metro project.  The 
general approach to the research documented in this chapter is to utilise a methodology that is 
appropriate and effective for use by a risk practitioner and where its application is demonstrated 
through practical use.  This chapter illustrates the capabilities of the methodology through its Chapter 1  
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application on Crossrail, where a risk practitioner can evaluate any number of global and elemental 
risks of varying importance by questionnaire survey.   
A process for the mitigation of risks to avoid cost overruns is outlined in chapter six with 
Crossrail Farringdon station being used to model its application. Six design options are evaluated 
using an analytical hierarchy process completed by a team of engineering practitioners.  This 
results in the best design option being chosen.  An item within this chosen design considered as 
having significant risk is then identified.  A design alternative based on the chosen design is created 
which does not have this risky item and a capability is placed in the chosen design to allow the 
design alternative to be installed if necessary.  Implementing the design alternative may be 
essential due to the potential occurrence of risks.  It is proposed that real options can value the 
option to change design during construction where the payment of a premium between relevant 
actors allows the mitigation of the risk by implementing the less risky design alternative. 
Chapter seven continues on from chapter six and identifies the optimum time to implement 
the design alternative using a stated preference survey to establish the clients’ acceptable limits of 
key variables including cost; time; risk; and overall value of the completed station.  The outcome of 
this survey thus yields the trigger value representing the key variables.  Should this trigger value be 
reached at any point during the construction of the chosen design, then the design can be swapped 
for the pre-designed alternative.   
Chapter eight is used to highlight conclusions, recommendations and further research. 
Additional information is provided in appendices and glossary.  
 
 
1.4 The Crossrail Project 
Crossrail is a major rail project involving an underground section beneath central London and 
surface sections stretching east and west out of London.  The author was given the opportunity to 
work on the Crossrail project during this study, joining the consultant responsible for various 
design phases associated with ‘Package 3’ as shown on figure 1.1.  At the time of joining in the 
summer of 2006, the Crossrail project was going through its Initial Reference Design stage with 
submission in December 2006.  Design work continued throughout 2007 with the first of three 
Scheme Designs being submitted in December 2007.  A second Scheme Design submission 
occurred in October 2008 and a third in March 2009, prior to the Crossrail project procurement 
structure changing with the likely adoption of a partnering framework similar to that used to 
procure the CTRL Phase 2 to St. Pancras.  It was at this point that the author left the Crossrail 
project.   
  Crossrail’s route has four distinct sections: a central section through central London; 
western; north eastern; and south eastern sections extending into outer London and parts of 
Berkshire and Essex.  The central section, and part of the south eastern section, will comprise new Chapter 1  
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twin-bore tunnels.  These tunnels represent the main engineering element of the project.  They will 
run from Royal Oak, west of Paddington, passing beneath Hyde Park, the West End, Holborn, 
Clerkenwell, Shoreditch and Stepney.  At a point beneath Stepney Green, the route will fork.  One 
set of tunnels will continue to the north east before emerging to the surface at Pudding Mill Lane 
near Stratford.  The other set of tunnels will head south eastwards, emerging adjacent to Victoria 
Dock Road in the Royal Docks.  Twin-bore tunnels will also be constructed between North 
Woolwich and Plumstead to take the south eastern section of the route under the River Thames.  In 
total, 46 km of tunnel will be built (equivalent to 23 km of twin-bore).  The tunnels will be 
constructed at about the same depth as London Underground’s Central line.  Rail level will 
generally be 20 m to 25 m below street level through the West End and the City, with low points of 
30 m or 35 m at some points.  This level will increase to 40 m between Liverpool Street, Pudding 
Mill Lane and the Royal Docks, with a low point of 50 m just east of the Isle of Dogs. 
New stations will be located along the central section at Paddington, Bond Street, 
Tottenham Court Road, Farringdon, Liverpool Street, Whitechapel and the Isle of Dogs.  Station 
platforms will be designed to accommodate the proposed 10-car Crossrail trains.  However, the 
station tunnels will be constructed to allow for a future upgrade of platforms to 245 m, for the 
operation of 12-car trains, should this be required in future.  The tunnels will be connected to the 
surface by shafts in order to provide access, emergency escape routes or ventilation.  Current safety 
standards indicate that these shafts should be no more than 1 km apart.  Some shafts will be 
incorporated into the new station buildings, whilst others will be free-standing. 
Outside central London, Crossrail will generally use existing railway corridors.  New track 
will be laid at a number of locations in order to provide additional capacity or segregation between 
services, for example, between Plumstead and Abbey Wood on the south eastern section.  The 
western section of the route will run from Maidenhead along the Great Western main line, through 
Slough towards Westbourne Park and the tunnel entrance (portal) to the central section tunnels at 
Royal Oak.  A new connection will be constructed west of Hayes to allow Crossrail services to 
access Heathrow Airport using the existing rail tunnel into the airport.  From Stratford, the north 
eastern section of the route will join the existing Great Eastern mainline and continue through 
Ilford and Romford as far as Shenfield.  A new depot will be built at Romford for maintenance of 
Crossrail trains.  The south eastern section of the route will join the North London Line corridor 
near Custom House station and continue to North Woolwich.  It will run under the Royal Docks 
using the existing Connaught Tunnel.  A new tunnel will then take the route under the Thames to 
Plumstead, where it will join the North Kent Line and continue to Abbey Wood. 
Crossrail will generally operate trains that are 200 m long and made up of 10 carriages.  
During weekends, and after 9.00 pm on weekdays, trains will comprise of five carriages.  The 
trains will be electric, with power delivered through overhead lines, and will have a top speed of 
160 km/h.  The busiest part of the route will be between Paddington and Whitechapel with the 
number of trains operating along this section during the morning and evening rush hours, Monday Chapter 1  
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to Friday being 24 trains per hour in each direction.  This is equivalent to a train in each direction 
every two to three minutes.  At other times of the day and at weekends, 16 trains per hour will 
operate, equivalent to a train in each direction every three to four minutes.  Crossrail services will 
operate over a similar period to the London Underground network.  By 2016, it is forecast that 
160,000 passengers will be using Crossrail during the busiest three hours in the morning, between 
7.00 am and 10.00 am.  Trains will be most heavily used between Whitechapel and Liverpool 
Street (forecast to carry 55,000 passengers), Liverpool Street and Farringdon (49,000 passengers), 
and Paddington and Bond Street (35,000 passengers).  Approximately 1,400 staff will be required 
to operate and maintain the Crossrail trains, stations and tracks.   
Crossrail will employ up to 15,000 people on its construction during the most intensive 
phase of work.  Many other people will be employed to supply the equipment, materials and 
services upon which the project’s construction will depend.  The removal of excavated material 
from the tunnels will be undertaken 24 hours a day, seven days a week as will below-ground work 
such as tunnelling and the fitting-out of stations.  Work on or very close to existing railways will in 
many cases take place during possessions when normal train services are suspended.  In order to 
minimise inconvenience to rail users, these possessions will usually occur at night or at weekends. 
Deliveries will be arranged to minimise impacts on the road system as far as reasonably practicable 
with abnormal loads being delivered to work sites outside of the assumed normal working hours 
following approval by the relevant authorities. 
  Chapter 1  
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Figure 1.1 The Crossrail route plan 
Source: www.crossrail.co.uk (pre 2009) Chapter 1  
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Figure 1.2 Thesis flowchart 
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2 Cost Overruns in Metro Projects 
2.1 Background 
The increasing popularity of infrastructure megaprojects may be explained by the big fix mentality 
that they can create (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003b).  Development planners and political leaders can be 
attracted by a single solution to an array of transportation problems and as a fiscal measure to 
promote economic growth and to provide employment. A systems approach may also exist where 
planners seek to commission infrastructure megaprojects as part of a transport system, the 
maximum utility of which is only realised if individual projects are complemented by the 
development of other infrastructure.  For instance, Hong Kong’s Chek Lap Kok airport can only 
operate effectively at full capacity if adequate transport links exist to and from the city centre.  The 
airport project therefore necessitates a series of other projects (bridges, tunnels, expressways, rail 
links etc.) to create a total transport system driven by the airport capacity.  In comparison, 
London’s Crossrail scheme may be seen as a transportation system which will complement the 
increased passenger numbers resulting from London Heathrow Airport’s new Terminal 5 (T5) and 
future developments at Heathrow Airport.  This indicates how infrastructure projects are built as a 
cluster of interdependent projects but contribute to an ever growing and complex transport system. 
In addition, arrangements such as Public Private Partnerships (PPP); Build-Own-Operate-Transfer 
(BOOT) and Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) (see Smith, 2008; Murdoch and Hughes, 
2008) arrangements have facilitated commercial involvement in transport infrastructure 
development and as such has mobilised new sources of capital, thus providing the financial backing 
for megaprojects that may not have existed previously. 
However, cost overruns in infrastructure megaprojects are widespread where the actual 
cost is often 50-100 percent higher than the estimated investment cost (Bruzelius et. al. 2002).  
Indeed, the causes of cost overruns may be due to a variety of factors including the lack of realism 
in initial cost estimates, contingencies being set too low, changes in project specifications, unclear 
project strategies, uninformed decision making and insufficient consideration of design scope.  
Many megaprojects also contain a large degree of associated risks and uncertainties which can 
translate into high cost increases.   
A comprehensive study carried out by Aalborg University, Denmark, (Flyvbjerg et. al. 
2003a) considered 258 infrastructure projects across 20 countries on 5 continents with a total 
project value of US$90 billion (1995 prices).  The project types considered were bridges, tunnels, 
roads, high-speed rail, conventional (inter-urban) rail and urban rail.  One of the significant 
findings of this research was that actual costs in rail projects was on average 45% higher than 
estimated costs (with a standard deviation of 38%).  Within the sample of 44 urban rail projects Chapter 2  
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where cost overrun data was available, 25% of the projects had a cost overrun of at least 60% and 
the remaining 75% of the projects had a cost overrun of at least 33%. 
This led Flyvbjerg et al. (2003b, p3) to comment that while infrastructure megaprojects are 
being proposed and built around the world, it is becoming clear that many such projects have 
strikingly poor performance records in terms of being delivered within set targets; their 
contribution to their respective economies; their local environment; and public support.  Flyvbjerg 
et al. (2003b) continued to note that cost overruns and lower than predicted revenues from 
completed projects frequently place the viability of new projects at risk.  In this regard, work by 
Haynes (2002) questioned the real motivations for developing megaprojects and whether the public 
sector in particular has yet developed the institutional capacity to manage the complex social, legal, 
and political challenges that megaprojects entail.  Failing to manage the complex relationships 
within megaprojects often has costly consequences for all parties involved with such projects (Fiori 
and Kovaka, 2005). 
 
2.1.1 The issues to be addressed to successfully develop metros 
Heathrow’s £4.3bn Terminal 5 suffered an operational failure during its opening in March 2008.  
The failure of baggage systems resulted in cancelled flights, lost luggage and queues which 
ultimately undermined public confidence in an exceptional engineering achievement
1.  Of 
relevance to this work is that this operational failure occurred not because of a technical or 
engineering failure, but because of a lack of strategic planning and co-ordination between British 
Airways (BA) as the sole tenant of T5 and BAA, the airport operator.  Indeed, such issues are 
common in most 21
st century infrastructure projects, tunnelling and metro projects included, where 
the sources of problems resulting in cost and time increases can mostly be traced to management 
failings and not technical issues (Dix, 2008; Williams, 2009).  Overruns in the 21
st century are 
therefore usually driven by administrative and bureaucratic problems within project management 
and not engineering issues (Dix, 2008).  It should be noted however that the risks and uncertainties 
associated with underground construction means that overruns can always occur purely due to 
technical or engineering failures.   
 
2.1.2 Risk and metro construction   
The construction of tunnels is an inherently uncertain and risky environment.  Risks are augmented 
in a metro setting given the numerous interfaces and the proximity of 3
rd party underground 
infrastructure to a new development.  To this extent, a Code of Practice for Risk Management of 
Tunnel Works (ITIG, 2006) is a document which promotes best practice for the minimisation and 
management of risk associated with all tunnelling works.  Despite this Code of Practice, a single 
                                                      
1 New Civil Engineer (3
rd November 2008); www.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7314816 (27th March 2008)  Chapter 2  
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risk occurrence or event somewhere within a metro project’s lifecycle can routinely be related to 
one or more of the risk areas listed in section 1.1 of Chapter 1.  This risk occurrence is commonly a 
failure during the construction phase of the project, with its physical cause typically lying with the 
actions of the construction contractors.  Table 2.1 is a list of recent metro projects around the world 
which have experienced cost increases due to the occurrence of risk events (from Landrin et al., 
2006).  It should be noted that the values shown represent the cost of recovering the incident and 
does not represent the overrun experienced by the whole project. 
  Table 2.1 Major metro losses since 1994 
Project  Type of Loss  Cause of Loss  Loss (€m) 
1994  Heathrow Express  Tunnel Collapse  Faulty workmanship  150 
1994  Munich metro, Germany  Tunnel Collapse  Faulty design  2 
1994  Metro Taipei, Taiwan  Ingress of water  Faulty workmanship  12 
1995  Metro Los Angeles, USA  Tunnel Collapse  Faulty workmanship  16 
1995  Metro Taipei, Taiwan  Ingress of water  Faulty workmanship  30 
2000  Metro Taegu, Korea  Tunnel Collapse  Faulty design/workmanship  13 
2003  Shanghai Metro, PRC  Tunnel Collapse  Faulty workmanship  69 
2004  Singapore Metro, Singapore  Tunnel Collapse  Faulty design/workmanship  180+ 
2005  Barcelona Metro, Spain  Tunnel Collapse  Geotechnical problems  t.b.a 
2005  Lausanne Metro, Switzerland  Ingress of water  Geotechnical problems  t.b.a 
2005  Kaohsiung Metro, Taiwan  Ingress of water  Faulty workmanship  t.b.a 
2007  Sao Paolo Subway, Brazil  Tunnel Collapse  Faulty design/workmanship  t.b.a 
2007  Beijing Subway, PRC  Tunnel Collapse  Faulty design/workmanship  t.b.a 
2009  Cologne Metro, Germany  Tunnel Collapse  Geotechnical problems  t.b.a 
 
It is clear to see from table 2.1 that tunnel collapse is the main cause of cost increases with 
varying cost implications to the projects.  Collapses often materialise through the occurrence of 
risks which ultimately kill and/or injure people, cause cost and time overruns and destroy existing 
infrastructure.  In many cases, these risks arise from a combination of causes including 
unforeseeable geological features; deficiency in planning and designing; and improper construction 
management.  The Taipei, Lausanne and Kaohsiung metro collapses were triggered as a result of 
water ingress during tunnelling in waterlogged ground.  Similarly, the Munich, Taegu, Shanghai, 
Cologne and Barcelona metro collapses were caused by geological irregularities which were not 
accounted for by any of the actors associated with these projects.  Should sufficient resources and 
programme float have been allocated by the client in order for the construction contractor and his 
engineers to make adequate assessments and associated adjustments during construction, then 
corrective actions could have been taken before these collapses occurred.  However, even if such 
resources had been allowed for by the client and incorporated by the construction contractors, it 
will never be known whether they would have been used for their intended purpose.  In these cases, 
the technical failure could therefore have been avoided but for management failures in the design 
and planning activities preceding construction.     
It is known that in many of the cases shown in table 2.1, with the Singapore metro collapse 
of 2004 being a typical example (Hight, 2008) (discussed specifically in the next section), 
contractors hoped to save time by cutting corners in crucial engineering areas of the construction Chapter 2  
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process and in doing so made critical errors.  The Heathrow Express, Sao Paolo and Beijing metro 
collapses resulted from poor construction planning; poor workmanship during construction; 
insufficient engineering control; and a lack of safety management.  This can be attributed to 
contractors seeking to maximise their return from a minimum investment in a project.  In such 
cases, the technical failure was a result of inter-related management failures by all actors. 
  However, if we consider that construction contractors often work with project budgets and 
programmes that have been underestimated during the planning process, then it is only likely that 
they will struggle to achieve set targets.  In their efforts to return to their contracted level of 
performance they effectively make the project liable to overrun by taking risks.  It can therefore be 
said that the true underlying cause of cost overruns lies within areas of management relating to the 
project strategy; design; planning; and the behaviour of humans associated with this work.  It is 
these areas and their associated administrative and bureaucratic procedures that give rise to the 
pressures experienced by contractors later in the project lifecycle and thus the increases in costs 
relating to the occurrence of risks.  These pressures result in errors (recorded as ‘faulty 
workmanship’ in table 2.1) which are nearly always blamed on the contractor but are actually 
rooted in the design and planning phases occurring prior to construction.  Collapses are thus the 
material result of the actions of stretched contractors trying to regain a level of performance worthy 
of acquiring set rewards after setbacks in the construction programme due to management 
deficiencies occurring pre-construction.   
 
2.1.3 The Singapore Metro collapse 
An example of how administrative and bureaucratic issues are obscured in project management 
strategies and procedures is demonstrated by the Singapore Metro collapse at Nicoll Highway in 
2004.  The collapse of diaphragm walls used to support the 30m deep cut and cover excavation for 
Singapore’s new Mass Rapid Transit Circle Line had been caused by the collapse of temporary 
works which were inadequately designed due to inappropriate soil analysis during the early stages 
of the project. The accident caused part of Nicoll Highway which leads into Singapore's business 
district to cave-in creating a crater 30 m deep, 100 m wide and 150m long.  The catastrophic 
collapse was unprecedented in scale and led to the death of four construction workers.  Figure 2.1 
shows the area shortly before collapse the and area shortly after the collapse had occurred.  
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Figure 2.1 Nicoll Highway area before and after collapse       
 
The contractor for the Nicoll Highway section was a Nishimatsu-Lum Chan (NLC) joint 
venture which was responsible for design and construction and the appointment of subcontractors.  
Many of the problems which materialised at the Nicoll Highway collapse were related to the 
geotechnical analysis work carried out by the contractor, much of which was low cost and quick.  
In the period leading up to the collapse, the NLC joint venture failed to communicate any 
information to the client (Singapore’s Land Transport Authority (LTA)) regarding the problems 
faced at Nicoll Highway.  LTA stated post collapse that had they known that NLC’s designs had 
serious defects then they would have used contractual powers to stop the work. 
It will never be known whether LTA would have stopped work had they known of the 
issues and problems at Nicoll Highway.  NLC’s failure to pass key information to the client can be 
considered as a stalling tactic by the contractor to avoid interruptions to the progress of work.  This 
can be related to the contractual agreement between client and contractor and the allowances made 
within this contract to account for problems and risks.  It is likely that the contractor used a low-
balling tactic during the tender period and subsequently won the work.  Under these conditions, any 
interruptions to the works would have resulted in significant losses for the contractor given that 
contractual conditions may not have allowed for re-negotiation in order to account for potential risk 
occurrences.  On the other hand, several authors have explored Singapore’s reliance on lowest-bids 
to compete infrastructure projects and therefore some responsibility for the core issues may lie with 
the LTA (Dulaimi and Shan, 2002; Dulaimi et al., 2002; Singh and Tiong, 2006).  Table 2.2 is a 
timeline of events prior to the collapse and shows the many warnings made and the opportunities 
that existed to avoid the collapse. 
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Table 2.2 Timeline of events prior to the collapse at Nicoll Highway, Singapore 
No. of 
days 
before 
collapse 
Event 
225 
Concrete diaphragm walls settle unexpectedly.  150 metre long settlement cracks appear on ground surface.  The actual 
movements (deflections) in the temporary supports for the diaphragm walls are three times as much as the anticipated 
190mm.  Realisation that the computer modelling was not the same as reality. 
209  Contractor’s design engineer reports that the design is being stretched to the limit and that on site monitoring equipment 
had reported breaches of allowable design values.  A problematic situation is identified. 
198  Construction contractor questions the expertise of the design engineer stating that the engineer was incapable of 
supervising the works. 
178  A member of an independent expert panel (Expert 1) employed by the project advises that the techniques used to design 
the works underestimated the forces on the walls. 
160  The contractor’s project team refuses to re-assess the design.  A second independent expert (Expert 2) notes that the 
works are under-designed with no sound technical basis and that it would be irresponsible to continue working. 
97 More  deflections 
81  More deflections and ground surges indicating the existence of severe pressure on temporary works. 
80 
The contractor’s design manager borrows a copy of the computer program used to design the works. He has to borrow a 
copy because he has no budget for his own and is unable to complete any analyses as he does not have any engineering 
resources.  He returns borrowed software without completing any calculations or checks.  An independent expert 
(Expert 3) raises concerns about the design and finds from his own modelling that collapse is certain. 
60  Another expert (Expert 4) expresses concern about the unsound excavations and reports the potential for major failure. 
59  Singapore Government contacts the contractor’s engineers to report that they believed there was serious problems with 
the design predictions.  More deflections. 
19  Design engineer resigns.  No new engineers apply or take his job. 
7  The first independent expert (Expert 1) meets representatives from the contractor’s joint venture, explaining that if the 
excavation continued in its current state then it would collapse. 
5  Singapore Government says that there should be a design review. 
0  Collapse during a construction break.  4 people die. 
-1  Litigation starts between most parties involved. 
 
It is known that experts working on behalf of NLC informed LTA in 2002 of the 
geotechnical issues at Nicoll Highway.  An Interim report from the Committee of Inquiry set up to 
investigate the collapse (COI, 2004) identified glaring shortcomings in the project management and 
strategic execution of the project.  The committee continued to state that the shortcomings 
identified were common to the construction industry in Singapore and called for immediate action 
to prevent a repeat incident.  These shortcomings were echoed by other practitioners (Dix, 2008; 
Hight, 2008), in particular with regards to Singapore’s tendency to rely on the cheapest bid and 
poor construction methods.   The issues with the geotechnical information and associated risks 
formed the basis of the legal proceedings between client and contractor.  The events at Nicoll 
Highway only strengthen the argument that overruns in infrastructure projects have an 
administrative or bureaucratic origin located in project management procedures.  Physical events 
such as tunnel collapses are therefore more often the material result of management failures and the 
associated human behaviour rather than the failure of underlying engineering principles. 
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2.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this chapter is to set the basis for the thesis by addressing the strategic behaviour of 
parties (referred to as actors) involved in the development of metro megaprojects and the measures 
that can be taken to avoid cost escalation in such undertakings.  In doing so, the chapter proceeds in 
three steps.  It first contains a brief overview of the interests of various actors and the impacts that 
their behaviour can have on project costs.  This is followed by a consideration of how a particular 
contractual arrangement contributes to the avoidance of cost escalation.  The final step considers 
the role of cost estimating in the occurrence of cost overruns.  The study objectives are finally 
refined to define how work in this thesis can contribute to avoiding and controlling cost overruns.    
 
 
2.3 The Interests and the Behaviour of Actors Involved in a Project   
2.3.1 Project lifecycles and project structures 
Prior to discussing the interests of various actors involved in a project, it is important to define how 
this thesis visualises typical project lifecycles for metro developments and the structure and 
interactions of various actors involved in these lifecycles.   
From a clients’ perspective, the project lifecycle starts when there is a formal recognition 
of project objectives and ends with the commissioning and occupation of the completed project.  
The main phases of a project lifecycle are shown in figure 2.2 with the strategic, design and 
construction phases being the main areas of interest within this work.   
 
Figure 2.2 Life-cycle of construction projects  
 
Activities relating to the conception of a project may take place prior to the formal 
recognition of project objectives.  The inception phase is generally associated with political-
institutional planning by the client and its associated bodies with assistance being drawn from 
external consultants.  Both of these stages are of lesser interest within this work as they have been 
addressed by others (see Flyvbjerg et al., 2003b). 
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A detailed project lifecycle is outlined by the Office of Government Commerce (OGC, 
2007a) which describes the design and construction stages of a project in the context of gateway 
reviews and the inputs of key supporting processes such as risk management; value management; 
quality, cost, time; and change control. It also describes the key outputs that are required at each 
stage.   
There is a need to be flexible when considering a project lifecycle given the many forms of 
project procurement now available.  PPP, DBFO and BOOT arrangements (see Smith, 2008) to 
name a few, place emphasis on different elements of the project lifecycle and commonly tie one or 
more elements into a single stage.  Figure 2.2 however is sufficiently simple to account for a wide 
variety of procurement arrangements mentioned within this thesis and allows easy identification of 
where the processes and frameworks developed in this work fits into a project lifecycle.   
In the context of cost overruns, it is also important to recognise how the business lifecycle 
sits alongside the project lifecycle.  Many authors have noted that the most important success factor 
in megaprojects is the effort devoted to formulating the projects’ strategy, scope and objectives 
(Morris and Hough, 1987; Pinto and Mantel, 1990; Fewings, 2005 to name a few).  Project 
objectives are usually finalised concurrently during the strategy phase of the project lifecycle and 
during the early development stages of the project business case.  This crucial stage is often the 
origin of many of the causes of cost overruns in projects where inadequate consideration is given to 
critical scoping and planning issues which ultimately affect the direction of the project – the Jubilee 
Line Extension being a typical example (ARUP, 2000).  Figure 2.3 shows the relative points of a 
project lifecycle compared with a business lifecycle. 
 
Figure 2.3 Project lifecycle with a business lifecycle. 
  
Other infrastructure megaprojects have been launched with clear objectives but with 
considerable uncertainty as to whether, or how, those objectives could be achieved within set 
financial and time constraints.  The large size, complexity and technical uncertainty typical in such 
megaprojects has often resulted in the alteration of objectives later in the project lifecycle resulting 
in failure to deliver to set targets – the Channel Tunnel being a typical example here.  Morris and 
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Hough (1987, p212) however point out that the long duration and size of megaprojects tends to 
make them susceptible to changes in the socio-economic environment which can ultimately affect 
the appropriateness of the projects’ original objectives.  Such issues only reflect the difficulty of 
successfully managing megaprojects.   
The project structure in figure 2.4 defines how this work identifies the actors and the 
interfaces that exist between these actors on a metro megaproject.  The client is the body that has a 
need for a solution to a transportation problem.  Within the UK, the client for a metro would 
usually be one or a combination of central or local government and authorities; statutory boards 
and public corporations; and registered companies.  It is also typical for large governmental client 
to appoint a project sponsor from within one of its own public corporations (e.g. Transport for 
London) whose role is to oversee the initial stages of a project during the conception, inception and 
strategic stages. 
 
Figure 2.4 Project structure diagram 
 
Once a client has made a proposal, parties are usually appointed to oversee the 
development of the project and thus form the project team.  This team is the domain of consulting 
engineering practices who are often employed as the designer and depending on the specific 
contractual layout desired by a client, can have responsibility for co-ordinating the production of 
designs from many sub-consultants including architects, quantity surveyors and specialist 
engineers.  Within traditional UK procurement, the architect or the engineer will take the lead in 
the inception and design stages while the main contractor will have a leading role during 
construction.   
For recently completed infrastructure megaprojects in the UK, it has been common for 
clients to appoint executive project managers (also known as delivery partners) who are responsible 
for the entire project team and through whom the client communicates.  Figure 2.4 shows how the 
delivery partner fits into to the project structure.  The formation of this role is seen as a response to 
the difficulties which materialise when managing a multi interface megaproject such as a metro 
(Gutteridge et al., 2008; Haynes, 2002).   
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Significant problems associated with megaproject project delivery include the loss of 
control by the client over the design and construction phases which effectively creates a ‘gap’ 
between the clients’ objectives and the design process run by the designer/builder.  This gap 
unnecessarily introduces management problems and risks at the start of the project.  These issues 
can be compounded when it is considered that the design and construction portions of the contract 
are often based on price rather than on superior design quality and effectiveness (Pope et al., 2009; 
Hight, 2008).  It is therefore inevitable in this case that low-price bids made for work will prevail 
and introduce a level of under design and associated risks to a project. 
In order to solve the problems indigenous to project delivery, the use of a delivery partner 
as a single source of responsibility and communication can bridge the gap between the client and 
the design and build process.  The gap between design and build is identified as being a long term 
problem by Murdoch and Hughes (2008) and Murray and Langford (2003).  Given its 
responsibility for design and construction, the delivery partner can therefore use its authority to 
reduce the potential for or diffuse arguments between project actors and manage risks effectively 
on behalf of the client.  In conjunction with these capabilities, the delivery partner can also ensure 
that the client retains control of the project and that communication continues between all actors.   
The conceptual and schematic design phases occurring prior to detailed design (RIBA 
2, 
2004; GRIP 
3, 2005) are a crucial area of the project lifecycle given that the goals and objectives 
that have been established for a project are translated into reality during these stages.  A delivery 
partner can ensure that the clients’ objectives are compatible with designs which ultimately results 
in proposals and bids from contractors that are easier to compare and select by means of their 
accounting for risk; design; materials; technical solutions; and future operating costs.  Gutteridge et 
al. (2008) discussed the optimum time to include contractors in the design process where it was 
suggested that contractors should have no real involvement in design at all.  However this work 
believes that contractors should be involved in the latter stages of design given the expertise that 
they hold with respects to construction processes.  It would be inappropriate not to include 
contractors in the design process at all given the knowledge that they hold (Gil et al., 2001) while it 
would also be inappropriate to include them too early, given the expense that they would present at 
an early stage.   
All processes developed and outlined within this thesis is produced with its use by this 
delivery partner in conjunction with a client body in mind.    
                                                      
2 The Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) plan of work describes the activities from appraising the 
clients’ requirements through to post construction.  These stages are described as follows: A Appraisal; B 
Preparing strategic brief; C Outline proposals; D Scheme designs & Planning; E Detail design & Planning 
proposals; F Production Information; G Tender documents & Bills of Quantities; H Tender action; J Project 
planning & Mobilisation; K Site operations & Construction; L Completion; and M Feedback.   
3 The Guide to Railway Investment Projects (GRIP) was developed by Network Rail Ltd. as an approach to 
managing investment schemes.  The investment cycle of a scheme is broken down into eight stages where 
each stage is required to deliver a set of products to set quality criteria.  Key stages in the GRIP investment 
cycle are as follows: 1) Option definition; 2) Pre-feasibility; 3) Option selection; 4) Single option selection; 
5) Detailed design; 6) Construction test & Commission; 7) Scheme hand back; and 8) Project close out.  Chapter 2  
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2.3.2 The groups of actors  
The motivations and behaviour of actors involved in the procurement of a metro megaproject is a 
significant cause of cost overruns.  Actors within a political-institutional environment such as 
governmental transport policy makers and passenger forecasters can have a significant impact of 
the success of a project, particularly with regards to the misrepresentation of the benefits of a 
project during the inception stage of a project.  However, focus within this thesis lies mainly on 
actors such as the design and planning consultants and construction contractors involved in the 
strategic, design and construction phases of the project lifecycle defined in figure 2.2.  The basis 
for this is that the processes developed and outlined in this thesis fit into elements of the project 
lifecycle where design and construction born cost overruns are commonly found.  A further reason 
for giving less consideration to the impacts that actors within the political-institutional sector have 
on cost overruns is that this particular area has been considered by Flyvbjerg et al. (2002, 2003a, 
2003b) and Flyvbjerg and COWI, (2004). 
This thesis therefore considers three wide groups of actors operating within the project 
lifecycle detailed in figure 2.2.  Considering figure 2.4, the first group represents the client and his 
delivery partner, a second represents the design consultants (engineers, architects etc.) involved in 
developing a design and a third group represents the construction contractors (builders, material 
suppliers, sub-contractors/building specialists etc.).   
The next section will briefly consider the main interests of the three groups of actors 
defined above.  
 
2.3.3 The interests of actors 
The subsurface construction and tunnelling work inherent in metro projects provides a dimension 
of risks and uncertainties that is not present in other infrastructure projects.  For example, a 
highway project has very little or no underground work element, unless a road tunnel is specified in 
the design.  If the high level of risk and uncertainties encountered for metro construction is 
considered in conjunction with the long planning horizons, complex interfaces and huge budgets 
common for such projects, then it must be asked why various actors involved in project 
procurement do not set aside significant contingencies to counter any problems.  Any experienced 
actor knows that unplanned events are the norm rather than the exception in metro works and 
therefore it is also relevant to ask why, given evidence that such projects nearly always overrun on 
cost (and time) (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002), the estimated costs for work are commonly too low and 
stated benefits are too high.       
HM Treasury (2003a) notes that there is a demonstrated, systematic tendency for 
appraisers (financial or otherwise) representing any actor associated with a project to be overly 
optimistic.  Theories of cost overrun suggest that this optimism is a result of how a projects’ 
decision making process is organised and the strategic behaviour of the actors involved in the Chapter 2  
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project lifecycle (Flyvbjerg and COWI, 2004).  In particular, the high level of optimism in cost 
estimates results in the underestimation of project costs and the overestimating of project benefits, 
as confirmed by Mott MacDonald (2002).  Transport Analysis Guidance (TAG) from the 
Department for Transport (DfT, 2006) is based on the findings of Flyvbjerg and COWI and Mott 
MacDonald and provides guidance on the estimation and treatment of transport scheme costs with 
the aim of enabling realistic and accurate scheme cost estimates to be produced.  The strategic 
behaviour of actors naturally has its roots in the interests of those actors concerned and these 
interests are briefly explored below. 
2.3.3.1  Clients 
Given that underground rail projects are often colossal in scale, the clients developing such projects 
tend to be a consortium consisting of governmental institutions and private companies. The 
foremost interest of all members within such a consortium is the value for money realised from the 
development of a project.  Governments and associated branches such as Local Authorities, HM 
Treasury and the Department for Transport have a vested interest in delivering on promises while 
simultaneously seeing projects being delivered to budget.  However, herein lays an apparent 
weakness from a governments’ perspective where the desire to develop a project can often overrule 
the need to define a budget and then deliver a project to that budget.  This desire is often driven by 
political interests where the influence of announcing new infrastructure can maximise the chance of 
re-election (e.g. The Olympic Games, 2012).  A ‘monument complex’ (Flyvbjerg and COWI, 
2004) can also occur amongst politicians where the political desire to get a project announced 
under a particular government can push a project through its early development stages too quickly.  
This can often result in inadequate attention being paid to the planning; budgeting; risk; and 
engineering issues resulting in opportunities for other actors to serve their own interests.     
The interests of private companies are often financial, particularly under private financing 
arrangements where the investment made can be retrieved over a concession period.  Private 
interests could also be of a practical nature, as is the case for London’s Crossrail project where 
BAA (owner of Heathrow Airport) has pledged £230 million pounds
4 in order to have a Crossrail 
link running to the airport.  This may be seen as effort to make Heathrow more competitive than 
other airports near London by having a direct link into the London Underground system. 
Governments and private companies therefore have a great interest in avoiding cost 
overruns.  In the case of governments, the negative impacts will be felt in terms of lost votes (e.g. 
through the impact on taxpayers) and confidence while private companies (such as banks) may 
loose their own or investors money and prestige in the event of a cost overrun.  
                                                      
4 www.baa.com (4
th November 2008) Chapter 2  
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2.3.3.2  Consultants 
Consultants are heavily involved in all stages of the project lifecycle. Consultants acting in an 
advisory capacity often behave in a manner conductive to the clients’ desired outcomes.  The 
motives of the consultants in this sense are mainly financial and economic where the focus on 
justifying work streams within projects rather than scrutinising them can often lead to approval and 
subsequently more work (Flyvbjerg and COWI, 2004).  Consultants can also ‘gold-plate’ projects 
where some projects may have more requirements than what is needed right from the beginning.  
This action ultimately increases the fee-related work for the consultant.   
While the motivations of consultants during the conception and inception stage of a project 
it is not the main interest of this work, it can be said that such behaviour inherent of consultants at 
this stage is often ever-present throughout the project lifecycle.  Murdoch and Hughes (2008) note 
that consultants often seek to develop an identity which is uniform, consistent and serves their own 
interests.  In such cases, since the preferred role of a consultant does not align with the 
requirements of the project, the interests of clients are put in second place which has negative 
impacts on the project.  In addition to maximising the revenue that can be received by working on a 
project, consultants also seek to be associated with the prestige and reputation enhancement that 
can be gained through involvement with a metro project. 
2.3.3.3  Contractors 
A contractor will seek to achieve financial goals by expending the minimum resources required to 
meet a minimum scope of work.  The contractor will also seek savings on construction costs and in 
doing so hope to realise an increased level of profitability and competitiveness compared to other 
contractors.  Risk is a crucial area for contractors where the pricing for risk can be the difference 
between staying within or exceeding a projects’ budget (Laryea and Hughes, 2008).  Specialist sub-
contractors are often hired to assume certain work packages which can successfully account for a 
risk but can also introduce another project interface, thus potentially causing further management 
problems and financial losses in the event of risks occurring.  Murdoch and Hughes (2008) noted 
how contractors could seek extra payments by exploiting variations in designs that were not 
sufficiently addressed by contractual documentation.   
A contractor’s approach to completing a project is often incompatible with a client’s 
interest of obtaining maximum quality, functionality, aesthetics and capacity at minimum cost.  
Such a conflict of interests is often responsible for frequent disagreements between clients and 
contractors and this introduces a strategic source of overruns.  Many authors have modelled this 
issue as a principal-agent problem (Farrell, 2003; Quinet and Vickerman, 2004) which concerns 
motivating a party to act on behalf on another party which has asymmetric interests.  Other authors 
(Laffont and Triole, 1993) have sought to overcome this issue through modelling the placement of 
incentives in contracts with a significant focus on defence project procurement.   Chapter 2  
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With respect to contracts used for developing metros, the New Engineering Contract 
(NEC) (Broome, 1999; Thompson et al., 2000; Eggleston, 2006; Murdoch and Hughes, 2008) is a 
family of contracts which have been developed over the last 20 years to help avoid the conflict and 
disputes which often result in cost overruns (Perry, 1995; Wright and Fergusson, 2009).  The virtue 
of these contracts is that they discourage adversarial behaviour resulting from the tendencies of 
actors to act wholly in their own interests rather than working towards satisfying project objectives.  
Such behaviour results in a climate of contention leading to disputes being accepted as the norm, 
thus leading to loss and expense due to contractual claims (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000).   
The NEC has become increasingly popular in the civil engineering sector with recent 
projects such as the CTRL being procured on an adapted version of NEC 2 and elements of the 
Olympic Games 2012 also being procured on the same basis. The NEC is discussed in this chapter 
in terms of its effectiveness as a means of managing the conflict of interests between clients and 
contractors.  A taxonomy of the interests of the actors discussed in this section is presented in 
figure 2.5. 
Actor/Party Interest  Risk  Reward 
To obtain the most economic 
solution to a problem  Cost and time overruns  Profitable piece of infrastructure 
Ensure the safety of all working 
on the project at any stage in its 
lifecycle 
Tarnished image  Functionality 
Unnecessarily compromising the 
environment in which the project 
takes place 
Building a financially 
unsustainable project  Good aesthetics 
  Damage to the environment  Correct capacity for investment 
made 
Client 
  Health and Safety incidents   
To support the client to achieve 
their objectives  Damaged reputation  Repeat business 
To help the client identify, 
create, deliver and measure value  Errors leading to litigation  Profitable work stream 
To provide expert advice, skills 
and know how to the client 
Errors leading to environmental 
damage or Health and Safety 
incidents 
Customer loyalty 
Consultant 
(Design or 
Planning) 
To provide (or advise on) project 
management skills  Loss of staff  Enhanced reputation 
To provide a quality project 
Health and Safety incidents 
and/or damage to the 
environment 
Profitability 
Deliver work on time and within 
budget  Cost and time overruns  Strong cash flows 
Deliver a project safely and with 
minimum damage to the 
environment 
Occurrence of risks requiring 
investment by the contractor 
(Financial outflows > Financial 
inflows) 
Increased value in stock 
price/appreciation in company 
value 
Avoid risks  Variation in costs  Asset efficiency 
Expend minimum resources 
required to meet a minimum 
scope of work 
Unreliable sub-contractors  Good reputation 
Contractor 
  Resource/supply chain problems   
Figure 2.5 Taxonomy of the interests of actors Chapter 2  
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2.3.4 Compatibility of the interests of actors 
The structure of a construction project in terms of which project delivery method is employed and 
the manner in which the parties relate to one another can reduce or create conflict amongst project 
parties.  When the actors’ objectives and interests are not compatible, their interpretation of 
contract documents, terms and conditions can diverge, leading to conflict.  Key conflict areas 
associated with a metro project include (from Pope et al., 2009): 
•  Lack of clarity of responsibilities 
•  Vague risk registers (often because they are written shorthand) 
•  Uncertainties or lack of knowledge regarding ground conditions  
•  Use of early of purchases 
•  The use of provisional sums 
 
A simple review of the traditional relationships on a design/bid/build delivery system (as 
documented by Harris and McCaffer, 2001; Fewings 2005; Brook, 1998) (also see figure 2.4) 
illustrates a situation where the designer and the contractor have only a communication relationship 
with one another, but their roles on the project are defined in their separate contracts with the 
client/owner.  It is therefore important to ensure that both the design contract and the construction 
contract are compatible with one another, notwithstanding the fact that they represent entirely 
different relationships with the client/owner.   
Consultants (such project managers or surveyors) on the other hand are expected to provide 
certain contract administration functions during the course of the construction project, as 
envisioned in a construction contract.  It is therefore important that a consultants’ own contractual 
mandate with a client gives him the power to perform those functions while integrating with 
designers and contractors.   
The difficulties inherent in such relationships (both communication and contractual) only 
highlight the conflict-prone nature of construction projects where the origins of most conflicts and 
disputes lie in the incompatibility of actors’ initial interests and objectives.  Incompatible objectives 
are responsible for frequent disagreements on how to approach and complete a project (Flyvbjerg, 
2003b; Warrack, 1993; Fiori and Kovaka, 2005).  As identified, on any typical construction project, 
the owner wishes to obtain maximum quality, functionality, aesthetics and capacity at minimum 
cost. On the other hand, the contractor seeks to achieve financial goals that are advanced by 
expending the minimum resources required to meet a minimum scope of work.  In addition, metro 
projects are unique and require detailed analysis to establish the most appropriate procurement 
method prior to entering into a particular form of project delivery (Gutteridge et al., 2008).  This 
takes time, which often does not exist in metro procurement (Hight, 2008).  The parties involved 
with a project must therefore assess specific project characteristics to develop a jointly creative and 
effective approach to dealing with and resolving conflicts before the occurrence of disputes Chapter 2  
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involving, amongst others; incomplete scope definition; inappropriate contract type; poor 
communication; and uncertainty and unrealistic expectations.  Work by Matthews et al. (2000) 
showed that close cooperation between the actors involved in a project made significant 
improvements to the control of cost and time and identified the need for actors to share risks and 
resources.   
 
 
2.4 Contracts and Risk 
Contracts provide an opportunity between actors to foresee problems and to draft contractual 
provisions to take care of, or at least diminish, any problems and conflicts on a project if and when 
they occur.  This reflects the importance of contracts which are the basis of most liability in the 
construction industry with contractual claims representing 90% of all claims that occur and third 
party tort claims making up the remainder (Pope et al., 2009).  Given the importance of contracts, it 
is clear that more time should be spent discerning which contract (delivery system) is likely to 
provide the best option for the actors within a particular project relationship.  The power of a 
contract for any legal purpose is enormous (Dix, 2008).  Actors can limit their liability both in 
terms of time and resources, and can foresee problems and provide contractual obligations to deal 
with those problems.  Smith et al. (2006) note that the three main functions of a contract is defining 
the work that one actor will do for another; defining how risks in doing the work are allocated; and 
implanting motives in actors that match those of a client.   
Dix (2008) discussed the importance of tailoring contracts to projects rather than vice-
versa.  Indeed, to date, the Contractual Practices Group of the International Tunnelling Association 
(ITA) (UN Affiliate) has refused to produce a model contract for any tunnelling related project 
simply because of the need to tailor contracts to the local conditions of a project (Dix, 2008).  This 
is essential given that contracts have to allow for variations in different working environments as 
well as unique elements which are associated with metro projects.  However, problems with 
contracts are endemic to the construction industry and as indicated by Pope et al. (2009), represents 
the source of most of the claims that occur on a day-to-day basis. 
 
2.4.1 The NEC3 group of contracts and CDM 
In 1985, the Institution of Civil Engineers in the UK led a fundamental review of civil engineering 
design and construction contract strategies.  This review led to the development of a revolutionary 
new form of contract now known as the NEC Engineering and Construction Contract (ECC) with 
three main aims of: 
•  Clarity and Simplicity Chapter 2  
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•  Flexibility of use (e.g. for different contract strategies; different engineering and 
construction disciplines; use in different countries) 
•  Stimulus to good management 
 
After eight years of development the first edition of the contract was published as the New 
Engineering Contract (NEC) in 1993 (Broome, 1999; Murdoch and Hughes, 2008).  
Recommendations by Latham (1994) for the development of interlocking contract forms to cover 
all of the contractual relationships were incorporated into a second edition of the NEC in 1995, 
titled the Engineering and Construction Contract (ECC) to avoid misconceptions that it was only 
suited to engineering projects.  The term NEC became used as the encompassing name for the 
family of contracts, including ‘short contracts’ designed for lower value contracts (Bennett and 
Baird, 2001).  A third edition was published in 2005 (see Eggleston, 2006) and is commonly 
referred to as NEC3.    
The NEC3 provides the foundation for the application of many management practices 
which can be employed to avoid cost overruns.  Such practices typically involve guaranteeing the 
availability of resources (material equipment and all labour) from suppliers long before they are 
needed and performing constructability analyses during the planning and design stages of the 
project for early identification of any problems (Broome 1999; Eggleston, 2006).  The improved 
allocation of risk, effective utilisation of supplier knowledge, reduction of redundant work and 
reduction of disputes and disagreements ensure that the likelihood of cost overruns are minimised 
in a proactive manner which results in successful project delivery (Gutteridge et al., 2008).   
The Construction (Design and Management) (CDM) Regulations (HSC (Health and Safety 
Commission), 2007) are separate rules which must be satisfied on any modern construction project 
and complement the NEC3 contracts well.  While the key aim of CDM 2007 is to integrate health 
and safety into construction and management, they are also an effective tool for focussing attention 
on all aspects of planning and management throughout projects and can quickly and successfully 
identify any problems arising during design and/or construction.  Furthermore, they encourage all 
actors involved with a project to; 
•  improve the planning and management of projects throughout the project lifecycle; 
•  identify hazards as soon as possible so that they can be eliminated through design; 
•  allow sufficient time for adequate risk management plans to be developed; 
•  consider health and safety issues wherever appropriate and; 
•  discourage unnecessary bureaucracy. 
 
When any project is longer than 30 days in duration (or 500 person days of construction) 
then the Health and Safety Executive must be notified of its existence.  Within this process, a client 
must appoint a CDM co-ordinator who oversees the collection and management of information Chapter 2  
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including the production of statutory documents.  The Health and Safety (H&S) file is one of these 
documents and contains information on CDM risks.  It also contains a designer’s hazard 
elimination and management record.  Both of these aspects of CDM documentation provides 
effective communication of hazards and risks between project parties. 
The Construction (Design & Management) Regulations (HSC, 2007) have placed 
significant statutory health and safety obligations on designers in the construction industry. 
Architects and design engineers must consider the health, safety and welfare of those who 
construct, maintain and indeed use buildings as a place of work. They must also take into account 
those who may be affected by such activities.  These obligations extend to corporate responsibility 
and the value that organisations must place on Health and Safety.  This ties in with the Guidance on 
Internal Control (ICA, 1999) which considers the time, cost and resources that organisations should 
allocate to Health and Safety (Guidance developed by the Working party led by Nigel Turnbull and 
hence now the report is referred to as the Turnbull Report).  
 
2.4.2 Contracts, claims and disputes 
Claims on construction projects can involve all or any of the actors involved in project procurement 
and it is therefore important that all actors are prepared for the uncertainties presented by risks. 
While each risk may have an associated uncertainty with respect to the extent that the particular 
risk will manifest itself on a project, the essence of the ability to reduce the frequency and severity 
of claims relating to risks is the identification of all risk factors and dealing with them and/or 
providing for them in the construction and/or design contracts.  Risks on metro projects commonly 
occur due to the following problems: 
•  Changes in project scope  
•  Geotechnical and site-related problems  
•  Weather and force majeure conditions  
•  Negligence in both design and construction  
 
Such problems often result in claims which ultimately cause: 
•  Cost escalations  
•  Requirement for extra resources and time for completion 
•  Construction delays  
•  Health and Safety problems 
 
The use of NEC3 contracts to achieve dispute prevention involves equitable risk sharing 
and the use of innovative work award and delivery systems including; incentive programs; 
constructability analysis and cost and schedule controls (Bennett and Baird, 2001).  The costs of 
implementing these techniques are often viewed by owners as additional costs yet the benefits that Chapter 2  
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owners ultimately obtain far exceed the costs (Pope et al., 2009).  The next sections will consider 
risk allocation in contracts and the use of the NCE contract as an agreement to promote the 
equitable distribution of risks amongst project actors. 
 
2.4.3 Allocation of risk in contracts 
Smith et al. (2006) note that risk allocation strategies should be allocated at the inception of the 
project by the client since the reallocation of risk later in the project lifecycle will inevitably have a 
negative impact on costs.  Many factors must be considered when allocating risk, such as the return 
that certain actors will get from a project and the nature of the risks that are allocated.  Construction 
risks are naturally best allocated to a contractor, however major technical risks typically resulting 
from uncertain ground conditions; design changes; or force-majeure (as examples) are always best 
allocated to the client.  Pope et al. (2009) agree with this suggesting that such risk should be held 
by the client as this eliminates the problems realised when leaving any party other than the payee to 
manage large risks and their potential for increased costs and delays.  Crossley (in Pope et al., 
2009) considered the comparative success of Heathrow T5 where all risks were held by the 
client/payee (Constructing Excellence, 2004) against the overruns realised during the construction 
of Chep Lap Kok airport in Hong Kong where risks were left for various parties to manage.  Much 
of the success of Heathrow T5 was the procurement contract used and the way it incentivised all 
parties to manage risks or to collectively minimise their impacts if they occurred.   
This work agrees with the view of Pope et al. (2009) that major risks such as force-majeure 
should be born by the client and that the management of the many lesser risks existing on a metro 
project should be distributed to the actors involved in the project which are best able to do so.  The 
general principles of risk allocation as seen in NEC3 contracts are that (see Smith et al., 2006 for 
detailed discussion on risk allocation and risk strategies; Murdoch and Hughes, 2008): 
•  Successful risk allocation is based on having fair contracts that are understood by everyone  
•  The different actors involved seek a multi-beneficial distribution of risk  
 
However, in order to allocate risks on a metro project to the appropriate actors capable of 
their management, it is first necessary to undertake a complete risk assessment.  The assessment of 
risks is a relatively advanced science (see Simon, 1998; PMI, 2000; Hillson, 2002 Chapman and 
Ward, 2003; Smith et al., 2006).  This in combination with the identification of which actor is most 
capable of their management is key to developing a contractual arrangement that will work to the 
benefit of the project and its participants. Clients and delivery partners should perform a thorough 
assessments and evaluation prior to allocating the responsibility for managing risks and 
uncertainties which includes (see Smith et al., 2006): 
•  Assessing and evaluating the particulars and needs of the various project actors;  Chapter 2  
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•  Assessing and evaluating the individual peculiarities and sensitivities of each element of 
work to be completed;  
•  Assessing and evaluating the role to be played by each actor and how they will interact 
with one another during the completion of an element of work.  
 
2.4.4 Contribution to this work 
This work has discussed how management failures rather than technical engineering failures are 
often responsible for cost overruns.  Such management failings occur due to the occurrence of risks 
or design changes; inadequate identification of risks and provisions for risk mitigation; the often 
conflicting interests of the actors associated with a project; and the estimation of values with 
respect to costing and risk contingencies.  This section will identify aspects of the NEC3 series of 
contracts with relevance to this work and will highlight how this work can operationalise and add 
to existing practices and knowledge to ensure that cost overruns can be avoided.     
2.4.4.1  Price adjustment 
Complex design projects such as metro projects procured on a fixed price contract are the most 
prone to claims (Pope et al., 2009).  NEC3 contracts allow for price adjustment which controls 
price escalation during a project where acceptable limits to any cost escalation to be covered by a 
contractor are set in a contract.  Anything above the limit amount is attributable to the client.  In 
effect, if costs increase significantly during the life of the project, conditions within the contract 
allow the contractor to be compensated thus eliminating or reducing the need for costly claims and 
ultimately large cost overruns.   
With this practice in mind, a Cost Overrun Protection Programme (COPP) was negotiated 
by The Department for Transport, London Continental Railways (LCR) (the client) and Bechtel 
(privately owned delivery partner) for the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) (HoC, 2006).  
Bechtel, a key project manager on the Link and a shareholder in LCR, received £60 million for 
arranging the proposal.  It involved carrying a £100 million share of the first £300 million of 
potential cost overruns, providing the overruns were not the consequence of inflation greater than a 
contractually determined and defined cap of 3% per annum.  A group of insurers received a £27 
million premium for bearing £215 million of potential cost overruns in the range £300 million to 
£600 million.  LCR was to bear the full cost of any overruns above £600 million as shown in figure 
2.6.   
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  Figure 2.6 The sharing of cost overruns between the parties on CTRL  
(Source: HoC (2006), p12) 
 
It has already been identified in this work that the conflicting interests of actors have a 
major impact on the occurrence and extent of cost overruns. A notable issue with the COPP 
proposal is the variable amount of cost overrun attributable to various parties within each band of 
cost overrun.  While the CTRL project did not suffer any notable cost overruns, it must be asked 
what would have happened to the relationships between actors in the event that a serious overrun 
occurred and this programme was activated.  For example, if the project was overrunning by 
£295m, would it not be within Bechtel’s interest to push the overrun over £300m in order to pay 
nothing?  It could be argued that an overrun over £300m was unlikely and so Bechtel would remain 
accountable for any cost overrun based on the lower bands shown in figure 2.6, yet contrasted with 
Bruzelius et al. (2002) where it is stated that such projects can overrun on cost by 50-100%, an 
overrun of £300m or more was likely based on CTRL’s budgeted £1.6bn cost for Section 1 (£1.6bn 
taken from Smith et al. (2006), p228 (based on 1997 values)). 
This work seeks to develop a process that can complement price adjustment.  When cost 
overruns are beyond the amount attributable to a contractor then the client must consider two 
options in order to complete the project or element of the project that has overrun.  The client can 
continue with the project and absorb the cost overrun or can keep costs as low as possible by 
identifying the most appropriate time and cost to implement an alternative engineering solution that 
will solve the problem causing the overrun while maintaining the desired functionality.  This is 
achieved in this work through the application of real options theory (see Chapters 6 and 7).   
2.4.4.2  Managing changes and their associated costs 
Under NCE3 contract conditions, when change orders are priced by contractors, a reservation of 
rights is usually made to allow them the opportunity to make future claims for additional time or Chapter 2  
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money to complete the project.  A disclaimer is often used by the contractor in the change order 
quotation to allow for further review in order to assess the impact the change order will have on the 
construction schedule sequence of activities and the overall project duration.  This is reasonable 
since, in most cases, the contractor will not have had an opportunity to complete a total assessment 
of the time and cost implications of the change order.  
A compromise from a client’s perspective may be to allow the contractor a set period of 
time after the change order is signed to analyse and predict its cost and time impact on the overall 
project.  The contractor then informs the client and his delivery partner about its conclusions and 
the contractor’s claims are then frozen and dealt with.  The period for the contractor to analyse, 
formulate and transmit its claims to the owner may vary with the type and magnitude of the project, 
but it could range from one to six months.  If a contractor doesn’t inform the owner within the 
designated period of the cost and time impact of the change order, the contractor then waives the 
right to any additional time or cost resulting from the change order.  Further to this effective way of 
reducing disputes, a series of impact factors and formulae can be developed to account for impact 
costs like the timing of changes; the number of trades involved; the effect on the schedule; the 
effect on office and field staffing; and the cumulative nature of disruptions.  Subsequently, when 
change orders are priced and negotiated, owners and contractors will be in a position to incorporate 
both hard costs and impact costs, and they will be in a position to settle on a final adjustment to the 
contract value more easily.  Such arrangements can substantially mitigate a major source of 
disputes and in effect provides a dispute resolution process which is an alternative to litigation. 
This work seeks to provide a requirements process which can complement the above 
mentioned change processes (see Chapter 3).  The definition of scope by client and designers prior 
to construction is a key element of avoiding cost overruns and should be seen as the first step to 
keeping a project on target.  The successful application of this process will ultimately allow 
changes in scope to be made prior to construction, leaving the above mentioned process to be 
applicable only in the event that changes are needed during construction, typically in the event of a 
risk or uncertainty occurring or enforced changes to the project scope.  This process is 
complemented by a risk process that identifies global and elemental risks which lie outside project 
risk registers (see Chapter 5) and also a process that identifies the relationships that exist between 
risks associated with a project (see Chapter 4).  
2.4.4.3  Contract award and incentive programs 
Competitive bidding has been identified as a potential source of cost overruns where low-ball 
tactics used by contractors to win work is a significant strategic risk and can have a negative impact 
on the success of a project.  The NCE3 contracts use a three-step co-operative system for bidding 
where uncertainties can be allocated to various contractual parties for management while under the 
control and ownership of the client.  This system therefore divides the bidding process into three 
steps prior to contract award as follows: Chapter 2  
Cost Overruns in Metro Projects 
  32
(a) Selection of contractors. The client and delivery partner qualify interested contractors 
(for both design and construction). 
(b) Joint decisions. Selected contractors meet with the client and the delivery partner to 
jointly decide on the optimum engineering processes and equipment to be employed on the 
project. This can lead to effective estimations with regards to pricing earthwork and 
tunnelling elements of metro projects. In addition, critical elements of the project can also 
be discussed, including work items covering key risks areas such as geotechnical reports on 
the ground to be developed. 
(c) Awarding work. Each contractor presents a bid for an item of work based upon the 
criteria agreed on in the previous steps of the process.  The client and delivery partner then 
award the work to their favoured bidder who becomes responsible for its completion. 
 
The procurement process for Heathrow T5 was based on this process and its success has 
undoubtedly influenced the procurement strategy for London’s Crossrail where the major design 
work is being tendered for in a similar manner.    
A significant addition to this bidding process would be an effective process for 
incentivising all actors to obtain better performance.  Incentive programs tend to strengthen actors’ 
commitment to progress a project towards completion (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Farrell, 2003), 
typically aligning a construction contractor’s motivation and performance with a client’s 
objectives. In order to make such an incentive system work, a client must devise attainable and 
challenging goals for the construction team.  In addition to this, a client must evaluate the 
performance of the contractor against a set of objective goals in order to determine if the contractor 
has earned the incentive and whether the overall project goals will be achieved based upon progress 
made up to that point.  The Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) (Harris and 
McCaffer, 2001) has been used as a way of monitoring this where incentives in construction are 
usually paid upon achievement of milestone dates or the sharing between contractual parties of any 
savings based upon stipulated cost goals set out within the contract.   
The requirements process outlined in this work allows a client to define the requirements, 
scope and specifications of the work to be competed and thus this process provides the basis for the 
development of any incentives for improved performance from all actors associated with a project.  
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2.5 Cost Estimates and Optimism 
This section considers the role of optimism bias in the production of estimates and the use of 
reference class forecasting as a method for accounting for optimism including its drawbacks in 
terms of its ability to adequately account for risks. 
The process of estimating is extremely variable and depends on many factors such as the 
type of project under consideration, the organisation doing the estimate (e.g. client, designer or 
contractor) and the stage of the lifecycle the project is at (e.g. inception, design, construction).  A 
great deal of literature exists in the field of construction estimating (e.g. Brook, 1998; Harris and 
McCaffer, 2001; and Smith, 2008) and therefore it is not intended to review estimating procedures 
in this work.  It is appreciated that a key part of estimating is the establishment of costs relating to 
physical, material, human and financial resources.  Of interest to this work is the impact that 
optimism can have on estimates, its role in causing cost overruns and the effectiveness of methods 
that have been developed to control it.     
The design scope of projects can change considerably in the period between the initial 
outline business case and the full business case.  These changes may be required to mitigate the 
presence of project uncertainties occurring as the project planning and design programme evolves 
or as a response to change orders.  In the case of an urban rail project, such uncertainties may 
transpire due to the level of ambition, the project corridor, the technical standards, project 
interfaces, environmental issues and geotechnical conditions.  The effect of these uncertainties is a 
degree of budget uncertainty which would typically be reduced as the project moved forwards.  As 
more information and knowledge is gathered about a project, uncertainties associated with all 
aspects of project procurement are reduced throughout the project cycle from inception, feasibility 
studies and approval; to construction and contract award.  The level of uncertainties associated with 
a project that is known should therefore be duly reflected in the project documentation at any given 
stage. This is shown on figure 2.7 below. 
 
Figure 2.7 Budget uncertainty during the project cycle 
(Source: Flyvbjerg and COWI (2004), p33) Chapter 2  
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The problem of optimism bias arises when the effects of various factors (such as the 
interest of various actors or the absence of information on uncertainties) combine to produce a 
systematic under reporting of costs at the several key stages that the business case is updated (i.e. 
the strategic outline case, outline business case, full business case) (OGC, 2007b).  Many project 
parameters are affected by this optimism where appraisers tend to overstate and overestimate 
opportunities and understate timings, costs and the level of project uncertainty.   
Flyvbjerg and COWI (2004) were appointed by the Department for Transport (DfT) to 
undertake an assignment regarding costing of large transportation procurement.  They provided 
optimism bias uplift values based on empirical probability distributions of selected reference 
classes of transportation projects.  It was intended that these uplifts could account for optimism 
placed in cost and time estimates for transportation infrastructure and ultimately adjust project 
budgets sufficiently to include likely overruns.  It was suggested that the uplifts should be applied 
at the time of decision to build a project, as shown in figure 2.7.   
In order to establish the uplift values, Flyvbjerg and COWI (2004) divided the types of 
transportation schemes under the direct and indirect responsibility of the DfT into a number of 
distinct categories of roads, rail, bridges and tunnels.  Statistical tests and other analysis showed 
that the risk of cost overruns due to optimism bias within each category of project could be treated 
as statistically similar and therefore a reference class of projects was established as the basis for 
reference class forecasting.  For each category of projects, a reference class of completed, 
comparable transportation infrastructure projects was used to establish probability distributions of 
cost overruns for new projects of similar scope and risk exposure as the projects used in the 
reference class.  In a development on an earlier study carried by Mott MacDonald (Mott 
MacDonald, 2002), probability distributions allowed certainty percentiles to be used to determine 
the optimism uplift required for particular projects.  If investors require a high degree of certainty 
that cost overruns would not occur for their type of project (e.g. 20% risk of an overrun), then 
higher uplift values could be selected.  Conversely, if a 50% risk of cost overrun was acceptable, 
then a lower uplift could be applied.  Table 2.3 shows the applicable capital expenditure uplifts 
identified by Flyvbjerg and COWI (2004) for metro projects where the probability is expressed as 
percentiles. 
Table 2.3 Applicable capital expenditure uplifts for selected probability percentiles 
Applicable optimism bias uplifts  Category Type  of  project 
50% 
percentile 
60% 
percentile 
70% 
percentile 
80% 
percentile 
90% 
percentile
Rail  Metro  40% 45% 51% 57% 68% 
 (Source: Flyvbjerg and COWI (2004), p32) 
 
The Transport Analysis Guidance (TAG) from the DfT (DfT, 2006) uses the outcomes of 
the work by Flyvbjerg and COWI (2004) and Mott MacDonald (2002) to suggest optimism bias Chapter 2  
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uplifts appropriate to specific stages of the Guide to Railway Investment Projects approach (GRIP, 
2005).  The aim of TAG is to promote realistic estimates to enable affordability and value for 
money to be realised in infrastructure investments so as to avoid using central government funding 
to address any cost rises.  Table 2.4 shows the suggested uplifts for three stages of the life of a 
transport project where these stages correspond to the GRIP stages defined in section 2.3.1.  
Therefore, considering table 2.4; Stage 1 corresponds to the GRIP Stage 2 Pre-feasibility; Stage 2 
corresponds to GRIP Stage 3 Option Selection; and Stage 3 corresponds to GRIP Stage 5 Detailed 
Design.   
Table 2.4 Transport Analysis Guidance optimism bias uplifts  
  Category Type  of  project 
Stage 1  Stage 2  Stage 3 
Rail Metro  66%  40%  6% 
(Source: DfT (2006), p27) 
 
  The DfT is currently undertaking further research into optimism bias in rail schemes and 
therefore the uplift values will be revised accordingly. 
  
2.5.1.1  Reference class forecasting 
The reference class forecasting technique described by Flyvbjerg and COWI (2004) aims to reduce 
the optimism bias seen in project estimates by taking a sample of similar projects and evaluating 
the average cost overrun from a distribution of values.  The average size of the cost overrun is then 
used as a contingency factor which accommodates optimism bias in the cost estimates made for 
any new project.  
A key issue promoted by Flyvbjerg and COWI (2004) is that improved reliability of 
estimates may be introduced into the planning process by introducing an outside view.  This does 
not try to forecast the specific uncertain events that will affect the particular project, but rather tries 
to place the project in a statistical distribution of outcomes from a group of reference projects.  
Flyvbjerg and COWI (2004) note that this is more likely to produce accurate estimates and much 
less likely to deliver highly unrealistic ones compared to an inside view commonly held by the 
project team or other experts closely associated with the project.  Flyvbjerg and COWI also note 
that the inside view generally does not consider absolutely all of the possible events which could 
delay or disrupt a project budget or program and that project estimates can therefore remain 
exceedingly optimistic because of it.   
Flyvbjerg and COWI (2004) propose that the established uplifts for optimism bias found 
by reference class forecasting should be applied to a projects’ estimated budget at the time of the 
decision to build as this is likely to give a superior insight into the probable project cost.  The 
reference class approach therefore completely ignores the details (risks etc.) of the project at hand, 
and involves no attempt at forecasting the events that would influence a projects future course.   Chapter 2  
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From a project management perspective this is concerning as it essentially says that the 
internal process of estimating is ineffective and always underestimates values, and thus requires a 
blanket inflation to account for any risks.  Embracing the outside view and ignoring the internal 
view is the opposite of the stance taken in various risk literature (e.g. Chapman, 2006; Chapman 
and Ward, 2003; Simon, 1998) which recognise that avoiding the internal view for an outside view 
will almost certainly cause a significant number of risks within a project to be missed.   
Reference class forecasting does not have any structures for risk identification and avoids 
any framework or process for risk management.  Chapman (2006) concurs and considers the 
reference class forecasting approach in a wider risk management argument concerning ‘common 
practice’ and ‘best practice’ amongst risk management guidelines, and questions the ‘best practice’ 
objectives of the reference class methodology.  Chapman (2006) is critical of the optimism bias 
adjustment and states that HM Treasury optimism bias adjustment factors (from Mott MacDonald, 
2002 and Flyvbjerg and COWI, 2004) are ‘simple objective probability estimates’ of the average 
adjustment needed based on a classical statistical analysis of estimates and outturns by industry 
sector.  Risk Analysis and Management for Projects (RAMP) (Simon, 1998) stresses the 
importance of having an assumptions list, or the ‘known unknowns’, which are absent in the 
reference class approach.  It therefore indirectly considers the reference class forecasting approach 
in terms of the defects identified by Chapman (2006).  The stance taken by Elmaghraby (2005) also 
supports the case against reference class forecasting for optimism bias, stating that while project 
managers recognise the presence of risk and uncertainty in the estimates of the various parameters 
of their projects, replacing the random variables by their averages and avoiding the required risk 
analysis can lead to gross errors being committed in the cost estimates and on the bids based on 
them.  
Pollock et al. (2007) consider and criticise the evidence base used by the HM Treasury 
(from Mott MacDonald, 2002 and Flyvbjerg and COWI, 2004) for establishing overrun factors and 
explore its deficiencies.  This is in addition to the views held by various risk practitioners 
(Chapman, 2006; Elmaghraby, 2005) where the representativeness of the samples used by Mott 
MacDonald (2002) and Flyvbjerg and COWI (2004) are questioned.  The derivation of optimism 
bias uplift values from the samples of completed projects is contentious given that no clear 
definition is given as to how or at what point in each projects’ development stage the cost overruns 
were measured from, and whether the increases measured include risk contingencies.  A significant 
issue with the sample of projects used by Flyvbjerg and COWI (2004) is the lack of appreciation 
for the reasons behind the overruns on each project used to form a reference class.  The sample of 
projects used considered overruns in a reference class of projects where it was assumed that 
underestimation may have been prevalent, yet underestimation may not have been the sole cause of 
the overruns and it is therefore too simplistic to calculate contingencies based on uplifts derived 
from a selective sample.  Another issue with the uplift values is that their estimation does not 
reflect the extent or quality of the risk and uncertainty management processes in place for the Chapter 2  
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projects used to form a reference class, and provide no guidance on how to adjust the factors to 
reflect the quality of the risk management process for each project that they are applied to.   
It has been established that megaprojects are huge undertakings which are unique in nature 
and complexity.  This can be seen in existing megaprojects such as the Channel Tunnel and the 
Jubilee Line Extension.  It should be asked how a megaproject unique in nature such as a metro can 
have a reference class to establish optimism bias uplifts and to account for the many risks and 
uncertainties.  Flyvbjerg and COWI (2004) suggest that by considering a megaproject in terms of 
its several different component types, it is possible to place these components in a reference class 
and thus simply combine the appropriate uplifts to represent the megaproject as a combined 
project.  The uplift for Crossrail was calculated in this way where the £7bn base capital cost (1
st 
quarter 2002 prices) increased to £10bn when contingency was added (CLRL, 2003).  In this case, 
it could be said that the magnitude of the contingency was disproportionate to the cost and opened 
the project up to the threat of moral hazard.  
In this case, an actor on a project (e.g. contractor) may place less effort in managing a risk 
or risks based on the knowledge that any shortfall realised through the occurrence of the risk will 
be recovered through the additional finances made available due to the optimism bias uplift made.  
Reference class forecasting therefore exposes projects to moral hazard.  This only serves to work 
against the need to realise value for money in the delivery of infrastructure (DfT, 2004, 2007) and 
reduce the overruns realised in public projects (NAO, 2001).  
Flyvbjerg and COWI (2004) consider the possible motives of various project parties with 
respect to the contingency levels allowed for a typical project at full business case and state that 
most actors involved in a project have little or no interest in avoiding cost overruns or optimism 
bias.  They do not however provide any guidance for identifying and latterly combating the 
exploitation of optimism bias uplifts by some parties and do not identify or provide a process 
which can help to neutralise this issue.  Without this transparency, the reference class forecasting 
technique is surely flawed in that it can not effectively carry out what it set out to do.   
Partnerships UK
5 is identified as an actor with direct interest in avoiding optimism bias.  It 
assists transport authorities in performing better costing and risk analysis, and is often incentivised 
to combat optimism bias.  Flyvbjerg and COWI (2004) latterly recommend that optimism bias may 
be reduced through enforced risk management procedures in conjunction with optimism bias uplift 
values; fiscal penalties for overruns; and a change of culture which de-legitimises optimism bias 
and encourages realistic budgeting.   
This work believes that the key to the application of these recommendations is the 
incentivisation of project actors to routinely provide realistic cost estimates that do not show any 
levels of optimism.   
                                                      
5 Partnerships UK was established by the UK Government to accelerate the development, procurement and 
implementation of PPPs. Chapter 2  
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2.6 Summary and Confirmation of Objectives 
This chapter described the background that led to the current research.  The interests of various 
actors associated with a metro development were highlighted and the impacts that conflicts 
between these actors can have in the causes of cost overruns was discussed.  The use of contracts to 
account for the different interests of actors was discussed with the role of the NEC family of 
contracts being briefly documented.  This was followed with an analysis of where elements of this 
research can provide additional support to the NEC to keep metro projects within budget.  The 
outcomes of this analysis therefore align with the objectives set out in section 1.2 and will aim to: 
1.  Develop, apply and validate a requirements management process which can be used by 
design and planning practitioners to manage design scope and any changes made to this 
scope during the design and planning phase.  This framework complements the change 
management pricing elements of the NEC and will improve the communication and 
decision making related to establishing project scope and specifications (see Chapter 3). 
2.  Develop, apply and validate a simple process that allows all actors involved with a project 
to identify, record and link all risks.  This process is seen as a key element of developing 
effective designs where the impact of inter-related risks can be identified and accounted for 
in design iterations prior to setting risk contingencies or allocating risk between actors (see 
Chapter 4).  This framework is complemented by a fuzzy logic process to evaluate the 
global and elemental risks associated with a project (see Chapter 5).  
3.  Develop and apply a process that can complement the price adjustment process used in 
NEC contracts.  When cost overruns occur then the client must consider absorbing the 
overruns or change the project design to cut costs while maintaining a level of 
functionality.  This element of the work will use real options theory to implement change 
in a working project environment.  The formulation of strategies for dealing with a risk 
event prior to the event is seen as an effective way of reducing cost overruns (see chapters 
6 and 7).   
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3 Requirements Management 
3.1 Introduction 
An effective requirements process has been outlined as part of this work which allows project 
requirements to be listed and managed.  Such a process develops the high-level stakeholder 
requirements into the specific lower-level project requirements from which designs are produced.  
It is intended that this process can allow all project actors to agree on most aspects of a projects’ 
specification prior to any detailed project design work taking place.  This should significantly 
reduce the occurrence of any changes required to a project by ensuring that all actors are informed 
of and satisfied with every aspect of the project’s specifications prior to any contractual 
commitments being made.  
 
3.1.1 Project goals and objectives 
A project is successful if it meets the goals and objectives prescribed in the project plan (Turner et 
al., 1988).  A successful project means that the project has accomplished its technical performance, 
maintained its schedule and remained within budgetary costs.  As megaprojects (the category of 
project that metros often fall into) are colossal affairs, it is therefore very important to prioritise the 
many goals at the start of the project since the lack of clear goals can lead to project failure 
(Knoepfel, 1989; Fewings, 2005; Marrewijk et al., 2008).  However, given the large size, 
complexity and technical uncertainty of metro megaprojects, the process of identifying goals and 
objectives can clearly be very difficult.   
Many projects are launched with clear objectives but with considerable uncertainty as to 
whether, or how, they will be achievable within set financial and time constraints.  In addition, the 
long duration and size of megaprojects make them susceptible to changes in the socio-economic 
environment which affects the appropriateness of the original definition (Morris and Hough, 1987).  
Project completion can be spread over a number of years where governments, the socio-economic 
scenario and international affairs may be different from what they were when the project was 
conceived.  Therefore, planners can sometimes be inclined to make significant changes to the goals 
of the project in order to align it with the changing scenario.  Such changes might lead to serious 
problems or even failure of the project as it will make the project management hierarchy change, 
contracts may be altered and schedules and finances may change significantly.  London’s Crossrail 
saw many revisions to its requirements in the period between the initial proposal in the Central 
London Rail Study of 1989
6 and receiving Royal Assent
7 for the Crossrail Bill
8 in July 2008.  New 
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Civil Engineer (NCE, 10/8/2006) quoted then Crossrail chairman Doug Oakervee saying that 
“standards have changed and what was the best solution ten years ago may not be the best solution 
now”.  Crossrail saw several alterations with proposed routes being curtailed, tunneling 
methodology being overhauled in a bid to keep the project costs under control and changes in 
specification to overturn the many objections made by third parties.   
Work by Larson and Gobeli (1989) showed that clearly defined objectives are by far the 
strongest and most consistent predictor of project success.  This supports the same work by the 
same authors which highlighted the importance of clearly defining the objectives of a project 
before undertaking it and then managing the project to achieve these objectives.  The setting of 
goals and objectives is therefore part of a two way process where a project must be conceived with 
achievable objectives while latterly being managed to achieve these objectives.  The focus of this 
chapter is the former where objectives are set through project requirements.  
 
3.1.2 Project complexity 
Metro megaprojects are often very complex with extensive interfaces existing between the many 
engineering and management disciplines which bring the project into existence.  For example, on a 
metro project; heavy (civil) construction, building services and electrical systems works are often 
completed by separate contracts but all impact on each other with respect to the interactions that 
they have and the actions that they influence to make a project work.  On the scale of mega 
projects, these individual elements of work can be the equivalent financial size of a ‘normal’ 
engineering project (e.g. building a bypass around a typical English County town) in their own 
right and therefore it can be said that a metro megaproject is indeed a multi-project undertaking that 
is identified as a single project despite being a collective of engineering projects.  For example, the 
escalator fabrication and installation alone for Crossrail runs into many millions of pounds.   
This draws parallels with the work of Aritua et al. (2009) who explored the management of 
multiple projects given that they present fundamentally different challenges to project management 
compared to single project management.  Aritua et al. (2009) cite work by Kometa et al. (1995) and 
Chinyio et al. (1998a, 1998b), stating that many construction projects are initiated by the same 
construction clients and therefore become multi-projects from the clients perspective.  In the 
context of this work, a metro megaproject can be considered as a multiple of projects which is held 
by the same client and in doing so, the management of these multiple projects can benefit from the 
application of complexity theory as discussed by Lewin (1999).  However, as within any 
construction project, the level of complexity drives the level and amount of planning and 
                                                                                                                                                                 
7 The granting of Royal Assent is the formal method by which a constitutional monarch completes the 
legislative process of lawmaking by formally assenting to an Act of Parliament. 
8 The main purpose of the Bill is to secure the powers necessary to build Crossrail. Chapter 3  
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organising which is required within the multi interface environment of asymmetric interests that is 
typical of metro megaprojects.   
Baccarini (1996) states that important roles held by a manager are the appreciation and 
management of all complexities in order to deliver projects successfully.  Many authors have 
discussed complexity in construction projects with Marrewijk et al. (2008) discussing complexity 
in project design and its relevance to cost overruns in particular.  Austin et al. (2002) consider 
complexity in the various elements of a design and develop a process for simplifying the capturing 
and subsequent presentation of these complexities for analysis by design teams.  Capka (2004) 
discussed a further dimension of complexity in megaprojects which is the management of the 
complex and sometimes difficult-to-understand set of public dynamics associated with project 
development.  Public and political interests can also have a negative impact on the progress of a 
project and often brings with it a difficult interface which can have adverse effects on the goals and 
objectives of a project.   
 
3.1.3 Complexity in project requirements 
This work appreciates the complexities associated with the derivation of requirements from project 
goals and objectives and the management of these requirements by the individual roles developing 
a metro megaproject in order to form a basis for detailed design.  The design phase of any project is 
crucial to its success and any work and planning carried out during this phase of work has a critical 
impact on activities occurring post-design.  Moreau and Back (2000) support this view stating that 
the quality of design can influence the number of interferences, the amount of rework required and 
the ease of construction of a project.  A study cited by Moreau and Back (2000)
9 quantifies the 
significance of the design phase stating that in a study of 20 construction projects, approximately 
28% of project labour costs and 22% of project activity time is consumed by the design process.  
Yet despite the significance of the design process in a project lifecycle and delivery, much of it is 
‘riddled with inefficiencies’ (Moreau and Back, 2000).  In response to this, Moreau and Back 
(2000) present a method to quantify the time and cost impacts that that result from modifications to 
proposed work, i.e. changes to project requirements.  While this method does not suggest a process 
for managing requirements, work by Choo et al. (2004; associated with Austin et al., 2002) 
considers a combined planning, scheduling and control methodology for integrated design 
management.  Within this process, the definition of project goals, objectives and requirements is 
achieved through the documentation of individual tasks in the initial part of the methodology.  No 
focus is given to the management of these tasks (which can be seen as requirements) in the event 
that changes are made and therefore this could be seen as a limitation of this work, yet Choo et al. 
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(2004) imply that the management of requirements is not a concern of theirs and focus on 
developing their methodology to achieve greater integration of design in a supply chain.    
  Shen et al. (2004) describe a framework for identifying and representing project 
requirements.  The proposed framework facilitates the identification, clarification and 
representation of requirements in a hierarchy which ranks and links requirements.  Of relevance to 
this work is the focus given to what Shen et al. (2004) identify as the four interrelated phases of 
requirement identification and representation namely; preparation; information (i.e. 
communication); analysis; and evaluation.  Shen et al (2004) discuss these facets in detail and 
consider how they can be applied.  (It is not intended to repeat this information here).  A limitation 
of Shen et al. (2004) is how the framework could be operationalised in the context of a metro 
megaproject and how requirements information and management can be communicated across 
multiple interfaces and design teams.  Parfitt et al. (1993) identify that a significant contributor to 
poor communication in the engineering and construction industry is the lack of an efficient means 
of disseminating information in projects.  To this extent, Ahlemann (2009) proposes a reference 
model for project management information systems which in effect is a data structure.  The concept 
of this structure can ideally be adapted for the identification and management of requirements in a 
metro megaproject environment and in conjunction with the ideas of Shen et al (2004), can provide 
a structure for the communication of requirements between project parties. 
 
 
3.2 Project Requirements Concepts  
The requirements process developed in this work allows project requirements that are derived from 
objectives to be listed.  Such a process uses a set of high-level stakeholder requirements as a 
starting point as they give a structured outlook on the goals and objectives of a project.  For a 
project such as Crossrail, stakeholders would typically be Transport for London, Network Rail, 
London Underground, Train Operating Companies, Canary Wharf Group and BAA. 
Stakeholder requirements are produced by the project client in conjunction with 
stakeholders who specify simple but essential wishes.  Stakeholder requirements are derived from 
an even higher-level of requirements referred to as functional requirements.  For example, in the 
case of a metro the functional requirements would be; the route, desired location of stations and 
simple rolling stock specifications (e.g. colour, air conditioned etc.).  Stakeholder requirements 
would then flow down from these requirements and include more detail which would typically 
address the; size of trains; length of platforms; number of stations; expected passenger throughput 
at the stations; service patterns and so on.  This particular activity is shown in Phase 1 of figure 3.1 
which is an overall definition of the requirement stages from high-level to low-level.  
  Once stakeholder requirements have been established, these are then developed to yield 
lower-level requirements specifications as shown in Phase 2 of figure 3.1.  This phase provides Chapter 3  
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more detail about the project and coincides with the inception, feasibility and scoping aspects of the 
project lifecycle (see figure 2.2, Chapter 2).  Requirements defined at this phase are at a reasonably 
high-level and give a wide definition of important aspects of a project.  From the perspective of a 
metro project, such requirements would include the number of escalators in a station; the number 
and location of entrances/exits; the type and number of ticket barriers; station operating system 
specifications; outline structural requirements and so on.  Upon review of these project 
requirements by the relevant stakeholders and actors, they too are developed and expanded to yield 
the project design requirements which are at a lower-level again.  This relates to Phase 3 shown in 
figure 3.1 which coincides with the start of the reference design work.  Requirements developed at 
this stage inform the appropriate level of reference design prior to informing the detailed design in 
Phase 4 of figure 3.1.  It is envisaged that requirements defined at the Final Reference Design Stage 
of Phase 3 of figure 3.1 would be sufficiently robust to require little change and so would allow 
detailed design to proceed with little need for requirement revisions.  This is the aim of the 
requirements process developed in this chapter.  The net result of the requirements process is a list 
of detailed statements which inform all project parties of the requirements which satisfy the project 
objectives and give a clear picture of the goals to be achieved through planning and design work.   
 
Figure 3.1 Structure for requirements definition and specification  
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  In addition, the requirements process developed in this work empowers individuals within 
a project to react to changes during planning and design quickly and in an independent, self 
organised way.  This is an effective way of controlling changes in specification and relates to 
statements made by Aritua et al. (2009) with respect to the resistance that senior project managers 
have to delegating control and thus the tendency of wanting to control every detail of every project 
specification.  Changes to agreed upon requirements can be troublesome and costly (Steffens et al., 
2007) while some changes due do risks (such as force majeure) are generally hard to manage, but 
often essential (Wu et al., 2005).   The requirements process outlined in this work allows project 
teams impacting on each requirement to respond to changes in an interactive way resulting in quick 
and satisfactory alterations which ultimately results in a successful project.  While this process 
would therefore give complete view of the whole project it terms of what is being planned, it would 
have other crucial roles too.  These are to;   
•  Provide an interface for all project parties to communicate in the event of any changes being 
made to the project during the early project phases running up to detailed design.  The effects 
of any changes can be quickly identified, the extent to which they change budgets and 
timescales, and the resources that are needed to implement the change.  This is a crucial part 
of managing project specifications and a core element of many efforts to avoid cost overruns.  
•  When lower-level design details are established through the requirements process, the risks 
associated with designs can be qualified and quantified.  This is crucial in setting project 
budgets and timescales and is closely linked with any risk management process and any 
subsequent risk mitigation.  Of note here is that the application of risk management processes 
early in the project lifecycle is most effective if a concise requirements management process 
exists.  This has subsequent knock-on effects to any value management efforts where the 
identification, recording and communication of the latest requirements can be a great benefit.  
 
3.2.1 What is a requirement? 
Requirements engineering is traditionally a part of systems and software engineering where a set of 
validated and baselined requirements are produced at the beginning of the project lifecycle to 
ensure that the project progresses in the desired direction.  Engineers working in the computer and 
software industries devote a significant amount of their time to defining and managing 
requirements.  Many software or systems projects have suffered severe cost overruns (Mott 
MacDonald, 2002) and so the definition of specifications and requirements in this industry is seen 
as essential to reducing potential problems arising from intensive development processes, dynamic 
research inputs and the complex nature of the work.  In order to apply a robust approach for 
defining the components of a metro megaproject at early stages of the project lifecycle, approaches 
similar to those used in systems engineering has been adopted by this work.   (LU Engineering 
Standard (2003); BS ISO/IEC 15288:2002). Chapter 3  
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  A requirement can be defined as a condition or capability that the component being built 
must satisfy or conform.  A civil engineering requirement may be defined as: 
•  A physical capability of whatever that is being built to solve a problem, serve a purpose 
or provide a service 
•  A capability that must be met to satisfy a contract, specification, standard or other 
formally recognised need. 
 
The points listed below define what constitutes a good requirement. 
•  Each requirement must: 
– Stand alone  
– Specify clearly and unambiguously what is wanted 
– Must be verifiable  
– Must be necessary  
– Must be achievable 
•  Must be traceable 
•  Must be at the right level 
– Detail must appropriate for corresponding level of design  
•  Must be well-formed 
– Each requirement must be written in a formal style 
e.g. “The combined level of risk due to all the hazards under the direct control of 
the Infrastructure Controller shall not exceed 0.01 equivalent fatalities per year”. 
  
3.2.2 What is requirements management and the associated problems ? 
Since requirements define the conditions to which a project design must conform, the level of 
conformance to these requirements is therefore an effective measure of how successful a project is.  
Requirements engineering includes elicitation, analysis, specification, verification and management 
of the project requirements with the planning and controlling of all of these activities being defined 
as requirements management.  Management in this sense is very important as it entails tracking all 
necessary changes made to project requirements over the planning and early design stages of a 
project.  Changes during these project stages are viewed positively as they indicate that 
consideration has been given to requirements by project actors and stakeholders.  Olsson (2006) 
discusses changes in project scope and considers projects that undergo changes as drifting 
environments.  Changes in this context are not necessarily caused by the actual changes in the 
project but may occur as project stakeholders and associated actors get a better understanding of 
their actual needs and gain improved abilities to express the needs.  The focus of this work is to 
isolate such changes to Phases 1, 2 and 3 represented in the ‘V’ diagram of the project requirements 
lifecycle shown in figure 3.2, thus eliminating any unnecessary changes in later phases of the Chapter 3  
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project lifecycle that could ultimately result in design changes and subsequent project overruns.  
The lifecycle shown by figure 3.2 shows how each of the requirements phases shown in figure 3.1 
is linked together by a series of reviews (the green shaded area) that results in the building of a 
detailed requirements hierarchy of sufficient detail to inform detailed design and subsequent 
construction.  The blue shaded area on the right denotes the validation work required to ensure that 
the constructed project achieves the requirements set.  This can be associated with the 
commissioning and handover phase of a project lifecycle.     
 
Figure 3.2 Project requirements lifecycle ‘V’ diagram 
 
  At an early stage during this work the author was asked to work within the requirements 
team formed by a design consultancy working on the Crossrail project.  This team had 
responsibility for defining and managing the requirements for a core central section
10 of the 
proposed Crossrail project as part of a contract to provide initial reference designs and subsequent 
scheme designs (RIBA, 2004; GRIP, 2005) for the project.  During the latter part of this role, the 
author was responsible for the management of the requirements for the central section which 
ultimately enabled the identification of the issues needing to be addressed in order to identify and 
manage requirements effectively on a metro megaproject such as Crossrail.  Requirements work 
completed by the consultant on previous projects had consisted of listing requirements in a 
spreadsheet and then refining these as necessary through a spreadsheet owner.  This was laborious 
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and time consuming with significant potential for errors.  The Crossrail project had taken a systems 
approach to requirements with regards to their management and control.  In conjunction with a PC 
based program called DOORS®
11 (Dynamic Object Oriented Requirements System), this provided 
a step forward from the spreadsheet based requirements management.  Difficulties and problems 
remained however which the author has attempted to document below and mitigate using the 
requirements process developed.  Difficulties associated with requirements management included:      
•  Requirements not always being obvious;  
•  Requirements can often be difficult to express simply in word form; 
•  Different types of requirement exist at different levels of detail (e.g. a high-level 
stakeholder requirement may have a strategic purpose while a low-level design 
requirement may be a plain instruction of the need for a physical item);   
•  The number of requirements can become unmanageable; 
•  Requirements can be related to each other in a variety of ways (e.g. through interfaces, 
by other requirements, by serving the same purpose despite having separate owners)  
•  Requirements can have various levels of importance; 
•  Separate actors may have interests in the same requirement and therefore each actors’ 
interest must be accounted for and included in the requirements’ definition; 
•  Requirements can change for many reasons including new stakeholder needs, time 
sensitivity and feature creep.  
 
Many of the above issues could be resolved using Telelogic DOORS software as a 
platform.  While DOORS provides capabilities for linking, tracing, analysing and recording 
changes to requirements; the contribution of this work is to provide a process for project 
requirements to be derived within the DOORS environment.  Project teams and stakeholders can 
use DOORS software as an interface to define and manage requirements as well as a platform for 
the verification of the requirements during the project lifecycle.  All requirements, source 
documents and other associated documents are located within a DOORS database as individual 
‘modules’.  Links can be created between these modules in order to provide an auditable and robust 
hierarchy of requirements capable of informing the project design process.   
DOORS therefore gives increased capability for managing requirements compared with 
spreadsheet based systems by optimising communication, collaboration and by promoting 
compliance and verification.  DOORS was identified by the Crossrail project as the program to be 
used to manage the requirements for the project and hence its use in this work.  As a ready-made 
installation for standard PC’s, DOORS provides an user friendly interface similar in nature to that 
of MS Excel and this allows the program to be mastered quickly by practitioners.  A further benefit 
of DOORS is that large chains of requirements can be built in the program with the linkages 
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between the requirements being shown clearly.  The program does not require a significant amount 
of computer memory and this is relevant to its widespread use on standard PC’s throughout a 
project like Crossrail.  A different program considered was the REVEAL® requirements method 
(Vickers et al., 2002).  While being similar in application to DOORS, REVEAL was seen as a more 
complex requirements management program more suitable for application in complex systems 
engineering.  A similar downside to both of these programs (and thus a potential barrier to their use 
in the future) is the expense associated with the purchasing of licences for their respective use.          
 
3.2.3 Making the requirements process operational 
The foundation blocks of the requirements process are the high-level stakeholder requirements 
which must be agreed upon by the client and associated organisations.  Such requirements are often 
strategic in nature and define a simple but vital requirement (e.g. “Station operating systems shall 
be able to handle 24 trains per hour through the station”).  Lower-level requirements which have 
greater focus on the specification of details that inform design must be produced form the high-
level requirements and linked accordingly to show the relevant relationships.  This in effect creates 
a requirements hierarchy ranging between high-level and low-level requirements and to 
successfully impose this in a megaproject environment it was realised that the requirements process 
should: 
•  Agree on a common vocabulary as this would benefit all and avoid confusion.  The 
language used to describe requirements should be as informative and practical as possible 
with a sole focus on what is required and specifically avoiding documenting how it should 
be achieved; 
•  Identify or derive requirements for the project covering areas such as functionality; 
usability; reliability; performance and supportability; 
•  Define the importance of each requirement by placing them in a high to low-level 
hierarchy of requirements; 
•  Attribute classification to each requirement such as ‘open’, ‘accepted’, ‘rejected’ or 
‘defective’; 
•  Provide traceability which includes change history;  
•  Provide outputs such as status reports for management purposes 
 
     In order to construct a robust requirement hierarchy using the requirements process defined 
in this work, crucial concepts are described below which are considered essential to the success of 
the process. Chapter 3  
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3.2.3.1  Requirements types 
The larger the project the more intricate and varied the requirements are.  Requirements can be 
classified as different types which are an effective way of organising requirements into meaningful 
and manageable groups.  This can also assist practitioners in managing and communicating 
changes.  As previously mentioned, business or strategic requirements are usually high-level 
requirements from which lower-level requirements are derived.  These low-level requirements may 
include physical specifications, functional needs, reliability requirements, performance benchmarks 
and conformance to certain design standards.  Within a megaproject, classifying requirements into 
certain types can therefore make the requirements management process simpler.  
3.2.3.2  Cross-functional teams 
Several roles within the lifecycle of a project are filled by specific groups of actors.  The 
identification of requirements should involve representatives of all actors which have an input into 
the design, planning and construction process.  Not only does this allow individuals to contribute 
their expertise to the development of the project, it also allows the early identification of any 
problems, the communication and resolution of any issues between any actors and also allows the 
client and his representatives to observe whether the project is progressing in the desired direction.  
Those responsible for using the requirements to develop designs should also have access to the 
requirements process and these may be engineers, architects, designers, programmers, and 
technical writers.  The responsibility for authoring a requirement is allocated by functional area 
which improves the quality of the design.  This only reflects the difficulty of managing 
requirements, especially across a typical arrangement of functional teams as shown in figure 3.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Figure 3.3 Cross-functional teams for deriving requirements 
 
3.2.3.3  Traceability 
As already implied, no single requirement stands alone.  Stakeholder requirements are related to 
lower-level project requirements which ultimately inform of the specifications that need to be met 
in order for the project to satisfy its purpose.  Project requirements are related to further, lower-
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level design requirements which give greater detail of the specifications that must be met by 
design.  All design work produced according to requirements at all levels must be verified and 
validated through links to documentation such as reports, technical drawings or design documents.  
In addition, refining requirements for whatever reasons requires changes to be made and thus the 
recording of change histories.   
  For all of the above to be achieved, traceability relationships must be documented, 
maintained and understood.  While traceability is one of the most difficult aspects of requirements 
management to maintain, it is essential, especially when cross-functional teams have inputs into the 
requirements process and different requirement types exist as is typical of a metro megaproject.  
The DOORS software is a major help to achieve traceability as practitioners can link and trace 
requirements and all associated items themselves.   This relates to the work of Aritua et al. (2009) 
who stated that the importance of allowing individuals to be able to make decisions outside 
management personnel was of benefit to the management of projects.       
3.2.3.4  Requirement attributes 
During its formation and confirmation, each requirement goes through a series of attributes until it 
becomes accepted.  Figure 3.4 shows a typical example of the attribute network used where 
identified requirements become ‘proposed’ once inputted into the requirements management 
process and subsequently ‘open’ for viewing by the cross-functional teams with an interest in it.  If 
all parties agree with the composition of the requirement, then it can proceed to become ‘accepted’ 
and hence included as a requirement of the project.  If the requirement is not acceptable then it is 
‘rejected’ or is classified as ‘defective’ and is returned to the proposed stage for review and re-
writing by its owner.  A requirement would be rejected if it is not acceptable, contradicts another 
requirement or is not a project requirement but a project assumption or a risk.  Defective 
requirements would indicate that one or more of the actors holding interests in the requirement 
disagreed with its purpose or had an issue with the requirement which they would like resolved or 
changed. 
 
 
 
 
       
 
Figure 3.4 Requirement attributes 
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Olsson (2006) with drifting environments) which is desirable in order to keep the project up to date 
and to deliver the best product to the client, e.g. through value management processes.  Recording 
previous versions of project requirements enables project managers to capture the reasons for 
changes and also allows associated project assumptions and risks to be updated accordingly, 
reducing the potential for errors leading to problems in progressing the project.  As requirements 
evolve, it is important to understand their history; what changed, why, when, by whom, and by 
whose authorisation.  The DOORS software automatically records change history which removes a 
significant difficulty in the management of requirements.   
 
 
3.3 The Requirements Process 
The requirements process described in this section can be undertaken to produce a baselined set of 
project requirements which will form a project requirements specification from which designs can 
be developed.  This process includes several sub-processes which are defined below, are executed 
in the reviews shown in figure 3.2 and are discussed within this section: 
•  Requirements Capture; 
•  Requirements Review; 
•  Requirements Analysis; 
•  Requirements Validation; 
•  Requirements Baselining. 
 
Each requirement will go through the process shown in figure 3.5 and will subsequently be 
linked up with other requirements using the DOORS software.  When this process is complete it 
will form a baseline of project requirements that is sufficiently robust for detailed design activities 
to take place.   
 
Figure 3.5 Process for producing a project requirements specification 
 
Existing Requirements New Requirements 
Step1  
Section 3.3.1  
 
Step 2 
Section 3.3.2 
Step 3 
Section 3.3.3 
Step 4 
Section 3.3.4 
Step 5 
Section 3.3.5 
Requirements Review
Requirements Analysis
Requirements Validation
Baselining Project Requirements 
Requirements Capture Chapter 3  
Requirements Management 
  52
The ultimate aim of this process is to produce a requirements baseline that is sufficiently 
robust so that little change is needed in requirements specifications during the detailed design phase 
of the project or indeed the construction phase.   
Figure 3.6 is a graphic layout of the requirements hierarchy and shows the linkages that 
form the traceability between the requirement definitions and source documents.  The requirements 
process builds this hierarchy of project requirements around the high-level stakeholder 
requirements set by project stakeholders.  The construction of this framework within DOORS 
allows several parties within the project to interface in order to derive requirements for the project 
which will ultimately be designed for and constructed.  It is intended that using the defined process 
to build this hierarchy can yield sufficiently robust information which will result in a detailed 
design specification that requires very little alterations.  
 
Figure 3.6 Requirements hierarchy 
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a design.  A satisfaction argument presents an argument and evidence where appropriate, that 
detailed design requirements at lower-levels satisfy the higher-level requirements.  The formation 
of a satisfaction argument is discussed in a later section.   
A satisfaction argument is available to be read by all project parties (through DOORS) and 
once all parties agree that a particular requirement is covered by lower-level requirements, then the 
argument can be closed and the design and planning process can move on.  Requirements at all 
levels are also supported by domain knowledge which records facts about the environment that 
supports the requirement.  This is achieved through verification arguments (also defined in a later 
section) which link requirements to design documents or drawings and in doing so validates that 
the design or drawings being developed fulfil the requirements.  Verification of requirements at 
each level within the hierarchy is crucial as this ensures that all project parties agree with the 
requirements developed, provides traceability within the system and generates records of reviews.  
This ultimately reduces the likelihood of gaps in knowledge and also highlights and informs all 
parties of any changes being made within a project.  This therefore removes a major cause of cost 
overruns within projects. 
   
3.3.1 Requirements capture 
Project requirements are captured by the requirements manager in consultation with the relevant 
stakeholders and engineering teams through requirement workshops.  The primary activity of 
capturing is developing the scope for the project with the aim of identifying the customer vision of 
the project to be built.  This vision expresses key features that are in effect the high-level 
requirements of the project in order for it to solve the problem and serve the purpose its client and 
stakeholders are developing it for.  The outputs of capturing for inclusion in the requirements 
process are collections of prioritised client-stakeholder needs and features which provide a better 
understanding of the purpose of the project.  This refines the scope of the project in order for all 
other requirements and their attributes to be defined.   
Requirements can be captured from existing documents (e.g. project definition document) 
or created as a result of validation of assumptions, approval of design options, value engineering, 
design reviews, defect and enhancement requests and so forth.  The capture process may include 
some or all of the following activities, as found necessary during the capture process: 
•  Study and review of project functional requirements and other reference documents e.g. 
project design standards  
•  Discussions with individuals associated with the project or groups of stakeholders to record 
new or modified requirements or expectations, and the technical interfaces; 
•  Study of feasibility reports or other documents produced during project feasibility stage; 
•  Derive requirements from value engineering activities which are significant drivers of 
changes in requirements (as expected during design scoping). Chapter 3  
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The requirements can be captured directly into the DOORS database via web-based access 
with requirements modules being able to accommodate a number of additional attributes if needed, 
such as environmental or safety relevance.  The requirements manager for a project is the owner of 
the project requirements and so has ultimate responsibility and control for the management of the 
requirements.  
 
3.3.2 Requirements review 
The client-stakeholder requests that ultimately become requirements during the capture activity are 
often ambiguous, overlapping and even extraneous since they can originate from one of many 
sources that do not communicate with each other.  The captured requirements are therefore 
reviewed for accuracy and consistency.  The result of this review process is the incorporation of 
new information, elimination of errors and addition of further details from the stakeholders.  To 
achieve this, requirements are initially placed in a ‘requirements development’ area of DOORS 
where the requirements manager reviews, interprets, groups, perhaps retypes (without rewriting) 
and translates them into a common language.   
In order to refine draft requirements to define requirements at any level they undergo a 
rigorous series of disciplinary and cross-disciplinary reviews by the client, relevant project 
stakeholders and other relevant actors, as outlined in section 3.2.3.4.  The initiating stakeholders 
are consulted at multiple points to help refine the draft requirement and to constrain the number and 
scope of potential interpretations and solutions for the requirement.  The reviews mentioned above 
are performed more than once, often with different stakeholders and project development teams in 
workshops.  Such reviews are completed in the company of the requirements manager who would 
manage the iterative process of refining the requirements; taking the stakeholders visions to the 
development teams in order to outline design solutions to the requirements; and then returning to 
the client and stakeholders in order to refine the requirement further, based on the solution it will 
attract.    
 
3.3.3 Requirements analysis 
The requirements that are captured and reviewed for their correctness are the raw requirements, 
which need to be analysed and developed into a technically clear and achievable set of project 
specifications.  A requirement analysis is undertaken by the engineering team with the output being 
a project requirements specification document, which consists of the following: 
•  Process compliance, e.g. GRIP processes; Euro Code Standards compliance; 
•  Deliverable documentation which specifies what design specification should be. 
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The effectiveness and quality of the output of the requirements elicitation process is highly 
dependent on the quality of the considerations made with regards to the need for the project and 
subsequently the domain knowledge and experience of the actors associated with creating the 
requirements.  Measures of the effectiveness of the elicitation process are: the amount of rework 
that extracted requirements need; the domain knowledge required during the requirements analysis 
phase; and the number of comments received during the review of the elicited requirements. 
Clearly, these measures are highly dependent on the complexity of the issues considered 
during the capture and review processes.  During the requirements analysis, questions asked to 
determine whether the requirements can inform design specifications are: 
•  Does the requirement stand on its own – i.e. is it self-contained? 
•  Is it at the correct level – i.e. is it at an appropriate level of detail for a requirement for the 
level of design specification it is covering? 
•  Is it testable – i.e. can it be verified that the requirement has been met once design work 
has taken place? 
•  Is it traceable – i.e. can it be traced back via satisfaction arguments to a higher-level of 
requirement, or via a verification argument to supporting documentation, legislation or 
domain knowledge? (Requirement satisfaction and verification is discussed in section 
3.3.4) 
•  Is the requirement well-formed – i.e. is the wording appropriate for a requirement, is it 
unambiguous, and carefully worded? 
 
There are occasions when a requirement will be formulated at a particular level of detail, 
but with no obvious linkage to higher-level requirements. This is typical of many non-functional 
requirements such as usability, reliability, performance and supportability requirements where the 
presence of such a requirement will be necessary, for example, because of legislation, or standards 
that only apply at a certain level of detail.  In such circumstances the requirements manager must 
trace the dependencies of these requirements at higher-levels in the requirements and then create 
links within DOORS so that relevance to functional or use cases can be recorded.  In some cases, it 
may be necessary to reverse-engineer higher-level requirements to address the area covered by the 
requirement under question.  For example, should a client desire specific seating to be included on 
platforms then this would naturally be addressed at detailed design stage.  However, the inclusion 
of seating could affect passenger flow in platform areas, particularly during an emergency 
evacuation and therefore the seating requirement needs to be considered at a higher requirement 
level so that designs can be developed appropriately according to relevant evacuation standards.    
Where a requirement is too detailed for the corresponding level of design, it is never 
deleted from the requirements hierarchy but is placed at the appropriate level of requirements.  The 
existence of such a requirement is then noted in the DOORS requirements hierarchy until it has Chapter 3  
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been linked to relevant requirements under the relevant fields.  This ensures that the more detailed 
requirement is not forgotten and that it is in place ready for work at the more detailed stage.   
 
3.3.4 Requirements validation 
All requirements are stored in a hierarchy within DOORS that provides a steady and rigorous 
refinement from the project functional requirements, down through the stakeholder requirements to 
the lower-level design and specification requirements.  However, the traceability of these 
requirements through satisfaction and verification is essential in order to ensure that requirements 
within the hierarchy are correctly linked together within the appropriate domains and that designs 
produced during the initial, intermediate and final reference design stages of Phase 3 of figure 3.2 
conform to the requirements produced during Phases 1 and 2.  This section will define the role of 
both satisfaction arguments and verification arguments for providing the essential requirements 
traceability within the requirements hierarchy (Hammond et. al. (2001); Vickers et. al. (2002)).  
The reader should consult figure 3.6 in order to visualise the arrangement of satisfaction and 
verification arguments within the requirements hierarchy.  
3.3.4.1  Satisfaction argument 
Satisfaction arguments link the requirement vertically through the requirements hierarchy and 
provide the necessary traceability between the requirements (again, see figure 3.6).  As successive 
layers of lower-level, more detailed requirements are developed; these have to be linked to each 
previous higher-level requirement from which they originate. A requirement at a particular level 
will decompose into several requirements at the next level down.  Satisfaction arguments should 
therefore be linked in the requirements hierarchy to each requirement that has undergone review 
and analysis.  The strategy for requirements satisfaction which occurs throughout the project 
requirements lifecycle (but mostly during Phase 2 and 3 of the project requirements lifecycle 
shown in figure 3.2) is summarised as follows: 
•  The project requirements are solely derived from and totally fulfil the stakeholders 
requirements and the applicable levels; 
•  The low-level design requirements are solely derived from and totally fulfil the project 
requirements;  
•  The design specifications are solely derived from and totally fulfil the low-level design 
requirements. 
 
The satisfaction of requirements is organised as shown in figure 3.7.  Here, individual 
requirements at a certain level of detail are placed in a horizontal row (e.g. level n+1).  The lower-
level requirements at level n+2 that flow down from the single requirement at level n+1 are linked 
back to the requirement at level n+1 via satisfaction argument module.  The attribute ‘Satisfaction Chapter 3  
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Argument’ is used to contain text that describes how the lower-level requirements at level n+2 sum 
to jointly fulfil the higher-level requirement at level n+1.  The Satisfaction Argument therefore 
presents the argument and, where appropriate, evidence, that the lower-level requirements satisfy 
the higher requirement 
 
Figure 3.7 Satisfaction hierarchy layout 
 
3.3.4.2  Verification argument 
Verification is only likely to start occurring during Phases 2 and 3 of the project requirements 
lifecycle (see figure 3.2) as design documents start being produced.   Therefore, as the various 
discipline engineers complete phases of designs they will undertake reviews by performing gap 
analyses of the design against the requirements to ensure that the design is completely aligned with 
the requirements for that stage of the design.  Additionally, these reviews ensure that 
interdisciplinary, interface, and generic requirements have been adequately addressed and that a 
project is achieving its goals and objectives.  Prior to conducting these verification reviews, design 
engineers answer two questions for each requirement.  The following fundamental questions are 
asked: 
1.  How does the design verify the requirement? 
2.  Where is the evidence to prove that the design verifies the requirement? 
 
A verification module is created in DOORS for each requirement at any given level within 
the requirements hierarchy and each requirement is linked to its corresponding verification module 
(again see figure 3.6).  The verification module is subsequently linked to any appropriate design 
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documents which may cover the requirement, typically an engineering drawing, design report, 
construction schedule or document register.   
All requirements state ‘what’ is required; the design specification states ‘how’ the 
requirement is to be met within the relevant part of the project to be built.  The verification module 
is therefore an explanation of how the requirement is verified by the referenced design documents. 
This answers question 1 above.  The verification module also contains a reference to design 
documentation, and the reference indicates the section within this documentation that implement 
the requirement in the design. This answers question 2 above.  
A document register exists in DOORS where documents can be listed and verification 
modules can be linked to these documents as necessary.  Practitioners can therefore access these 
documents as needed in order verify requirements or to gather information.  If such a document 
exists then verification is complete, otherwise verification remains ‘open’ until a document does 
exist or design work is completed that covers the requirement.  The hierarchy for the verification of 
design is organised as shown in figure 3.8 below.  
 
Figure 3.8 Verification argument layout   
 
3.3.5 Refining the definition/baseline 
After validation, the requirements are baselined.  Baselining of requirements is needed to ensure 
that at a given stage of a project’s planning and design phases, a firm basis for development (i.e. a 
consistent set of requirements) are available to enable further activities (including design) to be 
carried out.  Baselining therefore ensures that requirements are correct as per the project needs and 
stakeholders are in agreement with the requirements identified.  Any changes (after baselining) to 
the requirements are possible through a change control procedure which is outlined in the next 
section.   
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3.3.6 Managing change 
It is inevitable that changes will occur to requirements throughout the requirements definition cycle 
and it is therefore crucial that any changes are communicated to all relevant parties (such change 
would usually come about through risk identification and value engineering/management).  While 
the DOORS software highlights and records changes to all requirements, it also informs all project 
team members and stakeholders of any changes.  A key aspect of change management is 
traceability where the links created between requirements in the requirements hierarchy can 
highlight any requirements that have undergone any change.   
  Requests for changes to a requirement may be initiated by any stakeholder or project team 
at any time for a variety of reasons, e.g. 3
rd party interests, development planning constraints, 
loss/gain of funding, political manoeuvring etc..  All change requests including changes to a 
requirement or enhancement requests as well as defects should all be channelled through the 
requirements manager using a pre-defined change management process.  This process in effect uses 
the DOORS software to log and track change requests and then places these change items in a 
central database for review by a group consisting of the client and relevant actors (e.g. 
stakeholders, project teams etc.) as appropriate in order to achieve resolution.  The involvement of 
the client is essential in most circumstances, particularly where scope modification results in an 
increase in resource requirements that exceed the allocated amounts.  Such a situation necessitates 
approval by the client in order to pass changes to time and budgets.    
  It is proposed that the requirements manager co-ordinates the requirements change review 
activity with all relevant actors and in doing so presents a prioritised list of requirements for 
review.  In using processes previously discussed in this chapter to review and analyse re-writes of a 
requirement under consideration, a new requirement can be included in the requirements hierarchy 
and its impacts on any other requirements analysed using the traceability links made for the 
requirement that it replaced.  This helps to communicate any changes to any stakeholders or project 
teams that may have had no interest in changing the requirement but the action of changing it may 
have an impact on their activities.  Conversely, re-writing a requirement may remove an impact 
that it has on other requirements and therefore this also needs to be communicated.   
      
3.3.7 Additional functions and capabilities 
Separate procedures are required to record, manage, and approve project assumptions.   Such 
procedures can however be operated within a DOORS software environment and this creates a 
useful opportunity to jointly manage two closely related aspects of project planning; assumptions 
management and requirements management.  Assumptions are crucial in the creation of 
requirements since it is often the case that little information is known at the start of a project during 
the planning and early design stages.  Practitioners therefore make assumptions in anticipation of 
real information and project requirements are often captured based upon these assumptions.   Chapter 3  
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DOORS can provide traceability and justification for assumptions and link them to 
associated requirements.  When assumptions are subsequently validated with the passing of time, 
the requirements hierarchy can deal with the changes in assumptions if they are either closed as real 
information becomes available, converted into a requirement or recorded as a risk.  Such 
procedures are not outlined within this thesis although the author had significant involvement with 
the assumptions for the Crossrail project as the assumption manager.  Suffice to say that good 
practice in the management of assumptions involves a similar approach to that of requirements 
management where issues should be recorded in a traceable manner in a hierarchical database.   
 
 
3.4 Case Study – An Application to Crossrail 
This section gives a demonstration of the application of the requirements process to an element of 
the Crossrail project.  A stakeholder requirement regarding the design and location of electrical 
switchgear is used in this section with its inclusion in the DOORS software detailed.  The 
requirement management process outlined earlier in this chapter is used to define a series of lower-
level requirements around this electrical switchgear requirement.  Chapter 3  
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3.4.1 Requirement definition 
Figure 3.9 details the elicitation of requirements from a high level stakeholder requirement 
concerning the design and location of switchgear for the Crossrail project (It should be noted that 
figure 3.9 is a sample version of the requirements associated with the switchgear requirement and 
does not show all of the identified lower-level requirements).  The requirements contained in figure 
3.9 can be related to Phases 2 and 3 of the requirements structure defined in figure 3.1 and the 
requirements ‘V’ lifecycle defined in figure 3.2. 
  A shaded box in figure 3.9 shows a requirement covering the security aspects of the 
switchgear.  This requirement has been expanded in figure 3.10 to show how the requirement 
hierarchy defined in this chapter works.  A satisfaction argument is shown between the higher-level 
requirement and the lower-level requirements.  This in effect defines how the lower level 
requirements combine to define and satisfy the higher level requirement.  The satisfaction argument 
thus provides a form of validation where the argument allows practitioners to see evidence of how 
the lower-level requirements fulfil the higher-level requirements.   
Verification arguments are shown to emerge from each lower-level requirement and are 
used to evaluate whether or not the requirement is adequately covered in the associated verification 
evidence.  Such evidence is held in DOORS by way of design information and this is a form of 
validation.  In this case, the verification evidence provides the validation needed to confirm that the 
defined requirement accomplishes its intended purpose.   
 
Figure 3.10 A practical application of the requirements framework 
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3.4.2 DOORS Structure 
The location of the high-level requirement in DOORS is shown in red text in figure 3.11.  The 
associated lower-level requirements are not shown since they are located elsewhere in the DOORS 
database.  Figure 3.12 however gives a collective view of the requirements with the satisfaction 
argument link between them, again in red text.  Figure 3.13 shows the verification arguments for 
the three lower-level requirements with the verification evidence being numbered documents or 
drawings associated with the Crossrail project.  Within figures 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13 respectively, 
other requirements that are associated with Crossrail are shown in black text.  ‘MDC’ is merely a 
label for the Crossrail management and design contract with the term ‘Central’ indicating the 
geographical area of Crossrail under which the requirement applies.  With reference to figure 3.11, 
each requirement is labelled as ‘InitDes’ (Initial Design) with a number which represents the 
DOORS program labelling for that particular requirement.  The orange and red arrows located next 
to each ‘Requirement’ term is the ‘clickable’ link within the program that takes the user to 
associated requirements, satisfaction arguments and verification arguments.  The term ‘Header’ 
simply represents the area within the hierarchy under which particular requirements belong. 
  The DOORS structure allows requirements to be recorded upon their identification and 
subsequently communicated to all actors that hold an interest in any particular requirement.  This in 
effect achieves a cultural change in the design process as the inefficiencies associated with iterative 
design development through ongoing consultation between stakeholders and practitioners is 
replaced by the definition of designs based on specifications derived from elicited and reviewed 
requirements.  While consultations may still be required, designing form defined requirements 
improves the quality of the design and reduces the amount of expensive iteration and changes that 
are required while allowing further requirements to be identified if necessary.  This has impacts on 
the management of the design process where designs can be delivered in a form that aligns more 
favourably with clients’ goals and objectives while being of improved quality.   
  To the right of the requirements listed in figure 3.11 are object areas for each requirement 
that allow practitioners to comment on the requirements.  This is not shown in figure 3.11 as no 
comments had been made on any of the requirements included.  As previously discussed in this 
chapter, this area is where any project actor can comment on, add to or object to any requirement.  
The DOORS software would highlight any comment by changing the text colour of the 
requirement and inform the requirements manager with an automatically generated report.  This is 
a critical aspect of requirements management where any changes in requirements can be 
highlighted and passed on the affected practitioners for information and actioning.  The associated 
benefits to the management of the design process is that changes have less impact on the progress 
of a design and this ultimately has benefits in terms of the cost and time needs of the design work. 
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  Figure  3.11  Electrical  switchgear requirement in DOORS Chapter 3  
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Figure 3.12 Satisfaction argument between the higher-level and lower-level requirements in DOORS 
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Figure 3.13 Verification arguments for the lower-level requirements in DOORS Chapter 3  
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3.5 Summary 
The need to manage requirements is not new with the software and computer systems industry in 
particular committing a significant amount of resources to defining and organising requirements for 
their projects.   
Construction industry practitioners often note that management processes such as the 
requirements management work discussed in this chapter is over and above what is needed on 
construction projects and is often counter productive.  Indeed, there is some weight to this 
argument in that such processes are simply extra procedures for practitioners to deal with.  
However, when the scale of modern megaprojects is considered, particularly when they exhibit the 
characteristics of complex systems, the application of management processes such as requirements 
management becomes essential in order to manage the significant amount of specification that is 
inherent in such projects.  By the action of managing specifications, the impacts that specification 
changes can have on a project is minimised and thus removes a major source of overruns to a 
project.   
The cultural change achieved by the outlined requirements process can produce better 
designs and requirements which are auditable and traceable.  Significant cost savings can therefore 
be made by a client where agreements on scope, specifications and requirements can be made 
quicker and easier, thus reducing the amount of re-work that is required to designs.  The 
requirements process also allows changes to requirements to be made efficiently with any relevant 
project actor being informed of these changes.  In doing so, any changes to specifications and 
requirements can be dealt with in a way that allows communication between all relevant actors 
with respect to how the changes are resolved.  This is seen as a critical aspect of managing the 
design process where changes to requirements and specifications can have negative impacts on cost 
and time throughout the design phase and construction phase.  The quick resolution of the impacts 
of changes through the requirements process enables senior staff to be more client facing, thus 
strengthening their client relationships and widening their roles to provide an improved service.  
The process also allows engineering teams to produce precisely scoped designs and plans, thus 
reducing the time spent of particular items of work and freeing time in order to focus on other 
project issues.  
A significant driver in the need for changes is the risk and value management work carried 
out during the design phases of a project.  The detailed requirements process can make this work 
more efficient and therefore assist practitioners.  The next chapter discusses this aspect in more 
detail.          
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4 Risk Networks 
4.1 Background 
Projects within large science and engineering initiatives are challenging tasks where the stakes are 
high, the commitments irreversible and the probabilities of failure may be significant (Miller and 
Lessard, 2001).  Risk and uncertainty management is a major challenge for project managers and 
always exists in design, procurement, construction and operation of large and complex projects, 
particularly those involving underground components (Reilly and Brown, 2004).  All risks and 
uncertainties must be carefully identified, evaluated, and accounted for in the deliberations that 
precede procurement decisions with the management responsibility being allocated to suitable 
actors and strategies being put in place to mitigate risks if and when they occur.  However, even 
after careful planning, due to a mega projects’ complexity and scale, things don’t always go as 
planned (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003).     
Traditional project risk registers completed during the design and planning stage of a 
project ignore a critical aspect of risks which is that separate risk areas can be related to each other 
through a network of individual risks.  The holistic management of the typical risk areas shown in 
figure 4.1 should be integrated within risk management practices to ensure that in the event of a 
risk relating to an uncertainty occurring, its impacts on other risks can be accounted for.   
 
Figure 4.1 Inter-related risk areas 
 
In the context of the risks shown in figure 4.1, strategic risk arises from adverse decisions 
or improper implementation of those decisions. This risk represents the compatibility between a 
client’s strategic goals for the project, the strategies developed to achieve those goals, the resources 
deployed against these goals and the quality of implementation.  Programme risks threaten the 
success of the projects’ implementation whereas technical risks represent the potential loss from 
engineering activities.  Operational risk is a risk arising from the activities of constructing a project 
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whereas safety risk is related to the health and safety threats facing operatives in the effort of 
constructing a project. 
This work recognises that the lack of identification of the relationships between risks and 
how risks from different areas interact can cause failures within projects, particularly in the multi-
design team, multi-interface environment of an underground railway megaproject. 
If more than one risk occurs at the same time then this creates a portfolio of risk events 
which could ultimately create synergy of risk where the impacts to the project are severe.  Figure 
4.2 is a snapshot of a few of many interrelated risks identified for Crossrail.  It can be seen that a 
few major individual risks can be linked to many smaller risks which are ultimately linked to other 
major risks.  If any risks occur then it only increases the likelihood of other risks occurring and so 
the need to identify networks of risks to avoid cost overruns is clear.  This chapter documents a 
process that can be used by practitioners to document the linkages between identified risks and 
uncertainties.  This process is an extension of the requirements process outlined in Chapter 3 and 
can be used as an effective method for allocating responsibility for groups of risks in a project.      
 
Figure 4.2 Snapshot of related risks on Crossrail 
 
Additionally, the focus on engineering and technical risks only considers a small 
proportion of all types of risk while Construction (Design and Management) Regulations (HSC, 
2007) have made the identification of health and safety risks that may occur at any point in a 
project lifecycle a legal requirement of project designers.  A much wider set of risk categories 
exists from which risks that adversely affect project performance may occur.  These additional 
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categories of risk such as political, financial, market, client, regulatory are referred to as global and 
elemental risk factors in this thesis and are not usually considered within the context of technical 
risks, or at least not considered formally.  This may possibly be due to the fact that engineering risk 
registers do not have a place for them and the difficulty in adequately quantifying them on a cost 
basis.  A process to evaluate global risks is considered using fuzzy logic, the technicalities and 
application of which is outlined in Chapter 5. 
 
 
4.2 Value, Risk and Estimating 
Appendix A provides the background on risk and uncertainty that is relevant to the work 
throughout this thesis.  Appendix A is divided into three sections, the first of which discusses the 
nature of risk and uncertainty and the differences that exist but which are often blurred in literature.  
The second section discusses risk identification and risk management processes, the weaknesses 
that exists in some of these processes and how small modifications can be made in order for these 
processes to be useful in the early design phases of a project.  The final section considers risk 
efficiency which has a considerable role in design refinement and value management.  The subject 
of this third section is of relevance to the work in this chapter and therefore discussion on the 
aspects of value and risk management are continued below. 
Value management and risk management techniques are now standard parts of project 
feasibility, strategy and design stages.  Smith (2008) devotes a chapter to value management with 
Fewings (2005) also giving considerable focus to risk and value management.  Enhancing value is 
often related to risk analysis through the assessment of alternative methodology and functional 
value where investigation and analysis by practitioners can identify the best value for money for a 
client or stakeholders.  It is also central to the efforts associated with exploiting opportunities where 
the scenarios for minimising the impact of threats or for doing things better are identified.    
Value management therefore seeks to maximise value in relation to function and cost, 
whilst risk management seeks to minimise the probability of it not being realised. These are 
primarily responses by the construction industry to improve the value for clients by identifying 
risks and using more innovative technology and coping with demanding targets where time and 
cost slippage can lead to financial penalties.  Both value management and risk management are 
therefore essential to successful project delivery and helps ease difficulties of making design 
changes later in the project lifecycle (e.g. during construction). 
Smith (2008) details the objectives of six value management reviews which consider 
buildability, safety, operation and maintenance.  The timing and format of these six reviews is 
variable but Smith (2008, p19-23) does list a minimum of seven opportunity points where the Chapter 4  
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reviews can be carried out
12.  These seven opportunity points loosely correspond to the business 
case development stages outlined by OGC (2007b).      
When pricing work, attention should be paid to the knock on effects of risks arising from 
groups of risks as well as the risks themselves.  A holistic approach to risk is therefore required as 
compounding effects exacerbate the systemic nature of the risks (Ackermann et al., 2006).  In many 
cases, compounding effects can drive vicious cycles where risks generate self-sustaining disasters 
(i.e. a snowball effect).  In late 1994 the temporary lining to the station tunnels for the Heathrow 
Express in the central terminal area of Heathrow Airport collapsed, creating a significant set-back 
to the project.  As a result of the collapse, many other risks (technical or otherwise) materialised 
and compounded the problems faced by the project.  For example these risks included the sourcing 
of the extra concrete that was needed to recover the collapse in a concrete market that was already 
stretched by other major projects that were occurring in the south east of England.  Other risks that 
materialised were associated with the delay to the commissioning of the railway and the damage 
that was caused to existing infrastructure at Heathrow.  However, the client, design team and 
contractor succeeded in recovering the situation to the extent that the initial estimate of 18 months’ 
delay was reduced to six months.  This was achieved by the effective management of the many 
risks which occurred after the collapse event and the production of a revised design for the central 
terminal area which incorporated a 60m diameter cofferdam to encircle the majority of the tunnel 
collapse zone. 
A crucial aspect of risk valuation is how contractors price risk in their estimates.  Work by 
Laryea and Hughes (2008) considered how contractors arrived at their bid price in practice and 
how, and in what circumstances, risk apportionment influences pricing levels.  It was found that 
despite there being over 60 models available in academic journals for contractors to price risk, few 
were actually used.  This provided the motivation for their work which proceeded to interview five 
UK contractors on how they priced work and specifically risk.  Wu et al. (2006) described three 
ways that risk contingencies are priced in practice and their work is consistent with the findings of 
Laryea and Hughes (2008); 
•  The cost of the works (calculating the work quantities (materials, labour and 
equipment) before using a historical database to calculate a margin of error around the 
accuracy of the estimates). 
•  The cost of risk (the risk attributes can alternatively be analysed using probability 
functions or other approach)  
•  The price of profit (allocating a contingency for risk). 
 
                                                      
12 The seven opportunity points for reviews are: 1) During the concept stage of the project; 2) During the pre-
feasibility stage; 3) During the scheme design; 4) During detailed design; 5) During 
construction/implementation; 6) During commissioning/operation; 7) During decommissioning/end of assets. Chapter 4  
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Laryea and Hughes (2008) found that in practice, risk apportionment occurred at three 
stages during the contractors’ bid creation.  The first being where the whole bid team assesses 
(qualitatively and quantitatively) risks in a workshop environment where previous experiences 
were used to inform of how to deal with most risks and greater focus being given to bespoke items 
and associated risks.  This first stage then proceeded to a second stage where estimators would 
price some of the risk for inclusion in project estimates of items of work.  At the final third stage 
the bid adjudication team would adjust the estimated bid value to reflect the prevailing market 
conditions and the contractors’ circumstances.  Therefore, if the contractor was keen to win the 
work then he could lower the bid value and in effect use low-ball tactics to win work.  Laryea and 
Hughes (2006) note that in the third stage, priced risks may be excluded at the final settlement 
depending on a set of micro-economic factors relating to the contractor. 
Under certain risk allocation and payment mechanisms (see Smith et al., 2006) the above 
methods described by Laryea and Hughes (2008) would not apply since the contractor would be 
paid for work done on a unit basis.  However, this work recognises the benefit of providing a 
bidding contractor with a risk network to enable the full extent of a portfolio of risks to be 
accounted for in bid pricing.  If value engineering can not remove a certain network of risks from a 
design then designers should account for these risks through identification only.  The client can 
then communicate this information to the contractor (or any other project actor) in order for the 
risks to be accounted for adequately in bid estimates.   
Construction Design and Management Regulations (HSC, 2007) places responsibility on 
designers to provide a Designers Hazard Elimination and Management Record for safety risks 
associated with a design.  While this is a legal requirement, this work proposes that construction 
clients make obligations of contractors to provide evidence that all risks presented in tender 
documents are accounted for.  This would enable bids to have sufficient contingency to cope with 
risk occurrences and help avoid cost overruns.   
 
 
4.3 A Process for Presenting Risk Networks    
Work by Williams et al. (1997), Eden et al. (2000) and Eden et al. (2005) identified that it is the 
interaction between different types of risk than can cause the most damage to a project.  The simple 
classification of risks into set categories (as shown in figure 4.1) without consideration of the 
connections between risks in different categories is unhelpful as risks can be dependent on each 
other.  In addition to considering the connections between risks, it is also important to consider the 
impacts that risks can have on each other.  For example, considering figure 4.1, a safety risk may 
be intrinsically linked to a strategic risk as was realised during the Jubilee Line Extension (JLE) 
project.  A significant problem faced early in the JLE construction phase was the New Austrian 
Tunnelling Method collapse on the Heathrow Express project in October 1994.  This caused similar Chapter 4  
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tunnelling work on the JLE to be halted until given the all-clear by the Health and Safety Executive 
resulting in considerable cost and time increases (ARUP, 2000). 
  It is often acknowledged that a technical (engineering) risk can impact upon another, for 
example a need to change a metro station tunnel diameter may affect ventilation systems which in 
turn may need a revision of the capacity of ventilation ducts which subsequently may require the 
revision of platform sizes.  However, a risk in one area may cause or contribute to the likelihood of 
a risk event elsewhere, for example a supplier going out of business may impact on a technical risk 
or a change in a safety standard may impact on an operating risk.  Risks can therefore be seen as a 
network of interrelated possible events which may be referred to as the systemicity of risk 
(Ackermann et al., 2007). 
  Additionally, since one risk may occur at the same time as other related risks then a 
portfolio of risks is created where the impact of the whole can be greater than the sum of the parts.  
Therefore, if one risk occurs then it may have the consequences of reinforcing the likelihood of 
other risks occurring, causing a complex chain of outcomes.  Williams et al. (1997) model such 
chains of risks as causal networks which are a form of cause mapping that can be used as a means 
of modelling complex qualitative structures (see Ackermann and Eden, 2004).        
An intention of this chapter is to outline a process that can link risks in one category to 
risks in other categories in such a way as to allow practitioners a holistic view of all risks connected 
with an element of a project.  In taking the same approach as the requirements process outlined in 
Chapter 3, the risk process allows the updating of risks while maintaining traceability and 
ownership.  The risk process can be linked into the requirements process outlined in Chapter 3 
using the DOORS software.  DOORS can then be used to link all risks associated with 
requirements.  A benefit of the DOORS process is that a far greater number of risks can be 
contained in a registry and subsequently managed compared to a standard spreadsheet risk register 
which may typically have a maximum of 80 individual risks included.  
A further component of the risk process is the linkage to a value management element 
which allows the risks associated with a requirement to be evaluated.  This in turn assists in the 
definition of requirements through consideration of the associated risks and value engineering to 
find the most risk efficient designs. 
In order to account for the different categories of risks associated with a project, the 
proposed process considers all risks as systemic and therefore;  
•  Allows the interactions between risks to be identified and therefore focuses value 
engineering efforts and risk management efforts on the management of the outcome of all 
the interacting risks forming a group rather than the individual risks within a group.   
•  Focuses attention on the risk groups that are significant threats and on the clusters of risks 
(rather than single risk items) thus forcing the consideration of risk mitigation actions 
across risk categories. Chapter 4  
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4.3.1 The contribution of health and safety risk  
The generation of CDM assessments by designers is a valid and acceptable starting point for the 
focus of wider risk assessments.  Given that CDM assessments must be made from a very early 
point in the planning and design process (and therefore early in the project lifecycle) it is therefore 
only natural that health and safety risks are used to identify and inform of wider risks associated 
with a project.  It is not suggested that CDM assessments should be the foundation of all risk 
assessments but rather as a medium for informing of wider risks and then developing a network of 
risks from strategic, operational, programme, technical and safety backgrounds.   
When completing CDM assessments, practitioners often use what-if scenarios to inform of 
the health and safety risks for each activity or aspect of design under consideration.  A great deal of 
knowledge and heuristics used by project teams in risk identification is in such form.  For example, 
‘what would happen if the ventilation system broke down?’.  The main advantages of such 
techniques are that they are easy to understand and provide modularity to considerations.  This 
enables addition, deletion and change of considerations independently.  
The safety threat based assessments made can therefore be used to inform of risks which 
would occur in the event the safety threat becomes a reality.  Not only does this allow a risk 
network to be built, but it allows risks and uncertainties which would not immediately be 
associated with the scenario under question to be recorded.  It also helps with value engineering 
and opportunity identification where a desire to make designs safer and easier to construct can have 
positive impacts on increasing value.       
Such an approach ties in with the Guidance on Internal Control (ICA, 1999) (i.e. the 
Turnbull Report) which requires all companies to include in their annual statement of accounts a 
guide showing how risks and opportunities are monitored and managed.  The aim is therefore to 
implement control over the wider aspects of risk in such a way as to add value rather than merely 
completing a compliance exercise.  In the context of this work, such value would involve the 
identification of a series of inter-related risks which could subsequently improve decision making 
with regards to risk mitigation.  Furthermore, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (FRC, 
2008) requires that all company directors are briefed on issues arising from corporate meetings.  
The Guidance on Internal Control suggests that information relating to these issues percolates 
throughout an organisation to add value.  The Health and Safety Executive (www.hse.gov.uk) 
identify this value as social, environmental and economic.  The result is that the impact for society 
and on the business and its undertakings is reduced through improved risk communication.  This 
communication can be achieved on a construction project by the networks detailed in this chapter. 
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4.3.2 Layout of the risk network 
The risk network shown in figure 4.3 is designed to fit into the identification phase of any risk 
management process.  This work believes the activity of identifying all risks to be the most critical 
with the allocation of the financial and managerial responsibility second to this.  The identification 
activities are important simply because all other analysis and evaluation phases will always be 
relevant to the risks identified and so will only ever be as complete as the risk identification phase.   
Whereas in Chapter 3 a requirement was linked to satisfaction and verification arguments, 
the requirement shown in figure 4.3 is linked to directly related risks.  As noted earlier in this 
chapter, the requirement and risk components can be presented as individual modules in DOORS 
with the linkages between the modules being made accordingly by practitioners.  The primary 
risk(s) module shown in figure 4.3 contains the risks that are immediately associated with the 
requirement under question.  These risks will inevitably be safety and technical engineering risks 
with other relevant operational and programme risks being listed if appropriate.  The associated 
risks module shown in figure 4.3 contains risks that are associated with those risks listed in the 
primary risk module.  Risks listed here may not be directly related to the requirement but result 
from the occurrence of the risks listed in the primary risk module.  The population of this module 
by practitioners therefore requires the consideration of risk events which may result from the 
occurrence of risks listed in the primary module.   
 
Figure 4.3 Basic risk network. 
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design and value management work where decisions and plans can be made with regards to the 
level of risk (safety, technical or otherwise) that is presented. 
  Within the primary and associated risk modules shown in figure 4.3 is a ‘risk impact’ box.  
This is included along with the risk description as a means of informing of the impact to the project 
should the risk occur.  The description of the expected impact is therefore a form of reasoning 
behind the inclusion of the risk and an indication of why and how risks are linked together.  A 
likelihood or probability of the risk occurring is not included in this aspect of the risk network.  
This is deliberate since the purpose of the network is to identify and present risks associated with 
requirements quickly and simply.  The inclusion of probabilities introduces an element of analysis 
to the risk identification process and this is undesirable.  It is intended that the risk network can be 
presented to any actor working on a project as a register of all risks that should be considered.  The 
inclusion of probabilities and likelihoods in this sense would therefore have the same impact as that 
of risk ranking (see Baccarini and Archer, 2001; Shang et al., 2005) where some actors considering 
risk would only consider and account for the most significant of risks (e.g. the top 10) in their work 
and simply acknowledge the rest.   
Figure 4.3 shows a value management module arising from the risk identification modules.  
This includes all the value engineering work which would be associated with the identified risk 
networks and is discussed in more detail in the next section.  It is proposed that probabilities or 
likelihoods are included in the value management module since this is viewed by planners and 
designers within their role of refining design scope, objectives and requirements (which has 
obvious links with the work of Chapter 3) 
As an extension to the reasoning for not including probabilities, the risk network also does 
not specifically allow the allocation of the financial or management responsibility for a risk or risks 
to be stated, but does require the risk type to be identified e.g. construction, safety, engineering, 
programme etc..  While the ownership of risks is an important part of any risk management process 
(Chapman and Ward, 2003, Smith et al., 2006), this should occur after the risk identification phase.  
Indeed, identifying a network of risks and recording them using the process outlined in this section 
will inevitably impact every subsequent phase in a risk management process since the identification 
of a group of associated risks rather than individual risks could necessitate a radical change in 
designs through value management activities and hence refinement in the identification of which 
actor or actors are best placed to take ownership of a risk or network of risks. 
   
4.3.3 Refining project scope by assessing risks  
Functional analysis is a fundamental pre-cursor to the creative, threat and opportunity and value 
adding aspects of risk and value management.  The functional analysis is in effect based on the 
requirements elicitation and management process outlined in Chapter 3.  The process of risk 
assessment involves finding the level of significance to provide some guidance to the seriousness Chapter 4  
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of the risks associated with the identified requirements.  Value management subsequently seeks the 
best value for money associated with the design options proposed as a consequence of these 
requirements.  Appendix A described a theoretical approach to calculating risk as the product of 
probability and impact.  This can be considered as a form of expected monetary value (EMV) for 
risk assessment (Fewings, 2005).  EMV takes each risk and provides a monetary value for impact i 
and reduces it by multiplying by the degree of probability p of the risk occurring where the 
probability is rated between 0 and 1.   
The relevance within this chapter is that the EMV approach can be used to value a network 
of associated risks where clusters of systemic risks can be valued and viewed in a value 
management context.  Groups of risks that make designs inefficient by way of the significance of 
the risks that they represent can therefore be eliminated or changed in order to become more risk 
efficient.  Table 4.1 shows how a risk network can be valued in this way using assumed 
probabilities p and monetary values i (this network is simulated for demonstration purposes).   
Table 4.1 Risk network assessed by expected monetary value 
Risk Probability  p 
(0-1) 
Impact i 
(£m) 
Expected Value 
(p*i) (£m) 
Heavy plant damages shallow water utilities  0.2  0.02  0.0004 
Construction delay  0.9  0.03  0.0009 
Damage from flooding  0.6  0.01  0.0001 
3rd party claims  0.8  0.08  0.0064 
Total monetary value        £0.0078m
 
The value derived from table 4.1 can therefore be added to the base cost of design as the 
expected monetary value of risk.  Designers and planners can subsequently develop designs that 
reduce the risk value and so minimise the contingency required for risks while maintaining the 
required functionality in design.  Figure 4.4 shows three different hypothetical design options 
where the basic construction costs are shown with the expected monetary value of risks added on to 
this.  It is the role of value management to derive these values which ultimately presents a strategic 
decision for the client and stakeholders as to which design options they choose and thus the amount 
of value they derive from the design.  While being hypothetical, it should be appreciated that these 
options would realistically be risk efficient (see figure A.3 of Appendix A) where the risks would 
be minimal for the specifications that each design option contains.      
          
    Figure 4.4 Hypothetical design options 
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  It is the above mentioned process that would be included in the value management module 
shown in figure 4.3.  The benefits of the above is that the systemicity of risk can be easily 
identified with the risk identification work and used constructively to refine the project 
requirements by value management.  In using DOORS for this purpose, communication between 
the various actors working on a project is vastly improved with the communication of design and 
planning output also being communicated effectively in the periods preceding detailed design and 
construction.  As noted in Chapter 3, the DOORS interface naturally provides assurance and 
traceability features which can help the practitioner build a knowledge base for a project. 
  
 
4.4 Practical Application of the Risk Network 
Unlike the requirements management process presented in Chapter 3, the risk networking presented 
in this chapter was not applied in a commercial environment on a project such as Crossrail.  The 
method in which Crossrail was being procured at the time of this research did not present an 
opportunity for the author to trial or apply the proposals of this chapter on any scale.  However, a 
pilot application was made using the DOORS software with a requirement from the Crossrail 
project being used as the foundation. 
  Figure 4.5 shows a requirement relating to Crossrail Tottenham Court Road station.  At the 
time, the entrance to the passageway leading to the Crossrail platforms at this location was to be 
placed between existing underground passageways.  This presented a significant number of risks to 
the Crossrail project which, when combined could provide a valid case for re-thinking and re-
drafting the Crossrail designs to eliminate or mitigate these risks.  Figure 4.5 shows a map of some 
of the risks associated with this requirement and shows the complexity that can be realised very 
quickly by simply relating all associated risks together to form a network.  Figure 4.6 shows how 
these risks would be classified in a DOORS interface (the value management module is not 
shown).  The linkages are not shown between risks in figure 4.6 since they are electronic and are 
created by practitioners in DOORS.   
In presenting the risks in this way, practitioners can take a holistic view of all the risks and 
importantly the network of related risks that impact each other.  This can ultimately make the 
refining of requirements and the subsequent communication quicker and easier, particularly across 
the multi-interface environment typical of megaprojects.  DOORS also allows many forms of 
filtering where risks within certain categories can be shown.  Figure 4.7 shows a typical layout of 
the work proposed in this chapter in DOORS.  The green arrow represents the linkage which would 
take the user to the risk module shown in figure 4.8 with the blue arrow in 4.8 taking the user to the 
work associated with value management (not included).Chapter 4  
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Figure 4.5 Risk and Impact map associated with a single requirement at TCR
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(TCR) Station shall be located in-between the entrance to the passageways leading to the LU 
Northern Line platforms and the LU Central Line passageways.     
RISK (Technical) 
Hitting stray piles or 
unknown ground 
anchors    
IMPACT  
•  Damage to 
machinery 
•  Cost of replacing 
damaged parts 
•  Delay   
RISK (Safety) 
Safety and welfare 
issues associated with 
carrying out 
construction work 
during TCR hours of 
operation  
IMPACT  
•  Issues relating to 
having the public 
walking through 
what is effectively a 
working 
construction site 
RISK (Technical) 
Working between two 
existing underground 
passages could cause 
damage to existing 
infrastructure 
IMPACT  
•  Health and safety 
issues 
•  Cost increases to 
remediate damage 
•  Delay   
RISK (Safety) 
Dust escaping into public 
areas  
 
IMPACT – Health risk to all 
RISK (Technical) 
Potential damage to other 
infrastructure  
 
IMPACT – Cost of remediation 
RISK (Safety) 
Confined working space for 
workers 
 
IMPACT – Risk of 
asphyxiation 
RISK (Technical) 
Underpinning may be required to 
stabilise structures compromised by 
striking stray pile 
 
IMPACT – Cost and schedule 
increases with significant review of 
construction methodology needed 
RISK (Safety) 
Workers may compromise their 
safety by investigating the damage in 
an unsafe underground environment 
 
IMPACT – Potential ground collapse 
causing death of workers
RISK (Technical) 
Drilling/tunnelling in a confined 
space could destress ground resulting 
in collapse of existing nearby tunnels 
 
IMPACT – Cost and schedule 
increases.  Safety of public and 
workers.   
 
RISK (Strategic) 
Threaten integrity on 3
rd party 
property and operations and staff 
 
IMPACT – Loss of trust and damage 
to working relationship with 3
rd 
parties 
RISK (Operational) 
Damage temporary operations put in 
place to allow TCR to operate while 
construction proceeds 
 
IMPACT – Impacts on public 
resulting objections from the client.  
Cost, scheduling and methodology 
revisions
RISK (Operational/Technical) 
Collapse could require larger plant to 
remediate the situation.  However 
the larger plant may not fit on site 
 
IMPACT – A radical review of 
construction methodology and plans 
requiring possible re-design. Cost 
and schedule increases
RISK (Technical/Operational) 
The need for large & heavy 
plant damaging utilities under 
roads around the site  
 
IMPACT – Damage to utilities 
causing inconvenience and 
costs to  a variety of 3
rd parties 
 
RISK (Safety) 
Damaged utilities presenting a hazard to public and workers 
 
IMPACT – Potential for severe injury and damage to infrastructure 
Req. ID – InitDes 469  Req. Type - Design ASSOCIATED REQUIREMENT 
TCR station shall operate as normal 
throughout the construction period 
other than during designated 
possession hours negotiated with LU. Chapter 4  
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Figure 4.6 Risk and Impact Network for a requirement at TCR 
REQUIREMENT 
The entrance of the passageway leading to the Crossrail platforms at Tottenham Court Road 
(TCR) Station shall be located in-between the entrance to the passageways leading to the LU 
Northern Line platforms and the LU Central Line passageways.    
PRIMARY RISK(S) 
Risk  Type/Field  Risk Description  Risk ID 
Number 
Risk Impact 
n  Working between two existing 
underground passages could cause 
damage to existing infrastructure 
 
•  Health and safety issues 
•  Cost increases to remediate damage 
•  Delay   
 
Technical 
n+1  Safety and welfare issues associated with 
carrying out construction work during 
TCR hours of operation 
•  Issues relating to having the public 
walking through what is effectively a 
working construction site 
•   
Technical 
n+2  Hitting stray piles or unknown ground 
anchors    
 
 
•  Damage to machinery 
•  Cost of replacing damaged parts 
•  Delay   
Safety 
ASSOCIATED RISKS 
Risk  Type/Field  Risk Description  Risk ID 
Number 
Risk Impact 
n+11  Workers may compromise their safety by 
investigating the damage in an unsafe 
underground environment 
 
Potential ground collapse causing death 
of workers  
Safety 
n+12  Potential damage to other infrastructure  
 
Cost of remediation  Technical 
n+13  Underpinning may be required to 
stabilise structures compromised by 
striking stray pile 
Cost and schedule increases with 
significant review of construction 
methodology needed 
Technical 
ASSOCIATED RISKS 
Risk  Type/Field  Risk Description  Risk ID 
Number 
Risk Impact 
n+9  Dust escaping into public areas   Health risk to all  Safety 
n+10  Confined working space for 
workers 
Risk of asphyxiation  Safety 
ASSOCIATED RISKS 
Risk  Type/Field  Risk Description  Risk ID 
Number 
Risk Impact 
n+3  Drilling/tunnelling in a confined space 
could destress ground resulting in 
collapse of existing nearby tunnels 
 
Cost and schedule increases.  Safety of 
public and workers.   
 
Technical 
n+4  Threaten integrity on 3
rd party property 
and operations and staff 
Loss of trust and damage to working 
relationship with 3
rd parties  
Strategic 
n+5  Damage temporary operations put in 
place to allow TCR to operate while 
construction proceeds 
 
Impacts on public resulting in objections 
from the client.  Cost, scheduling and 
methodology revisions 
Operational 
n+6  Collapse could require larger plant to 
remediate the situation.  However the 
larger plant may not fit on site 
 
A radical review of construction 
methodology and plans requiring 
possible re-design. Cost and schedule 
increases 
Technical/ 
Operational 
n+7  The need for large & heavy plant 
damaging utilities under roads around 
the site 
Damage to utilities causing 
inconvenience and costs to a variety of 
3
rd parties 
Technical/ 
Operational 
 
n+8  Damaged utilities presenting a hazard to 
public and workers 
Potential for severe injury and damage to 
infrastructure 
Safety Chapter 4  
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Figure 4.7 Requirement in DOORS with green link to risk modules 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Risk description in DOORS Chapter 4  
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4.5 Summary 
Chapter 3 considered a process for the identification, recording and management of project 
requirements throughout the planning and design stages preceding a projects’ detailed design stage.  
Chapter 4 provided an additional element to that which was documented in Chapter 3 in that it 
considered a process for recording and analysing the risks associated with requirements.  Specific 
attention was paid to the relationship between risks and the identification of further risks that could 
occur as a result of a related risk occurring.  These relationships were presented as risk networks 
with the DOORS program being proposed as a method of operationalising this activity on a project.  
In identifying the systemicity of risk and the clusters of risks which may not necessarily be obvious 
to the many multi-discipline practitioners working on a megaproject, the monetary value realised 
by clients and stakeholders of a project can be improved as designs can be refined and adjusted to 
avoid scenarios which would present significant risks resulting from risk networks.  Using an 
expected monetary value approach can yield a reasonable financial value for a risk network.  
Strategic decisions with respect to the definition of requirements that inform a design can be made 
based on this.  Figure 4.9 shows how the requirements management process detailed in Chapter 3 
relates to the risk networks presented in Chapter 4. 
 
Figure 4.9 The requirements management process and the risk networking process. 
 
 
SA 
VA  Document 
R 
R  R  R 
Risk 
Risk 
Risk 
Risk 
Value 
Management 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 4 
SA 
VA 
Satisfaction 
Argument 
 
Verification 
Argument 
 
R  Requirement 
Key Chapter 5  
Assessing Global and Elemental Risks 
  83
5 Assessing Global and Elemental Risks 
5.1 Background 
Risk management is not simply concerned with managing perceived threats, opportunities and their 
implications; it involves identifying and managing all the many sources of risks and uncertainty 
that give rise to and shape what is perceived as threats and opportunities to a project (Chapman and 
Ward, 2003; Hillson, 2002; Mun, 2006).  This involves exploring and understanding the origins of 
project risks and uncertainty before seeking to manage it with no preconceptions about whether it is 
desirable or not.  The main concern is whether a risk or uncertainty is important in a given project 
context and where it is not.  It has been recognised that risks and uncertainties that lie outside the 
technical aspects of a project can have a significant bearing on project success and possible project 
scenarios (Atkinson et al., 2006).  Such risks and uncertainties may typically lie in interfaces or 
external sources to a project such as political events and changes in project funding during 
development.  
These risks are in effect global and elemental risks and can significantly increase project 
costs (Baloi and Price, 2003).  Some of these risk factors are intrinsically related to the project 
practitioners that are solely responsible for their management, with others being related to the 
political, regulatory, economic, client, working interface, natural and business environments within 
which a project is developed.  The Mott MacDonald (2002) study defined some of these areas 
stating that they should all be addressed during the development of the project business case.  
Unfortunately, no guidance is given on how this should be done but several practitioners have 
produced work in this area by either identifying global and elemental risk factors and/or evaluating 
them (Ghosh and Jintanapakanont, 2004; Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006; Fortune and White, 2006; Pinto 
and Slevin, 1987; Pinto and Mantel,1990; Morris and Hough, 1987).  Traditionally, global and 
elemental risk factors have not been included in cost estimates for projects as they transcend the 
boundaries set by the allocation of financial and management responsibility, yet can have a large 
impact on the project.  Smith (2008) gives a valid definition of global and elemental risks, stating 
that global risks can be subdivided into four sections; political, legal, commercial and 
environmental.  Political risks typically include those relating to public inquiries and approvals to 
legal risks.  Commercial risks can include (amongst others) the wider aspects of supply and 
demand and consumer behaviour while environmental risks in a global sense are related to external 
interests and wider environmental issues.  Elemental risks as defined by Smith (2008) are those 
associated with elements of the project including implementation risks and operational risks which 
can be controlled or managed by project actors.        
The project risk register is the established method for holding and communicating technical 
and engineering risks to senior management and the project team.  Guidance for good practice in Chapter 5  
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the development of risk registers is held in the PRAM Guide (Simon et al., 1997) and chapter 11 of 
the PMBoK Guide (PMI, 2000) where risks are identified and the evaluation of the risk is made.  
Chapman (2006) is critical of these methods mainly for their common practice and not best practice 
intentions since they do not consider wider risk areas – the absence of which can lead to generally 
poor classification of risk on a project.  This is echoed in the views of other practitioners (Hillson, 
2002) who also state that a lack of external risk identification impacts on the identification of 
project opportunities.    
Ackermann et al. (2007) are also critical of the lack of risk and uncertainty coverage that 
project risk registers facilitate.  The engineering/technical risk data that risk registers tend to hold 
only considers a small proportion of project risks.  This leaves a large gap in the risk management 
process of a project as global and elemental risks and uncertainties are not considered whatsoever – 
the non-identification and management of which could lead to massive cost overruns.  It was stated 
by the National Audit Office (NAO, 2001) that 63% of all project risks (which subsequently 
impacted on a project) were not identified (and thus not accounted for) at the start of a project.  
Ackermann et al. (2007) attribute the non-inclusion of global risk factors in project risk registers to 
their inherent ‘soft’ nature.  Since there is no place for these risks in risk registers and given the 
lack of a forum for discussing their impacts, they are often ignored.  Additionally, since the 
classification of global and elemental risks requires a more subjective evaluation, the risk 
magnitude is not recorded due to the perceived difficulty in providing subjective judgements.  
Consideration of large rail projects (e.g. the West Coast mainline, JLE) shows that these global and 
elemental risks and uncertainties can not be ignored if cost overruns are to be avoided, and the 
subjective estimates that they require for classification must be adopted.     
Risk analysis at the early stages of a project can be difficult given the lack of information 
upon which risk analysis using modern quantitative techniques can be performed.  For techniques 
such as Monte Carlo simulation, sensitivity analysis, fault tree analysis and Programme Evaluation 
and Review Technique (PERT) to be effective, high quality data is needed.  Such data is rarely 
available at the early stages of a project, the same stages that commentators (Morris and Hough, 
1987; Pinto and Mantel, 1990; Fewings, 2005) describe as the point where project objectives and 
goals need to be confirmed for project success to be likely and overruns to be avoided.    
Given the difficulties presented by the subjective nature of assessing global and elemental 
risk factors during the design and planning phases, it is essential to develop and use separate risk 
analysis methods that can identify, make assessments and provide information for practitioners to 
manage a project through to the full business case and the start of construction.  Any risk 
information produced can then be processed and reliably applied to decision making and design 
development throughout the design process and this corresponds to the strategic, outline and full 
business cases of the business lifecycle (see figure 2.3, Chapter 2).  The identification and 
assessment of global and elemental risks before construction begins therefore enables practitioners: Chapter 5  
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•  To reduce the threat to achieving project goals and objectives in terms of safety, schedule, 
and budget (so that overruns can be avoided); 
•  To evaluate their impact on designs and planning; 
•  To refine project goals, objectives and priorities which may be affected by global and 
elemental risks; 
•  To gain more information so that estimates of cost and schedule can be improved;  
•  To develop adequate risk mitigation plans;  
•  To allow improved decisions to be made in light of significant risk associated with any 
global risk factor; 
 
In possessing such information regarding global and elemental risks, their potential impact on 
the project can be addressed during the design stage, before construction has started.  This is 
naturally cheaper than having to address the impact of the risk occurrence during construction since 
the mitigation is paper based.  In effect, risk mitigations required due to the assessments made for 
global and elemental risks can be incorporated into designs at a cost that is significantly less than 
that associated with incorporating the mitigation measures once construction has started.  
Assessments can however be made during construction and this could yield relevant data regarding 
risks with specific impacts on construction, but the interest of this work was to improve the 
assessment of risks pre-construction which could help inform of corrective actions before any 
irreversible commitments are made on a project.  Additionally, flexible designs can be generated 
prior to construction that can account for the occurrence of global and elemental risks during 
construction and these flexible designs can be built after construction has started if necessary.   
Chapter 6 considers real options theory as a process for risk mitigation during the 
construction stage since mitigating risks by refining designs during construction has difficulties due 
to the financial commitments made and the number of interfaces that exist between actors.  Real 
options thus enable the risk mitigations to be made to a tangible asset whereas the assessment of 
global and elemental risks proposed in this chapter enables the identification and assessment of 
such risks in order to develop a design that accounts for these risks before construction has started.  
The next section will consider the most appropriate process to assess global and elemental risks and 
will subsequently apply it to a case study.         
 
5.1.1 Identifying a process for assessing global risks 
Risk and uncertainty has many different sources and different types (Ackermann et al., 2007) and 
so the main objective of risk management is to reduce uncertainty and thus improve decision-
making.  The diversity in terms of different types of global and elemental risks and uncertainties 
makes the modelling process a very difficult task because the information concerning specific risks 
and uncertainties can be scarce.  Several formal techniques for evaluating the different types of risk Chapter 5  
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and uncertainty have been developed for decision making purposes where knowledge based 
systems (KBS) or decision support systems (DSS) have had considerable academic focus (see Tam 
et al., 2006).  Baloi and Price (2003) note that there has not been any consensus on the 
appropriateness of such techniques for evaluating global and elemental risk factors and that since 
there is no best theory for the documentation of uncertainty, the choice of theory depends wholly 
on the specifics of the problem under question.  Baloi and Price (2003) document what they 
consider to be the four main approaches that are used for handling uncertainty in KBS and DSS 
respectively, namely Probability Theory, Certainty Factor Theory, Dempster–Shafer Theory and 
Fuzzy Set Theory. 
  Probability theory is concerned with the analysis of random phenomena and has been used 
to model precisely described, repetitive experiments with observable outcomes.  However, not all 
uncertainty associated with a construction process is random, particularly those associated with 
management issues and strategic decision taking where outcomes are aligned more with cognitive 
behaviour rather than precise measurement of random behaviour.  Additionally, probability theory 
can not distinguish between randomness and ignorance.  The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence 
(Shafer, 1976) seeks to account for ignorance in probability definition where the addition of 
degrees of belief to probabilities can assist in adding confidence to the likelihood of various 
outcomes.  Uses for this theory are rare in the engineering environment due to its application being 
at an early stage (Oberkampf, 2005).  Certainty theory was formulated by Buchanan and Shortliffe 
(1984) to handle uncertainty in the medical expert system MYCIN (an expert system which 
diagnoses microbial infections).  Certainty theory requires the assignment of a number between -1 
and +1 to reflect the belief in an answer, where −1 represents complete certainty that a proposition 
is false and +1 represents complete certainty that a proposition is true.  Its application to the 
objectives of this work is limited in the same way as that of the Dempster-Shafer theory where the 
production and subsequent and interpretation of the required belief functions is difficult as a result 
of limited theoretical definition and practical application.    
  Fuzzy Set Theory is a branch of modern mathematics that was formulated by Zadeh (1965) 
(see Klir and Yuan, 1995) to model vagueness intrinsic to human cognitive processes.  Fuzzy Set 
Theory defines ‘set’ membership as a possibility distribution where some number of possibilities 
can be used to generate a single outcome by using a set function.  It therefore represents uncertainty 
by focusing on the ambiguities that describe events rather than the uncertainty about the occurrence 
of an event. 
It is, therefore, suitable for uncertain or approximate reasoning that involve the human 
intuitive thinking associated with subjective probability assessments common to risk and 
uncertainty assessment.  Fuzzy Set Theory uses linguistic variables and membership functions with 
varying grades to model uncertainty inherent in natural language.  The importance of fuzzy logic 
derives from the fact that most modes of human reasoning and especially common sense reasoning Chapter 5  
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are approximate in nature.  In recent years there has been an increase of its application in the 
construction industry (see Zeng et al., 2007; Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006; and Dikmen et al., 2007).   
 
5.1.2 Set Theory and it relevance to fuzziness 
As previously noted, the evaluation of risks and uncertainties is often based on the subjective 
assessment made by practitioners drawing on their judgement, experience and assumptions.  As a 
consequence, the evaluation of risk and uncertainty is somewhat cognitive in nature which presents 
elements of both ambiguity and vagueness to assessments (Kahneman et al., 1982; Klir and Folger, 
1988).  Ambiguity is a result of an expression or word having a number of interpretations where 
only the addition of a contextual aspect would assist in clarifying the real interpretation.  For 
example, a global risk factor “Quality of project management” does not have an exact meaning, 
because the qualifier “quality” may assume several degrees of intensity.  “Quality of project 
management” may involve a wide range of human perceptions, as there is no rigorous definition of 
what “Quality of project management” is.  Vagueness arises when the interpretation of an outcome 
can not be classified into a fixed set.  In other words, a vague interpretation is ill defined and lacks 
sharpness.  For example, even if ambiguity has been accounted for in an experiment where two 
independent respondents have given ‘good’ and ‘very good’ as replies, the limits of where ‘good’ 
ends and ‘very good’ begins remains undefined.  Baloi and Price (2003) define this vagueness as 
fuzziness which is a form of imprecision where the transition of an element between membership 
states (i.e. ‘good’ to ‘very good’) is gradual.  
Classical Set theory defines a set as collection of objects having a general property, for 
example, a set of clients (Baloi and Price, 2003).  Since the sets are rigid (the term ‘crisp’ is used in 
Fuzzy Logic terminology to represent rigid) in Classical Set theory, an element is therefore a 
member of the set or not (i.e. a person is a client or not).  In effect, there are no intermediate states 
which can account for element which lie in between full membership of a set and non-membership.  
Such an outlook is ubiquitous in systems and circuitry where binary logic (0 or 1) is straight 
representations of yes or no answers.  However, the reality of risk and uncertainties is that 
vagueness and ambiguity is prevalent due to the complexity that can exist and the human 
interaction that is required to account for them adequately.  
Fuzzy Set Theory can be used to tackle ill-defined and complex problems due to 
incomplete and imprecise information that characterise such real-world systems and can be 
recognised as an extension to the classical Boolean or binary logic (Baloi and Price, 2003).  
Fuzziness provides a gradual representation of the transition of an element from membership to 
non-membership of a state of a set rather than an abrupt transition associated with binary.  Thus, 
Fuzzy Set Theory allows adoption of the Classical Set concept to model complex or ill-defined 
activities such as risk and uncertainty assessment.  The main concepts associated with Fuzzy Set 
Theory, as applied to decision systems are; (from Baloi and Price, 2003) membership functions, Chapter 5  
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linguistic variable, natural language computation, linguistic approximation, fuzzy set arithmetic 
operations, set operations and fuzzy weighted average.  Details concerning these topics can be 
found in Klir and Yuan (1995) and relevant items are discussed in more detail in the next section. 
5.1.3 The concepts of fuzzy set theory 
This section is included in Appendix B and uses a simple example to convey the principles of 
Fuzzy Set Theory to the unfamiliar reader.    
 
 
5.2 Using Fuzzy Set Theory to Assess Global and Elemental Risks  
The fuzzy principles and methodology for global risk assessment presented in this chapter are 
based on the work of Zeng et al. (2007) and Dikmen et al. (2007).  The application of fuzzy 
reasoning techniques provides a systematic tool to deal with qualitative and quantitative 
information arising during the design process of a metro project where the magnitude of all global 
and elemental risk associated with a project can be assessed by considering two fundamental risk 
parameters, Risk Likelihood (RL) and Risk Impact (RI).  However, it should be noted that the 
magnitude of a particular global risk factor (e.g. client risk) is not only highly dependent on risk 
sub-factors within the same category (e.g. the client’s financial stability, their size, past history and 
past experience) but also the relationship between these sub-factors.  These relationships between 
the sub-factors are particularly difficult to measure and this ‘systemicity’ has been considered by 
Ackermann et al. (2007).  In order to assess the risks associated with the construction projects 
efficiently and effectively, a risk parameter called Factor Index (FI) is proposed by Zeng et al. 
(2007) which is more transparent in the way it measures the relationship between the risk factors 
compared to Ackermann et al. (2007).  The FI evaluates the project environment within which a 
risk exists by investigating the many associated factors which may include the identification of 
influential factors, the location of the risk within a hierarchy of risks and the measurement and 
prioritisation of these risks in this hierarchy. 
An analytical hierarchy process (AHP) is used to structure global and elemental risks for 
assessment.  AHP is a decision making technique that involves the pair-wise comparison of criteria 
and therefore is easy to understand which results in quick prioritisation of alternatives in a multi-
criteria setting (see Cheng, 1997; Al-Subhi Al-Harbi, 2001).  This section latterly considers an 
adapted AHP method proposed by Zeng et al. (2007) which can accommodate fuzzy numbers and 
is capable of representing pair-wise comparisons in a fuzzy inference process.  Global and 
elemental risks identified by brainstorming and research can subsequently be given a significance 
weighting using an AHP by subjective assessment.  
Using the fuzzy methodology proposed by Zeng et al. (2007), the FI can be combined with 
RL and RI and integrated into a fuzzy inference system which results in a Risk Magnitude (RM) Chapter 5  
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value representing the global and elemental risk associated with a project.  The RM is presented as 
a numerical score derived by a defuzzification operator in the fuzzy inference system where a 
linguistic term is also used in order to put the numerical score into a defined context.  
The Crossrail project is used as a case study with questionnaires being distributed to 
practitioners working on the project in order to gather information about the global and elemental 
risks associated with the project.  A comprehensive list of global and elemental risk factors 
associated with Crossrail is made in section 5.2.1 of this chapter.  The inputs to the fuzzy 
assessment methodology are practitioners’ assessments of the project environment within which 
each global and elemental risk sits as well as ratings for the likelihood of the risks occurring and 
the impact that the risk could have on budget and schedule.  The development of the questions used 
in a questionnaire is included in section 5.2.5 with a copy of the questionnaire used included in 
Appendix C.  It is also necessary to define a knowledge base which is based on experts’ knowledge 
of risk and acts as a repository of knowledge and heuristics used by professionals to solve 
problems.  The knowledge base is determined in this work through interviews with project 
personnel and is an integral part of the fuzzy inference phase of the fuzzy process used where if-
then rules are used to map relationships between FI, RL, RI and RM.  This is outlined in sections 
5.3, 5.4 and Appendix D.     
The output of the fuzzy methodology is a Risk Magnitude (RM) measurement of the global 
and elemental risks associated with a project.  This can help to inform on the most appropriate risk 
response strategies in the light of the level of global and elemental risks established and thus help 
practitioners take appropriate measures to manage global and elemental risks.  This can therefore 
increase the chances of a project being a success. 
 
5.2.1 The global and elemental risk factors associated with Crossrail 
To identify the significant global and elemental risk factors associated with Crossrail, a literature 
review was undertaken to establish risks that could be associated with such a project.  Fortune and 
White (2006) review 63 publications that focus on project critical success factors.  These 
publications draw on a variety of data sources, encompassing both theoretical and empirical studies 
of successful and unsuccessful projects.  Fortune and White go on to discuss the ranking that each 
publication they consider gives to common success factors and recognise the significant 
inconsistencies that exist in literature with regards to which success factors are the most important.  
The critical success factors identified by Fortune and White are used to inform of risks that could 
occur on Crossrail with the ranking discussed being ignored since this work uses an AHP process 
to place risks in a hierarchy.  Ghosh and Jintanapakanont (2004) identify significant risk factors for 
an underground rail project in Thailand where 59 variables were derived from an extensive 
literature search documented by the authors.  Faridi and El-Sayegh (2006) however used a 
questionnaire survey to define the most significant causes of delay in the UAE construction Chapter 5  
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industry.  While the use of a questionnaire without boundaries in this context could lead to a large 
cross-section of interpretations in responses, a list of 44 delay factors are identified which are 
somewhat consistent with the findings of Fortune and White (2006) and Ghosh and 
Jintanapakanont (2004).   
  The list of risks derived from literature was then evaluated to segregate risks that were 
appropriate to Crossrail from a small number that were irrelevant.  This evaluation was achieved 
through discussions between the author and professionals working on the Crossrail project.  To 
ensure that a thorough range of risks was retained, a case study type method was adopted where the 
forensic analysis of existing projects was used to evaluate whether the risk had any relevance to 
Crossrail.  In this case, the forensic analysis of previous projects worked on by the professionals 
(e.g. the Jubilee Line Extension) provided the author with a valuable means for identifying the 
relevant wide-ranging global and elemental risk types.  Global and elemental risks that were not 
relevant to the project were subsequently discarded.  Such risks would typically be geographic 
specific risks that had or would have no obvious link to Crossrail.  For example, the risk relating to 
war; earthquake damage; sandstorms; and extreme heat is minimal in London and so such risks 
could be eliminated from the list with simple reasoning.  Table 5.1 defines the 56 global and 
elemental risk factors identified for the Crossrail project and hence the risk factors upon which the 
fuzzy methodology for risk assessment is based.  Six broad risk areas are identified (defined as 
‘Level 1’ in table 5.1) under which more detailed risk areas (defined as ‘Level 2’ in table 5.1) are 
defined.  These lead to the definitions of the global and elemental risks which are defined as ‘Level 
3’.  Table 5.1 has been separated to classify the risks under the definitions of global risks and 
elemental risks as given by Smith (2008).  
Table 5.1 Global and elemental risk factors for Crossrail 
Elemental Risks 
Level 1  Level 2  Level 3 
Quality of subsurface conditions 
Quality of information held for the site 
Subsurface Design 
Interactions with existing underground assets 
  
Accommodating complex construction processes in design 
Accommodating the use of unproven engineering processes 
Understanding of complex design issues by other project parties 
Design Complexity 
Scheduling of sufficient time to include complexities in design 
  
Quality of data from construction contractors 
Accommodating design changes due to construction difficulties 
Accommodating the effects of construction contractors on design progress 
Contractor Involvement in Design 
Contractor expertise being involved at the appropriate stage 
  
Procedures for placing and negotiating changes 
A low number of changes in design scope 
Agreeing on design changes between project parties 
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Design Changes 
Development of a robust design 
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Table 5.1 continued 
 
Elemental Risks (continued)  
 
Level 1  Level 2  Level 3 
Quality of the design schedule 
Keeping to the design schedule 
Design Schedule 
Dealing with changes to the design schedule 
  
Release of information from project parties 
Access to sites for surveying 
Interfaces with 3
rd parties 
Interfaces 
Effective transfer of information between all relevant parties 
  
Development of a workable project programme 
3
rd parties conforming to the programme 
Getting regulatory approvals to materialise in time 
Project Programme 
Identifying time critical interfaces 
  
Having a clear and unchanged scope of work 
Clarity of risk transfer details 
Resolution of disputes between parties 
P
R
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U
R
E
M
E
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T
 
F
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R
S
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Contract 
Receiving timely payments for work done 
     
Level 1  Level 2  Level 3 
Organisation of Clients Team 
Allocation of responsibility within the clients team 
Ability of the client to procure the project 
Organisational Capability of Client 
Communication within the clients organisation 
   
Attitude and motivation of the clients' team 
Clients' project management skills 
C
L
I
E
N
T
 
F
A
C
T
O
R
S
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Client Characteristics 
Timely approval of work so that design can proceed 
     
Global Risks   
     
Level 1  Level 2  Level 3 
Identifying the quantity of construction material needed 
Planning the delivery of material to site 
Identifying the amount of labour needed for construction 
Resource Risks 
Recruitment of planning and design professionals 
   
Correct Knowledge of Health and Safety Standards 
Planning the safe removal of hazardous material from site 
Health and Safety 
Application of CDM regulations in design 
   
Planning the removal of spoil material from site 
Mitigating the effects of construction pollution 
Reducing the project's effect on the natural environment 
C
O
N
S
T
R
U
C
T
I
O
N
 
F
A
C
T
O
R
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Environment 
Reducing the effects of noise and pollution 
     
     
     
     Chapter 5  
Assessing Global and Elemental Risks 
  92
Table 5.1 continued   
   
Global Risks (continued)   
     
Level 1  Level 2  Level 3 
Accurate cost estimates 
Funding decisions being made to develop design 
Stability of financial markets 
E
C
O
N
O
M
I
C
 
F
A
C
T
O
R
S
 
(
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l
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s
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Financial 
Changes in scope being aligned with appropriate changes in budget 
    
Level 1  Level 2  Level 3 
Timely turn out of approvals by public bodies  Public Bodies 
Incorporating the outcomes of public consultation 
Support from major political parties 
G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
T
 
F
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C
T
O
R
S
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Political Issues 
Support from political stakeholders 
 
5.2.2 Definition of fuzzy set membership functions 
As described earlier, a fuzzy set is fully defined by its membership function.  How best to 
determine the membership function is a critical aspect of the application of Fuzzy Set Theory in 
certain applications. For most control applications the measurement functions that are defined are 
easily identifiable.  For other applications they will have to be determined by knowledge 
acquisition from an expert or group of experts.  The approach adopted for acquiring the shape of 
any particular membership function is often dependent on the application.  For most fuzzy logic 
control problems, the assumption is that the membership functions are linear, usually in a triangular 
shape although trapezoidal and S-shaped membership functions are common (Sii et al., 2001).  
However for many other applications, triangular membership functions are not appropriate as they 
do not represent accurately the linguistic terms being modelled and so will have to be elicited 
directly from the expert, by a statistical approach or by automatic generation of the shapes.  
There are various statistical techniques for determining the membership functions. 
Watanabe (1979) asserts that these fall into two broad categories: the use of frequencies or by 
direct estimation.  Put simply, the frequency method obtains a membership function by measuring 
the percentage of people in a group (typically experts in a particular domain) who answer yes to a 
question about whether an object belongs to a particular set.  Direct estimation methods take a 
different approach by asking experts to grade an event on a scale and refining the parameters of a 
membership function using an algorithm (see Pham and Darwish (2009)).  Watanabe conducted 
some experiments on the two approaches and concluded that the use of direct estimation methods is 
the better of the two.  These two methods are covered by Turksen (1991) in a review of the various 
methods and research into the acquisition of membership functions.  In particular he considers four 
different approaches: direct rating, polling, set valued statistics and reverse rating.   
However, Sii et al. (2001) note that triangular and trapezoidal measurement functions are 
the most frequently used in project risk management and so the issues to be determined are the Chapter 5  
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linguistic terms that define the triangular and trapezoidal measurement functions.  These linguistic 
terms are usually based on the experiment controller’s experience and/or are generated 
automatically.  If linguistic terms are used then the measurement functions can be characterised in 
the universe of discourse in which the linguistic variable is defined.  In effect, the fuzzy 
measurement functions can be arranged to represent the linguistic terms equally.  For example, 
Zeng et al. (2007) use two separate groups of five linguistic terms to define the Factor Index (FI), 
Risk Likelihood (RL) and Risk Impact (RI).  These linguistic terms
13 each have an associated fuzzy 
set measurement function as shown in figure 5.1 where the numerical scores are defined and 
discussed in a later section of this chapter.  The output measurement function representing the Risk 
Magnitude (RM) takes the form of a trapezoidal measurement function.  Again, this is based on the 
work of Zeng et al. (2007) where the definition of four linguistic terms to represent the threat to the 
project is ideally defined for application on Crossrail.  The terms ‘Negligible’, ‘Minor’, ‘Major’ 
and ‘Critical’ are natural linguistic terms that are used by practitioners when describing the 
significance of a risk or group of risks on such a project.  Figure 5.2 shows the measurement 
functions for Risk Magnitude (RM) that are used in this work. 
          
Figure 5.1 Measurement Functions for the scoring system (Factor Index, Risk Likelihood and Risk 
Impact)  
 
Figure 5.2 Measurement functions for Risk Magnitude  
 
  The Factor Index (FI), Risk Impact (RI), Risk Likelihood (RL) and Risk Magnitude (RM) 
are defined in the next section. 
                                                      
13 Scoring for Risk Likelihood (RL) and Risk Impact (RI) is; VL - Very Low; L - Low; M - Medium; H - 
High; VH - Very high;  
Scoring for FI, Factor Index is; VP - Very poor; P - Poor; F - Fair; G - Good; VG - Very good;  
Scoring for Risk Magnitude (RM) is; N, Negligible; Mi, Minor; Ma, Major; C, critical 
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5.2.3 Factor Index (FI), Risk Impact (RI), Risk Likelihood (RL) and Risk Magnitude (RM)            
The FI was constructed so that risks could be assessed at the correct level where in the context of 
this work the FI hierarchy has three levels (as shown in figure 5.3).  In effect, the analysis of where 
risk factors lie in a hierarchy had already been made for the questionnaire respondents with the 
only requirement placed on them being the need to compare each risk factor within set levels (i.e. 
Levels 1, 2 or 3).  Figure 5.3 is a section of the FI hierarchy showing certain Design Factor risks 
from table 5.1.  Calculating values for the FI required practitioners to evaluate (by scoring) the 
project environment within which each global and elemental risk factor existed by considering the 
project conditions including the projects’ ability to deal with the respective risk factor.  
Practitioners were also required to provide pair-wise comparisons between each of the risk factors 
at each level in order to derive a level of importance for each risk within the hierarchy.  For 
simplicity, direct pair-wise comparisons were not made between risk factors lying in different risk 
categories at the third level (i.e. Level 3 risks defined in table 5.1).  This was done for practical 
reasons where pilot questionnaires showed that such comparisons would add to the requirements 
placed on questionnaire respondents and could impact on the quality of the outcomes.  Comparison 
between categories was however required at the first and second levels of the hierarchy.   
   
Figure 5.3 A Factor Index hierarchy for selected Design Factor risks 
 
  The Risk Impact (RI) was a measure of the effect that the risk factor under consideration 
could have on the delivery of Crossrail within budget and schedule at or around the time of the 
survey.  Similarly, Risk Likelihood (RL) was a measure of the likelihood of the risk occurring at 
the time of the survey.  The Risk Magnitude (RM) was an output based on the FI, RI and RL by 
which practitioners could assess the extent of the level of the global and elemental risk associated 
with Crossrail.  Upon analysis of the FI, RL and RI inputs, the RM could be used to inform of any 
strategies that may be needed in order for the project to avoid or mitigate any significant global or 
Factor Index (FI) 
Design Changes 
Design Factor Risks 
Procedures for placing and negotiating changes 
A low number of changes in design scope 
Agreeing on design changes between project parties 
Development of a robust design 
Level 3 
Level 2 
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elemental risks.  Individual risks could also be identified by consideration of the results obtained 
from the questionnaire survey. 
 
5.2.4 Sample selection and weighting of respondents’ contributions 
The evaluation of global and elemental risks required the establishment of a group of experts with 
knowledge of the risks to be evaluated.  The assessment proposed for Crossrail involved the 
identification of around 60 individuals who were working on the design or planning of the 
Crossrail project with each expert being given an identification Em where m was the experts’ 
identity number.  The aim of this sample size was to obtain as many responses as possible from 
experts who were working on aspects of the project where the identified global and elemental risks 
existed.  This would allow sufficient coverage of the risks by the maximum number of experts that 
were available on the Crossrail project to give responses.  Assessment groups containing 5 
individuals each were then established where those with similar professional roles (e.g. project 
manager, senior engineers, planners etc.) were deliberately placed in separate groups.  This allowed 
each group of 5 experts to have a cross section of different professional roles.  This would assist in 
the completion of assessments for all six areas of global and elemental risk defined in table 5.1 
since each group of 5 would contain an expert element which could evaluate each of the global and 
elemental risks from the perspective of their individual profession and specific experiences.  
Combining assessments from each of the 5 experts within each group could then be used to provide 
a collective evaluation of the global and elemental risks from a cross-section of experts.   
Since the questionnaires required a reasonable amount of time for consideration and 
completion, the questionnaire surveys were split in some cases to contain certain global risk 
categories out of the six categories defined as ‘Level 1’ in table 5.1.  This allowed some experts to 
make responses for certain risk areas in a shorter space of time.  The partial responses from these 
experts were then combined to form one whole questionnaire with the varying levels of experience 
of the respondents being accounted for.   
  Since different experts had a varying amount of knowledge regarding a risk or an area 
within which global and elemental risks existed, a weighting factor was used in the analysis to 
account for this.  Zeng et al. (2007) describe this as a ‘contribution factor’ (cfm) where the totality 
of the weighting for a group of 5 experts is 1 and each expert is allocated a percentage weighting 
within this as appropriate (i.e., cf1 + cf2 +…+ cfm =1).  This work required questionnaire 
respondents to specify their number of year’s experience from which a contribution factor was 
inferred.  The authors’ subjective judgement was used to infer a percentage value to represent each 
expert’s contribution factor.  This was achieved by considering the experience, knowledge and 
expertise of each expert within each group of 5 experts and assigning a numerical (percentage) 
value which represented their contribution to the evaluation process.  For example, if expert E1 
recorded 30 years experience; E2 19 years; E3 12 years; E4 18 years; and E5 6 years then the author Chapter 5  
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could make a subjective judgement and allocate a contribution factor value (cfm) of 26% to E1; 22% 
to E2; 17% to E3; 21% to E4; and 14% to E5.   This subjective judgement was informed and based 
upon the number of years experience that each expert had given as a response to simple 
demographic questions at the start of the questionnaire and information available to the author with 
respect to the knowledge and expertise that each respondent had (e.g. in the form of curriculum 
vitae’s and knowledge gained from working alongside the respondents on Crossrail).  The result 
was that experts with more experience could have greater influence on the evaluation process 
where the extent of this influence could be determined using the experts’ years of experience and 
knowledge gained from information available to the author.        
 
5.2.5 Global and elemental risk questionnaire design   
Defining the Questions 
The risk questionnaire used closed format questions that were based on the linguistic and numeric 
scoring systems defined by the fuzzy membership functions shown in section 5.2.2.  In requiring 
respondents to provide answers according to these scoring systems, data could be collated and 
processed easily for all groups of 5 experts and subsequently for the collective response given by 
the whole sample of respondents.  Closed format questions also allowed scores to be tracked over 
time and this was identified as an aspect that would enable the questionnaire to be applied at 
various stages of the project lifecycle.  Finally, closed format questions enabled unclear and/or 
unprompted answers which often occur when using open format questions to be avoided. 
  Phrasing was a key issue within the questionnaire where questions seeking to gather 
information for the Factor Index (FI) consistently featured the words ‘performance’ and ‘quality’.  
This was identified as a means to gain responses that were conductive to evaluating the project 
environment within which the global and elemental risk existed.  The wording of the questions was 
extensively revised along with the placement of intermediate wording into the questions as a way 
of reducing ambiguity.  In addition, pointers were placed after some questions to assist the 
respondent in their interpretation of the question.  For example, the question asking about the 
performance of the project with regards to its interactions with existing underground assets is 
contextualised by a pointer that suggests “a low number of interactions would be good”.  While 
confirming to respondents that fewer interactions is generally a good thing on a project, this pointer 
also avoids the creation of a leading question in that its wording is set in an informative sense.   
The three assessments to be completed for each global and elemental risk presented in the 
questionnaire are detailed below.  
5.2.5.1  Step 1 
The first part of the assessment to be made in order to establish the Factor Index is outlined below.  
Each expert was required to assess the project environment within which each the global and Chapter 5  
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elemental risk factor existed at the lowest level of the Factor Index (i.e. Level 3 of table 5.1)) using 
the score system provided.  This evaluation was made on the basis of the experts’ knowledge and 
experience of the project environment within which the global or elemental risk factor under 
question existed.  As is specified below, an experts’ response could take the form of a linguistic 
term or a range of numerical responses according to their preferences.  Descriptions of the 
linguistic terms were provided to assist respondents in their interpretation of them.  This resulted in 
consistency being maintained across the questionnaires circulated to the sample of respondents.   
Responses could be provided by;  
•  Circling a linguistic term from very poor, poor, fair, good, very good 
or 
•  Circling a single number or a range of numbers on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is very poor 
and 10 is very good  
 
The examples provided below show the different ways of completing Step 1.  Numerical and 
linguistic scales were provided throughout the questionnaire;    
  
i)  Linguistic terms could be circled if the respondent preferred these to numerical terms  
 
 
ii)  Circling a single number   
 
iii) Circling a range of numbers 
 
iv)  Circling a range of numbers and identifying the most likely   
 
Table 5.2 Descriptions of linguistic terms  
Term General  interpretation 
Very Poor (VP)  Project environment within which risk factor exists is very poor 
Poor (P)  Project environment within which risk factor exists is poor 
Fair (F)  Project environment within which risk factor exists is fair 
Good (G)  Project environment within which risk factor exists is good 
Very Good (VG)  Project environment within which risk factor exists is very good 
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5.2.5.2  Step 2 
A second aspect of establishing the Factor Index (FI) involved an analytical hierarchy process 
(AHP) to establish the most important risk factor defined under each Level 2 global and elemental 
risk shown in table 5.1.  Respondents were required to rate the importance of the risk factors.  This 
could be achieved by identifying on a scale which of two given risk factors was more important, 
and by how much.  A typical pair-wise comparison used in a AHP requires respondents to select a 
number on a scale between 1 and 9 in order to present the priority that one factor has over another 
(Saaty and Vargas, 2000).  Therefore, if a factor Y is weakly more important than factor X, then it 
is given a score of 3.  If the importance of Y is even more important than X then higher numbers on 
the scale can be used to represent this (e.g. if Y is very strongly more important than X, then the 
number 7 can be selected and so on).  If a reverse situation is true where X is more important than 
Y, then respondents can again represent this with a numerical term although in analysis this number 
is presented as a reciprocal.  For example, if X is strongly more important than Y, a score of 5 is 
given which is then reciprocated to 1/5 for analysis.   
An example is provided in below using factors ‘X’ and ‘Y’.  In this example it can be seen 
that factor ‘Y’ is weakly more important than ‘X’ by selecting a value of ‘3’.  As in step 1, a single 
value or a range of values can be circled. 
X   Y 
The numerical scale for Step 2 is defined as follows;   
• A score of 1 would mean that the risk factors are of equal importance 
• A score of 3 would mean that a risk factor is weakly more important 
• A score of 5 would mean that a risk factor is strongly more important 
• A score of 7 would mean that a risk factor is very strongly more important  
• A score of 9 would mean that a risk factor is absolutely more important  
• 2,4,6,8 are intermediates. 
 
A problem arises with pair-wise comparison if an expert cannot decide on an exact value 
which represents the level of importance.  This may be due to the expert having knowledge about 
different situations on the project under question where the importance of the factors (in their view) 
may vary.  In this case, a standard AHP can be discarded for a fuzzy AHP as proposed by Zeng et 
al. (2007).  The use of fuzziness to define comparisons can however introduce an element of 
consistency in comparisons where ranges of numbers may always be similar resulting in the 
dampening of comparisons (Ruoning and Xiaoyan, 1992).  To rectify this, Zeng et al. (2007) 
propose the use of a fuzzy AHP only for comparison of the global risk factors where experts give a 
range of numbers to define the importance (and thus higher priority) of one risk factor over 
another.  Experts can therefore circle a number or a range of numbers on the pair-wise comparison 
scale.  In adopting the approach of Zeng et al. (2007), experts’ comparisons can then be converted Chapter 5  
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into uniform fuzzy numbers for all comparisons with fuzzy aggregation being used to obtain single 
number representing the comparison for each risk factor.  This therefore allows experts to select 
numerous numbers in their comparisons in the questionnaire with subsequent manipulation giving 
a single number to represent the comparisons for analysis.  
5.2.5.3  Step 3 
Respondents were required to evaluate the Risk Impact (RI) and Risk Likelihood (RL) for each 
category of factors according to their knowledge and experience of the Crossrail project.  The 
measurement of RI and RL was arranged in a similar manner to that used in Step 1 to evaluate the 
Factor Index.  Closed format questions were used with the same concepts being applied to their 
formulation with particular attention being given to the clarity and the avoidance of ambiguity.  
Respondents were asked to rate the impact that the risk would have should it occur and the 
likelihood of it occurring.  These likelihoods and impacts were to be based on how well the project 
had addressed the risk at the time of the survey.  This in effect gave a view of how well the risks 
were being managed and consequently, should the questionnaire be applied at certain points during 
the project lifecycle, show whether the risks were being mitigated as the project moved forward.  
Descriptions of the linguistic terms were provided to assist respondents in their interpretation of 
them.       
The impact and likelihood of each risk factor could be scored using either; 
•  A linguistic term from very low, low, medium, high and very high; 
or  
•  Numerical values in a range of 0 to 10 where 0 is very low and 10 is very high. When 
using numerical values, a choice was possible of either stating a precise value or using a 
range of numerical values as outlined in Step 1.  
 
The examples provided below show the different ways of completing Step 3.  
i)  Circling a linguistic term as in Step 1 
 
ii)  Circling a single number or a range of numbers as in Step 1 
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Table 5.3 Descriptions of Risk Impact and Risk Likelihood 
Description of Risk Impact  General Interpretation 
Very Low (VL)  Negligible increase in costs  
Low (L)  >1% increase in costs 
Medium (M)  >5% increase in costs 
High (H)  >15% increase in costs 
Very High (VH)  >40% increase in costs 
  
Description of Risk Likelihood  General Interpretation  Probability  
Very Low (VL)  Very unlikely to happen  <1% 
Low (L)  Occurrence is unlikely  >1% 
Medium (M)  Likely to occur  >10% 
High (H)  Very likely to occur  >50% 
Very High (VH)  Occurrence is almost inevitable  >90% 
 
 
Refining the Questions 
The design of the questionnaire involved two related issues.  The first was to ensure that the 
language used was both clear and unambiguous and not specific to a negative aspect of the 
Crossrail project.  The sample of respondents was multi-national and multilingual and therefore 
questions had to be understood by a wide range of participants.  Questions also had to be laid out in 
a manner that would obtain the required response without being too detailed as to enable a few 
respondents to reply and alienate others by their natural lack of knowledge about the subject.  
Ensuring that people from different professions within the construction industry could understand 
the questions was of paramount importance and this required the questionnaire to be piloted on a 
research team in the first instance.  This first pass revealed differences in interpretation which 
required tightening up of the language used in the questionnaire.  A second pilot on construction 
professionals yielded further need for word changes which was seen as very important since this 
second pilot gave insight into how the survey would actually perform with professionals. 
  The second issue was to consider the type of responses that were required from the 
questionnaire.  The questionnaire required respondents to evaluate the project environment within 
which each risk factor existed and then provide pair-wise comparisons between these risk factors.  
In asking for an opinion on an aspect of the Crossrail project, a straight yes/no answer was not 
desired as this would not yield a measure of the risk parameter being considered.  The inclusion of 
numerical scales (as shown in figures 5.1 and 5.2) was found to help respondents define their 
answers while removing any uncertainty they may have had regarding how they would articulate 
their own knowledge.  These issues were identified and addressed through piloting the 
questionnaire (as with the languaging).     
The inclusion of numerical scales as well as linguistic terms was found to be crucial and of 
great benefit to the questionnaire survey.  The numerical scales helped put the linguistic terms into 
context and as such ensured that respondents understood the meaning (or significance) of selecting 
the linguistic terms as responses.  For example, by providing a numerical scale, ‘Very Low’ Risk Chapter 5  
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Likelihood could be quantified since the fuzzy set measurement function for ‘Very Low’ covered 
the numerical scale values of 0-2.5, as shown in figure 5.1.  This resulted in consistency where 
respondents could relate the linguistic terms to a numerical value.  This was also very helpful 
considering the questionnaire’s distribution in an engineering environment.  In effect, the linguistic 
scales and numerical scales relied on each other to get the desired response from the questionnaire.   
Each questionnaire respondent was supervised by the author to ensure that they understood 
the scoring system and this only improved the consistency of responses received across a range of 
professionals.  The method of deriving useable data from these scores is defined in a later section 
and is based on standardised trapezoidal fuzzy numbers (STFNs) as utilised by Zeng et al. (2007).     
 
 
5.3 Fuzzy Reasoning to Evaluate Global Risks  
This section outlines the arithmetic and conceptual background of the fuzzy methodology used to 
evaluate the global risks for Crossrail.  The fuzzy methodology is based on that proposed by Zeng 
et al. (2007) since the risk assessment methodology proposed by these authors is ideal for assessing 
global and elemental risks associated with megaprojects such as Crossrail.  It is also appropriate for 
dealing with ill-defined situations meaning that more global risks could be accounted for in the 
methodology should they become apparent at any point during the design and planning stages of a 
project.  In addition to documenting a fuzzy methodology, Zeng et al. (2007) provide an excellent 
illustrative example which enables the reader to gain a sound grasp of what its being achieved by 
the fuzzy methodology.  Dikmen et al. (2007) in comparison do not give sufficient details of the 
fuzzy approaches to risk assessment that they use and this disadvantages the reader.  They do 
however provide an example but the absence of underlying theory does not allow the reader to fully 
understand the processes used.  Lin and Chen (2004) use a fuzzy methodology for decision making 
with regards to project bids.  A description of the fuzzy methodology used by the authors is given 
although in comparison with Zeng et al. (2007), it only covers certain aspects of what is required in 
an entire fuzzy methodology.  Elements of the fuzzy methodology used by Zeng et al. (2007) was 
therefore identified as the most appropriate to follow for the needs of this work.   
 
5.3.1 Manipulating the questionnaire responses 
The respondents to questionnaires were allowed to provide any form of score they wanted when 
assessing the project environment within which each the global and elemental risk factor existed 
(see section 5.2.5.1).  This could have been a linguistic term (e.g. ‘High’); a single numerical value 
(e.g. ‘5’); a range of values, e.g. ‘4,6’ meaning that the score could be anywhere between 4 and 6 
on the measurement scales provided; or an extended range of numbers, e.g. ‘4,6,7’ where the score 
could be anywhere between 4 and 7 with the most likely being 6.  To account for the different Chapter 5  
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scores recorded in questionnaires responses, a process was required to manipulate the values into a 
uniform structure that could be used in the fuzzy inference system.  Zeng et al., (2007) use 
standardised trapezoidal fuzzy numbers (STFNs) to achieve this by taking each score in a 
questionnaire and transforming it into a four digit number.  STFNs can be built to represent each 
response received within the questionnaire by manipulating the subjective judgement that forms the 
response.  Figure 5.4 (taken from Zeng et al., 2007) shows the theoretical definition of a STFN 
where a
l, a
m, a
n and a
u represent the transformation of scores within the universe of the STFN 
where 0 ≤ a
l ≤ a
m ≤ a
n ≤ a
u ≤ 10 (with 0-10 being the numeric scores in the universe (U) of the 
STFN).  If a
l = a
m = a
n = a
u, a STFN is a single numerical value; when a
l = a
m and a
n = a
u, a STFN 
is a range of numerical values; when a
m = a
n, a STFN becomes an extended range.  For example, 
using this scoring process, a singe numerical score of ‘7’ would become a STFN of ‘7 7 7 7’; a 
score of ‘5,7’ would become ‘5 5 7 7’; and a score of ‘5,6,7’ would become a STFN of ‘5 6 6 7’.  
Linguistic terms were converted to STFNs using pre-defined values where the measurement 
functions themselves were used to define the numerical values.  For example, ‘medium’ would 
become an STFN of ‘2.5 5 5 7.5’ based on figure 5.1.  The pre-defined values are given in table 5.4   
         Figure 5.4 Defining a STFN from scores given as responses in questionnaires 
 
5.3.2 The Fuzzy Process for Measuring the global and elemental risk 
Appendix D details the mathematical process for establishing the Factor Index using the evaluation 
of the project environment within which each global risk factor exists and also the weighting of the 
risk factors using the AHP and pair-wise comparisons.  It also details how the mathematical 
process for establishing Risk Impact and Risk Likelihood of risk factors.  Finally, details of the 
mathematical process for combining the outputs of the Factor Index, Risk Likelihood and Risk 
Impact in a fuzzy inference system are described.  This gives a measure of the overall global and 
elemental Risk Magnitude.  The next section applies this process to the outputs of the questionnaire 
to find the Risk Magnitude of the global and elemental risks associated with Crossrail.    
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5.4 Application of the Fuzzy Process to Crossrail 
42 useable questionnaire replies were returned which were equivalent to 30 full questionnaires.  
Questionnaires for partial completion were targeted at certain experts by the author in order for 
them to provide assessments on certain global and elemental risk areas.  This was allowed for as 
discussed in section 5.2.4.   
  The questionnaires were distributed to pre-defined groups of experts and so with 30 full 
replies this gave 6 groups of 5 Experts to carry forward into the assessment and analysis phase.  
The outputs of the application of the mathematical process outlined in section 5.3 and Appendix D 
is detailed below where the results from one group of five experts are used for illustration purposes. 
The outcomes of the questionnaire surveys as a whole are however used to establish the Risk 
Magnitude for Crossrail.    
Prior to documenting the questionnaire responses, table 5.4 details the contribution of each 
expert as well as providing descriptions of the parameters used for assessment.  
Table 5.4 Descriptions of FI, RL, RI, and RM and cfm for experts in the group
14 
Experts  Background  Contribution Factors (cf) 
E1 Project  Manager  C1 = 0.26 
E2 Construction  Planner  C2 = 0.22 
E3 Engineering  Consultant  C3 = 0.19 
E4 Civil  Engineer  C4 = 0.17 
E5 Structural/Tunnel  Engineer  C5 = 0.16 
Total   C 1+C2+C3+C4+C5=1 
    
Description of FI  General interpretation  FI measurement function 
Very Poor (VP)  Project environment within which risk factor exists is very poor  (0.0, 0.0, 2.5) 
Poor (P)  Project environment within which risk factor exists is poor  (0.0, 2.5, 5.0) 
Fair (F)  Project environment within which risk factor exists is fair  (2.5, 5.0, 7.5) 
Goog (G)  Project environment within which risk factor exists is good  (5.0, 7.5, 10.0) 
Very Good (VG)  Project environment within which risk factor exists is very good  (7.5, 10.0, 10.0) 
    
Description of RL  General Interpretation  RL measurement function 
Very Low (VL)  Very unlikely to happen  (0.0, 0.0, 2.5) 
Low (L)  Occurrence is unlikely  (0.0, 2.5, 5.0) 
Medium (M)  Likely to occur  (2.5, 5.0, 7.5) 
High (H)  Very likely to occur  (5.0, 7.5, 10.0) 
Very High (VH)  Occurrence is almost inevitable  (7.5, 10.0, 10.0) 
    
Description of RI  General Interpretation  RI measurement function 
Very Low (VL)  Negligible increase in costs   (0.0, 0.0, 2.5) 
Low (L)  >1% increase in costs  (0.0, 2.5, 5.0) 
Medium (M)  >5% increase in costs  (2.5, 5.0, 7.5) 
High (H)  >15% increase in costs  (5.0, 7.5, 10.0) 
Very High (VH)  >40% increase in costs  (7.5, 10.0, 10.0) 
    
Description of RM  General Interpretation  RM measurement function 
Negligible (N)  Risk is acceptable  (0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 3.0) 
Minor (Mi)  The risk is tolerable - risk controls should be undertaken if possible  (1.0, 3.0, 4.0, 6.0) 
Major (Ma)  Risk must be reduced if it is reasonably practicable to do so  (4.0, 6.0, 7.0, 9.0) 
Critical (C)  Risk must be reduced save in exceptional circumstances  (7.0, 9.0, 10.0, 10.0) 
                                                      
14 Zeng et al. (2007) describe a table similar to this Chapter 5  
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5.4.1 Calculating the Factor Index (FI) 
Table 5.4 shows the numerical STFN values representing the linguistic terms detailed previously in 
figure 5.4.  Table 5.5 shows how the experts within a group assessed and scored the project 
environment for the procurement risks identified as global and elemental risks.  The reader will 
note how the scoring system outlined in section 5.2.5.1 allowed the experts to provide responses in 
various forms with linguistic terms, single numbers or ranges of numbers being used.  The STFNs 
representing the scores could then be aggregated to give an aggregated STFN score for the group. 
The aggregations of scores in table 5.5 could be calculated by equation D.1 from Appendix 
D.  For example, the aggregation of ‘Identifying Time Critical Interfaces’ under the Project 
Programme risk category is calculated by  = [(3,3,3,3) ×0.26 + (5,5,5,5) × 0.22 + (6,6,6,6) ×0.19 + 
(5,5,5,5) × 0.17 + (4,6,6,7) × 0.16] = (4.5100, 4.5100, 4.8300, 4.9900) 
15.   Aggregated scores could 
be obtained in the same way for all risk factors shown in ‘Level 3’ of table 5.1.   
The pair-wise comparisons of the risks in the ‘Project Programme’ category detailed in 
table 5.5 are shown in table 5.6.  The aggregation of STFN scales could be calculated by equation 
D.2 from Appendix D.  For example, the STFN scale of comparing ‘Deployment of a workable 
project programme’ with ‘Identifying Time Critical Interfaces’ can be aggregated by a
*
14 = (1,1,1,1) 
× 0.26 + (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5) × 0.22 + (0.33, 0.33, 0.33, 0.33) × 0.19 + (0.33, 0.33, 0.33, 0.33) × 0.17 
+ (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25) × 0.16 = (0.5299, 0.5299, 0.5299, 0.5299).   
While the calculations in table 5.6 show the comparisons for risk factors at the lowest level 
in the Factor Index (i.e. Level 3 as shown in table 5.1), comparisons of the higher risk factor 
categories was also required to allow the relative weight of each risk factor at the lowest level to be 
calculated.  In effect, pair-wise comparisons were completed for Level 2 and Level 1 categories.  
While the comparisons made for these categories are not shown in this section, the relative weights 
for the ‘Procurement Factor’ risks can be seen under the Level 1 and 2 risk headings shown in table 
5.5. 
The pair-wise comparisons were completed for all categories of risk in Level 3 of the 
Factor Index with equation D.3 from Appendix D being used to defuzzify the aggregated STFN 
scores.  Table 5.6 shows the individual defuzzification of the aggregated STFNs of each 
comparison.  The pair-wise comparison matrix defined by equation D.4 from Appendix D could be 
used to calculate the weights of each risk factor as shown in matrix A below. 
⎪
⎪
⎭
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⎪
⎬
⎫
⎪
⎪
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⎪
⎪
⎨
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= =
0000 . 1 4630 . 0 4630 . 0 8872 . 1
4300 . 2 0000 . 1 9259 . 0 9698 . 3
1600 . 2 0800 . 1 0000 . 1 9796 . 3
5299 . 0 2519 . 0 2513 . 0 0000 . 1
Risks   Programme Project  , ij a A  
Figure 5.5 Matrix of defuzzified values for the Project Programme risk pair-wise comparisons 
                                                      
15 As an example, the aggregated score 4.8300 is calculated by (3×0.26) + (5×0.22) + (6×0.19) + (5×0.17) + 
(6×0.16) = 4.8300 Chapter 5  
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Table 5.5 Factor Index scores, STFN conversions and STFN aggregations 
Evaluation                      Aggregated  STFN  Procurement 
Factor Risks 
Level 1 Risk 
 
Weight = 0.238 
  
E1 (0.26)      E2 (0.22)      E3 (0.19)      E4  (0.17)    E5 (0.16)     
Level 2 Risks  Level 3 Risks 
Score Converted 
STFN 
 Score Converted 
STFN 
 Score Converted 
STFN 
 Score  Converted 
STFN 
 Score Converted 
STFN 
 
Quality of the design schedule  Good (5,7.5,7.5,10)   (4,7)  (4,4,7,7)   (5,8)  (5,5,8,8)    6  (6,6,6,6)   6  (6,6,6,6)  (5.1100, 5.7600, 6.9900, 7.6400) 
Keeping to the design schedule  Good  (5,7.5,7.5,10)   5  (5,5,5,5)   6  (6,6,6,6)   6  (6,6,6,6)    6  (6,6,6,6)  (5.5200, 6.1700, 6.1700, 6.8200) 
Design Schedule 
 
 
Weight = 0.30  Dealing with changes to the design schedule  Fair (2.5,5,5,7.5)   4  (4,4,4,4)    (3,5)  (3,3,5,5)    4  (4,4,4,4)    3  (3,3,3,3)  (3.2600, 3.9100, 4.2900, 4.9400) 
                          
Release of information from project parties  Fair (2.5,5,5,7.5)    (4,5)  (4,4,5,5)    (4,6)  (4,4,6,6)    5  (5,5,5,5)    4  (4,4,4,4)  (3.7800, 4.4300, 5.0300, 5.6800) 
Access to sites for surveying  (3,4) (3,3,4,4)    2  (2,2,2,2)    (2,3) (2,2,3,3)    2  (2,2,2,2)    3  (3,3,3,3)  (2.4200, 2.4200, 2.8700, 2.8700) 
Interfaces with 3
rd party services  (4,5) (4,4,5,5)    3  (3,3,3,3)    4  (4,4,4,4)    3  (3,3,3,3)    3  (3,3,3,3)  (3.4500, 3.4500, 3.7100, 3.7100) 
Interfaces 
 
 
 
Weight = 0.37 
Effective transfer of info. between all relevant parties  4 (4,4,4,4)    4  (4,4,4,4)    (4,5)  (4,4,5,5)    4  (4,4,4,4)    4  (4,4,4,4)  (4.0000, 4.0000, 4.1900, 4.1900) 
                          
Development of a workable project programme  Good  (5,7.5,7.5,10)   5  (5,5,5,5)   6  (6,6,6,6)   6  (6,6,6,6)    4  (4,4,4,4)  (5.2000, 5.8500, 5.8500, 6.5000) 
3
rd parties conforming to the programme  4  (4,4,4,4)    2  (2,2,2,2)   4  (4,4,4,4)   Poor  (0,2.5,2.5,5)    3  (3,3,3,3)  (2.7200, 3.1450, 3.1450, 3.5700) 
Getting regulatory approvals to materialise in time  3  (3,3,3,3)    4  (4,4,4,4)   3  (3,3,3,3)   3  (3,3,3,3)   (2,3)  (2,2,3,3)  (3.0600, 3.0600, 3.2200, 3.2200) 
Project 
Programme 
 
 
Weight = 0.22 
Identifying time critical interfaces  3  (3,3,3,3)    5  (5,5,5,5)   6  (6,6,6,6)   5  (5,5,5,5)  (4,6,7) (4,6,6,7)  (4.5100, 4.5100, 4.8300, 4.9900) 
                          
Having a clear and unchanged scope of work  3 (3,3,3,3)    (2,3)  (2,2,3,3)    3  (3,3,3,3)    2  (2,2,2,2)    2  (2,2,2,2)  (2.4500, 2.4500, 2.6700, 2.6700) 
Clarity of risk transfer details  5  (5,5,5,5)    4  (4,4,4,4)   4  (4,4,4,4)   3  (3,3,3,3)    3  (3,3,3,3)  (3.9300, 3.9300, 3.9300, 3.9300)  
Resolution of disputes between parties  4  (4,4,4,4)    4  (4,4,4,4)   3  (3,3,3,3)   4  (4,4,4,4)   (3,5)  (3,3,5,5)  (3.6500, 3.6500, 3.9700, 3.9700) 
Contract 
 
 
 
Weight = 0.11 
Receiving timely payments for work done  6 (6,6,6,6)    6  (6,6,6,6)    (6,9)  (6,6,9,9)    6  (6,6,6,6)    7  (7,7,7,7)  (6.1600, 6.1600, 6.7300, 6.7300) 
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Table 5.6 Pair-wise comparisons and fuzzy aggregation of Project Programme Risks 
Level 3 Project Programme 
Risks 
 
Development of a workable 
project programme 
j = 1 
  3
rd parties conforming to the 
programme 
j = 2 
  Getting regulatory approvals 
to materialise in time 
j = 3 
  Identifying time critical 
interfaces 
j = 4 
   Scale Converted 
STFN 
 Scale  Converted 
STFN 
 Scale  Converted 
STFN 
 Scale  Converted 
STFN 
E1        (1/7)  (0.14, 0.14, 0.14, 0.14)    (1/4, 1/3)   (0.25, 0.25, 0.33, 0.33)    1  (1, 1, 1, 1) 
E2        (1/4)  (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)    (1/4)  (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)    (1/2)  (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5) 
E3        (1/3)  (0.33, 0.33, 0.33, 0.33)    (1/4)  (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)    (1/3)  (0.33, 0.33, 0.33, 0.33) 
E4        (1/3)  (0.33, 0.33, 0.33, 0.33)    (1/5)  (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2)    (1/3)  (0.33, 0.33, 0.33, 0.33) 
Development of a 
workable project 
programme 
 
i = 1 
E5        (1/4)  (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)  Defuzzified  (1/4)  (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)  Defuzzified  (1/4)  (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)  Defuzzified 
  Aggregation      1  (0.2513, 0.2513, 0.2513, 0.2513)  0.2513  (0.2631, 0.2631, 0.2415, 0.2415)  0.2519  (0.5299, 0.5299, 0.5299, 0.5299)  0.5299 
                      
E1              2  (2, 2, 2, 2)    4  (4, 4, 4, 4) 
E2              1  (1, 1, 1, 1)    2  (2, 2, 2, 2) 
E3              (1/2)  (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5)    1  (1, 1, 1, 1) 
E4              (1/2)  (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5)    1  (1, 1, 1, 1) 
3
rd parties 
conforming to the 
programme 
 
i = 2 
E5      Defuzzified        1  (1, 1, 1, 1)  Defuzzified  2  (2, 2, 2, 2)  Defuzzified 
  Aggregation      3.9796      1  (1.0800, 1.0800, 1.0800, 1.0800)  1.0800  (2.1600, 2.1600, 2.1600, 2.1600)  2.1600 
                      
E1                    3  (3, 3, 3, 3) 
E2                    2  (2, 2, 2, 2) 
E3                    2  (2, 2, 2, 2) 
E4                    3  (3, 3, 3, 3) 
Getting regulatory 
approvals to 
materialise in time 
 
i = 3 
  E5     Defuzzified      Defuzzified        2  (2, 2, 2, 2) 
  Aggregation      3.9698      0.9259      1  (2.4300, 2.4300, 2.4300, 2.4300)  2.4300 
                      
E1                    
E2                    
E3                    
E4                    
Identifying time 
critical interfaces 
 
i = 4 
E5      Defuzzified     Defuzzified     Defuzzified     aji = 1/aij 
  Aggregation      1.8872     0.4630     0.4630     1 Chapter 5  
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  Since the fuzzy comparisons have been defizzified in this way, the weights could be 
obtained using a standard manipulation as used in an AHP process.  The columns of the matrix 
shown in figure 5.5 could be summed to give a total for the column and then each element in these 
columns could be divided by this summed value to give a normalised relative weight.  Figure 5.6 
shows this process and the subsequent action of averaging across the rows of the matrix in order to 
obtain the eigenvector which yields individual weights for each Level 3 risk factor. 
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Figure 5.6 Derivation of the eigenvector representing the weights of each risk 
 
  The eigenvector, also known as the priority vector (Saaty and Vargas, 2000), has a sum 
value of 1 as it is normalised.  It represents the relative weights of all the risks that were compared 
in the pair-wise comparison in table 5.6.   
  Consequently, the priority weights calculated for Level 3 risks could be multiplied by the 
weights of higher level risks (i.e. Levels 1 and 2) in order to gain a weighting for each Level 3 risk 
within the whole hierarchy of risks.  For example, table 5.5 shows a weighting of 0.238 for the 
Level 1 Procurement Factors Risks.  Additionally, the Level 2 Project Programme Risks have a 
weighting of 0.22.  Considering the weighting calculated by pair-wise comparison for the Level 3 
risk ‘Getting regulatory approvals to materialise in time’ is 0.3697 from figure 5.6, the hierarchical 
weighting for this risk could be calculated using equation D.6 from Appendix D. 
w
’
Getting regulatory approvals to materialise in time  = 0.3697 × 0.2200 × 0.2380 
= 0.0194 
  Upon calculation of the hierarchical weighting of all Level 3 risks, these weighting values 
could be multiplied by the assessment of the project environment scores to yield a measure for the 
Factor Index.  For example, considering the Level 3 risk factor ‘Getting regulatory approvals to 
materialise in time’ again, the score for this factor could be taken from table 5.5 as (3.0600, 3.0600, 
3.2200, 3.2200).  Multiplying these score values by the hierarchical weighting of this risk factor 
using equation D.7 from Appendix D gave a value of the Factor Index for this risk factor.   
[(3.0600 × 0.0194) + (3.0600 × 0.0194) + (3.2200 × 0.0194) + (3.2200 × 0.0194)] 
  = [0.0594, 0.0594, 0.0624, 0.0624] = FI 
By executing this operation on each Level 3 risk factor and then cumulatively adding all 
outcomes gave an aggregated STFN that represented the Factor Index for Crossrail.  This fuzzy 
number could be plotted on to the defined measurement functions of figure 5.1 of Chapter 5 in 
order to determine the fuzzy sets for fuzzy inference.  However, prior to completing this, the Risk 
Likelihood and Risk Impact must be accounted for and this is detailed in the next step. 
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5.4.2 Measurement of Risk Likelihood and Risk Impact  
The measurement of Risk Impact and Risk Likelihood was achieved is the same way as that of the 
Factor Index.  Questionnaire respondents were required to rate the likelihood and impact of all 
Level 2 risks.  The rating of Level 2 risks rather than Level 3 risks was done in order to reduce the 
workload placed on questionnaire respondents where questionnaire piloting showed that the risk 
rating of Level 3 risks took too long.  Ackermann et al. (2007) found that 2 hours was a maximum 
amount of time that should be spent completing such a risk questionnaire.   
Zeng et al. (2007) also rate risks at an equivalent level to the Level 2 risks in this work.  
Using the scoring process outlined in section 5.2.5.3, respondents could rate Risk Likelihood and 
Risk Impact for each level 2 risk factor as shown in table 5.7 where the rating given by an expert 
group considering the Level 2 ‘Project Programme’ risk factor is shown.  In asking for Level 2 
risks to be rated, the questionnaire requested that respondents appreciate the associated Level 3 
risks in their considerations (i.e. in rating Project Programme (Level 2) risks, respondents should 
consider the associated Level 3 risks as shown in table 5.5). 
Table 5.7 Risk Likelihood and Risk Impact of Project Programme risks with STFNs   
Experts Measurement         
  Risk Likelihood      Risk Impact   
            cf 
Preference Converted  to 
STFN 
 Preference  Converted  to 
STFN 
E1          (0.26)  (6,7) (6.0,6.0,7.0,7.0)    Medium  (2.5,5.0,5.0,7.5) 
E2          (0.22)  (5,6) (5.0,5.0,6.0,6.0)    (4,6)  (4.0,4.0,6.0,6.0) 
E3          (0.19)  (5,8) (5.0,5.0,8.0,8.0)    (6,7)  (6.0,6.0,7.0,7.0) 
E4          (0.17)  6 (6.0,6.0,6.0,6.0)    (5,7)  (5.0,5.0,7.0,7.0) 
E5          (0.16)  6 (6.0,6.0,6.0,6.0)    6  (6.0,6.0,6.0,6.0) 
Aggregated 
STFN 
(5.5900, 5.5900, 6.6400, 6.6400)    (4.4800, 5.1300, 6.1000, 6.7500) 
 
  The aggregation of the values to obtain an aggregated STFN for both Risk Likelihood and 
Risk Impact involved multiplying each node reading of the converted STFN derived from experts 
ratings by the respective respondents contribution factor, as detailed by equations D.8 and D.9 from 
Appendix D.  For example, the value 4.4800 in the aggregated STFN for Risk Impact in table 5.7 
can be derived as [(2.5 × 0.26) + (4.0 × 0.22) + (6.0 × 0.19) + (5.0 × 0.17) + (6.0 × 0.16)] = 4.4800.  
This operation could be executed to obtain aggregated STFNs for all Level 2 risks.   
  The aggregated STFNs for each risk factor in Level 2 could subsequently be multiplied by 
the weightings of each of the risk factors in order to account for the impact and likelihood of the 
risk within the hierarchy of risks.  This is achieved by multiplying the nodes of each aggregated 
STFN for Risk Likelihood and Risk Impact by the Level 2 risk weighting.  Taking the aggregated 
STFN of the Risk Impact shown in table 5.7 and multiplying by the Level 2 hierarchical 
weighting
16 of 0.0524 for the Project Programme risk gave an STFN for Risk Impact that 
                                                      
16 The value 0.0524 represents the hierarchical weighting of the Level 2 risk and accounts for its weight 
under the higher Level 1 risk, i.e 0.0524 = 0.22 × 0.238 (values from table 5.5). Chapter 5  
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accounted for the risk weighting.  For example, [(4.4800, 5.1300, 6.1000, 6.7500) × 0.0524] = 
(0.2346, 0.2686, 0.3194, 0.3534).  These STFNs could then be cumulated to give aggregated 
STFNs representing Risk Likelihood and Risk Impact respectively which could be used alongside 
the Factor Index fuzzy number in the fuzzy inference process.      
 
5.4.3 Fuzzy Inference and the rule base 
Since the aggregated STFNs that represent the Factor Index (FI), Risk Likelihood (RL) and Risk 
Impact (RI) were fuzzy numbers, they needed to be converted into fuzzy sets in order to conform 
with the if-then rules held in the knowledge database that allow the Risk Magnitude to be 
calculated.  The definition of fuzzy sets could be achieved by taking the intersections of the STFNs 
representing FI, RL and RI with their respective fuzzy measurement functions described in figure 
5.1.  The cumulative STFNs representing FI, RL, and RI are shown below and represent the results 
of the questionnaire survey to establish the global and elemental risks associated with Crossrail: 
FI = (4.4860, 4.8882, 5.2218, 5.6108) 
RL = (5.4431, 5.7987, 5.8813, 6.2391) 
RI = (6.2978, 6.5891, 6.6938, 7.0340) 
  These STFNs could be plotted on their respective measurement functions as shown in 
figure 5.7 respectively.   
Cumulative STFNs representing FI, RL and RM on their respective 
measurement functions.
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Figure 5.7 Plots of FI, RL, and RI on measurement functions (MF) 
  
The STFN representing FI [(4.4860, 4.8882, 5.2218, 5.6108)] is shown again on figure 5.8 
where its intersections with the measurement functions are highlighted.  Recalling that μ(x) 
represents the degree of membership within a particular function, the intersection point values 
between STFN and the measurement functions can therefore be read off the y-axis.  
FI 
RL 
RI 
MF 
μ(x) Chapter 5  
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Figure 5.8 Intersection of the FI STFN and the measurement functions 
 
  The intersection values from figure 5.8 could subsequently be used to create a fuzzy set 
representing the Factor Index.  It can be seen that the STFN intersects the ‘Poor’ measurement 
function at μ(x) = 0.1771; the ‘Fair’ measurement function at μ(x) = 0.9467 and at μ(x) = 0.8949; and 
the ‘Good’ measurement function at μ(x) = 0.2114.  These values can therefore be combined to form 
a fuzzy set as shown below where the lowest membership value (μ(x)  = 0.8949) of ‘Fair’ is taken.  
This is due to the fuzzy minimum operation to come.   
FI* = {(Poor, 0.1771), (Fair, 0.8949), (Good, 0.2114)}  
The above process could be repeated for the RL and RI STFNs shown in figure 5.7 to give 
fuzzy sets representing RL and RI.  The RL STFN intersects the ‘Medium’ membership function at 
μ(x) = 0.7203 and at μ(x) = 0.5886 respectively and the ‘High’ membership function at μ(x) = 0.2066 
and at μ(x) = 0.4336 respectively.   The RI STFN intersects the ‘Medium’ membership function at 
μ(x) = 0.2185 and at μ(x) = 0.4307 respectively and the ‘High’ membership function at μ(x) = 0.5876 
and at μ(x) = 0.7162 respectively.   The fuzzy sets representing these values are shown below:   
RL* = {(Medium, 0.5886), (High, 0.2066)} 
RI* = {(Medium, 0.2158), (High, 0.5876)} 
  
A measure of the Risk Magnitude of the global and elemental risk associated with Crossrail 
can be defined by a relationship between FI, RL, RI and RM which is characterised by if-then rules.  
These rules are statements which map relationships between the parameters.  Since the FI, RL and 
RI each had five linguistic measurement functions then the if-then rule base contained 5 × 5 × 5 = 
125 rules.  These rules were defined by the author in conjunction with a risk practitioner working 
on Crossrail using subjective engineering judgement.  The role of these rules is to map the fuzzy 
sets representing FI*, RL* and RI* to a fuzzy set representing the Risk Magnitude (RM*) of the 
global and elemental risks.  Therefore, recalling equation D.10 from Appendix D where R
k is the k
th 
rule, the rules can be defined.  For example, If FI is ‘Poor (P)’ and RL is ‘High (H)’ and RI is ‘Low 
(L)’ then RM is ‘Major (Ma)’.  Table 5.8 below details the 125 defined rules that are held in the 
knowledge base. 
VP P  F  G  VG  1.0 
μ (x) 
Linguistic Score 
System for FI 
Score, FI  0 5  2 3  10  4  1  6 7 8 9 
FI 
0.9467
0.8949
0.2114
0.1771
Degree of Membership 
5.2218
 5.6108
4.8882
4.4860Chapter 5  
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Table 5.8 The knowledge base containing the if-then rules 
Risk Likelihood (RL)  Factor Index 
(FI) 
Risk Impact 
(RI)  VL L  M  H  VH 
                      0.7203    0.2066      
VG     VH    Mi     Mi     Ma     C     C    
      H  0.5875  Mi    Mi    Mi    Ma    C    
      M  0.4307  N    Mi    Mi    Mi    Ma    
      L    N    N    Mi    Mi    Mi    
      VL    N    N    N    Mi    Mi    
                               
G  0.2114  VH    Mi    Ma  Ma   C    C     
      H  0.5876  Mi    Mi    Ma  0.2114  C  0.2066  C    
      M  0.4307  Mi    Mi    Mi  0.2114  Ma  0.2066  Ma    
      L    N    N    Mi    Mi    Ma    
      VL    N    N    N    Mi    Mi    
                               
F  0.9467  VH    Ma    Ma    C   C   C    
      H  0.5876  Mi    Ma    Ma  0.5876  C  0.2066  C    
      M  0.4307  Mi    Mi    Ma  0.4307  Ma  0.2066  Ma    
      L    Mi    Mi    Mi    Ma    Ma    
      VL    N    N    Mi    Mi    Ma    
                               
P  0.1771  VH    Ma    C   C   C   C    
      H  0.5876  Ma    Ma    Ma  0.1771  C  0.1771  C    
      M  0.4307  Mi    Ma    Ma  0.1771  Ma  0.1771  C    
      L    Mi    Mi    Ma    Ma    Ma    
      VL    N    Mi    Mi    Ma    Ma    
                               
VP     VH    C    C   C   C   C    
       H  0.5876  Ma    C   C   C   C    
      M  0.4307  Ma    Ma    Ma    Ma    C    
      L    Mi    Ma    Ma    Ma    Ma    
      VL     Mi     Mi     Mi     Ma     Ma    
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  The weights of the if-then rules shown in table 5.8 could subsequently be calculated using 
equation D.11 from Appendix D where the fuzzy minimisation operation determined the degree of 
membership of the combined fuzzy sets representing FI*, RL* and RI*.  For example, consider the 
following if-then rule R; IF FI is ‘Good (G)’ and RL is ‘Medium (M)’ and RI is ‘High (H)’ THEN 
RM is ‘Major (Ma)’; then the weight of this rule can be calculated using equation D.11 from 
Appendix D as: 
( ) ( ) ( )
(RM*))   , 2114 . 0 (                 
0.5876)   0.7203,   , min(0.2114                 
* RI * RL * FI R
Ma
H M G
μ
μ μ μ μ
=
=
∧ ∧ =
 
where the values are taken from table 5.8. 
  The weights for all if-then rules in the knowledge database could be calculated in this way 
with the output being a truncated and weighed fuzzy set that is representative of the FI*, RL* and 
RI* inputs corresponding to each Risk Magnitude measurement function, i.e. Negligible (N), Minor Chapter 5  
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(Mi), Major (Ma) and Critical (C) (see figure 5.2).  It should be noted that only rules for which 
weighting values can be determined are included in the if-then knowledge base.  This is related to 
the intersections that the cumulative STFN representing the questionnaire outputs had with the 
measurement functions.  In effect, the number of different measurement functions that the FI, RL 
and RI STFNs intersect determines the number of components to a fuzzy set which ultimately has 
implications to the number of weighed rules that are included in the rule knowledge base. 
  The fuzzy outputs obtained by equation D.11 from Appendix D to represent each rule 
could be aggregated into a single fuzzy set representing the Risk Magnitude measurement functions 
using the fuzzy maximum operation described by equation D.12 from Appendix D.  In effect, the 
rules having the largest weighting for each of the RM measurement functions (Negligible (N), 
Minor (Mi), Major (Ma), and Critical (C)) could be aggregated to form a fuzzy set representing the 
Risk Magnitude.  The application of the data into equation D.12 from Appendix D resulted in the 
following;              
(RM*))}   (0.2066,   (RM*)), (0.5876,   (RM*)),   {(0.2114, RM* C Ma Mi μ μ μ =  
  Note that Negligible (N) was not included as the STFN outputs from the questionnaire did 
not intersect any measurement functions that would lead to fuzzy sets being formed with 
sufficiently low values.  The effect of this was that the rules established were not ‘light’ enough to 
have a classification under the Negligible RM classification. 
  
5.4.4 Defuzzification 
The aim of defuzzification was to transform the aggregate fuzzy set representing RM into a crisp 
value and in doing so to give a value for the Risk Magnitude of the global and elemental risks 
associated with Crossrail.  Equation D.13 from Appendix D details how the centre of area method 
can be used to defuzzify the fuzzy set representing RM.  Figure 5.9 shows the aggregated degree of 
membership of the RM inputs of FI*, RL* and RI* for the aggregated RM* fuzzy set.  It is in effect 
the aggregated degrees of membership of the FI*, RL* and RI* for each fuzzy set of RM* (N, Mi, 
Ma and Cr) derived by equation D.11 from Appendix D.   
  Defuzzification therefore calculates the centroid under the line shown in figure 5.9 while 
accounting for the four individual fuzzy sets within the aggregated fuzzy set representing RM.  
Calculations in the fuzzy model show that the centres of the degree of membership for each of the 
individual RM fuzzy sets was {0.000, 4.3496, 5.000; 6.1174} respectively.  Equation D.13 from 
Appendix D could therefore be used for defuzzification giving a crisp value of 5.0929 for the Risk 
Magnitude. 
  
0929 . 5
2066 . 0 5876 . 0 2114 . 0 000 . 0
2066 . 0 1174 . 6 5876 . 0 000 . 5 2114 . 0 3496 . 4 0.000 0.000
RM =
+ + +
× + × + × + ×
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The Aggregated Degree of Membership of the RM inputs FI, RL 
and RI.
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Figure 5.9 The degree of membership of FI*, RL* and RI* for the aggregated RM* fuzzy set  
 
  Figure 5.10 shows a plot of the Risk Magnitude value on the RM membership functions 
defined in figure 5.9.  It can therefore be inferred that the Risk Magnitude is 5.093 with a 
confidence of 54.6441% that it is Major and a confidence of 46.36% that it is minor.  The next 
section discusses the implications of these results and their relevance to the strategic management 
of global and elemental risks on Crossrail risks.   
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Figure 5.10 A single value representing Risk Magnitude 
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5.5 Results and Interpretation of the Risks 
The Risk Magnitude is a single representation of the FI, RL and RI parameters where variation in 
one or more of these parameters has implications on the level of Risk Magnitude.  For example, 
should the likelihood and impact of a number of risks increase and the FI score decrease then this 
could result in a significant increase in the Risk Magnitude value.  Conversely, a decrease in the 
likelihood and impact of risks and an increase in the FI score would result in a reduction in the Risk 
Magnitude.  It is this reduction that is desirable where the Risk Magnitude value should decrease 
over the planning and design phases of a project.  
  The questionnaire survey was conducted during the months after a Scheme Design 
submission for Crossrail in the spring of 2008.  This submission corresponded to a RIBA Stage D 
(RIBA, 2004) design although a subsequent Scheme Design submission in the autumn of 2008 was 
also of the detail associated with RIBA Stage D with some elements of a RIBA Stage E Design.  
The questionnaire was distributed at a period when the design for Crossrail was at a stage when a 
significant amount of information was known about the project and associated decisions had been 
made, yet many major issues and risks remained to be addressed.  Figure 5.11 below is a 
representation of the typical design phases and is taken from Smith (2008, p237).  The 
questionnaires were distributed at a time consistent with the latter part of outline design stage 
although no detail design had been completed for Crossrail. 
 
 
    Figure 5.11 Typical design phases of an engineering project 
 
5.5.1 Relevance and use of the Risk Magnitude value 
The use of a Risk Magnitude (RM) value during the design and planning process has been the 
desired outcome of the fuzzy modelling.  The analysis of the questionnaire outcomes using the 
mathematical fuzzy processes outlined in Appendices D and section 5.4 resulted in a RM value of 
‘5.093’ for the global and elemental risks associated with Crossrail.  This value is the result of the 
fuzzy inference process where the fuzzy numbers representing FI, RL and RI were manipulated to 
give a single number representing RM.  The value for RM could subsequently be drawn on the RM 
measurement functions defined in figure 5.2 and shown again in figure 5.10.  In considering the 
fuzzy result of 5.093 as a ‘singleton’ fuzzy number (i.e. a one digit fuzzy number (Klir and Yuan, 
Concept 
Feasibility 
Outline 
Detail 
Potential overlap 
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1995)), it could be drawn on the RM measurement functions as a vertical line, as shown in figure 
5.10.   
The points where this line intersects the RM measurement functions on figure 5.10 can be 
used as confidence intervals of the RM value of 5.093 under the measurement functions.  The 
values of these confidence intervals can be inferred as percentages from the y-axis since it 
represents the degree of membership under a measurement function.   Therefore, confidence values 
in the RM value can be derived from figure 5.10 where a confidence of value of 54.64% that the 
RM is Major and a confidence of 45.36% that it is Minor is realised.   
  This process of Risk Magnitude identification can be useful to the management practitioner 
where global and elemental risks need to be accounted for.  The RM score of 5.093 is considered 
representative of the level of global and elemental risks associated with Crossrail while recognising 
the design stage the project was at when the questionnaire was distributed.  As noted by Mott 
MacDonald (2002), the level of risk and uncertainties associated with a project should decrease as 
it moves through its lifecycle since more information becomes available and decisions are made to 
mitigate risks.  This work identified previously that a significant issue with global and elemental 
risks is that they often remain recognised but unaccounted for in any strategic decisions made 
during the planning and design phases of a project.  The use of a RM value derived using the 
responses that expert practitioners gave to a questionnaire is therefore an appropriate way of 
accounting for global and elemental risks since the knowledge is taken from individuals working 
on the project (hence it is the best available knowledge) and their subjective analyses provide the 
most realistic judgements of the risks.   
  A project manager considering the RM should aim to reduce its value during the design 
and planning stage so that the magnitude of the global and elemental risks are minimal.  The value 
to which the RM is decreased to be at the discretion of the manager, although a low value would be 
anticipated where the Risk Magnitude has a score of 2 or less with membership mostly under the  
Negligible measurement function.  The RM associated with global and elemental risks can not be 
eliminated however since there will always be minimum level of risk associated with a project.  
Such risk could be force-majeure or unexpected events such as the Heathrow Express tunnel 
collapse that resulted in suspension of all tunnelling work on the Jubilee Line Extension (JLE) for 
safety reasons, resulting in serious delays and cost increases to the JLE project. 
 
5.5.2 Second distribution of the Crossrail questionnaire 
The questionnaire used to assess the global and elemental risks associated with Crossrail was 
distributed a second time to a single group of 5 experts.  The aim of this survey was simply to Chapter 5  
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establish whether the fuzzy methodology could assess the global risks adequately
17.  It was 
therefore a crude form of validation of the methodology where a lower Risk Magnitude was 
expected since the 2
nd pass of the questionnaire was distributed after the second Crossrail Scheme 
Design submission in the autumn of 2008.  The relevance of the timing of this questionnaire is that 
it was distributed after the granting of the Royal Assent to build Crossrail in July 2008 and so 
significant improvements were expected in certain risk areas where considerable uncertainty had 
been removed and thus the likelihood and impact of certain risks had decreased. 
  The group of 5 experts were selected from the list of those that had provided responses to 
the 1
st pass of the questionnaire survey.  In order to reduce the time these experts would have to put 
aside to complete the survey, they were not required to provide pair-wise comparisons of the risks 
in the hierarchy.  This also introduced a constant into the experiment where only the scores of the 
performance of Crossrail against the risk factors, the Risk Likelihood and Risk Impact was 
required.  The pair-wise comparisons made by the 5 experts in the 1
st questionnaire survey was 
therefore located and used in the manipulations of the 2
nd pass survey results.  The Risk Magnitude 
realised from the 2
nd pass of the survey is shown in figure 5.12.      
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Figure 5.12 Risk Magnitude score with measurement functions for the 2
nd questionnaire survey 
 
  Using the same interpretations as those outlined for figure 5.10, a Risk Magnitude score of 
4.418 is realised in figure 5.12 for the second pass of the questionnaire with confidence values of 
79.084% that the magnitude is Minor and a 20.916% confidence level that it is Major.  These 
results therefore show that the Risk Magnitude of the global and elemental risks associated with 
Crossrail was decreasing as the project progressed through its design phases, which was expected 
and desired.  The real benefit of this second result is to show the extent to which the Risk 
                                                      
17 In reality, this fuzzy risk assessment should be completed 3 or 4 times prior to the construction phase of a 
project in order to obtain a measure of the magnitude of the global and elemental risks associated with the 
project and to ensure that it is decreasing.  Ackermann et al., (2007) make a similar suggestion in their work.      
4.418 
20.916% 
Major 
79.084% 
Minor 
N Mi  Ma  C 
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Functions 
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Magnitude has decreased compared to the result of the 1
st pass questionnaire.  The second 
questionnaire was distributed approximately 8 months after the first, a period in which reassurances 
had been gained with regards to the future of Crossrail as well as another 8 months of design and 
planning work.  The next section will analyse the outcomes of the first questionnaire with 
consideration given to the second questionnaire where appropriate in order to understand more 
about the drivers of the global and elemental risks on Crossrail.    
 
5.5.3 Analysis of the questionnaire results 
A difference between the first pass questionnaire and the second was the number of respondents.  
The first yielded 30 full responses from experts while the second was only distributed to 5 experts.  
Statistical analyses was therefore not be conducted between the two given the significant difference 
in sample sizes.  As noted in section 5.2.4, the first questionnaire was targeted for completion by a 
sample of 60 experts working on the Crossrail project.  The aim of this sample was to obtain as 
many responses as possible from experts who were working on aspects of the project where the 
identified global and elemental risks existed.  This sample of experts was considered the most 
capable of evaluating the risks by consideration of each expert’s knowledge and experience by the 
author (as described in section 5.2.4).  An allowance was made in the sampling procedure where 
experts were allocated into groups of 5.  This meant that the subsequent analysis would be possible 
despite the number of responses received.  This was considered acceptable on the basis that 
sufficient questionnaires had been distributed to a group of experts with a broad exposure to the 
global and elemental risks relevant to Crossrail. 
  Since the second questionnaire was distributed 8 months after the first, many of the experts 
that had completed the first questionnaire had moved on from the roles they held during the first 
pass questionnaire.  This is typical of large engineering projects where the expertise involved 
through the various development stages is dynamic (Haynes, 2002).  As stated in section 5.5.2, the 
aim of the second survey was to establish whether the fuzzy methodology could assess the global 
and environmental risks.  It was decided that using a smaller sample of 5 experts taken from the 30 
experts that completed the first questionnaire would be a more adequate and consistent way of 
achieving this as opposed to approaching 60 different experts for a second pass.  Therefore, since 
the 5 experts used for the second pass questionnaire would intuitively have the same perceptions of 
the global and elemental risks associated with Crossrail as when completing the first pass, the use 
of 5 experts to establish the effectiveness of the fuzzy methodology was justified.  In addition, the 
second questionnaire could be used for comparison in order to show how the rating of the Crossrail 
risk parameters changed in the period between the completion of the two questionnaire surveys.   
Figure 5.13 is a spider diagram showing how the Factor Index scores of the Level 2 risk 
factors (see table 5.1) changed over the 8 month period between the two surveys.   Chapter 5  
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Plot of the Changes in Factor Index Scores for Level 2 Global and 
Elemental Risk Factors
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Figure 5.13 Changes in Factor Index score for Level 2 risks 
 
  It can be expected that as the project progresses the scores for each risk should increase as 
a reflection of the positive way the project is dealing with the risks.  A decrease in scores for risks 
is undesirable and so the benefit of the fuzzy process is clear where a project manager can see from 
figure 5.13 which risk areas need management attention.  The differences in values received from 
the two surveys can also be related to how the fuzzy methodology processes the results from the 
surveys.  In the case of figure 5.13, the sample size of the first questionnaire results in an averaging 
of scores and thus the rounding of the score values.  This results in the dampening of the 
significance of any high or low values given by individual experts due to the generation of an 
average score over a sample of 30 responses.  This can be seen as a weakness of the methodology 
since a sample size of 5 experts (as used for the second pass questionnaire) would allow the 
significance of assessments made by respondents to have greater influence on the average score 
value.  This does not therefore say that the results in figure 5.13 are incorrect, only to identify that 
in the context of this fuzzy risk assessment, a smaller sample size could result in more realistic 
score values for consideration by practitioners.  
  Considering figure 5.13, three Level 2 risk categories can be seen to be underperforming if 
making a comparison between the 1
st and 2
nd questionnaire scores.  The Resource Risks, Contractor 
Involvement in Design and the Financial risk category under perform.  The consideration of the 
Level 3 risks associated with each of these Level 2 categories can help identify the source of the 
issues leading to the low score values. 
  The Level 3 global and elemental risks lying under Resource Risks are related to the 
recruitment of professionals, resourcing of construction labour and materials and the planning of Chapter 5  
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material deliveries to Crossrail construction sites.  These risks have a poor score as the Crossrail 
project had only partially addressed the underlying issues related to these risks at the time of the 
first questionnaire.  The scores realised in the second questionnaire were lower as a result of these 
issues remaining partially addressed, particularly as the project procurement structure was about to 
change shortly after the second questionnaire was distributed.  The low scores therefore reflect the 
decreasing confidence that the questionnaire respondents had in the Crossrail projects’ ability to 
address these risks.  The effect of the Contractor Involvement in Design risk on Resource Risks 
cannot however be ignored as the issues leading to the low scores for itself and the Resource Risks 
are somewhat related.   
  The underlying issue with regards to the low scores for these two risk categories was a 
consequence of there being no contractor input to the project design phases.  While construction 
contractors were appointed to Crossrail, they were only in an advanced work capacity responsible 
for co-ordinating site surveys and the gathering of information for planning and scope designs.  
Further discussion with individual experts that completed the 2
nd pass questionnaire surveys 
indicated that the designs for Crossrail were sufficiently advanced for the involvement of 
construction contractors in some capacity.  While the procurement strategy for Crossrail may not 
have allowed for or specified the need for input from fully appointed construction contractors, 
contractor input could have assisted in buildability and value engineering assessments.  The low 
scores given by the experts in the 2
nd pass survey therefore reflected further concerns regarding the 
non-involvement in design of any construction contractors where this issue could have a 
detrimental impact on the project and other risks.  Such a risk in this case was the Resource Risks 
where contractors would typically be allocated the responsibility of sourcing labour and materials 
and hence the relationship between the two categories of risk.   
A further impact of the non-involvement of a contractor in design was a marginal increase 
in the scores for Design Changes and Design Schedule risk categories.  This could be related to the 
likely changes in designs that would occur once a contractor and associated designer
18 were 
appointed and hence the little change in scores seen in figure 5.13.   
The Environment and Health and Safety risk categories score highly in both the 1
st and 2
nd 
pass questionnaires.  This is a direct impact of the quality aspects of the project procurement where 
emphasis was given to ensuring that the project had no impact on the environment within which it 
was being built.  HSC (2007) regulations require designers to assess safety risks throughout the 
design lifecycle and the high score seen in figure 5.13 reflects the amount of safety risk related 
work carried out in designs.  This score increased in the second pass questionnaire where a 
directive from the Crossrail project required that each element of design being passed between 
parties associated with the design process be accompanied by a CDM assessment. 
                                                      
18 The contractual arrangement between contractor and designer can vary.  Smith (2008) discusses the 
various contractual arrangements.  For example, a contractor may complete a design ‘in’ house using his own 
engineers or may create a joint venture with a design consultancy to complete a design. Chapter 5  
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The impacts of the Royal Assent in the time between the two questionnaire surveys can be 
seen in the risk areas of figure 5.13 that cover project Interfaces, Project Programme, Public Body 
and Political Issues.  Increases in scores for each of these risks categories reflect the increase in 
confidence resulting from Royal Assent where commitments to the project by various 3
rd parties 
inevitably strengthened, resulting in a reduction in the global uncertainties associated with the 
project.  However, a decrease is seen in the Financial risk category and this can be attributed to the 
economic climate at the time of the second survey.  Despite there being a full political commitment 
to build Crossrail, the sources of funds remained uncertain.  This was compounded at the time of a 
recession and this is reflected in the low score given in the 2
nd survey.  Figure 5.14 shows the best 
scoring global risk factors from the 1
st pass questionnaire and the scores for the same risks from the 
2
nd questionnaire.  Similarly, figure 5.15 shows the worst scoring global risk factors from the 1
st 
pass questionnaire and the scores for the same risks from the 2
nd questionnaire.                           
Best Scoring Risk Factors in 1st Pass Questionnaire Survey with Scores 
given to the Same Risks in the 2nd Survey
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Figure 5.14 Best scoring risks from the 1
st survey with 2
nd survey scores for comparison  
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Worst Scoring Risk Factors in 1st Pass Questionnaire Survey with Scores 
given to the Same Risks in the 2nd Survey
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Figure 5.15 Worst scoring risks from the 1
st survey with 2
nd survey scores for comparison  
 
The global and elemental risk factors shown in figures 5.14 and 5.15 are Level 3 factors.  
As identified previously from figure 5.13, the health and safety and environmental risk categories 
are the best performing and this is confirmed in figure 5.14 where the high performance of the five 
Level 3 risks shown can be related to the environmental and safety obligations placed on designers.  
Figure 5.15 shows that certain Level 3 risks associated with the interfaces that are an integral part 
of the designs’ progress were the worst performing during the 1
st pass of the questionnaire survey.  
The passing of the Royal Assent to build Crossrail had an obvious impact on these risks where for 
instance, 3
rd parties were obliged to give access to sites for surveying due to the firm commitment 
to build Crossrail and so the performance of the project against the interfaces with 3
rd parties was 
improved.  Marginal increases are seen with regards to the number of changes in design scope and 
upon agreeing on the changes.  This reflects the typical evolution of a design where fewer changes 
would be expected as the project progresses through the design stages.  However, the values remain 
low and this can be attributed to the design stage where the detailed design for Crossrail was yet to 
begin.  It can also be related to the lack of contractor input into the design and the fact that the 
procurement structure of the Crossrail project as a whole was to evolve in the spring of 2009 
(shortly after the 2
nd survey) where a partnering framework was to be adopted involving delivery 
partners, designers and eventually contractors.  The knowledge that this change would ultimately 
result in a single entity to procure the design with a delivery partner to control the project meant 
that the low scores for these risks as well as that relating to the timely approval of work would 
increase and thus the risks would eventually become less significant.     Chapter 5  
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5.5.3.1  Weighting of the global and elemental risks 
Figure 5.16 shows the Level 3 global and elemental risk factors with the highest weighting based 
on pair-wise comparisons made in the 1
st questionnaire survey.  The weighting represents the 
hierarchical weighting of the factors and so each weighting accounts for the Level 2 and Level 1 
category weightings.  It is to be expected that the quality of subsurface conditions would be the 
most significant risk factor given the negative impact that poor ground conditions can have on the 
success of a project.  The ‘delivery of material to site’ risk as the second most significant is 
surprising.  Risks associated with the delivery of materials to sites can however be significant in the 
construction lifecycle of Crossrail where supply chains into London could be affected by a host of 
related events, issues and risks such as the Olympics and delays due to traffic.  Related resource 
risks in the amount of construction material and labour needed is significant in that it can have 
significant impacts on Crossrail’s financial expenditure given the project’s size and tunnelling 
aspects.       
  The inclusion of two client related risks is expected since the impact that a client can have 
on a project is significant (Kometa et al., 1995).  The attitude of the client in particular is crucial as 
this has implications with regards to the allocation of risk on a project.  Should the client be risk 
averse then it is likely that risks will be allocated amongst actors working on the project and this 
can have negative impacts (Pope et al., 2009).  Smith et al. (2006) discusses risk allocation in 
construction in detail. 
There is no place for any risk factor associated with design changes in figure 5.16.  This 
can be attributed to that fact that design changes would idealistically have been eliminated at the 
design stage and so would have little impact on the wider project lifecycle.  However, as identified 
in this work, changes in design have significant impacts to the success of a project and even more 
so during construction.  The absence of any design change risks in figure 5.16 can be linked to the 
way the comparison was worded in the questionnaire survey where the focus of the question and 
thus the interpretation of the respondent was towards changes solely occurring during the design 
phase, hence its absence. Chapter 5  
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Most Significant Risk Factors According to Pair-Wise Comparisons
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Figure 5.16 The most significant Level 3 global risk factors by weight 
 
5.5.4 Risk Likelihood and Risk Impacts 
The questionnaire required respondents to rate the impact and likelihood of the Level 2 risks 
associated with Crossrail.  As detailed in Appendices D and section 5.4, the questionnaire did not 
ask respondents to rate all Level 3 risk factors as this had a negative effect on the questionnaire in 
making it too big.   
  Respondents therefore rated the impact that such risks had on delivering Crossrail to 
budget and to schedule at the time the questionnaires were distributed and also the likelihood that 
risk could occur and adversely affect the project.  Figure 5.17 is a plot of the Risk Impacts for each 
Level 2 risk category and figure 5.18 is a plot of the Risk Likelihood of the risk categories affecting 
the project.  Both figures show the outcomes from the 1
st and 2
nd pass questionnaire surveys.   Chapter 5  
Assessing Global and Elemental Risks 
  124
Plot of the Impacts of Level 2 Risks from the 1st and 2nd Questionnaire 
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Figure 5.17 Plot of the Risk Impacts of each Level 2 global and elemental risk category  
 
Plot of the Likelihoods of Level 2 Risks from the 1st and 2nd Questionnaire 
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Figure 5.18 Plot of the Risk Likelihoods of each Level 2 global and elemental risk category  
 
  Figure 5.17 shows a general decrease in global and elemental risk likelihood and impacts 
between the 1
st and 2
nd pass of the survey with the impacts relating to the Contractor involvement 
in design, Resource and Design Change risks increasing in impact respectively.  While undesirable, 
the resource and contractor involvement impacts can be related to the reasons outlined earlier 
where contractors were not involved with the design due to the way the project was being procured.  
The procurement structure for the Crossrail project was to change in the spring of 2009 to a 
partnering framework agreement and so the likelihood of contractor involvement risk would 
decrease over time, although figure 5.18 shows that this is not the case.  This could be interpreted 
as a sign that respondents knew that design budgets would be negatively affected by the 
involvement of contractors in design given the inevitable design changes that would occur.    Chapter 5  
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Design change impacts are also linked to the absence of a contractor in design since the 
potential for re-design upon the appointment of a contractor is high.  This led to respondents rating 
the impact higher in the 2
nd questionnaire compared to the 1
st since more design work had taken 
place and thus a greater potential for changes leading to increased costs and time requirements.   
Discussion with the respondents of the 2
nd pass questionnaire established the reasoning 
behind the higher rating for the impacts and likelihood of the Project Programme risks shown in 
figure 5.17 and 5.18 respectively.  Since the procurement structure for Crossrail was to change in 
the spring of 2009, a significant amount of design work needed to be completed in order to take a 
thorough outline design forward into detailed design.  This resulted in the ‘crashing’ of critical 
paths within design work programmes and thus an increase in the likelihood and impact that the 
design phase work would not be within budget and on schedule. 
 
5.5.5 Concluding remarks   
This section has used a fuzzy process to yield a measure of the Risk Magnitude associated with 
Crossrail.  This measure can be used as an indicator of the level of global and elemental risks 
associated with Crossrail and thus can be used by management to focus attention on risk areas that 
need attention.  It is intended that the fuzzy methodology used for deriving the Risk Magnitude can 
be applied at numerous points during the design process as a means of evaluating the inherent 
project environment within which risks exist; impacts; and likelihood of global and elemental risks 
during the planning and design stages leading up to construction.   
  Previous sections discussed how global and elemental risks are often vague and difficult to 
structure in order to make adequate assessments.  The use of the fuzzy methodology enables risks 
to be structured for assessment and also allows the information surrounding the risk to be recorded.  
Storing knowledge in this way allows assessments of global and environmental risks on future 
projects to be considered and thus the entire process becomes a tool for continuous learning and 
knowledge management of such risks.  The use of the methodology cannot however be generic 
since research is required into the particular project under question to allow global and elemental 
risks critical to the particular projects’ success to be considered.  As noted, the methodology used 
in this section is capable of being adapted for any number of risks that have a vague composition 
and require subjective judgements as a form of assessment. 
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5.6 Summary    
This chapter described an approach that could model, assess and manage global and elemental risk 
factors associated with the Crossrail project.  It was found that global and elemental risks can be 
intrinsically related to the engineering and construction elements of a project or a wider set of 
economic, socio-cultural and political environments within which the project is developed.   
  A literature review was undertaken to establish the global and elemental risks associated 
with Crossrail with the relevance of these risks being refined by consultation with practitioners 
working on the Crossrail project.  Consequently, a fuzzy methodology documented in literature 
was adapted to assess the global and elemental risks identified with the inputs for this model being 
established by a questionnaire survey distributed to expert practitioners working on the Crossrail 
project.   
  The outcomes of the model were the structuring of the global and elemental risks 
associated with Crossrail and a measure of Risk Magnitude for the project.  This Risk Magnitude 
was itself an amalgamation of the Risk Likelihood, Risk Impact and a measure of the project 
environment within which a particular risk existed.   
  It was therefore intended that the outcomes of the fuzzy methodology could be used by 
management practitioners as a mode of assistance in making strategic decisions on a project with 
regards to the management of risks and the structuring of global and elemental risks that were 
previously difficult to assess.     
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6 Risk Mitigation Using Real Options 
6.1 Background 
Project procurement under price based contracts (e.g. ‘lump sum’ or ‘fixed’ payment) (Smith, 
2008) involves allocating an estimated amount of money in the form of a contingency fund to cover 
the increase in costs due to the occurrence of risks and uncertainties.  Alternatively, NEC3 
contracts have mechanisms that allow project actors to place ‘early warnings’ and associated 
‘compensation events’ in the event of cost escalations during the design and implementation phase 
of a project and these enable increases in costs to be covered by extra payments from the client. 
Neither procurement types encourage the identification of opportunities in the project to maximise 
value when risks and uncertainties occur.  This value can be in the form of reduced spending of the 
contingency sums or making contractual decisions to follow other pre-defined construction plans 
which are cheaper and less risky. 
To this end, the observational method (OM) (Peck, 1969; Nicholson et al., 1999; 
Powderham, 2002) is a managed process of design and construction control with associated 
monitoring and review procedures that enables previously defined modifications to be incorporated 
into a project during construction.  The observational method was initially proposed in an effort to 
reduce costs during construction due to civil structures being over-designed in order to account for 
the most unfavourable conditions.  As a result, OM designs are based on the most probable 
geotechnical conditions rather than the most unfavourable where the gaps in the available 
information are filled by observations (i.e. from geotechnical instrumentation measurements and 
geotechnical site investigation).  These observations aid in the assessment of the behaviour of the 
structure during construction which can then result in the design being modified in accordance with 
the findings.  The observational method is suitable for projects that have already started and some 
unexpected development has occurred, or whenever a failure or accident is likely or has already 
taken place.  The method is not suitable for projects where the design cannot be altered during 
construction.  The observational method therefore encourages engineers to devise solutions to all 
problems that could arise under the least favourable conditions.  This includes choosing appropriate 
courses of action for all foreseeable deviations from those assumed in the design as disclosed by 
observations from the real conditions.  A drawback of the OM is that no formal procedure exists to 
value any pre-planned changes that are incorporated during construction.   
Project actors can identify, consider and quantify project risks and uncertainties using 
methods discussed in previous sections.  Such information can subsequently be used to devise 
alterations from proposed plans should risks and uncertainties occur.  Valuing the decisions to alter 
plans in the context of a dynamic and uncertain construction environment can be achieved by the 
application of a branch of financial options theory.  This work therefore considers the potential role Chapter 6  
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of real options in risk mitigation for a metro project, which is in effect a form of insurance that 
covers the costs of changing plans due to risks and uncertainties. This insurance can be considered 
as a form of compensation that covers the losses to project actors as a result of a client making 
changes to previously agreed plans.  Such losses could be a reduction in profit margins to actors as 
a result of changes that alter the amount of work to be completed or any costs associated with 
preparing for the work that was subsequently not required.   
Real options have roots in financial options which themselves are forms of financial 
derivatives and futures (Hull, 2003).  Real options analysis allows the opportunities to mitigate the 
impacts that risks and uncertainties can have on a project to be valued (Mun, 2006a).  Having real 
options in a project is therefore highly constructive in that a value can be given to a decision to 
change a design (e.g. through OM practices) and this value can be seen as an insurance premium.  
In effect, clients can hedge themselves against any downside risks and uncertainties and give 
themselves the ability to take midcourse corrections when risks and uncertainties become known 
and subsequently threaten the success of their project.  Therefore, not only does real options 
provide a decision maker with a hedging vehicle to reduce the impacts of risks and uncertainties, 
but also improves value and cost control under uncertain conditions by valuing opportunities for 
change in projects.  
This chapter will detail the application of real options theory to the construction phase of 
an underground metro station.  Given that cost overruns on metro projects mostly originate through 
the occurrence of risks during the early part of the construction phases (see table 2.1, Chapter 2), 
this work believes that the presence of real options in the early parts of the construction programme 
can introduce a level of flexibility that could assist project managers in containing increasing costs 
under adverse construction conditions.  Section 6.1 will continue to highlight the technicalities of 
real options theory with section 6.2 introducing the case study and section 6.3 detailing the 
application of real options theory to this case study.        
 
6.1.1 Standard options theory in finance 
This section explains the terminology associated with options theory and provides a simplified 
example to demonstrate the application of options theory in finance.  The processes and 
descriptions provided for financial options are equally applicable and hold true for real options 
theory. 
Derivatives and futures are financial instruments that provide insurance for market risks.  
For example, a market derivative is a special type of contract about the future of a market and the 
risk it contains.  The main purpose of these financial instruments is to limit uncertainty by reducing 
its volatility which subsequently improves financial planning assumptions.  
Market derivatives insure against the volatility in the prices of tangible goods.  Similarly, 
financial derivatives insure against the downside when investing in assets suck as stock.  An option Chapter 6  
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is an instrument that can provide this insurance which, at a cost, allows the option holder to insure 
the downside and participate in the upside.  In other words, an investor can buy something in the 
future for a price agreed now.  An option can be bought or sold to buy or sell stock.  In doing so, 
the option buyer protects himself (by the insurance it provides) against risk.   
There are two types of basic financial options: a call and a put.  A call option gives the 
option holder the right but not the obligation to buy an underlying asset
19 for a specified exercise 
price within or at a specified time.  A put option gives the option holder the right to sell an 
underlying asset for a specified exercise price within or at a specified time.  (Exercise refers to the 
action of doing something with the option; the exercise date is often referred to as ‘maturity’ while 
exercise price is often referred to as ‘strike price’).  The time of exercise of either a call or put 
option can be categorised into two styles – a European option or an American option.  The key 
difference between European and American options relates to when the options can be exercised: 
•  A European option may only be exercised at the expiry date of the option, i.e. at a pre-
defined point in time.  
•  An American option may be exercised at any time before the expiry date.  
 
European and American options are often referred to as ‘plain vanilla’ options given the 
relative simplicity to the valuation of their payoffs (European more so) (in Hull, 2003).  It is not 
intended to discuss a significant assumption held in modern financial stock options valuation 
processes that no arbitrage opportunities exist.  Many authors discuss no arbitrage in the context of 
financial options at length, including Hull (2003) and Mun (2006b).  It is sufficient to mention that 
since the physical assets to which real options are applied within this thesis are not traded assets in 
the same sense as stock is traded, then no arbitrage assumptions hold true within this work.   
Plain vanilla financial options are therefore contracts enabling the holder of the option to 
buy (or sell) an underlying asset at a specified exercise price in the future, within a pre-determined 
time window.  The holder’s right (without the obligation) and the underwriter’s (or seller’s) 
obligation to fulfil the holder’s right, gives an option contract its value at the time it is written.  
Calculating this contract value was an unsolved problem in economics until the Black-Scholes 
formula enabled the calculation of the value of a European call option on a non-dividend paying 
stock (Black and Scholes, 1973)
 20 (also in Hull, 2003).  The foundations of modern financial 
options theory can be traced to the work of Black and Scholes (1973) who developed a closed-form 
solution that could calculate the fair economic value of a European option for a buyer and seller.   
                                                      
19 The underlying assets for financial options include stocks, stock indices, foreign currencies, debt 
instruments, commodities, and futures contracts. 
20 Fischer Black and Myron Scholes received the 1997 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for the Black-
Scholes model produced in 1973 and later associated work. Chapter 6  
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Hundreds of publications since have used the same or similar mathematical construction as 
Black and Scholes used to value options contracts with a variety of characteristics. These exercises 
shared two common goals:  
a)  to find the value of such a contract, and  
b)  to find the ‘optimal exercise rule’, i.e., the conditions under which it would be optimal to 
exercise the option. 
 
Calculating the option exercise condition to achieve a payoff can be achieved  by 
considering the maximum of a relationship between the underlying asset value and the exercise 
price and zero: for call options it is the maximum of either 0 or the underlying asset price minus the 
exercise price.  For put options it is the maximum of either 0 or the exercise price minus the 
underlying asset price.   
Call Option Payoff = Max ((Underlying Price
21 (S)
 - Exercise Price
22 (X)),0) 
Put Option Payoff = Max ((Exercise Price (X) - Underlying Price (S)),0)  
 
Example of a Financial Put option  
Ben buys one European stock put option contract on OKRail stock with an exercise price of £10.00 
because he thinks that the value of the stock will decrease over time.  Suppose the current price of 
OKRail stock is £11.50 and the expiration date of the option is in six months. Since the option is 
European, Ben can only exercise the option on the fixed expiration date in six months time.  If the 
stock price on the expiration date is greater than £10.00, Ben will choose not to exercise.  If the 
stock price on the expiration date is less than £10.00 then Ben will choose to exercise.  
For instance, if the stock price on the expiration date is £11.30, Ben will not exercise the 
option as he would have to buy a share of OKRail stock directly from the market for £11.30 and 
sell it for the exercise price of £10.00, making a £1.30 loss.  If the stock price on the expiration date 
is £8.00 then Ben will exercise the option and earn £2.00 because he can immediately buy the stock 
for £8.00 and sell for £10.00.  (The above example excludes a value for premiums payable in order 
to obtain the put option or commissions payable as costs in order to execute the option.  However, 
the premium is represented in figure 6.1 simply to account for its impact on profit). 
Considering the above example, Ben as the holder of the option therefore has the right to 
exercise the option, but no obligation to exercise the option.  The key property of an option is the 
asymmetry of the payoff, i.e. an option holder can avoid downside risks and limit the loss to the 
price of getting the option while he can take advantage of the upside risks for his monetary gain.  
Figure 6.1 shows the payoff of a put stock option.  
                                                      
21 The underlying price represents the price of the stock in the market at any point in time.   
22 The exercise price is the price at which the stock will be bought or sold when the option is exercised. Chapter 6  
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Figure 6.1 Payoff from buying a put stock option. 
 
Considering figure 6.1, if the current stock price is higher than the exercise price then the 
option would not be exercised and the loss would be limited to the premium paid to get the option.  
If the stock price was lower than the exercise price then the option would be exercised and the 
payoff would be the exercise price minus the current stock price and the premium paid to get the 
option.  The maximum loss is therefore equivalent to the premium paid to purchase the option.  As 
seen from figure 6.1, the put options’ intrinsic value begins when the exercise price X exceeds the 
underlying asset value S and therefore the value of the put option can be defined as MAX [X - S, 0]. 
 
6.1.2 From financial options to real options 
The concepts of options methodology has gradually spread to have applications within broader 
areas of finance as well as non-finance, including real options (Hull, 2003).  This section reviews 
real options as as a way of thinking.  In a narrow sense, the real options literature builds on an 
analogy between real projects and plain vanilla financial options (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999).   
While financial options are traded on exchanges and over-the-counter markets, real options 
are not traded.   Real options theory is more of a methodology for valuing opportunities and/or 
design flexibility in physical assets using the valuation techniques that have their roots in financial 
options.  Simply defined, a real option is a right, but not an obligation, to do something to a 
physical asset for a certain cost within a period or at a specific time (Hull, 2003).  Real option 
valuation is therefore a systematic approach and integrated solution used to value the flexibility 
associated with doing something to a physical asset as opposed a financial asset.   
In the context of real options, the underlying asset could be any real or physical object that 
has modularity in design.  Modularity (Olsson, 2006) facilitates flexibility in design which could in 
effect be applied to any physical object that is built in modules, ranging from an oil platform to a 
railway station, as is the focus of this thesis.  Major one piece projects such as tunnels have a low 
level of modularity since half a tunnel would never be built.  Elements of underground station 
construction do however have modularity since some elements of the design will be constructed in 
a sequenced programme, thus presenting the opportunity to build these elements with a small level 
Payoff 
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of flexibility with regards to what is and how they are built.  It is this flexibility that gives rise to 
opportunities to mitigate and manage risks and uncertainties as and when they occur.  
Real options operate in a similar manner to financial options with the difference being that 
the decision maker would have the right to (and thus an option to), but not the obligation to make a 
change to a physical asset in the face of uncertainty.  For example, in a dynamic and uncertain 
construction environment where decisions may need to be flexible in order to better manage risks 
and uncertainties, real options can assist in decision making, valuing potential risk mitigation 
methods and managing capital expenditure.  According to Mun (2006a), real options can: 
•  Identify different decision pathways that decision makers can navigate given uncertain 
conditions; 
•  Value each of the decision pathways and what they represent in terms of financial viability 
and feasibility; 
•  Optimise the value of strategic investment decisions;  
•  Timing the effective execution of investments and finding the optimal trigger values which 
would trigger the execution of the option. 
 
6.1.3 Real options application to projects and problems 
This section reviews and structures the literature on real options as a valuation methodology and as 
a process for risk mitigation.  Most applications of options theory to real investment problems have 
been used to provide rational explanation of market phenomena and used as a tool for economic 
analysis.  The standard discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis often undervalues investment 
opportunities thus leading to under-investment because it fails to account for important strategic 
considerations such as accounting for flexibility in timing (Trigeorgis, 1996).  Real options theory 
emerged as an alternative route to evaluating the capital investment decisions of firms as it captures 
the strategic value of investment projects in an uncertain economic environment.  
Capozza and Li (1994) and Williams (1997) used it as a tool for economic analysis and 
developed models which could explain vacant urban land.  In this case, vacant urban land that 
could support immediate profitable construction was explained as an option where the land owner 
had the option to develop the land in the future.  This option was not exercised immediately as it 
was found through the real options analysis that this was not optimal to do so.  Grenadier (1996) 
also used options theory to explain over-building in real estate markets. There are volumes of 
literature applying real options theory as a form of cash flow analysis (see Lander and Pinches, 
1998); to real estate development (e.g. Holland et al., 2000; Quigg, 1993); capital budgeting (Bowe 
and Lee, 2004); research and development (Eckhause et al., 2009); and natural resource 
development (Brennan and Schwartz, 1985).  In all of these contexts, the options theory served as a 
tool for explaining situations that had the same conceptual characteristics as financial options. Chapter 6  
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In the past decade, the focus of real options research has spread further with many authors 
applying the concepts to any strategic decision taken with regards to the development of any 
physical asset.  This has often built on the work of Dixit and Pindyk (1994) who sought to place 
options methodology into the practitioner’s toolbox as a normative investment valuation tool 
(Luehrman, 1998a; Luehrman, 1998b).  Introducing the concept of real options in management has 
found little resistance overall according to Boer (2002) with a number of authors applying real 
options to construction and infrastructure investment topics.  Ford et al. (2002), consider the option 
value of design flexibility in a toll road construction project; Ho and Liu (2002) evaluate the default 
option of a privatised build-operate-transfer (BOT) construction project; Garvin and Cheah (2004) 
further assess the deferment option of a BOT highway project; Cheah and Liu (2006) treat 
contractual elements of a BOT project in the context of real options with particular focus on the 
risk and reward of certain arrangements; with further work by the same author in Mattar and Cheah 
(2006) considering the valuation of certain risk types for infrastructure investment.  Work by Ng 
and Björnsson (2004) complements that of Garvin and Cheah (2004) in its consideration of 
investment valuation with the work of Ng et al. (2004) comparing the use of real options to cap the 
prices of construction material procurement and long term supply contracts.  Yiu and Tam (2006) 
analyse a real life construction tender using real options with conditions allowing the switching of 
construction modes under uncertain conditions.  
However, prior to most of this work, de Neufville (2003) categorised real options as those 
that are either ‘on’ or ‘in’ projects.  Real options ‘on’ projects are financial options taken on capital 
investment, treating technology itself as a ‘black box’.  Real options ‘in’ projects are options 
created by changing the actual design of the technical system.  For example, de Weck et al. (2004) 
evaluated real options in satellite communications systems and determined that their use could 
increase the value of satellite communications systems by 25% or more.  These options involved 
the inclusion of additional fuel for orbital manoeuvring systems (OMS) onboard satellites in order 
to achieve a flexible design that can adjust capacity according to need.  Fuss et al. (2008) also 
applied real options in the context of space technology, specifically using options theory to 
optimise the timing of satellite mission launches under uncertain demand conditions.    
Real options ‘in’ projects therefore build on options thinking through the application of 
options theory into physical assets, adding flexibility into procurement or development of physical 
assets systematically with consideration for risks and uncertainties.  With the insights and 
flexibility that options theory can provide in this context, the application can be wide and varied. 
As stated, when real options are applied ‘on’ projects, the technicalities of the underlying 
asset (be it a railway or a high rise building) is treated as a ‘black box’, leaving analysts to use their 
financial expertise to apply real options.  In general, real options ‘in’ projects requires an 
understanding of the physical asset under consideration and therefore this gap in the knowledge of 
financial analysts may explain the small progress made with the application of real options ‘in’ 
projects.  Moreover, the data available for real options ‘in’ project analysis is of much poorer Chapter 6  
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quality than that of financial options or real options ‘on’ projects (Wang, 2005).  de Neufville 
(2003), de Neufville et al. (2006) and de Weck et al. (2003) attempted to bridge this gap and 
introduce real options analysis ‘in’ project development.   
From the above literature review, the real options most often encountered in the 
management of engineering projects relate to deferral of decisions, abandonment, growth, 
contraction and the switching of operational modes.  A brief account for each kind is presented in 
Appendix E.  This classification of options is only one of many found in the literature, and is 
certainly not conclusive.  Trigeorgis (1996) gives a similar list and Vollert (2003) presents a 
comprehensive list of real options applications and categorises them based on several attributes. 
 
6.1.4 Real options and flexibility 
The work in this thesis therefore involves a departure from the current trend in academia of 
applying options theory to the capital valuation and budgeting of real projects and problems.    
Work by Ford et al. (2002), Keswani and Shackleton (2006) and Bowe and Lee (2004) considered 
the benefits of using flexibility for managing uncertainty in capital investment typically over the 
business lifecycle shown in figure 2.3 (Chapter 2).  Real options applied in this context (or 'on' 
projects) is visible from the outset since the valuation starts with the strategic outline business case 
and continues through the stages corresponding to design and construction and then through to 
operation and decommissioning.  However, none of these practitioners considered a practical 
process upon which flexibility ‘in’ projects could be operated, managed or valued.  Work by de 
Neufville (2003), de Neufville et al. (2006), de Weck et al. (2004) and Wang (2005) incorporated 
real options in the engineering arena, although their work concentrated on the discipline of systems 
engineering and engineering platform design.  Wang and de Neufville (2005), Wang (2005) and de 
Neufville (2003) built on the concept and theory of real options to distinguish between managerial 
flexibility that is emergent or coincidental in the development and operation of engineering 
systems, and flexibility that has to be anticipated, designed and engineered into engineering 
systems.  Applying real options 'in' projects means that real options are considered during the early 
stages of the project lifecycle since designs are formed and refined through consideration of the 
potential risk occurrences - some of these risks may be global and elemental, hence the use of the 
fuzzy process to analyse and develop information so that designs can be set up to deal with them.  
These designs present the alternatives that could be incorporated during construction and thus form 
the flexibility that is desired and designed into the project in order to mitigate risks if and when 
they occur during construction.  This aspect of the real options ‘in’ projects is not so obvious 
compared to the capital investment analysis but exists much the same.  The execution of an option 
during construction is therefore the action on the project that uses the flexibility devised during the 
early project stages occurring prior to the construction stage.  This will be demonstrated in the case 
study detailed in later sections.       Chapter 6  
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From a project management perspective, it is relevant whether flexibility lies in the project 
or in the decision process associated with the project.  Olsson (2006) picks up on this issue and 
details the impacts of high and low flexibility in a project and in a project’s decision making 
process.  Miller and Lessard (2001) also consider this issue due to the separate issues of using real 
options to price risk and the detailing of options in the managerial decision process.  The relevance 
here is that if both the project and the decision making process have low flexibility then 
adjustments are difficult to make.  If however the level of flexibility in the project is high with low 
flexibility in the decision process then such a situation would present a strategy where the resultant 
project would be relatively simple to achieve but with a level of operational flexibility built in, e.g. 
the ability to add a third lane to a dual carriageway in the future.  If however, this flexibility is not 
used then the inclusion of flexibility is a waste of resources. 
Of interest to this work is a situation where there is low flexibility in the project (such as an 
underground station) but high flexibility in the decision process where final decisions can be 
postponed until they must be made.  This scenario is conducive to the underground construction 
environment where decisions can be delayed to allow uncertain conditions to unfold and for 
enough information as possible to be gathered about risks.  A potential drawback of such flexibility 
is that it may cause frustration amongst stakeholders due to the potential for uncertainty and the 
lack of commitment on decisions.  This work however argues that this approach is beneficial to the 
construction of underground stations despite the perceived irreversibility of scope in large 
engineering projects (Miller and Lessard, 2001).                     
Kreiner (1995) argues that flexibility is necessary to face uncertainty in projects while 
other authors such as Morris and Hough (1987) and Miller and Lessard (2000) indicate that clear 
project definition is a critical success factor for projects.  Kreiner (1995) argues however that the 
traditional focus on the stability of project definition is challenged under risky and uncertain 
conditions.  Allowing controlled change may therefore benefit the successful completion of a 
project.  Olsson (2006) defines flexibility in this light as the capability to adjust the project to 
prospective consequences of uncertain circumstances within the context of the project.   
Chapman and Ward (2003) state that contingency plans should reflect anticipated potential 
departures from the defined plans of a project and should be in the form of alternative plans that 
could be used if the baseline plans cannot be executed.  Chapman and Ward (2003) however point 
out that it is important to restrict the development of overly detailed contingency plans in order to 
realise reasonable value in planning costs.  This in effect means that proactive planning for risks 
and uncertainties should be carried out to an extent that allows reactive planning to cope without 
any nasty surprises (most of the time) when risk and uncertainties occur.  Over allocating efforts to 
contingency plans before risks and uncertainties occur can detract from the effectiveness of the 
base plans which in turn could jeopardise the base plans themselves.  The availability of 
appropriate contingency plans can however be a significant help to managers facing potentially 
huge expenses to salvage risk events when they happen on metros.  Despite working in the space Chapter 6  
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and satellite sector (another highly risky and expensive working environment), Fuss et al. (2008) 
take this same view where it is seen as prudent to have optimised alternative plans rather than 
suffer great expenses and worsening project scenarios when emergencies occur.  
The application of flexibility within this chapter and associated case study is distinctive 
with regards to where it is applied.  It considers applying flexibility during the construction phase 
of a project because it is believed that this is where flexibility can have most value in terms of 
preserving value for clients when risks and uncertainties that cause cost overruns occur.  Authors 
including Morris and Hough (1987) and Miller and Lessard (2000) warn against applying 
flexibility in design during construction, suggesting that flexibility only be considered and applied 
during the planning and design phases.  This is because the flexibility considered in this work 
differs from the flexibility that Morris and Hough (1987) and Miller and Lessard (2000) refer to.   
Allowing flexibility with regards to changes in project requirements and specifications 
during the construction stage can constitute extra expense and encourage a claims culture between 
actors.  Indeed, this is true if changes are requested which deviate from those planned and designed 
for during the pre-construction phases and subsequently tendered for by construction contractors.  
Such flexibility is undesirable and is objected to by authors including Morris and Hough (1987) 
and Miller and Lessard (2000).   
However, should changes be required as a result of risks and uncertainties and the need to 
minimise cost overruns then the allowance for changes through flexibility is justified.  As is 
considered by Peck (1969); Nicholson et al. (1999); Powderham (2002) and Chapman and Ward 
(2003), this flexibility is facilitated by consideration of potential deviations from baseline plans 
during the planning and design phases in order to minimise problems if and when they occur during 
construction.  It is intuitive that this is so given that planning for flexibility to minimise cost 
overruns is significantly cheaper at the front end of project phases compared to its application at a 
point during the project execution phase (i.e. construction).  Additionally, planning for flexibility 
during construction when risks and uncertainties have occurred can be ineffective since the reactive 
actions which would have been proposed while considering flexibility during the design stage 
would be replaced by crisis actions and these could be less effective (Chapman and Ward, 2003).  
The ability to be flexible during construction in the underground environment is therefore seen as 
an essential tool in this work, given the risks and uncertainties that the associated activities have.  
In effect, the ability to depart from the planned ‘isolation’ of construction plans and designs when 
things go wrong can be beneficial to minimising cost overruns on a project. 
Olsson (2006) links flexibility to the efficiency and effectiveness of designs.  While 
efficiency can be easily linked to the success of the project in terms of it meeting its scope, cost, 
quality and time; effectiveness is regarded as an external measure of the long term effects on a 
project.  Within the consideration of project effectiveness lies flexibility, as it is this that can give a 
project the ability to be effective under constraints which may impact the project during its 
development.  Therefore, in order to maximise efficiency, projects are generally required to be well Chapter 6  
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defined during the planning and design phases.  However, risks and uncertainties may negatively 
impact the achievement of the initial definition thus reducing the success of a project.  While this 
may be the status quo within the construction industry, the use of pre-planned flexibility can assist 
in minimising the impacts on efficiency when things go wrong and in doing so, opportunities may 
be utilised to increase effectiveness and thus long term value for project owners and users (Kreiner, 
1995; Brennan and Trigeorgis, 2000). 
6.1.4.1  Flexibility example 
This sub section details a simple example where flexibility can be used to improve the value of a 
decision.   Certain assumptions are made regarding the timing of decisions with the example itself 
being based on capital allocation for the purposes of simplicity.   
Net present value (NPV) or discounted cash flow (DCF) approaches assume a single 
decision pathway with fixed outcomes where all decisions are made at the beginning of a project 
without the ability to change or develop over time.  This is inappropriate in valuing certain aspects 
of projects where managerial flexibility can add extra value compared to the static decision making 
associated with traditional approaches such as NPV.   
Compared to the NPV approach, a real options approach considers multiple decision 
pathways as a consequence of uncertainty coupled with management’s flexibility in choosing the 
optimal strategies as and when new information becomes available.  In effect, management has the 
ability to adapt given a change (e.g. due to the occurrence of a risk or uncertainty) in a project due 
to the dynamic series of decision options that real options present.  If the traditional NPV approach 
and real options approach is considered in terms of two points within a project;  
1)  the investment starting point where strategic investment decisions have to be made; and 
2)  at the end where a maximum return is sought; 
then a comparison can be made.  The traditional NPV approach would join these two points in a 
straight line in a one time decision making process whereas the real options approach would join 
these two points together with multiple routes to get to the ultimate goal of maximum return.   
The examples shown in figures 6.2 and 6.3 provide a simple analogy of the flexibility that 
real options can provide in capital investment strategies.  Suppose an investment costs £1000 to 
initiate (at t0) and that the payoff will yield £1300 in a year (at t1) with a risk free discount rate of 
5% (which is annualised).  As illustrated in figure 6.2, the one dimensional NPV of the investment 
between time t0 and t1 is £238.10, indicating a positive investment potential.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Net Present Value payoff 
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However, suppose this investment is being made under uncertain market conditions where 
the position of the market is unknown and that it would be possible to delay the investment.  Lets 
say that it is possible to delay making the investment for a year (i.e. waiting until t1 before 
investing) to allow any uncertainties in the market to be evaluated.  A real options approach is 
ideally suited to this scenario, as illustrated by figure 6.3 where investment occurs at time t1 with 
cash flows occurring at t2.  If it was possible to wait a year then the effects of the uncertainties on 
the market could be better estimated and the payoffs would bifurcate into two scenarios.  Should 
events prove unfavourable resulting in a low revenue of £900 and thus a loss (£900/(1.05)
2 - 
£1000/(1.05)
1 = £-136.05), then the investment would be abandoned.  Alternatively, should events 
result in an increase in cash flows to £1500, then the benefits of waiting and holding the option will 
be appreciated.  The simplified example shown in figure 6.3 does not account for the allowances 
that should be made for the loss of cash flow from t0 to t1 or the loss of opportunities which may 
have arisen between t0 and t1.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Real Options payoff  
 
In waiting a year and delaying the investment until t1, the potential for cash flow is being 
forfeited until t2.  Figure 6.3 shows a truncated downside because a rational investor would never 
knowingly enter a sure loss investment.  This makes the net present value of waiting an extra year 
£408.16 which, if considered in conjunction with the £238.10 value from figure 6.1 represents a 
flexibility value of (£408.16 - £238.10) = £170.06.   
In the context of this work, the relevance of being able to make changes at certain points 
within a construction programme is significant.  If an underground station is being constructed and 
at a certain point during the construction work, significant risks start to materialise and the 
associated uncertainties threaten to push to a costs over budget and increase timelines, then the 
ability to be flexible with regards to some construction decisions could help stay within targets.   
This chapter will detail a metro station case study showing how real options can be of 
benefit if applied in certain circumstances during the construction phase.  The next section 
discusses option valuation strategy.     
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6.1.5 Option valuation 
Trigeorgis (1996) discussed the drawbacks in terms of the accounting for flexibility of several 
traditional valuation techniques including; accounting rate of return (ARR); the internal rate of 
return (IRR); NPV; and decision tree analysis.  NPV is however considered superior amongst these 
techniques given its ability to maximise the shareholders’ utilities (Copeland and Weston, 1988) 
with work by Ho and Liu (2002) stating that when uncertainty is involved in an investment, the 
discount rate used in NPV calculations can be adjusted for risks according to the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM). 
Copeland and Weston (1988) give a full derivation of the CAPM.  The CAPM is a model 
that describes the relationship between risk and expected return and is used in the pricing of risky 
securities.  The general idea behind CAPM is that investors need to be compensated in two ways: 
time value of money and risk.  The time value of money is represented by the risk-free rate (rf) in 
the formula and compensates the investors for placing money in any investment over a period of 
time.  The other half of the formula represents risk and calculates the amount of compensation the 
investor needs for taking on additional risk.  This is calculated by taking a risk measure beta 
(β) that compares the returns of the asset to the market over a period of time and to the market 
premium (rm - rf) (i.e. the premium is the difference between the market return and the risk free fate 
of return).  The CAPM formula can be written as follows: 
rr rr ifi m f = + − β ()     6 . 1    
where ri is the return on the asset i, rf is the risk free rate, βi is the beta of the asset i and rm is the 
expected market return. 
 
The CAPM says that the expected return of a security or a portfolio equals the rate on a 
risk-free security plus a risk premium.  If this expected return does not meet or beat the required 
return, then the investment should not be undertaken.  Using the CAPM model and the following 
assumptions, the expected return of a stock can be calculated for the following CAPM example: if 
the risk-free rate is 4%, the beta (risk measure) of the stock is 2 and the expected market return 
over the period is 11%, the stock is expected to return (4%+2(11%-4%)) = 18%.  
The CAPM uses a β coefficient – a measure of systematic undiversifiable risk relative to 
capital markets – to compute the appropriate discount rate.  The β is calculated simply as the 
covariance (cov) of the asset’s (i) and the market’s (m) returns cov(ri,rm), divided by the variance of 
the market returns var(rm).  Further, covariance can be broken down into the products of correlation 
ρi,m, and the standard deviations of the asset (σi) and the market (σm) or  
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There are many problems with computing the discount rate for application in real options 
using the CAPM.  For instance, the β needs stock returns to be calculated – there aren’t any on a Chapter 6  
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real construction project, not to mention that stock prices change every few minutes which means 
that even if a β value could be calculated for real options, it would be unstable over different time 
horizons.  Also, if the project is not part of a diversified portfolio of projects, then using this 
diversified market as a proxy for the risks inherent in a single project is unjustified.  
Mun (2006b) however argues that the CAPM is flawed by design in that it can only be 
deployed effectively in a theoretical and hypothetical world with multiple assumptions.  In effect, 
the single factor beta used in the CAPM does not sufficiently explain expected returns from a 
market and therefore can not give an adequate value for a discount rate.  Mun (2006b) mentions the 
development of a multifactor asset pricing model which is more effective than the CAPM and uses 
internal comparables and Monte Carlo simulation to derive a discount rate for a project.  However, 
this multifactor model remains unsuitable for this work as it requires a cumulative discount rate 
from a portfolio of projects.  Given that the case study discussed later in this chapter is an 
individual project and is also not traded in a financial market, the derivation of a beta value for a 
CAPM derived discount rate or the application of the multifactor model by Mun (2003b) is not 
possible.  A discount rate can be estimated with reference to other projects with similar 
characteristics (e.g. other metro projects), in a similar manner to work by authors including Ho and 
Liu (2002); Fuss et al. (2008); and Chen et al. (2009).   
6.1.5.1  Binomial expansion 
Multiple methodologies and approaches are used in financial options analysis to calculate an option 
value.  These range from the closed-form equations like the Black-Scholes model, lattices (e.g. 
binomial, binomial pyramid lattices (in Ho and Liu, 2002); trinomial, and multinomial lattices) and 
variance reduction to other numerical techniques including partial differential equations.  The most 
common used methods are however the closed-form solutions and lattices.   
  Given the required inputs to the associated equations, closed-form solutions (like the 
Black-Scholes) can be solved quickly using basic programming.  However, limitations are that 
such solutions are difficult to explain given the stochastic calculus mathematics involved in their 
derivation
23 (in Hull, 2003; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) and that they value European options exactly 
in comparison to giving approximate values for American options.  In the context of applying real 
options to a metro project where risks and uncertainties can occur at any time, closed-form 
solutions are therefore a drawback with regards to valuing options given that American options are 
best applied since they can be exercised at any time.  
  Binomial lattices, in contrast, are easily implemented and explained and can be used to 
solve all types of options (Cox et al., 1979).  They are highly flexible with a simple drawback being 
that they require significant computing power when the number of lattice steps becomes significant 
(i.e. over 1000).  Mun (2006b) notes that solutions derived from binomial lattices tend to be similar 
                                                      
23 Hull (2003) provides a simplified application of the Black-Scholes model to value a European option.  Chapter 6  
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to those derived from closed-form solutions and thus the application of lattices is valid for valuing 
real options.  The rest of this section introduces the use of binomial lattices to value options 
including the derivation of all the input values used.     
   When using binomial lattices to value real options, the solution can be achieved in two 
ways.  The first is to use risk-neutral probabilities and the second is to use market replicating 
portfolios
24.  Within this work, risk neutral probabilities are used since obtaining the appropriate 
data for use in replicating portfolios is considerably more difficult.  Besides, as confirmed by Mun 
(2006b), the results obtained from replicating portfolios are identical to those obtained through risk 
neutral probabilities.  Market replicating portfolios’ main assumptions are that there are no 
arbitrage opportunities and that there exist a number of traded assets in the market that can be 
obtained to replicate the existing asset’s payout profile
25.   
  In replacing the market replicating portfolio with the risk neutral probability approach, a 
more appropriate methodology can be achieved for valuing options.  Instead of using a set of risky 
cash flows and discounting them at a risk adjusted discount rate (similar to NPV or discounted cash 
flow methods), the probabilities of the cash flows that occur at certain times can be risk adjusted.  
In effect, by using the risk adjusted probabilities on the cash flow allows these cash flows to be 
discounted at a risk free rate since the risks have been accounted for in the probabilities.  This is the 
essence of using binomial lattices for real options valuation. 
6.1.5.2  Binomial lattice input values 
This section applies risk neutral valuation in a binomial lattice.  Within any options model using 
binomial lattices, there are two lattices.  The first is always the lattice of the underlying asset and 
the second is the option valuation lattice.  No matter what type of real option is being modelled 
(e.g. an abandonment option, contraction option, expansion option), the basic structure always 
takes the same form.  Cox et al. (1979) developed the binomial tree that could consider one 
variable.  Under capital allocation and therefore real options on projects, the basic inputs to the 
lattices are;  
•  the present value of the underlying asset (S);  
•  exercise price of an asset (i.e. implementation cost or budget)  (X);  
                                                      
24 As an example, suppose one owns a portfolio of publicly traded stocks that pay a set percentage dividend 
(i.e. a cash flow) per period.  In theory, assuming no trading restrictions, taxes or transaction costs, one can 
purchase a second portfolio of several non-dividend paying stocks, bonds and other instruments and replicate 
the payout of the first portfolio of dividend paying stocks.  For instance, one can sell a particular number of 
shares per period to replicate the first portfolio’s dividend payout amount at every time period.  Hence, if 
both payouts are identical despite their stock compositions being different, then the value of both portfolios 
should be identical otherwise there will be arbitrage opportunities.  While this makes sense in the financial 
securities markets where stocks are freely traded and are highly liquid, in a real options world where non 
traded physical assets and projects are valued, it could be argued that the market replicating portfolio 
methods for option valuation are inapplicable. 
25 While this makes sense in the financial securities markets where stocks are freely traded and are highly 
liquid, in a real options world where non traded physical assets and projects are valued, it could be argued 
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•  volatility of the natural logarithm of the underlying free cash flow returns in percent (σ);  
•  time to option expiration in years (T); and 
•  risk free rate or the rate of return on a risk-less asset (rf).   
 
In addition the binomial lattice approach requires two additional sets of calculations, the up 
and the down factors (u and d) as well as a risk neutral probability measure p. 
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The above equations show that the up factor u is simply the exponential function of the 
cash flow returns volatility (σ) multiplied by the square root of time steps δt.  Time steps are 
simply time scale between steps within the time to expiration T (e.g. if an option has a one year 
maturity and the binomial lattice is constructed over 10 steps, δt would be equal to 1/10 = 0.1).  
The basis of the up factor u and the down factor d is the representation of uncertainty in cash flows.  
When uncertainty exists and is built into a model, several methods can be used in financial 
forecasting and option pricing models including Brownian Motion processes.  In an Exponential 
Brownian Motion where 
                                       6.6 
 
the process (described in equation 6.6) can be segregated into a deterministic and a stochastic part 
                                         6.7 
 
The deterministic part of the model (e
μ(δt)) accounts for the slope or growth rate of the 
Brownian process.  However, in real options analysis, the underlying asset variable is the sum of 
the present values of the future free cash flows, which means that the growth rate or slope in cash 
flows from one period to the next have already been accounted for in the cash flow analysis.  
Hence, the stochastic term (e
σε√δt) with a simulated term ε only needs to be accounted for.  The 
stochastic term (e
σε√δt) has a volatility component σ, a time component δt and a simulated 
component ε (ε is a simulated representation of expectation in options analysis).  Since the 
binomial lattice approach is a discrete simulation model, there is no need to simulate every time 
period and the simulated variable ε drops out.  The remaining stochastic term is simply e
σ√δt.   
The volatility measure is an annualised value and multiplying it by the square root of the 
time steps δt breaks it down into the time step equivalent volatility.  The down factor d is simply 
the reciprocal of the up factor u.  It should be noted that the higher the volatility, the larger the up 
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and down factors will be.  Given the reciprocal magnitude of u and d, the binomial lattices will 
recombine at various points since their magnitude is the same with only the signs being different. 
  The calculation of the risk neutral probability p is defined as the ratio of the exponential 
function of the difference between the risk free rate multiplied by the time step less the down 
factor, to the difference between the up and down factors (see equation 6.5).  As noted by Mun 
(2006b), this risk neutral probability value is a mathematical intermediate and by itself has no 
particular meaning.  Mun (2006b) provides an extensive derivation of risk neutral probability 
equations which does not need repetition here.   
6.1.5.3  Option example using binomial lattices    
This example takes the binomial lattice approach and associated inputs discussed in this section and 
demonstrate their application on a rail project using simulated inputs.  In this case, the option is to 
contract construction operations of a project in the event that overruns result in cost increases 
above the construction budget.  Any increase in construction costs results in a decrease of project 
valuation and it is the avoidance of this decrease that is desirable through the application of a 
contraction real option.  Contraction of the construction operations is achieved by not building 
elements of the railway, hence saving money on capital expenditure for construction.          
Suppose that a consortium of designers, planners and contractors has formed in order to 
build a new metro route under a major city.  The procurement arrangement may be in the form of a 
PFI or BOOT (see Smith, 2008) relationship, the details of which are not discussed further other 
than the fact that the consortium will operate the built infrastructure for a set period of time once 
the project is built.  The metro will take 6 years design and build, with the public body who will 
eventually take control of the project after the concession period specifically requesting that a 
minimum of 5 underground stations are built under the city centre (linked by tunnels) with a further 
16 surface stations being built in suburban areas.   
The consortium identified an optimum operating structure with 7 underground stations and 
18 surface stations with a static valuation of future profitability to be £5 billion.  It is assumed (but 
in reality can be found through Monte Carlo simulation) that the implied volatility of the returns on 
the projected future cash flows to be 50% (σ = 0.5) and the risk free rate for the next 5 years to be 
5% (rf = 0.05).   
The consortium decides to hedge itself against cost overruns on the project through the use 
of strategic options, specifically to contract the number of stations under construction from 7 to 6.  
While this would save the capital cost of construction the 7
th station, it would also satisfy the 
requirements of constructing at least 5 underground stations and would therefore conserve the 
valuation of the basic project.  Not constructing the 7
th station would present a cost saving of £175 
million to the project but would also reduce the £5bn future profit valuation by 9%.  Contraction 
can be achieved through certain contractual arrangements made in procurement contracts between 
the actors within the consortium and also a time delay on the construction of the 7
th station to allow Chapter 6  
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any likely overruns resulting from the construction of the rest of the metro to be established.  The 
construction of the 7
th station needs to occur in the 5
th year, indicating that the option to build the 
7
th station needs to exist for 5 years.   
  A valuation of this contraction option can be achieved using the previously discussed 
binomial approach to model an American put option.  All calculations included in figure 6.4 are 
based on the up factor, down factor risk neutral probability discussed in section 6.1.5.2 where the 
values are calculated by forward multiplication from left to right using the up and down factors (u 
and d).  The values for the binomial lattice are; 
•  S = £5000 m  
•  Volatility (σ) = 0.5  
•  time to expiration in years (T) = 5, δt = 1;  
•  risk free rate (rf) = 0.05  
•  from eqs. 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5; u = 1.6487, d = 0.6065, p = 0.427   
 
Figure 6.4 Contraction option (Underlying Asset Value)  
 
Starting with the underlying value of £5000m, this value can be multiplied by the up and 
down values to obtain £8243.5m and £3032.5m respectively with the rest of the lattice values being 
calculated in the same way.  The values in this lattice represent the impacts that events during the 
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construction period can have on the valuation of the project.  Therefore, if overruns occur then the 
valuation of the project will decrease and it is this decrease in value that would trigger the 
contraction of the project in order to preserve or salvage its value.  The minimum value of the 
underlying asset can be seen at node S0d
5, which is £410.4m.     
The second step is to calculate the option valuation lattice as shown in figure 6.5 using the 
values calculated in the lattice evolution of the underlying asset in figure 6.4.  The calculation of 
the nodes in figure 6.5 starts with the terminal nodes on the right and working left using backward 
induction as defined below.  Figure 6.5 shows a terminal node (denoted ‘A’) revealing a value of 
£60,908.5m.  This can be obtained through the value maximisation of the value of contraction (X) 
versus the underlying asset (S) at this node (max [X, S], i.e. the American put option payoff).  The 
value of contracting the metro project by not building the 7
th station is calculated based on the 
reduction of the operating structure by 9% plus the £175 m saving from not building the 7
th station.  
Hence, taking the maximum underlying asset valuation from node S0u
5 in figure 6.4, the value of 
contracting the consortium’s operations X is 0.91(£60,908.5m) + £175m = £55,601.8m.  The 
underlying asset value S = £60,908.5m from node S0u
5 so max[55,601.8, 60,908.5] = £60,908.5m. 
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Figure 6.5 Contraction option valuation lattice 
          
At the end of five years, the consortium has the option to contract its construction activities 
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or not to contract thereby keeping the option open and thus for the future i.e. until they decide 
whether to build the 7
th station at the end of the 5 year period.  The contraction value can be 
calculated by taking the underlying asset valuation from node S0u
2 in figure 6.4 resulting in the 
value of contracting the consortiums operations at node C to be 0.91(£13,591.1m) + £175m = 
£12,542.9m.  The value of continuing is simply the discounted weighted average of the potential 
future option values using the risk neutral probability.  As the risk adjustment is performed on the 
probabilities of future option cash flows, the discounting can be achieved using the risk free rate.  
The value for keeping the option alive and open at node C can be calculated by taking values from 
the nodes to the left of node C, as shown in figure 6.5.  Therefore [(P)(£22,407.2m) + (1 – P) 
(£8,243.3m)]exp[(- rf) (δt)] = £13,590.7m which is higher than the contraction value.  Therefore, 
by the contraction option payoff max[X, S], max[£12,542.9m, £13,590.7m] indicates that it is 
optimal to keep the option open at this point.  This assumes a 5% risk free rate rf, a time step δt of 
1 and a risk neutral probability P of 0.427 (calculated using equation. 6.5)
 26.   
Using this backward induction technique, the lattice is back calculated to the starting point 
to obtain the value of £5,020.6m.  Since the metro project value obtained through a discounted cash 
flow is £5bn for current operations, the option value of being able to contract 9% of operations is 
£20.6m (£5,020.6m - £5,000m).  The £5bn is the static NPV without flexibility, the £20.6m is the 
real options value and the combined value of £5,020.6 is the total strategic value or ENPV 
(expanded NPV).  The real options value is therefore worth an additional 0.41% to the existing 
valuation which represents the additional value that the option to contract gives the consortium 
given the strategic option to avoid cost overruns.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
26 An effort was made to use values that were representative but such values are in no way indicative of 
values typically associated with any given metro project.  For example, figure 6.4 shows the underlying value 
growing to over £60bn during the construction period which is highly unlikely in reality.  However, the 
decrease in valuation to the value of £410.3m is realistic due to cost overruns occurring during the 
construction period and it is this situation and its avoidance that is of interest to this work.  
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6.2 Flexibility Valuation in an Underground Station  
This section introduces the case study upon which the flexibility discussed previously will be 
applied.  Chapter 1 (Section 1.3) stated that the Crossrail project was being used as a general case 
study within this project.  A component of the Crossrail project is the development of a new station 
at Farringdon in central London.  Aspects of the Farringdon station design work have been used as 
a case study within this chapter since they presented an opportunity for the author to apply the 
methodologies discussed in section 6.1.  Section 6.2.1 will detail aspects of Farringdon station that 
are relevant to this work with section 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 detailing how the authors’ role in the planning 
and design of the station resulted in the identification of design options upon which the previously 
discussed flexibility concepts could be applied.  
Farringdon Crossrail will run beneath the subsurface London Underground (LU) lines 
between the existing LU Farringdon and LU Barbican stations. The existing LU Farringdon station 
will be redeveloped to provide access to all current rail services running through the station (i.e. 
Thameslink and LU services) in conjunction with the new Crossrail services.  This redevelopment 
includes the construction of a large new ticket hall and is referred to as the Farringdon West ticket 
hall.  Much of the work at Farringdon West ticket hall is subject to constraints presented by and 
allowances required for existing work being carried out upgrading the Thameslink project which is 
a major interface at Farringdon West.   
The subject of this case study is the new Farringdon East ticket hall.  It is smaller in scale 
compared to the Farringdon West ticket hall but presents a similar array of problems and 
constraints to designers and builders.  These problems could easily result in cost overruns to the 
project if not adequately addressed.  The new Farringdon East ticket hall will not replace the LU 
Barbican station but rather sit next to it, amongst a web of existing infrastructure and historic 
buildings.  Farringdon East ticket hall will provide access to Crossrail services as well as an 
internal interchange link to LU services at Barbican Station.  Figure 6.6 presents a view of the 
proposed Farringdon station with its interaction with existing rail transport infrastructure.   
 
Figure 6.6 Drawing of Crossrail Farringdon with existing transport infrastructure. Chapter 6  
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6.2.1 Context of application – Farringdon East Ticket Hall 
The proposed surface footprint of Farringdon East ticket hall (known as Farringdon ETH) lies 
within an area bordered by Long Lane to the south, Lindsey Street to the west, Hayne Street to the 
east and Charterhouse Street to the North.  Charterhouse Square, a historically significant square 
lies on the northern boundary of Charterhouse Street with the listed
27 Smithfield Market lying on 
the western boundary of Lindsey Street.  Figure 6.7 shows the location of Farringdon ETH within 
the Farringdon area.   
Up until the Spring of 2008, designs for Farringdon ETH had proceeded on the assumption 
that buildings within the footprint defined by the above mentioned roads would be demolished, 
giving access initially for the deep excavation required by the tunnelling work for the Crossrail 
running tunnels.  Upon completion of tunnelling work, this excavation would later be transformed 
into the Farringdon ETH station structure itself.  These plans required the excavation of ground 
underneath and in the basement of the north eastern corner of Smithfield Market (which would 
remain operational) in order to build passenger links between the Crossrail platforms and the 
Farringdon ETH .  The designs also proposed that the location of ventilation shafts from the 
Crossrail tunnels would be placed at a separate location to the north of the ETH site in Fox and 
Knot Street (see fig 6.7).  The placement of a ventilation shaft in Fox and Knot Street would 
require demolition of further buildings and deep excavations in the vicinity of two listed areas.       
 
Figure 6.7 Farringdon ETH and the surrounding area 
                                                      
27 A listed building in the United Kingdom is a building or other structure officially designated as being of 
special architectural, historical or cultural significance.  The authority for listing is presently administered by 
English Heritage. 
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Relevant information of potential risk sources within the Farringdon ETH area are listed 
below.  The list is not comprehensive but details the significant risk issues that must be appreciated 
and may need addressing in order to construct Farringdon ETH.  
1)  Smithfield Market is a Grade II listed Victorian building with the Smithfield Market 
Tenants Association acting in the interests of all parties associated with the market.  A 
market has existed in Smithfield for over 800 years and the area itself forms part of the 
City of London and therefore any excavations in the area could be subject to archaeological 
interest.   
2)  Charterhouse is a complex of buildings near Smithfield Market which lie on the site of a 
former 14
th century monastery.  This monastery was established near a 1348 plague pit 
which formed the largest mass grave in London during the Black Death.  This pit lies in 
what is currently Charterhouse Square. 
3)  A major sewer (the St. Johns Branch sewer) runs through the Farringdon site with much of 
its physical structure still in its original Victorian form.  In centuries past, this was a small 
river, becoming an ‘open sewer’ as London expanded and latterly becoming a culverted 
river prior its conversion into a buried sewer by the Victorians.  The sewer was covered by 
soil and fill material over the centuries to create the current ground level.   
4)  A geological fault exists in an element of the ground underneath the Farringdon area which 
may introduce geotechnical instability to any tunnelling or excavations carried out. 
5)  Much of the utilities in the Farringdon ETH area are placed at a shallow depth underneath 
public roads.  In some cases this may be due to other utilities lying at greater depth or the 
presences of shallow infrastructure such as cut and cover tunnels for LU services.  The 
consequence of shallow buried utilities is that the heavy plant required for excavation in 
the Farringdon ETH site could cause lasting damage.  As with any construction, known 
utilities would be moved but the amount of buried utilities in the Farringdon ETH could 
mean that some utilities are missed and thus suffer damage during construction work. 
6)  Much of the existing civil infrastructure (rail, road etc.) in the Farringdon area is very old 
with little data being held regarding its composition or integrity.  This presents 
considerable uncertainties with regards to integrating new with existing infrastructure.  
Hayne Street Bridge near Farringdon ETH is a typical example where struts are made of 
200 year old wrought iron.  Further examples are the brick retaining walls in LU Barbican 
station (pre-1900) that were declared a heritage area due to their design and appearance. 
7)  An Interlocking Machine Room (IMR) (an electrical signalling facility) is located in the 
Farringdon ETH site which is crucial for the operation of LU services to the wider area.  
 
Further risks are considered later using a CDM risk assessment.  The above are only risk issues 
which have an impact on and must be considered for the design, planning and construction work at 
Farringdon ETH.          Chapter 6  
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6.2.2 Station option evaluation 
Cross London Rail Links (CLRL), the client for Crossrail, instructed the design team of which the 
author was a member to evaluate the designs for Farringdon ETH in the Spring of 2008.  At the 
time, CLRL were working to obtain Royal Assent for the Crossrail project which would eventually 
become the Crossrail Act.  This required commitments with regards to which third parties would or 
would not be affected by the project, a relevant issue for Farringdon ETH given that the designs 
had not been considered in any detail since the Crossrail Hybrid Bill
28 in 2005. 
Two priorities were identified by CLRL in order to satisfy planning requirements and 
revolved around the removal of as many third party interfaces as possible.  These priorities were; 
1)  to permanently design out the need to utilise the basement area of Smithfield Market for 
permanent Crossrail Works; 
2)  to permanently design out the need to house ventilation systems within the Fox and Knot 
Street site. 
 
In giving the main consideration to priority 1 above, CLRL commissioned a study that 
would evaluate appropriate design options and are shown in table 6.1.  Designs also needed to 
address the following issues and in doing so presented the 8 options listed in table 6.1 for 
consideration;  
•  whether the ventilation systems could be removed from the Fox and Knot Street site; 
•  consider whether the disused Moorgate branch lines of the Thameslink network running 
through the proposed Farringdon ETH site could be permanently closed with the resulting 
free space being used in the new Farringdon ETH; 
•  whether the interchange links between the new Farringdon ETH and the existing LU 
Barbican station could be an underground tunnel or a surface walkway link.          
 
Table 6.1 Design considerations for Farringdon ETH 
Option  Vent in Fox 
and Knot 
Street 
Vent within 
Main Site 
Moorgate 
Branch Lines 
Reinstated to 
LU 
Moorgate 
Branch Lines 
Permanently 
Occupied 
Interchange 
for LU Above 
Ground 
Interchange 
for LU Below 
Ground 
1  X  X  X  
2  X  X    X 
3  X    X  X  
4  X    X  X 
5   X  X  X  
6   X  X    X 
7   X  X  X  
8   X  X  X 
                                                      
28 http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/crossrail/ (June 2009) Chapter 6  
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  Further input from CLRL in the early part of the design option study resulted in options 5 
and 6 being the only feasible options for further consideration.  The difference between options 5 
and 6 was the location of the passenger interchange link between the proposed Farringdon ETH 
and the LU Barbican station.  Option 5 included an over-bridge walkway interchange between the 
stations with option 6 offering a tunnelled interchange.      
Options 1 to 4 were discounted since the removal of the vent in Fox and Knot Street 
became a requirement of the project.  Of further relevance was that this site was to be used as a 
construction access shaft during construction meaning that ending its availability required the 
provision of an access shaft in another location near or in the main ETH site.  This new shaft was 
located nearer the Farringdon ETH site at 33-37 Charterhouse Street which lies within the footprint 
of a LU Barbican station platform.  Options 7 and 8 were discounted as LU needed the Moorgate 
Branch lines running through the proposed Farringdon ETH site to be returned to LU use once 
Crossrail construction had finished.  This in effect placed further restrictions on space available for 
Farringdon ETH.  With options 5 and 6 identified as the appropriate options to satisfy the 
requirements placed due to various priorities and constraints, the design team could develop 
variations of these options (called sub-options) to satisfy further criteria set by CLRL against which 
the optimum design for Farringdon ETH would be chosen.  These criteria included the following; 
•  architectural design of the station; 
•  passenger flow through the station; 
•  architectural design of the over site development (OSD); 
•  effect on the construction programme; 
•  level of risk; 
•  overall construction cost of the station; 
•  overall value of proposed OSD. 
 
Since the ventilation shaft was moved from Fox and Knot Street to elsewhere within the 
Farringdon ETH, the arrangement of the ventilation systems was a significant issue that would 
impact the design of the station.  Along with the type of interchange chosen, the ventilation systems 
were therefore critical drivers that would affect the overall value of the station and OSD.   
Option 5 (with walkway interchange to LU Barbican) was developed into 4 sub-options, 
5A, 5B, 5C, and 5D which generally had different solutions for the box and shaft structure that 
would form the underground portion of Farringdon ETH.  Option 6 (tunnelled interchange to LU 
Barbican) was developed into 2 sub-options, 6A and 6B, with the difference being whether the 
tunnelled interchange connection was shallow or deep.  Table 6.2 presents an assessment of sub-
options 5A, 5B, 5C, 5D, 6A and 6B.  Chapter 6  
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Table 6.2 Summary of options considering the design constraints 
Option  Main Footprint  Interchange 
type 
Shaft at 33-37 
Charterhouse 
Square 
Forced Air 
fan location 
Forced Air 
vent location 
Draught Relief 
vent location 
3 Hayne 
Street 
Station 
Entrance 
OSD Entrance  Location of OSD 
Structural Core 
5A  Square Diaphragm 
wall box and 
connected small 
circular shaft 
Below ground 
– in their own 
shaft 
Over Hayne 
Street 
Over Moorgate 
Branch lines 
Used for 
draught relief 
vents 
5B  Rectangular 
Diaphragm wall 
box (larger than 
the square of 5A 
and 5C) 
Below ground 
– in the main 
box 
Over Moorgate 
Branch lines 
Over Hayne 
Street having 
passed through 
OSD 
Used for 
forced air vents 
5C  Square Diaphragm 
wall box 
In OSD 
aligned 
vertically 
Over Hayne 
Street 
Over Hayne 
Street having 
passed through 
OSD 
Not Used 
5D  Circular 
Diaphragm wall 
shaft (smaller than 
the square) 
Overbridge 
walkway – 
options for 
dogleg 
overbridge and 
works to Hayne 
Street Bridge  
In OSD but 
aligned 
horizontally 
Over 
Charterhouse 
Square 
Over Hayne 
Street having 
passed through 
OSD 
Used for 
draught relief 
vents 
In preferred 
location midway 
along Lindsey 
Street 
 
Stepped access 
6A  Rectangular 
Diaphragm wall 
box (larger than 
the square of 5A 
and 5C) 
Tunnel – 
shallow dogleg 
shape cut and 
cover, accessed 
by stairs 
through LU 
platforms 
Temporary 
 
Bottle profile 
with circular 
contiguous pile 
outer ring. Either 
Sprayed Concrete 
Lining inner ring 
or segmental 
lining. 
Below ground 
– in the main 
box 
Over Moorgate 
Branch lines 
Over Hayne 
Street having 
passed through 
OSD 
Used for 
forced air vents 
6B  Circular 
Diaphragm wall 
shaft (smaller than 
the square) 
Tunnel – bored 
with straight 
profile, secant 
pile box 
required for 
stair access to 
LU Barbican 
WB platform 
Permanent 
 
Construction as 
above. Larger 
shaft required. 
In OSD but 
aligned 
horizontally 
Over 
Charterhouse 
Square 
Over Moorgate 
Branch lines 
Not Used 
On corner of 
Lindsey 
Street and 
Long Lane 
providing 
good 
visibility and 
direct access 
to Crossrail 
platforms. 
Ticket Hall at 
street level. 
In preferred 
location midway 
along Lindsey St 
 
Step free access 
In preferred location 
almost directly 
behind the OSD 
entrance and 
adjacent to Hayne 
Street Chapter 6  
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  As shown in Table 6.2, the location of ventilation systems for forced air
29 and draught 
relief was different for each of the six sub-options.  The arrangement of ventilation systems not 
only had impacts on the layout of the ticket hall and whether the vents would operate at street level 
or higher in the OSD, but also how much of the OSD would have to be allocated to contain the 
ventilation systems.  This was a trade-off that had to be made by the client.  If ventilation systems 
were located in the OSD then this would adversely affect its value and reduce the area to let.  
Conversely, vents located at street level would increase the OSD value but impact on pedestrians.  
The layout of ventilation systems also impacted on whether a property at 3 Hayne Street needed to 
be demolished for the purposes of providing ventilation systems and whether Hayne Street bridge 
needed to be raised in order to contain the relevant ducting.  As previously mentioned, Hayne 
Street bridge is an old structure which contains many utilities and therefore considerable risks 
existed with threats being that considerable re-work could be required beyond the project scope. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 3-D graphic of Farringdon ETH box structure with walkway and tunnelled interchange 
                                                      
29 Forced air ventilation allows atmospheric air to be forced into tunnels in the event of a fire.  A network of 
forced air systems can therefore contain a fire by pushing or pulling smoke along a tunnel environment to the 
nearest surface vent.  This is a very effective way of controlling smoke in a tunnel and thus assists in tunnel 
safety and evacuation.  Draught relief vents simply allow the air pressure built up by moving trains to escape. 
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The layout of the ventilation systems were therefore one of two significant differences 
identified between sub-options 5A, 5B, 5C and 5D.  The other difference was the structure of the 
station box itself which could take the form of a circular shaft or a diaphragm wall box.  
The station box structure was also a key difference between sub-options 6A and 6B.  Since 
the interchange link was now buried and not a walkway bridge as in sub-options 5, more space was 
available to locate ventilation systems.  The drawback here was that further tunnelling was required 
under existing transport infrastructure which itself presented considerable engineering and 
geotechnical risks.  Option 6A proposed constructing the interchange as a cut and cover tunnel 
which reduced its feasibility even further considering that the LU lines it was being constructed 
under had to remain operational.   
The next section details how the sub-options were evaluated to reach the two optimal 
solutions for the design of Farringdon ETH.  Figure 6.8 is a 3-D image of Farringdon ETH showing 
the main design and the layout of the two types of potential interchange.  The image does not show 
any ventilation systems for the purposes of clarity.  
      
6.2.3 Identification of the two best options for Farringdon ETH 
The identification of the two best sub-options shown in table 6.2 was achieved using an analytical 
hierarchy process (AHP) designed by the author.  This hierarchy was built using a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet and handed to 12 members of the design team for completion (with the author acting as 
moderator).  This team consisted of architects, engineers, construction planners and representatives 
of the client, CLRL.  The global and elemental risk evaluation process described in Chapter 5 also 
discusses the application of an analytical hierarchy process (AHP) (in Saaty and Vargas, 2000).   
In order to maintain a capability to operate in various office locations with multiple users, 
it was envisaged that the AHP process would take the form of an electronic questionnaire using 
Excel or Visual Basic.  The benefits of using Excel had a practical nature in that every computer 
available to the design team had Excel installed on it and that most users were familiar with its use.  
In addition, the computer file holding the AHP could be emailed between computers for effective 
communication of the results as well as giving the ability to make adjustments.  A further benefit of 
using Excel was that the analysis of the inputs could be carried out while the decisions were being 
made by the design team. 
Dr Thomas Saaty, the creator of the AHP, has recently completed an updated version of his 
AHP software called Decision Lens© (www.decisionlens.com).  Another company originally 
founded by Thomas Saaty that is known as Expert Choice Inc. (www.expertchoice.com) also 
provides desktop and web-based software (Comparison Suite™ and Expert Choice 11.5™) for 
decision making.  While the benefits of using this software was clear in terms of the ease by which 
decisions and comparisons could be made, they could also provide a professionally presented 
output which could help communicate the outputs to clients.  However, the Excel model could be Chapter 6  
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assembled in a way which provided similar presentability as well as being user friendly.  The 
benefits of using Excel were also logistic in nature since the decision process was being applied 
and completed in a third party office.  Licenses for AHP software would therefore be difficult to 
purchase and install on third party computers.  The use of Excel for the AHP that was developed 
and used in this work was therefore a reasonable choice given the time frame available and the 
practical constraints within which the AHP has to be completed.       
A criticism of AHP methods is the use of arbitrary scales (Dyer, 1990; Holder, 1990).  The 
pair-wise comparisons where the relative importance of different attributes are given a value on a 
scale of 1 to 9 or the inverse (1/9th to 1) are assigned by verbal elicitation of decision makers.  For 
example, if a person says attribute A is "moderately more important" than attribute B, A is said to 
have a relative weight of 3 times that of B while "extremely more important" will give A a weight 
of 9 times that of B. While this scale is commonly used in AHP, it is arbitrary in that the perceived 
meaning of verbal expressions can vary between respondents.  This issue was moderated in this 
work since all respondents were present in workshops which enabled discussion and analysis prior 
to any choices being made.   
Figure 6.9 shows the criteria that the author gathered as a result of consultation between the 
design team and client representatives.  This criterion was relevant to Farringdon ETH and was as 
detailed as practicable without making the evaluation process laborious.  Each sub-option was 
evaluated against each item of sub-criteria, considering any relevant information.   
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Figure 6.9 Criteria for sub-option evaluation 
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The first task of the evaluation process was to weigh the significance of each of the 
criterion.  This was achieved by pair-wise comparison where respondents would specify which one 
of two criteria was most important in the context of Farringdon ETH.  This was carried out for all 
criteria and sub-criteria.  The importance of one criterion over another was measured using 
intensities, as defined in Table 6.3 
Table 6.3 The fundamental scale of the pair-wise comparisons 
Intensity of Importance  Definition  Explanation 
1  Equal Importance  Two options contribute equally to the objective 
3 Moderate  Importance  Experience and judgement slightly favour one option over 
another 
5 Strong  Importance  Experience and judgement strongly favour one option over 
another 
7  Very Strong 
Importance  One option is favoured very strongly over another 
9  Extreme Importance  One option is absolutely more important than another 
Intensities of 2,4,6 and 8 are used to express intermediate values.  Intensities 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 etc. can be used for elements 
that are very close in importance.     
 
A pair-wise comparison for the sub-criteria associated with the Construction Programme 
criterion (see figure 6.9) is shown in table 6.4 below.  The respondents have simply stated which 
sub-criteria they believe is more important given their knowledge of the Farringdon ETH project 
and then specified an intensity which quantifies the importance of one criterion is over another.  
This is representative of the weighting carried out for all criteria and sub-criteria.   
The local weighting represents the weighting of the sub-criteria being compared at the sub-
criteria level.  The global weighting value represents the weighting of the sub-criteria in the context 
of the whole hierarchy.  This allows sub-criteria to be weighted with consideration to all the other 
sub-criteria in the hierarchy.  This is an effective way of considering all criterion in the hierarchy at 
the same level and then identifying the varying importance of each criterion. 
Table 6.4 A Pair-wise comparison for the Construction Programme sub-criteria 
 
 
A  B  More Important 
(A or B)  Intensity 
CONSTRUCTION 
PROGRAMME 
Construction programme 
length 
Phasing of construction 
activities  A 2 
CRITERIA SUB-CRITERIA    
     Local Weighting  Global 
Weighting 
   Construction 
programme length  0.67 0.098 
   Phasing of construction 
activities  0.33 0.049 
 
  Table 6.5 shows the weighting calculated for all criteria shown in figure 6.9.  This 
weighting is presented in percentage terms and represents the portion of weighting occupied by 
each criteria compared to the total weighting of all criteria.  It can be seen that respondents thought 
Risk and Construction Cost were of greater relevance than other criteria for Farringdon ETH.  
(Table 6.9 shows the relative weightings of all criteria and their associated sub-criteria). 
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Table 6.5 Criteria weights calculated using pair-wise comparisons 
Criterion  Weight 
Risk 29% 
Construction Cost  23% 
Construction Programme  15% 
Construction Impact  15% 
Station Operation  10% 
OSD Value  8% 
 
6.2.3.1  Evaluation of sub-options against all criteria 
The extent to which each sub-option fared against the criteria, sub-criteria and information shown 
in figure 6.9 was established using linguistic terms, defined as very low (VL), low (L), medium 
(M), high (H), very high (VH); or very poor (VP), poor (P), fair (F), good (G), very good (VG).  
These terms were used to classify how well each sub-option dealt with the criteria with intensity 
values being used to determine the extent to which one sub-option was better than another.   
If the criteria or sub-criteria being considered were specified using numerical values, then 
no linguistic terms were used for the evaluation of sub-options.  A typical example here was the 
capital cost of individual sub-options where the actual construction cost of each sub-option was 
used for comparison.  It was intuitive for respondents to simply rank the cheapest option as the 
best.  In this case, the cheapest sub-option ranked as best would inevitably be combined with the 
Construction Cost criteria weight (see table 6.5) to give a high score in the hierarchy.  This would 
have been incorrect and would have introduced an imbalance into the AHP model.  In order to 
overcome this, respondents were encouraged to ensure that the intensity values used to define the 
benefits of one sub-option over another reflected the significant differences in numerical values. 
Table 6.6 shows the linguistic evaluation of the impacts that each sub-option would have 
on the third parties surrounding ETH.  Potential areas of impact are listed as ‘Information’ under 
each sub-criteria in figure 6.9.    
  Table 6.6 Evaluation of ‘Physical impacts on 3
rd parties’ sub-criteria 
  Potential Areas of Impact   
 
Impacts on 
LU 
Impacts on 
Smithfield Market 
Utility 
diversions 
Impact on 
public utilities 
Land take  Overall 
Score 
Option 5A  H  L  H  M  H  M 
Option 5B  H  L  H  M  H  M 
Option 5C  H  L  H  M  L  M 
Option 5D  H  L  H  M  H  M 
Option 6A  VH  L  M  L  H  M 
Option 6B  M  VL  L  L  L  L 
  * factors rated as very low (VL), low (L), medium (M), high (H), very high (VH) 
 
  These outputs from respondents were then used to establish the overall score for the sub-
options as shown in the right hand column of table 6.6.  The overall score was presented as a 
linguistic term unless the criteria were defined using numerical values.  The overall score was 
included in a pair-wise comparison where respondents would define the intensity or the extent to 
which one option could be considered better than another in reducing the impacts defined by the Chapter 6  
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criteria.  Table 6.7 shows the comparisons and intensities derived from respondents assessing the 
impacts of the sub-options on the ‘Physical impacts on 3
rd parties’ sub-criteria.  An operation in the 
AHP process converts the linguistic terms used for the classification of sub-options into numerical 
values for calculation purposes.  A column is included in table 6.7 which shows the numerical 
values of the extent and ratio to which the impact of the chosen sub-option is less.   
Table 6.7 Pair-wise comparisons and intensities of the impacts of sub-options on the ‘Physical impacts 
on 3
rd parties’ sub-criteria 
Physical impacts on 3rd parties comparisons and intensities worksheet   
Comparison  Overall Score  Impact is less by 
   A  B  A  B 
Less 
impact  Amount  Ratio 
Better 
Option  Intensity  Matrix 
value 
1  Option 5A  Option 5B  M  M  Equal  0  1  Equal  1  1.00 
2  Option 5A  Option 5C  M  M  B  0.40  1.15  B  3  0.33 
3  Option 5A  Option 5D  M  M  Equal  0  1  Equal  1  1.00 
4  Option 5A  Option 6A  M  M  B  0.20  1.08  B  2  0.50 
5  Option 5A  Option 6B  M  L  B  1.40  1.54  B  5  0.20 
6  Option 5B  Option 5C  M  M  B  0.40  1.15  B  3  0.33 
7  Option 5B  Option 5D  M  M  Equal  0  1  Equal  1  1.00 
8  Option 5B  Option 6A  M  M  B  0.20  1.08  B  2  0.50 
9  Option 5B  Option 6B  M  L  B  1.40  1.54  B  5  0.20 
10  Option 5C  Option 5D  M  M  A  0.40  1.15  A  3  3.00 
11  Option 5C  Option 6A  M  M  A  0.20  1.07  A  2  2.00 
12  Option 5C  Option 6B  M  L  B  1.00  1.33  B  4  0.25 
13  Option 5D  Option 6A  M  M  B  0.20  1.08  B  2  0.50 
14  Option 5D  Option 6B  M  L  B  1.40  1.54  B  5  0.20 
15  Option 6A  Option 6B  M  L  B  1.20  1.43  B  4  0.25 
 
  The right hand column contains the absolute values of the intensities considering the 
preferences specified in the pair-wise comparisons.  This is an operation within the AHP process 
where all comparisons and their relative intensities are placed in an Overall Preference Matrix 
(OPM) which is in effect the accumulation of all the comparisons made for the sub-criteria under 
analysis.  The OPM for the ‘Physical impacts on 3
rd parties’ sub-criteria is presented in table 6.8. 
Table 6.8 An Overall Preference Matrix for the ‘Physical impacts on 3
rd parties’ sub-criteria    
     Option 5A  Option 5B  Option 5C  Option 5D  Option 6A  Option 6B 
Option 5A  1.00 1.00 0.33  1.00  0.50 0.20 
Option  5B 1.00 1.00 0.33  1.00  0.50 0.20 
Option  5C 3.00 3.00 1.00  3.00  2.00 0.25 
Option  5D 1.00 1.00 0.33  1.00  0.50 0.20 
Option  6A 2.00 2.00 0.50  2.00  1.00 0.25 
Option  6B 5.00 5.00 4.00  5.00  4.00 1.00 
Sum  13.00  13.00 6.50  13.00  8.50 2.10 
 
The comparison values in the OPM can then be manipulated to give their eigenvector or 
Relative Value Vector (RVV).  The numbers in this vector correspond to the relative score values 
of each sub-option listed in the columns of table 6.8 divided by the sum of the column, e.g. from 
table 6.8 the intensity of sub-option 5A in the column of 5A is 1.00.  The sum of all values in 
column 5A is 13 and so 1/13 gives a vector value of 0.08 in table 6.9 (all highlighted yellow).  Chapter 6  
Risk Mitigation Using Real Options 
  161
These vector values in table 6.9 can then be summed horizontally to give the total score value for 
each sub-option and then subsequently multiplied by the appropriate sub-criteria weights to give a 
local priority. 
The higher the priority value, the better the sub-option is in terms of minimising the 
impacts identified under the sub-criteria.  Table 6.9 shows the eigenvector for the sub-options 
assessed against the ‘Physical impacts on third parties’ sub-criteria and is listed in the Local 
Priority (RVV) column. 
Table 6.9 Relative values of the sub-options for the ‘Physical impacts on 3
rd parties’ sub-criteria  
         
  
Option 
5A 
Option 
5B 
Option 
5C 
Option 
5D 
Option 
6A 
Option 
6B  Sum 
Local 
Priority 
(RVV) 
Global 
Priority 
Option 5A  0.08 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.44  0.07  0.007 
Option  5B  0.08 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.44  0.07  0.007 
Option  5C  0.23 0.23 0.15 0.23 0.24 0.12 1.20  0.20  0.020 
Option  5D  0.08 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.44  0.07  0.007 
Option  6A  0.15 0.15 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.78  0.13  0.013 
Option  6B  0.38 0.38 0.62 0.38 0.47 0.48 2.72  0.45  0.045 
 
  The RVV value for sub-option 6B (from table 6.9) is the highest value at 0.45.  In effect, 
sub-option 6B is the best at minimising impacts on 3
rd parties.  The global priority is the RVV 
values multiplied by the weightings of the criteria, thus giving a ranking to the values within the 
whole hierarchy of criterion defined by figure 6.10.   
  The above comparisons and matrix processes were repeated for all criteria and sub-criteria, 
with all global priorities being collated to establish the best options for Farringdon ETH.  This is 
shown in table 6.10 within which sub-option 6B is identified as the best with sub-option 5D as 
second best.  Based on this evaluation, it was these two options that were chosen as the design 
options for the development of Farringdon ETH and for application within this case study. 
  The next sub-section will detail how a comparative CDM risk assessment was used to 
establish the most desirable sub-option (5D or 6B) for construction.   
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  Table 6.10 Collation of global values for the analysis of sub-options against all sub-criteria   
 
 
 
Criteria  Construction 
Cost  Construction Programme  Construction Impacts  OSD Value  Risk  Station Operation 
Sub-Criteria 
   Programme 
Length 
Phasing of 
construction 
activities 
Physical 
impacts 
on 3rd 
parties 
Environmental 
impacts 
Floor 
area 
available 
for OSD 
Layout of 
components 
for Station 
and OSD 
Engineering 
risks 
CDM 
risks 
Passenger 
flow 
Fire 
evacuation 
M & 
E 
Total Scores 
Option 5A  0.023  0.008  0.003  0.007  0.006  0.004 0.007  0.031  0.013  0.004  0.010  0.003  0.119 6th 
Option 5B  0.040  0.012  0.004  0.007  0.004  0.005 0.006  0.033  0.013  0.003  0.005  0.001  0.135 4th 
Option 5C  0.039  0.013  0.006  0.020  0.004  0.003 0.003  0.042  0.014  0.004  0.010  0.004  0.162 3rd 
Option 5D  0.096  0.030  0.010  0.007  0.004  0.001 0.004  0.051  0.011  0.007  0.007  0.002  0.231 2nd 
Option 6A  0.020  0.006  0.006  0.013  0.013  0.014 0.012  0.016  0.007  0.007  0.005  0.001  0.120 5th 
S
u
b
-
O
p
t
i
o
n
s
 
Option 6B  0.014  0.030  0.019  0.045  0.016  0.015 0.010  0.021  0.038  0.018  0.005  0.003  0.233 1st 
Sub Criteria Weights    10%  5%  10%  5%  4%  4%  19%  10%  4.3%  4.3%  1.4% 
Criteria Weights  23%  15%  15%  8%  29%  10% 
Total Weight  100% 
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6.2.3.2  Comparative CDM process to select best option 
The rationale behind completing a comparative CDM risk assessment of sub-options 5D and 6B 
was to refine the choice of the best sub-option.  The use of CDM frameworks in this context was 
ideal since it is an efficient way of not only identifying H&S risks, but also of elicitating other 
engineering related risks which may not otherwise be recognised.  
The results of the comparative CDM risk assessments (shown in Appendix F) contradicted 
the sub-option evaluation study completed previously, showing that the sub-option 5D was indeed 
the better option from a H&S perspective with a score of 250/1000 compared to the 284/1000 for 
sub-option 6B.  This result was expected given that sub-option 5D had far less associated 
tunnelling and deep excavation work and thus had less associated health and safety risks for 
operatives.  
Despite sub-option 5D being better in the context of H&S, sub-option 6B was chosen as 
the best design solution for what was required for the Farringdon ETH.  The next section takes this 
case study to the novel application of real options theory to mitigate risks and value the risk 
premiums needed for Farringdon ETH.  While all work that has been detailed up until this point 
was work completed by the author in a commercial role within a design team, the following work 
had no commercial relevance and is simply the application of research discussed in this chapter.  
Sub-option 5D will latterly be referred to as the ‘walkway interchange’ and sub-option 6B as the 
‘tunnelled interchange’.     
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6.3 Application of Real Options to Change Designs at Farringdon 
The previous section established design sub-option 6B as the chosen design for Farringdon ETH 
which involved the construction of the tunnelled interchange.  The application of real options to 
manage potential cost overruns in this case study requires the consideration of the construction 
phase of Farringdon ETH with the tunnelled interchange.  As discussed in Chapter 2, this phase is 
the most risky and uncertain of any project, where the causes of cost overruns often materialise.  
Therefore, this section moves the focus of the design stage work to construction and risk mitigation 
activities, as is the focus of CDM risk processes and good risk management practices.  
  A core assumption of this case study is that an option exists to swap the construction of the 
tunnelled interchange (design sub-option 6B) for the walkway interchange (design sub-option 5D).  
Therefore, the tunnelled interchange can be swapped out for a walkway interchange in the event 
that continuing to construct Farringdon ETH with the tunnelled interchange could cause serious 
risks and uncertainties to materialise resulting in catastrophic damage and huge cost overruns.  
Swapping the interchange types was practical in the Farringdon ETH site as the ETH construction 
programme indicated that work associated with either interchange option would be started at the 
same time and incidentally, no significant design changes would be required within the ETH 
structure to accommodate either option (e.g. the re-location of load-bearing structures was not 
required, etc.).  
As well as making Farringdon ETH £7m cheaper, the walkway interchange also presents 
considerably less risks and uncertainties and therefore provides opportunities to avoid the risks 
associated with the tunnelled interchange.  As will be described in section 6.3.1, risk events relating 
to ground settlement are assumed to be occurring during the construction of Farringdon ETH and 
swapping the tunnelled interchange for the walkway interchange presents an opportunity to 
mitigate conditions that will exacerbate risks and thus to avoid potential catastrophic damage.   
A graphical example of an investment can be used as an analogy to illustrate the swapping 
of interchanges.  In figure 6.10, an investment to construct design Farringdon ETH with the 
tunnelled interchange can be made at time zero which has a value of π.  However, at time t’, the 
level of uncertainties associated with the construction work up until t’ (shown by the striped area of 
figure 6.10) become known which results in three different scenarios being possible.  t’ 
corresponds to the point in time during the construction programme of Farringdon ETH where the 
tunnelled interchange link is to be constructed.  Thus the three possible scenarios available to the 
client are; 
•  The construction of  Farringdon ETH with the tunnelled interchange can proceed without 
any problems or risks occurring, resulting in the completion of the project to the desired 
value (π) – i.e. what the client wants and what each project actor will work to achieve 
unless otherwise instructed.   Chapter 6  
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•  Construction of Farringdon ETH with the tunnelled interchange can proceed to point t’ 
with a decision being taken to build the tunnelled interchange despite the occurrence of 
some settlement risks in the Farringdon ETH site.  Excavating the tunnel therefore results 
in further settlement and damage resulting in large cost increases associated with the 
remediation work.  These cost increases represent a loss of value (to π’) to the client.  This 
loss in value corresponds to cost overruns resulting from the occurrence of risks.   
•  The value drops to π’’ which represents the value of Farringdon ETH after the exercise of 
an option to abandon the construction of the tunnelled interchange for a walkway 
interchange.  The client can buy the option at t0 to switch to the walkway interchange at 
time t’ to preserve a reasonable value for the project (i.e. π’’) should adversities occur (i.e. 
settlement risks).  The client can then exercise this option to avoid the risks and 
uncertainties associated with the tunnelled interchange as well as avoiding exacerbating 
settlement risks in the Farringdon ETH site should it be needed. 
 
Figure 6.10 The project value over time 
 
  The key issue to be found is the maximum cost increases that the client is willing to accept 
while constructing Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled interchange before considering abandoning 
the construction of the tunnelled interchange for the walkway interchange.  Considering figure 
6.10, the loss in value realised by π - π’ can be interpreted as the value of cost overrun that would 
occur as a result of remediating the damage due to settlement and damage resulting from 
constructing the tunnelled interchange under risky settlement conditions.  It is this cost overrun 
(represented in value terms by π - π’) that needs to be avoided by abandoning the tunnelled 
interchange for the walkway interchange at a point before the construction of the tunnelled 
interchange.  In abandoning for the walkway interchange, the client loses value in the payment that 
must be made to cover some settlement damage and in constructing a less valuable asset.  
However, he avoids exacerbating the settlement and the further damage caused by building the 
tunnelled interchange and so suffers a loss in value of π - π’’ which is much less than π - π’.             
 
6.3.1 A scenario for changing from tunnelled to walkway interchange 
For the application of real options to mitigate risks, this case study assumes a scenario where a 
stage has been reached in the construction programme of Farringdon ETH (using the design for 
sub-option 6B) where the main body of the station has been excavated.  Construction engineers and 
Time 
t’ 
π’’ 
π 
π’ 
0 
Value of Far ETH after abandoning tunnel 
interchange for walkway interchange  
- 
Value + 
Value of Far ETH with tunnel interchange 
Loss in value resulting from collapses after tunnel 
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planners are now starting to consider excavating the tunnelled link to LU Barbican.  Preparations 
have been made to dig the tunnel with exploratory holes being excavated.  Having placed 
settlement monitoring devices in and around the construction site, geotechnical engineers report to 
the client that settlement in various locations is higher than calculated and that further settlement 
would result in serious structural damage to surrounding buildings as well as compromising 
structures already constructed within the underground station.  Geotechnical engineers report that 
settlement could continue if further excavations are carried out in the ETH site with the extent of 
which being unknown.  The reason for the settlement is down to highly variable ground conditions 
which could not have been foreseen during planning and design.  The excavation of the tunnel 
interchange to LU Barbican could result in the de-stressing of the ground and thus further 
settlement, resulting in a catastrophic collapse causing millions of pounds worth of damage and 
seriously compromising Health and Safety regulations.  Due to this initial settlement and the 
damage that has been caused, the project will overrun on cost due to the extra investment that will 
be required to remediate this damage.  This extra investment does not account for future 
remediation costs associated with damage that will result from a collapse relating to excavating the 
tunnelled interchange.   
 
6.3.2 Valuing the construction of the tunnelled interchange 
The valuation of Farringdon ETH with the tunnelled interchange is based on the present value of 
the construction cost.  A cash flow model of the client’s outgoing annual cash flows during the 
construction period is used which is in effect the payments made by the client to the contractor for 
constructing the station.  Figure 6.11 is an account of these cash flows over a six year period which 
reflects the time in which Farringdon ETH would be built with the tunnelled interchange (The six 
years excludes site set up and clear up which is included in the eight year construction period noted 
in Chapter 7).  The cash flow values have been calculated using the construction programme 
developed for Farringdon ETH and the cost estimates of each major item of work within this 
programme.  Both the programme and cost estimates were carried out by 3
rd parties working on the 
Crossrail project and are not included in this thesis.   
 
 
Figure 6.11 Present value of client’s payments during the construction of Farringdon ETH 
 
Discount Rate = 3.5% 
Year 0  Year 1  Year 6  Year 5  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4 
Investment = £0 
CO = Cash Outflow = Payment by client 
£-6.43m 
(1+0.035)
1 
CO1 = £-6.43m  CO2 = £-11.52m  CO3 = £-15.67m  CO4 = £-7.68m  CO5 = £-5.37m  CO6 = £-3.30m 
PV =   £-11.52m 
(1+0.035)
2 
£-15.67m 
(1+0.035)
3 
£-7.68m 
(1+0.035)
4 
£-5.37m 
(1+0.035)
5 
£-3.30m 
(1+0.035)
6 
= £-45.00m +  +  +  + + Chapter 6  
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The annual costs of construction are presented as the client’s payment outflows discounted 
to give a present value of £-45 million which represents the construction cost of Farringdon ETH 
with the tunnelled interchange.  A risk-free discount rate of 3.5% is used which is representative in 
this context as the volatility values used for real options modelling accounts for any risk allowance 
that needs to be included in the discount rate.  Mun (2006b) states that volatility can be used to 
impute the discount rate in this sense since the discount rate and volatility is a measure of the same 
risk.  Inflation has been accounted for in the annual construction costs at a rate of 2.5%, which is 
assumed representative. 
The investment amount is presented as £0 in figure 6.11 since the construction outflows 
that occur over the six years represent the investment for the project.  The value of the investment 
to the client once construction is complete is £45m, i.e. the client has an asset worth £45m.  If cost 
saving opportunities emerge during the construction process then the value to the client increases as 
the client gets a £45m asset as well as the value of the cost savings.  Conversely, if risks requiring 
extra investment occur then the value to the client decreases since the extra investment required is 
drawn against the £45m asset.  The valuation of the asset in this way can be achieved using real 
options where the evolution of the assets’ value over time can be modelled using a binomial lattice.   
The cost of finance and the generation of cash by the client is set at the risk-free rate of 
3.5% in the cash flow model of figure 6.11 and it is assumed that the client has a pool of his own 
finance available to pay for the construction work.  It is appreciated that the raising of finance by a 
client has a significant impact on the overall costs of the project and the discount rate in particular.  
The client’s accessibility to finance also has a significant impact as to the allocation of risk and the 
development of strategies to deal with risk events on a project.   
6.3.2.1  Contract strategy 
It is assumed in this case study that the contract strategy for Farringdon ETH is based around a cost 
reimbursable contract which involves the payment of actual construction cost and a fee for 
overheads and profit (Smith, 2008).  Under this form of contract, the client (as a promoter) pays all 
of the contractors’ actual costs of employees, materials, equipment and sub-contractors.  In 
addition, the client pays a fixed sum (or percentage) for financing, overheads and profit.  An 
extension of the cost reimbursable contract is the target cost contract where the client and 
contractor agree a target cost for the project as well as entering into a cost reimbursable contract 
(Smith, 2008).  An incentive mechanism is agreed for the target cost which deals with the 
difference between actual out-turn cost and target cost.  Any difference between the out-turn cost 
and the target cost is then shared between the client and the contractor in accordance with the 
agreed incentive mechanism (Smith, 2008).  It is assumed that the target construction cost for 
Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled interchange is £45m and the additional fixed fee payable to the 
contractor is 10% of this, or £4.5m.  Should the contractor deliver Farringdon ETH at £45m then 
his margin as a percentage of total cost is therefore (£4.5m/£45m) = 10%.   Chapter 6  
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6.3.3 The option to abandon  
Given that underground station construction is inherently risky with a large number of sunk costs, 
events can occur which result in increases in costs and thus loss of value.  Since settlement risks are 
occurring around the Farringdon ETH site, the client’s decision problem in this situation is to 
maximise value and control Health and Safety issues under uncertainty.  The uncertainty is whether 
the settlement will continue over and above the initial settlement, i.e. over the minimum impact.  
Therefore, the client’s interests are to minimise losses, i.e. to decrease the vulnerability to large 
losses in value.   
This can be achieved by swapping the tunnelled interchange for the walkway interchange 
since the walkway is a viable alternative that will avoid the risks associated with excavating the 
tunnel and thus the potential problems that would result in large cost increases.  The swapping of 
the tunnelled interchange in favour of the walkway interchange can be achieved through a 
contractual agreement held between the client and the contractor.  The application of real options 
theory can determine the cost of the payment that must be made by the client to the contractor to 
activate this agreement in order to have the right to switch from a tunnelled interchange to a 
walkway interchange.  This contract is akin to a financial futures contract where the value of the 
payment is determined at the start of the construction contract.  Chapter 7 will highlight how the 
change from tunnel to walkway interchange can be made without jeopardising the margin that the 
contractor would realise form the project under a shared incentive scheme defined by a target cost 
(cost reimbursable) contract.  While it can be appreciated that the client would want to switch from 
the tunnelled interchange to the walkway interchange to preserve value under uncertain project 
conditions, the construction contractor would not as this would represent a reduction in margin 
resulting from being asked to build a cheaper station.        
This case study assumes that the tunnelled interchange is abandoned in favour of the 
walkway interchange with the value of the clients’ right to do so being determined by using a 
binomial lattice to model an abandonment real option.  Abandonment options are abundant in the 
real business world where projects can be scrapped and salvaged resources can be re-deployed 
elsewhere (Mun, 2006b).  The relevance of the abandonment option is that the client has an option 
to avoid a large cost overrun.  In order to achieve this, the client ideally needs an option type which 
can be exercised at any point during the six year construction period.   
An American put option (Hull, 2003) is used as an approximation as it allows the option to 
abandon the tunnelled interchange to be exercised at any point in time
30.  Recall that a financial put 
                                                      
30 The case study seeks an option to abandon the tunnelled interchange at a certain point in time, i.e. at the 
time when a decision needs to be made with regards to whether the tunnelled interchange will be build or not.  
If an option expires at a certain point in time, then it can be modelled as a European option.  The reason an 
American option is used here is that it can account for schedule creep in the construction program and so has 
flexibility of time.  The reader will recall that a European option can only be exercised at a certain point in 
time (i.e. a specific day) which means that such an option could be void if schedule creep results in the time 
that the option should be exercised is moved.   Chapter 6  
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option (see figure 6.1) involves one trader selling a stock to another where the payoff from the 
financial put option becomes more valuable as the price of the underlying stock (S) 
depreciates relative to the exercise price (X).   The payoff of a financial put option can therefore be 
written as max[X-S, 0] as described in section 6.1.1. 
  A difficulty arises when transferring this financial put option payoff to a real option 
application.  This is due to the fact that financial options give the value and right to trade financial 
assets where buyers and sellers for these financial assets exist.  In a real options context, these 
buyers and sellers do not exist since the asset is not tradeable and so when the asset value changes, 
there is no-one to buy from or sell to.  Additionally, while real and financial options can be valued 
using the same option valuation methodologies (such as closed-form solutions (Black and Scholes, 
1973); partial differential equations (Dixit and Pindyck, (1994); and binomial lattices (Mun, 
2006b)), the relevance of these option valuations is different.  Financial option values are premiums 
to be paid in order to exercise the options for financial gain whereas real option values are the 
values of payments made between actors in order to exercise a strategic decision on a project.   
  As noted previously, this work uses binomial lattices to value real options and an 
abandonment put option can be modelled using such a lattice.  However, each node in the binomial 
lattice represents a decision that must be made by a client (or asset owner) and this decision is 
effectively a put option payoff represented by max[X-S, 0].  Due to the issues identified above, this 
financial put option based payoff is inappropriate to value an abandonment real option and so it 
must be re-arranged to represent the payoffs that could be realised from a strategic management 
decision regarding a real asset.  Mun (2006b) therefore presents an abandonment put option payoff 
function of max[X,S] where X is the exercise price of an asset and S the underlying asset value.  
This is feasible providing the payoff function remains constant at for all of its applications.   
  In presenting this abandonment put payoff function, the contextual meaning of X and S 
change slightly.  While remaining as the exercise price, X in the context of an abandonment real 
option represents the lowest asset value that a client is willing to accept prior to abandoning.  In 
terms of Farringdon ETH, this is the maximum cost overrun that the client is willing to accept prior 
to changing from the tunnelled interchange to the walkway interchange since an overrun represents 
a loss in value.   
S on the other hand is the asset value which for Farringdon ETH is the evolution of its 
value over the six year construction period.  The evolution of S is demonstrated using a binomial 
lattice and is determined by the binomial lattice inputs of volatility and discount rate.  An example 
of such a lattice was described in section 6.1.5.3 and it is applied to the Farringdon ETH case study 
in section 7.3 of Chapter 7. 
The next section describes how the abandonment real option payoff of max[X,S] is applied 
in a binomial lattice to yield the value of the payment that must be made by a client to a contractor 
in order to abandon the tunnelled interchange for the walkway interchange.        Chapter 6  
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6.3.3.1  Abandonment option concept 
The value of the payment to be made by the client to the contractor for the right to abandon the 
tunnelled interchange for the walkway interchange can be determined using two separate binomial 
lattices.  The first (called ‘Lattice 1’ say) models the evolution of the asset value (S) over the 6 year 
construction period.  The outputs are shown in the terminal nodes of the lattice which define how 
the asset value changed over the six years, based on the volatility and discount rate inputs.   
  The second binomial lattice is the option valuation lattice (called ‘Lattice 2’ say) and uses 
the abandonment real option payoff max[X,S] to determine the values for its nodes.  The option 
valuation lattice (Lattice 2) takes the asset values (S) at the terminal nodes of the evolution of the 
asset value lattice (Lattice 1) and places them in the abandonment put option payoff max[X,S]. 
Since X is the lowest asset value that a client is willing to accept prior to abandoning, then the 
maximisation of X and S yields the values for the nodes of the option valuation lattice (Lattice 2).  
In effect, if any of the asset values (S) derived from Lattice 1 is less than the lowest acceptable 
asset value X, max[X,S] ensures that the maximum value is included in the option valuation lattice 
(Lattice 2).     
The option valuation lattice (Lattice 2) uses backward induction to move back through its 
nodes and by using the abandonment put option payoff max[X,S] at each node, the value of the 
option to abandon is achieved.  This is in effect the value of the payment that must be made by the 
client in order to abandon the tunnelled interchange for the walkway interchange.   
This is the essence of the abandonment option where the lowest acceptable asset value (X) 
can be set based on the maximum cost overrun a client is willing to accept.  If this minimum asset 
value is ever breached then the abandonment option can be exercised to ‘cut off’ the construction 
of Farringdon ETH with the tunnelled interchange in order to salvage costs that would be allocated 
to cover cost overruns.  Chapter 7 goes on to outline the valuation lattices for Farringdon ETH 
which results in the valuation of the option to abandon the tunnelled interchange for the walkway 
interchange.   
6.3.3.2  The lowest acceptable asset value 
The purpose of abandonment is to protect the client and ‘bankruptcy’ can be used as an analogy.  A 
very common bankruptcy condition is when the borrower cannot meet the repayment schedule.  
However, during the construction phase of a project, since there is no revenue generated from the 
project, the repayment schedule is delayed until the completion of construction.  As a result, a 
project will never be bankrupted during its construction phase unless the client specifies some 
bankruptcy or abandonment conditions.   
Therefore, in order to prevent this problem, a client can impose conditions to trigger 
abandonment (or bankruptcy) should adverse conditions occur, especially under the significant 
risks and uncertainties present for Farringdon ETH.  A critical part of the put option described 
earlier is the lowest acceptable asset value (X) which in effect represents target asset value (i.e. Chapter 6  
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£45m) less the value of any cost increases (in present value terms) that the client is willing to 
accept prior to exercising the option to abandon the tunnelled interchange for the walkway 
interchange.  Under these conditions, the exercise of the option is effectively the termination of the 
construction of the tunnelled interchange once the lowest acceptable asset value (X) has been met.   
The lowest acceptable asset value can be determined in advance based on the maximum 
increase in construction cost that is acceptable to the client before he is willing to abandon the 
tunnelled interchange for a cheaper and less risky walkway.  Chapter 7 goes on to consider the 
setting of the lowest acceptable asset value (X) in more detail by using the responses made by 
practitioners associated with Crossrail to a Stated Preference (SP) survey.   
 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter considered real options as an extended application of financial options theory.  Early 
parts of the chapter considered how real options could be used to introduce strategic flexibility into 
the management process with a focus on investment.  Methods for applying real options in the 
construction project environment were considered with binomial lattices being identified as the 
most appropriate.  A simple example was used to demonstrate this application using representative 
values.   
A case study was outlined for the application of real options theory.  An analytical 
hierarchy process was used to evaluate six design proposals for Farringdon ETH against a range of 
relevant factors including: cost; construction programme; construction impacts on local area; value; 
risk and station operation.  The best two designs were chosen on this basis and a comparative CDM 
assessment was used as a means of further analysis.   
The two chosen designs were different in that one involved constructing a tunnelled 
interchange between Farringdon ETH and LU Barbican with the second involved constructing a 
walkway interchange as the same link.  The tunnelled interchange involved considerably greater 
risks and uncertainties compared to the walkway interchange and it was therefore proposed that the 
tunnelled interchange could be swapped for the walkway interchange during construction activities 
should it be needed.  This would effectively mitigate a great number of risks and uncertainties 
associated with Farringdon ETH should the construction of the tunnelled link introduce the 
potential for catastrophic damage to be caused by settlement and thus cost overruns to the project.    
Real options theory was suggested as a method for valuing the cost of implementing the 
walkway interchange if required at a certain point during the Farringdon ETH construction cycle 
where the option to do so was regarded as an abandonment put option.  The abandonment of the 
tunnelled interchange at Farringdon ETH was therefore seen as a potential strategy to mitigate 
significant risks and uncertainties and to avoid further cost overruns.  This strategy could therefore 
minimise the loss in asset value that could result from excessive settlement and collapse at the ETH 
site.  Chapter 7  
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7 Abandonment Conditions and Option Valuation  
7.1 Introduction  
Chapter 6 discussed how a client (or a client manager/delivery partner acting on the clients’ behalf) 
could hedge themselves against large risks and uncertainties associated with Farringdon ETH 
through the use of an abandonment option.  It was noted in Chapter 6 that the ETH construction 
was overrunning on cost which related to remediation costs associated with unexpected settlement 
that was occurring in and around the ETH site due to unexpected poor ground conditions.  As the 
construction contractors were about to excavate the tunnelled interchange to LU Barbican, the 
project engineers had notified all parties that they did not know what the final extent of the 
settlement would be.  There was no reason for the settlement to continue due to errors in 
engineering and construction other than the poor ground conditions encountered.  The excavation 
of the tunnelled interchange could exacerbate the settlement and could increase the likelihood of 
associated risks occurring around the ETH site.  All actors had informed the client that the 
additional settlement caused by excavating the tunnelled interchange would result in a significant 
increase in costs.  These costs would be in addition to the costs of remediating the damage relating 
to the settlement already occurring and would cost at least £12m to remediate (described in a later 
section).   
Chapter 6 considered an option to abandon the construction of the tunnelled interchange 
(design sub-option 6B) between Farringdon ETH and LU Barbican prior to its construction.  The 
abandonment option gave the client the right, but not the obligation to abandon the construction of 
the tunnelled interchange in favour of the walkway interchange (design sub-option 5D).  The 
abandonment presented a contraction in the cost of construction of Farringdon ETH as the station 
with a walkway interchange was costed at £38m (present value terms), £7m pounds cheaper than 
the station with a tunnelled interchange at £45m (These values do not account for the costs of 
remediating the settlement damage already in existence around the ETH site).  The abandonment of 
the tunnelled interchange also presented the client with the opportunity to avoid significant risks 
and uncertainties associated with the tunnelled interchange as well as exacerbating the settlement 
problems already in existence.  Choosing to build the walkway interchange could also act as a 
strategy to get the construction of Farringdon ETH back on track if cost overruns were occurring.    
  This chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 7.2 will derive the lowest acceptable asset value 
(X) for Farringdon ETH with the tunnelled interchange.  As noted, a stated preference survey is 
used to find the maximum increase in costs that a client is willing to accept prior to considering 
swapping the tunnelled interchange for the walkway interchange.  The lowest acceptable asset 
value can therefore be derived based on the difference between the target asset value of £45m and 
the value of the maximum acceptable cost increase.  Chapter 7  
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  Section 7.3 will outline the valuation of the option to abandon by binomial lattice.  The 
valuation of an option by binomial lattice was discussed in Chapter 6 and a practical application to 
the Farringdon ETH case study is outlined.  The binomial lattice results in the valuation of the 
option which is in effect the payment (i.e. the value of the contractual arrangement) that the client 
must pay to the construction contractor in order to have the right to swap the tunnelled interchange 
for the walkway interchange.   
  
 
7.2 Valuing the Lowest Acceptable Asset Value (X) 
As stated previously in this work, the holder of an option has the right but not the obligation to do 
something.  Section 6.3.3 of Chapter 6 outlined a process for valuing the option to abandon which 
in effect gives a value to the ‘right’ to do something.  Of further interest to this work and the 
subject of this section is the lowest acceptable asset value (X) which is in effect the trigger value 
where a client would abandon the tunnelled interchange under his own limits.  The lowest 
acceptable asset value (X) for Farringdon ETH is the difference between the target asset value of 
£45m and the value of the maximum cost overrun that the client is willing to accept prior to 
exercising the abandonment option to swap the tunnelled interchange for the walkway interchange.  
It is known from previous sections (Chapter 6, section 6.2) that the tunnelled link would be the 
favoured option for construction but the walkway link would not be ruled out on the grounds that it 
would provide a valid (i.e. acceptable to the client) and less risky alternative in the event that the 
tunnelled option had to be abandoned due to the potential occurrence of significant risks which 
would result in catastrophic overruns. 
  One way of identifying the lowest acceptable asset value (X) is a simple value stated by the 
client.  This value would be the value of the maximum increase in cost that the client would be 
willing to accept for the construction of Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled interchange.  In other 
words, if the client was willing to accept an increase in costs of say £4m to the budgeted 
construction cost of £45m for Farringdon ETH, then he would be willing to pay (£45 + £4m) = £49 
million for a station with a target construction cost of £45m.  In value terms, the lowest acceptable 
asset value (X) in this case would be the target asset value of £45m less the value of the maximum 
increase in construction costs of £4m to give (£45m - £4m) = £41m.  However, a simple number to 
represent the cost increase a client is willing to accept (such as the £4m) is too simplistic and does 
not represent other variables such as the level of uncertainty faced by the project or the loss in 
commercial value that would result from switching from a station design with a higher commercial 
value to a station with a lower commercial value.    
The aim of this section is to establish the clients’ real lowest acceptable asset value (X) for 
Farringdon ETH by way of a Stated Preference (SP) survey distributed to individuals working 
within the client organisation (CLRL) developing the Crossrail project.  As will be described Chapter 7  
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below, the SP survey accounts for variables outside the construction cost of Farringdon ETH in 
order to get a realistic value of a clients’ lowest acceptable asset value (X).  These outside variables 
include the level of risk and the commercial value of the station.  In getting the SP respondents to 
trade off and make choices between the values of the variables set for the design of Farringdon 
ETH with a tunnelled and a walkway interchange, the maximum cost increase that the client would 
accept could be derived.  This cost increase would therefore consider the level of risk and 
development (i.e. commercial) value variables which would impact the lowest acceptable asset 
value (X) of Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled interchange.  For example, a typical trade-off that a 
SP respondent would have to make is the amount of cost increase that would be acceptable against 
the loss of commercial value that would be realised if switching from Farringdon ETH with a 
tunnelled interchange to Farringdon ETH with a walkway interchange. 
    
7.2.1 Stated Preference survey background 
The term ‘stated preference’ refers to an array of possible ways of asking consumers about 
preferences, choices, ways of using choice options, frequencies of use and so forth.  Stated 
preference (SP) surveys for market products or services have been widely applied in the areas of 
marketing and travel demand modelling, separately or jointly with Revealed Preference (RP) 
surveys which result in observed choices of product purchase or service use.  It is an efficient 
method to analyse consumers’ evaluation of multi-attributed products and services, especially when 
there are hypothetical choice alternatives and differing valuations to the same attributes.   
Transportation researchers have had a long association with the modelling and analysis of 
stated preference (SP) data and the transportation research sector continues to use SP survey across 
many fields (see Algers and Beser (2001); Hensher et al. (2001); Rose and Hensher (2006) and 
Hess et al. (2007) for typical examples).  It is not intended to review the uses of SP surveys in 
different transportation studies in this work other than to apply the technique to deliver the lowest 
acceptable asset value (X) for Farringdon ETH.  The technicalities of SP surveys is offered by 
Hensher and Button (2000) where a historical perspective on SP is given along with a discussion 
on future directions and importantly, guidance in SP experiment design.  A Stated Preference (SP) 
survey was designed by the author and implemented for the objectives of this work which were: 
•  To quantify the extent of the cost increase that could occur during the construction of 
Farringdon ETH (with a tunnelled interchange) before the client was willing to abandon in 
favour of the cheaper walkway interchange; 
•  To quantify the level of risk that the client was willing to accept in the face of uncertainty 
before the client was willing to abandon the tunnelled interchange in favour of the cheaper 
walkway interchange; 
•  To encourage respondents to consider the cost increase and level of risk that could occur 
for the tunnelled interchange and make a trade-off between these variables and the loss in Chapter 7  
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commercial value realised by abandoning the tunnelled interchange in favour of the 
walkway interchange (which was of less commercial value).  This could indicate the loss in 
the commercial value that the client would accept before abandoning the tunnelled 
interchange in favour of the walkway interchange. 
 
The next section goes on to outline the approach of using the stated preference survey to 
determine the lowest acceptable asset value (X) which is in effect the trigger value where a client 
would abandon the tunnelled interchange under his own limits.     
 
7.2.2 The Stated Preference survey approach 
The Stated Preference (SP) survey was designed to be completed by professionals working on the 
client side of the Crossrail project.  Respondents of the survey were therefore to assume the role of 
a client’s decision maker with the objective of developing a metro station where the client would 
seek maximum value for money at all times.  In seeking this value, respondents had to trade off 
between variables including cost (and associated time), level of risk and the commercial value of 
the station.  These variables had associated unit values and were to be traded within scenarios (or 
‘tests’) set within the survey.  The collated outputs of all survey could then be manipulated to give 
the lowest acceptable asset value (X).   
  The scenarios were presented in the survey as paired comparisons between the tunnelled or 
walkway interchange with each scenario presenting variations to the variables of cost (and time), 
the level of risk and commercial value associated with both link types.  In presenting the scenarios 
in this way, the tolerances that individuals would have in terms of the increase or decrease in 
variable values could be established through tradeoffs.  The intricacies of each link type, i.e. the 
interchange walking times and layout of ventilation systems were fixed for both interchange types 
and so respondents’ preferences for these could be recognised by their choice of interchange 
without adding further variables to be traded-off.   
  In the context of this work, the tolerances to changes in the variables could be used to 
impute the acceptable increases in costs to Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled interchange.  The 
value of the acceptable cost increases could subsequently be subtracted from the target asset value 
of £45m to give the lowest acceptable asset value (X) to the client before he would consider 
changing to construct the less risky and less commercially valuable walkway interchange.  If the 
tunnelled interchange link was therefore about to be developed where overruns were occurring and 
significant further risks were also about to occur thus compounding these overruns, the client could 
swap the tunnel for the walkway in the knowledge that his lowest acceptable asset value (X) (which 
accounts for the cost increase, risk and commercial value variables) had been reached.   
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7.2.3 Details of the tunnelled and walkway interchanges 
The five variables (station interchange type, cost, time, risk and development value) that define the 
differences between the tunnelled interchange and the walkway interchange are defined below. 
7.2.3.1  Station interchanges  
Tunnelled interchange (see figure 7.1)  
•  All other things being equal, this is at least £7 million more expensive than the walkway 
link giving an initial budgeted construction cost of £45 million for the ETH; 
•  A mean pedestrian interchange time of 100 seconds which is better than the walkway link 
•  Draught relief vents exit through the ticket hall area at street level, thus having more; 
impact on 3rd parties at street level but increase the rental value of the OSD.    
 
 
  Figure 7.1 Tunnelled Interchange 
 
Walkway interchange (see figure 7.2) 
•  All other things being equal, this is at least £7 million less expensive than the tunnelled 
link giving an initial budgeted construction cost of £38 million for ETH; 
•  A mean pedestrian interchange time of 180 seconds which is worse than the tunnelled link; 
•  Draught relief vents exit through the OSD area, having less impact on 3rd parties at street 
level but reducing the rental value of the OSD.      
 
Figure 7.2 Walkway Interchange 
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7.2.3.2  Cost and time 
Cost represented the value of money (in present value terms) that was required to build the station 
to completion.  These were presented in present value terms to allow direct comparison with the 
development value.  The cost does not contain an allowance for risk or a contractors’ fee. Time is 
representative of the time in months required to build the station to completion.  The initial 
budgeted cost and time of Farringdon ETH with a;  
•  tunnelled interchange was £45 million and 96 months respectively which was at least £7m 
more expensive than a walkway;  
•  walkway interchange was £38 million and 93 months respectively which was at least £7m 
less expensive than a tunnel.   
7.2.3.3  Level of risk 
Level of Risk was a broad term which covered project engineering, construction and operational 
risks associated with the development of Farringdon ETH.  It was presented as percentage 
likelihood that risks will occur thus costing at least an additional £12 million to the budgeted cost.  
A higher percentage value indicated a higher likelihood of risks occurring while a lower percentage 
value represented a lower likelihood of risks occurring.   
7.2.3.4  Development value 
The development value of Farringdon ETH was a wide term that encompassed the many factors 
associated with the stations’ commercial value.  These included;  
•  Its layout and functionality, taking account of the station interchange types and the 
interchange time (as defined in i.)  
•  The revenue generating capability of the OSD and associated lifecycle revenues 
•  The overall value of the station (including the OSD) and how marketable it was as a 
centrepiece for the business area it serves. 
 
The development value was presented in present value terms so that it could be directly 
compared with the costs.  This value accounted for the interchange type within the station, the 
interchange time, the value of the site and the rental value of the OSD.  Values of between £80 and 
£85m were suggested by a 3
rd party to Crossrail for the Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled 
interchange. 
 
7.2.4 Stated Preference survey design 
This section outlines the development of the Stated Preference (SP) survey containing the scenarios 
(technically known as choice experiments) which were modelled on tradeoffs that developers of a 
metro would have to make under given scenarios.  As mentioned, the objectives of this survey was Chapter 7  
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to establish the effects that variations in the variables of cost  time, risk and commercial value of 
the station would have on respondents’ choice of interchange.  The point at which (in value (£m) 
terms) respondents would be willing to abandon the tunnelled interchange (design sub-option 6B) 
for the walkway interchange (design sub-option 5D) would be the maximum acceptable increase in 
costs.   
7.2.4.1  Sample selection and respondent information 
A number of methods are used by research practitioners to conduct SP surveys.  In most situations, 
SP surveys are conducted by means of face-to-face surveys, often involving the use of a lap-top 
computer.  Alternatively, SP surveys can be conducted by telephone with results being gathered by 
telephone interview (e.g. Computer Assisted Personal/Telephone Interviews (CAPI/CATI)).  The 
respondents for this survey were selected from individuals working on the client side of the 
Crossrail project that were known to have a basic knowledge of the engineering aspects of the 
Crossrail project as well as general knowledge about Farringdon ETH.   
Consideration by the author of the number of potential respondents revealed 46 individuals 
that were working in a client decision making role on Crossrail and this decision making element of 
their roles was desirable for the application of the SP survey.  These individuals were employed as 
the client and had responsibilities with regards to the development of the project although many 
were not direct employees of the Crossrail project in its existence as a subsidiary of the Department 
for Transport (DfT).  Around 60% of the sample of respondents were employees of engineering or 
management consultancies that were sub-contracted to Crossrail (and thus the DfT) and placed in 
client positions to carry out the procurement of Crossrail.  This is common for many post-
millennium projects that are publicly procured (Mott MacDonald, 2002) and so this issue was 
difficult to avoid without accepting a significant reduction in the respondent sample size.  A 
mitigating factor to having a portion of the sample as consultants working for the DfT and not 
direct DfT employees was that these individuals were incentivised to act as the client and thus 
sought to procure Crossrail with a clients’ values and mindset.  In addition, these consultants were 
not from the same consultancies that provided design and development services to Crossrail as this 
would introduce a conflict of interest.   
The aim of this sample size was therefore to obtain as many responses as possible in order 
to allow sufficient coverage of the decisions that could lead to abandonment of a tunnelled 
interchange for a walkway interchange.  Once a respondent had been selected to complete a survey, 
they were asked three screening questions: 
•  Their role on the project (e.g. Design Engineer, Design Manager, Planner etc.); 
•  Their professional title (Civil Engineer, Architect, Project Manager etc.); and 
•  The number of years experience that they had. 
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The aim of these questions was to ensure that the survey was distributed across a cross-
section of the professions associated with Crossrail that could influence the decision to build the 
walkway interchange instead of the tunnelled interchange.  The respondents’ professional roles and 
title could give an indication of how a respondent would reply to the choices represented in the 
survey.  It was assumed that asking a group of people with the same professional roles on the 
project to complete the surveys could skew the results of the survey according to the nature of their 
role (e.g. a civil engineer may be more risk averse compared to a project manager).  In addition, the 
respondents’ number of years experience was also considered as a more experienced professional 
may intuitively have more knowledge of an issue (e.g. a risk type) through prior experience and 
therefore may make a different decision compared to a less experienced, younger respondent in the 
same role.  
The screening questions were only used to help select respondents for the survey and were 
not used in the analysis of the data received from the survey.  The reason for this is that the output 
of the entire survey was a single value figure that would represent the acceptable increase in costs 
for Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled interchange based on a collective view of professionals 
working for the client.  The choices made by the respondents in the survey would represent their 
sensitivities to changes in the variables, hence the omission of the screening question answers from 
any analysis.  The sole purpose of the screening questions was therefore to ensure that a collective 
view was gained which represented a cross-section of relevant professionals working for the client.  
Figure 7.3 shows the number of respondents within certain age groups with figure 7.4 showing 
number of individuals within all of the screened professional categories.        
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Figure 7.3 Number of survey respondents within each age group 
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Number of professional roles providing survey responses.
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Figure 7.4 Number of respondents within each professional category 
 
7.2.4.2  Survey variables  
The five project variables (station interchange type, cost, time, risk and commercial value) 
associated with the development of Farringdon ETH were defined in section 7.2.3.  These variables 
were adapted for inclusion into the SP survey with cost and time being linked to form one variable 
and the station interchange type being linked with the commercial value of the station.  The reasons 
for this were to do with the organisation of the variables in the SP survey.  If cost and time were 
left as independent variables in the survey, the structural organisation of the SP survey (discussed 
in a section 7.2.4.3) would treat cost and time as independent and so the survey would be set up to 
allow variation in these variables to be compared for choice purposes.  Since it is known that these 
two variables are intrinsically related, they were joined to form one variable in the SP survey to 
avoid comparisons being made.   
The level of risk was presented as the likelihood of risks costing an extra £12m pounds 
occurring if the tunnelled interchange was excavated.  The aim of using a quantifiable value to 
classify the level of risk was to articulate simply the level of risk associated with the tunnelled 
interchange and the walkway interchange under the choice conditions where the likelihood of the 
£12m risk occurring was presented in percentage terms. 
Section 7.2.3.1 highlighted the differences between the tunnelled interchange and walkway 
interchange.  The two interchange types had many different aspects which set them apart including 
the travel time they provided between Farringdon ETH and LU Barbican; the location of vents and 
fans in the station (which affected the commercial value of the over-site development (OSD)); and 
the commercial value of the station itself.  Since these aspects would be too much for a survey 
respondent to consider in order to make an adequate comparison between choices, they were all 
combined under a variable named development value which represented the general commercial 
value of the station in present value terms.  This was in effect an all encompassing term which Chapter 7  
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reflected the commercial value of the ETH according to the Farringdon ETH design with tunnelled 
and walkway interchanges.  The survey therefore contained three main variables as shown in figure 
7.5 below        
Cost (£m) & Time 
(mths) 
Likelihood of risk costing £12m occurring 
(%) 
Development Value 
(£m) 
Figure 7.5 The three SP survey variables 
 
7.2.4.3  Establishing boundary values for the variables and piloting 
The SP survey employed in this thesis was somewhat different to conventional orthogonal design 
SP surveys where each respondent answers a fixed set of questions by trading off one variable 
against another (or trading off scenarios which contain many variables) and then making their 
preferred choice.  The purpose of the SP survey in this research was to find the boundary values of 
the variables which would indicate the maximum increase in costs that a client would accept of the 
tunnelled interchange before swapping it for the walkway interchange.  Therefore, the essential 
feature of the SP survey discussed here was that the questions searched for the boundary values of 
the variables.  The SP questions were therefore framed as ‘difference questions’ whereby the cost 
and time increases, risk likelihood and development values were presented to respondents as 
differences in the variable values associated with the design of Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled 
and walkway interchange. 
  The differences in variables were presented as the basic variable values established for 
tunnelled and walkway interchange (from section 7.2.3) with incremental increases in these basic 
values being added on.  This ultimately resulted in respondents stating which design they would 
prefer and allowed analysis to establish the boundary values of the variables.  For example, if the 
tunnelled interchange increased by £1m to a cost of £46m and the walkway interchange remained 
at a cost of £38m, the respondent may have chosen the tunnelled interchange.  However, in another 
scenario, the cost of the tunnelled interchange may have risen to £47.5m while the cost of the 
walkway interchange may have remained at £38m.  If the respondent chose the walkway 
interchange here then it could be inferred that a £1m overrun to the £45m of the tunnelled 
interchange was acceptable to the respondent, but an increase of £2.5m to £47.5 was not.  We can 
therefore deduce from this information that the cost overrun limit is about £47.5m (while 
recognising that it lies somewhere between £46m and £47.5m). 
  The differences in variable values were drawn from a matrix of differences, as shown in 
table 7.1.  It should be noted that £7m and 3 months was also added to the base cost and time 
difference values respectively to account for the cost and time difference between the tunnelled 
interchange and the walkway interchange (as defined in section 7.2.3.1) 
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  Table 7.1 Matrix of differences 
Level  Cost (£m) & Time (mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing 
£12m occurring (%)  Development Value (£m) 
0  A>B  £0.5m & 1.5 mths  A>B  5  A>B  8.5 
1  A>>B  £1.5m & 4 mths  A>>B  20  A>>B  10.5 
2  A>>>B  £3.5m & 7 mths  A>>>B  50  A>>>B  13.5 
3  A>>>>B  £5.5m & 9 mths  A>>>>B  75  A>>>>B  16 
 
  The 4 levels (0 to 3) shown in table 7.1 were conditions which define the differences 
between the variables for the tunnelled and walkway interchanges.  A constant increase is seen in 
the values at each level to reflect the increase in differences to be allowed for between the tunnelled 
interchange variables and the walkway interchange variables.  The increase of the levels is set to 
force a choice from the respondent and thus yield a boundary value which will ultimately inform of 
the maximum acceptable increase in construction costs for Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled 
interchange.  The increase values defined in table 7.1 were determined using experimental 
sensitivity analysis.  The cost (and time) differences were the main focus where the magnitude of 
the increases was researched carefully in order to promote the required tradeoffs in the scenarios.  
For example, stepped increases £0.25m were considered giving a minimum difference of £0.25m at 
level 0 and a maximum difference of £1m at level 3.  Pilot studies showed that respondents would 
not trade off between cost variables if these were the differences, often accepting the higher cost 
since the difference was marginal given that the overall cost of Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled 
interchange was £45m.  Similarly, larger stepped increases had the same impact but with opposite 
results.  In such cases, pilot studies showed that some trading would occur with minimum 
differences of £5m but when the stepped increases took the differences to £20m, respondents 
would not trade and always select the cheaper option (i.e. the walkway interchange).  Differences 
for risk variables and development value variables were set to allow for a broad coverage of values.  
The development values were derived based on valuations made by 3
rd parties associated with the 
Crossrail project.        
7.2.4.4  SP scenarios for comparison 
Since the three variables of figure 7.5 each had four levels as denoted in table 7.1, this information 
could be used in conjunction with a catalogue of fractional factorial designs which facilitated the 
construction of the choice experiments (see Kocur et al. (1982)).  This resulted in a SP survey with 
16 scenarios being proposed which contained combinations of the differences in variables.  These 
combinations are shown in table 7.2 where the differences in variables are taken from table 7.1.  
For example, Scenario 2 uses a cost and time difference value of £0.5m & 1.5mths from level 0 of 
table 7.1; a likelihood of risk costing £12m occurring difference of 20% from level 1 of table 7.1; 
and a development value difference of £8.5m also from level 0.       
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Table 7.2 Combinations of differences for each variable 
  
Cost (£m) & Time 
(mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing 
£12m occurring (%) 
Development Value 
(£m) 
Sceanrio 1  £0.5m & 1.5 mths  5  8.5 
Sceanrio 2  £0.5m & 1.5 mths  20  10.5 
Sceanrio 3  £0.5m & 1.5 mths  50  13.5 
Sceanrio 4  £0.5m & 1.5 mths  75  16 
Sceanrio 5  £1.5m & 4 mths  5  10.5 
Sceanrio 6  £1.5m & 4 mths  20  8.5 
Sceanrio 7  £1.5m & 4 mths  50  16 
Sceanrio 8  £1.5m & 4 mths  75  13.5 
Sceanrio 9  £3.5m & 7 mths  5  13.5 
Sceanrio 10  £3.5m & 7 mths  20  16 
Sceanrio 11  £3.5m & 7 mths  50  8.5 
Sceanrio 12  £3.5m & 7 mths  75  10.5 
Sceanrio 13  £5.5m & 9 mths  5  16 
Sceanrio 14  £5.5m & 9 mths  20  13.5 
Sceanrio 15  £5.5m & 9 mths  50  10.5 
Sceanrio 16  £5.5m & 9 mths  75  8.5 
 
The 16 scenarios were presented to respondents in the form of figure 7.6 which is the 2
nd 
scenario from the survey.  Note that the difference in cost is £7.5m (deriving from a cost increase 
of £0.5m (from table 7.1) and the cost difference between the tunnelled interchange and the 
walkway interchange of £7m).  The difference between risk likelihood values is 20% and the 
difference in development values is £10.5m.  Using the respondents’ replies to 16 of these 
scenarios can yield the boundary values for the variables.  The whole set of 16 scenarios is included 
in Appendix G. 
   Variables 
  
Cost (£m) & Time 
(mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing at 
least £12m occurring (%) 
Development 
Value (£m) 
Choose Tunnel 
or Walkway 
  Tunnel Option  £46.5m & 98.5 mths  30  81  Tunnel 
Scenario 2                
  Walkway Option  £39m & 94 mths  10  70.5  Walkway 
Figure 7.6 A stated choice scenario 
  
Significant importance was attached to ensuring the orthogonal design on the survey and 
therefore its validity.  A method of identifying any co-linearity between attributes was to check for 
any correlation between the variables used in the 16 scenarios.  Table 7.3 shows that all attributes 
are not first order correlated (i.e. have a zero value corresponding to the Pearson correlation) which 
indicates that the choice experiment is valid and consistent with its fractional factorial design.  
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Table 7.3 The non-correlation of attributes 
Correlations 
 
Cost 
Pounds(m) 
Likelihood 
of £12m risk 
occurring 
(%) 
Development 
Value 
Pounds(m) 
Pearson Correlation  1  0 0 
Sig. (2-tailed)    1 1 
Sum of Squares and Cross- products  1593  0  0 
Covariance 3.696  0  0 
Cost 
Pounds(m) 
N 432  432  432 
Pearson Correlation  0  1  0 
Sig. (2-tailed)  1    1 
Sum of Squares and Cross-products  0  315900  0 
Covariance 0  732.947  0 
Likelihood of 
£12m risk 
occurring 
(%) 
N 432  432  432 
Pearson Correlation  0 0  1 
Sig. (2-tailed)  1  1   
Sum of Squares and Cross-products  0  0  3530.25 
Covariance 0  0  8.191 
Development 
Value 
Pounds(m) 
N 432  432  432 
 
7.2.5 Choice modelling results and analysis 
The overall objective of the SP survey was to examine the extent of the cost increases, level of risk 
and loss in commercial value that the client could accept while constructing Farringdon ETH with a 
tunnelled interchange before being willing to abandon for a walkway interchange.  The scope of the 
survey was defined in terms of the three main tasks involved: 
•  To establish the value of the capital cost increases that could occur while building the 
tunnelled interchange before the client would be willing to abandon construction and build 
the walkway interchange.  The differences in capital cost between the tunnelled 
interchange and walkway interchange were framed in pre-set vales; 
•  To establish the level of risk that the client was willing to accept while constructing the 
tunnelled interchange before abandoning to construct the walkway interchange.  The level 
of risk was presented as the likelihood of a risk event costing £12m to recover occurring; 
•  To establish the loss in commercial value of the station that the client was willing to accept 
in deciding to abandon the tunnelled interchange for the walkway interchange. 
 
  The above tasks were executed by distributing the stated preference survey to the sample of 
46 respondents identified by the author.  The survey period occurred in early 2009 prior to the 
Easter break and during a transition period in the Crossrail procurement structure.  The benefits of 
the SP survey was that it distinguished between elements that were both external (and therefore 
observable) and internal (and therefore unobservable) to the respondent.  External observable 
elements were those such as the variables of capital cost, level of risk and commercial value.  Chapter 7  
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Internal unobservable elements were those such as the perceptions and preferences of the 
respondent.  Pearmain et al. (1991) note that external observable elements serve to promote and 
constrain respondent behaviour while internal observable elements reflect respondents’ 
understanding of their options and influence their decisions to pursue particular strategies.  A 
number of assumptions were therefore made regarding the responses made by respondents in the 
SP survey; 
•  The SP techniques relied on the concept of utility and thus respondents would be seeking 
maximum utility at all times; 
•  Respondents were assumed to act rationally, i.e. using a utility maximising choice strategy.  
This meant assuming that respondents would attach utility weightings to each of the 
variables in a choice situation and act rationally on their perceptions.   
•  The variables included within the survey were assumed to exhaust the respondents’ salient 
beliefs about the object in the survey.  It was therefore assumed that the information set on 
which decisions were made were those presented in the survey only.  
 
The above assumptions covered the external observable elements which were controllable 
to the author.  In doing so, the SP survey could be applied solely to gauge the internal observable 
nature of the respondents which would ultimately yield their sensitivity to changes in the tunnelled 
interchange variables and thus the point at which they would abandon for the walkway interchange.  
Models of decision making in the field of economics are based upon the principles of instrumental 
or substantive rationality, and utility maximisation.  Instrumental rationality is defined as the 
choice of actions that best satisfy a person’s objectives and thus presumes that an individual with a 
variety of objectives is capable of comparing the satisfaction of these various objectives so as to 
come to an overall assessment.  It is assumed that these various objectives can be ordered on a 
single scale to give a respondents’ utility.  The point of abandonment in cost terms could thus be 
established using a utility function that was linear and additive.   
The difference between the variable values for the tunnelled and walkway interchanges 
were set in order to define boundary values for the variables through the action of making a choice 
between the tunnelled and walkway interchange.  Each of the 16 scenarios available to respondents 
for trading off was assumed to have a benefit and therefore a utility.  The tradeoffs made by 
respondents with regards to changes in the values of the variables within each of the 16 scenarios 
were in effect their individual utility.  This utility depended on the willingness of respondents to 
accept increases in costs; increases in the likelihood of a £12m risk occurring; and decreases in the 
development value realised by switching the design of Farringdon ETH from the tunnelled 
interchange to the walkway interchange.  Theoretically, respondents (should have) chose(n) tunnel 
or walkway options which represented the highest level of utility that they think they could obtain.  
The utility of choosing the tunnelled interchange or the walkway interchange in the experiment Chapter 7  
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could thus be expressed as a function of the variables included in the survey, as shown in equation 
7.1.  The parameters in the utility function represented the relative importance of each variable 
where the functional form of the utility function was compensatory in that respondents’ traded-off 
changes in some variables against changes in another.  The utility functions UT and UW could 
therefore be written with (COST) representing the cost variable, (RISK) representing the risk 
variable and (DeVALUE) representing the development value variable. 
Where the higher the utility of the one interchange type compared to the other, then 
(theoretically) the higher the chances of choosing that one interchange type by the respondents.  
However, the chances of choosing the higher utility interchange type were dependent on the 
respondents’ perception of the variables and the associated tradeoffs that they made.  It is this that 
gave their real utility, whether the choice they made actually had the highest utility or not.   
UT = αT+β1 COST& TIMET+β2 RISKT+β3 DeVALUET   (7.1) 
UW = αW+β4 COST& TIMEW+β5 RISKW+β6 DeVALUEW 
 
where U = Utility, T = Tunnel, W = Walkway, α = constant and β = parameters 
 
As respondents made choices, the relative effect of each variable (i.e. cost (and time); risk; 
and value) on their overall utility could be established.  Since the choices made by respondents 
were based of the difference between variables presented for the interchange choice options, the 
utility value of choosing to abandon the tunnelled interchange for the walkway interchange could 
be presented by UTW which is the utility function representing the difference between UT and UW.   
        UTW  = (UT) - (UW)       ( 7 . 2 )  
 
The objective of the analysis was to determine the overall preferences made by the 
respondents in order to generate outcomes for the constant (α) and parameters (β) defined in 
equation 7.3 (which is derived from equation 7.2).  The variables could therefore be presented as 
the difference in variables where (Diff COST) represented the cost difference, (Diff RISK) 
represented the risk difference and (Diff DeVALUE) represented the development difference. 
UTW = (αT+β1 Diff COST& Diff TIME +β2 Diff RISK +β3 Diff DeVALUE)  (7.3) 
 
where β1 = β4, β2 = β5, β3 = β6 and αW = 0 
 
27 surveys were returned giving 422 choices out of the 432 possible choices (giving 97.7% 
success in the choices made within the 27 replies) and these outputs are included in Appendix H.  
A further 2 surveys were unusable.  The 27 usable surveys were subsequently analysed using the 
logit regression analysis function from SPSS for windows version 17.0.  Table 7.4 shows the 
Homer-Lemeshow statistic with a significance of 0.934.  The Homer-Lemeshow statistic is a Chapter 7  
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measure of the quality of a regression model with a scale of between 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 where a higher value 
reflects a better quality model (Field, 2009).  
Table 7.4 Model summary and Homer-Lemeshow statistic result  
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step 
Chi-
square  df Sig. 
1 1.843  6 0.934 
 
Three main comments can be made on the survey methodology to get to this point; 
•  The survey captured respondents’ trade-offs between capital cost increases, level of risk 
and loss in commercial value, with no account of the potential contractual and 
critical/physical difficulties that would exist in swapping the tunnel construction 
methodology for the walkway construction methodology.  While it was mentioned that the 
physical changes required to change from the tunnelled interchange to the walkway 
interchange would be minimal, it is unclear whether respondents implicitly allowed for the 
inevitable contractual and interface difficulties in their responses; and hence how such 
difficulties would affect their choices. 
•  The key question asked in the survey was simply “If you had a choice between a tunnelled 
interchange that would overrun by ‘x’, have ‘y’ associated risk and ‘z’ commercial value 
and a walkway interchange with smaller values of ‘x’,’y’ and ‘z’; which would you 
choose?”  A doubt exists as to whether this type of question and descriptions gave 
respondents a sufficiently clear picture of the differences between the tunnel and walkway 
interchange variable values in order to make definitive tradeoffs.  This issue is particularly 
relevant to the level of risk where the inclusion of a salvage cost greater than £12m would 
have given greater insight into respondents’ views on risks.  For example, a £24m risk 
event could have been use instead to increase the impact of this variable. 
•  The survey is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the respondent is responding on behalf 
of himself only or on behalf of the client organisation.  Hence, whether the resulting lowest 
acceptable asset value (X) that is based on the collective survey responses is a collation of 
respondents views based on their perception of what the group would like or what they 
would like as individuals is unclear.  In practice, the values have been interpreted and 
applied with the respondents views for a client organisation in mind since this is what was 
asked for in the survey.  It may have been helpful to specify clearly that respondents should 
make their choices based on their own personal views since this would be representative of 
the deliberations occurring between individuals within a client organisation prior to the 
decision to abandon.  
    
Logit regression yields values for the constant (α) and the parameters (β) shown in 
equation 7.3. The Time Difference variable is not included as this has been included under the Chapter 7  
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COST and DiffCOST variables for the reasons discussed earlier concerning the design and layout 
of the SP survey.  Table 7.5 shows that 74.6 percent of respondents chose the tunnel which 
indicates that the tunnel options were preferred more than the walkway option.   
Table 7.5 Percentage of respondents choosing tunnelled and walkway options 
Classification Table 
Predicted 
Choice 
Observed  0 (W) 1  (T) 
Percentage 
Correct 
0 (Walkway W) 153  77  66.5  Choice 
1 (Tunnel T) 30  162  84.4 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage     74.6 
 
The respondents overall evaluation of the choice between tunnel and walkway accounts for 
the bulk of their attitude towards it.  There are a number of factors that affect the attitudes, beliefs 
and intentions of the respondents about the choices made.  Models of consumer decision making 
(such as multi-attribute models), of which an SP surveys is one, relies upon the functional theory of 
attitudes to explain how attitudes facilitate behaviour (where an attitude is defined as a general 
evaluation of an object or issues).  To this extent, Azjen and Fishbein (1977) developed the theory 
of reasoned action which measures the three components of attitude: the salient beliefs that people 
have about a variable; the probability that salient beliefs are held about a particular variable; and 
the evaluation of each of the salient beliefs.  The theory recognises the power of other people in 
influencing behaviour by including the following; 
•  Normative belief – that others believe an action should be taken or not taken; 
•  The motivation to comply with the belief – the degree to which a survey respondent takes 
others anticipated reactions into account when evaluating a course of action. 
 
The above mentioned could be used to explain how the tunnelled interchange was chosen 
more than the walkway interchange.  The tunnel option could have been more popular due to the 
knowledge that the sample of respondents had regarding the case study used.  This could be a 
significant reason for the imbalance as some respondents may have accounted for factors lying 
outside the survey, despite instructions requiring the consideration of information only presented in 
the survey.  Of further relevance was that during the time the SP survey was distributed, rumours 
existed regarding the objections that some 3
rd party interests had with a spatial design element of 
the walkway interchange option.  While this rumour was of no greater significance than any other 
issues related with either the tunnelled or walkway option, it could have an effect on respondents’ 
choices.  There was no possible way to account for this type of influence in the survey design 
particularly as the Farringdon ETH design was moving through its early design phases and design 
changes were constantly being discussed.   Chapter 7  
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In effect, social influence (Fishbein and Azjen, 1975) may have affected the respondents 
decision where conformity, obedience, leadership and collective behaviour may have resulted in 
respondents selecting the tunnel interchange more than the walkway.  Cognitive dissonance may 
also have played a role where respondents believed that the tunnel interchange had additional 
utility under all choice scenarios even if the utility of the walkway interchange was greater in 
certain cases.  Under such circumstances, respondents could have simply stated their preference for 
the tunnel or walkway option without consideration for any variables, yet there was not evidence of 
non-traders within the sample.  This relates to their (i) exposure to information (ii) perception and 
(iii) choice strategy.  With regards to i, respondents may not have used the information that was 
available to them in the 16 scenarios and thus this affected the assumptions they made with regards 
to the utility they identified in the choices.  Regarding ii, shifts in their perception, selectivity and 
lumping/chunking may also have played their part in the tunnel interchange being chosen more 
frequently.   
Finally, respondents’ choice strategy (iii) may have affected their decision making.  Under 
these circumstances, respondents’ rationality may have become bounded by their lack of 
appreciation for the information available which subsequently resulted in choosing to satisfy rather 
than optimise, despite their wishes to maximise utility.  A number of choice strategies exist which 
may have been followed by the SP respondents and which could have influenced the outcomes as 
follows; 
•  Dominance-based choice processes may have resulted in respondents making choices 
based on a higher value located in the scenario.  Since the tunnel variables routinely had 
higher values, this may be a reason why the tunnelled interchange was selected more. 
•  The maximax choice strategy from game theory may have been used by some respondents 
where the highest maximum level of satisfaction was selected.  A 50:50 split existed in the 
maximum utility available for the tunnelled and walkway interchanges in the 16 scenarios 
contained in the SP survey and so respondents following this strategy would have produced 
an equal split in choices between the tunnel and walkway interchange.  However, it could 
be that the maximax strategy was not used in some cases as respondents saw greater utility 
in the tunnel interchange despite the walkway interchange having more utility. 
•  Lexiographic choice strategies may have been used in some cases where respondents 
ordered all variables presented in the scenarios and chose a tolerable value for their most 
important variable.  This could have resulted in the tunnelled interchange being chosen 
more often due to a lack of difference between the variable values of the tunnel and 
walkway options in some scenarios.  
•  Conjunctive choice strategies may have been used where an acceptable level for each 
variable was set by a respondent and any variable where this level is not met was rejected.  
Under these circumstances, some respondents may have chosen a limit to the variables they Chapter 7  
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considered and made choices on this basis.  As a result, the tunnel interchange was chosen 
in most scenarios apart from the most extreme.  A greater variation in the variable values 
could have mitigated the impacts of this strategy on the survey results. 
 
The analysis in table 7.6 shows good results, finding that all three variables of cost 
difference (0.000), risk difference (0.001) and development value difference (0.000) are all 
statistically significant (i.e. significance ≤0.05).  
   Table 7.6 Logit regression outputs showing parameter values  
Variables in the Equation 
  β  S.E. Wald  df  Sig.  Exp(B) 
CostDif -0.405  0.071 32.912  1  0  0.667 
RiskDif -0.049  0.005 85.192  1  0  0.952 
DevValDiff 0.155  0.045  11.864  1 0.001 1.167 
Step 1
a 
Constant 3.49  0.781 19.97  1  0 32.788 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: CostDif, RiskDif, DevValDiff. 
 
The β values given for the parameters in table 7.6 can be used as inputs into equation 7.3.  
Therefore αT = 3.490, β1 = -0.405, β2 = -0.049 and β3 = 0.155.  The utility value for choosing to 
abandon the tunnelled interchange for the walkway interchange can therefore be defined by 
equation 7.4.       
UTW = (3.940 – 0.405* Diff COST -0.049* Diff RISK + 0.155* Diff DeVALUE)    (7.4) 
In dividing through by the β parameter value β1 (i.e. 0.405), each variable in equation 7.4 
can be defined in cost terms.  This operation is shown in equation 7.5; 
    UTW  = (3.940 – 0.405* Diff COST - 0.049* Diff RISK + 0.155* Diff DeVALUE)    (7.5) 
       0.405    0.405                         0.405                         0.405   
           = (£8.617 - Diff COST - 0.121* Diff RISK + 0.383* Diff DeVALUE) 
 
Equation 7.5 is the formula that represents the utility of abandoning the tunnel for the 
walkway in cost terms.  The maximum acceptable increase in costs can therefore be calculated by 
placing the averages of the variable values shown in table 7.1 into a re-arranged version of equation 
7.5.  This is defined below in conjunction with a sensitivity analysis around the variable values 
using Monte Carlo simulation. 
7.2.5.1  Average of variables 
The variable values to represent ‘Diff COST’, ‘Diff RISK ’ and ‘Diff DeVALUE ’ can be derived 
using the average of the differences shown in table 7.1.  In this case Diff COST represents the 
average of the cost increases from table 7.1 of ((£0.5m+£1.5m+£3.5m+£5.5m)/4) = £2.75m; the 
£7m difference in cost between the tunnelled and walkway interchanges (£45m - £38m = £7m); 
and the acceptable increase in costs.  Diff COST can therefore be written as (£2.75m + £7m + AIC)  
= £9.75 + AIC  where AIC represents the acceptable increase in costs.   Chapter 7  
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To convert the Diff RISK percentage into cost terms, the expected cost of the risk 
occurrence that was presented in the survey is used (i.e. £12m).  In other words, the cost of every 
1% increase in the likelihood of the £12m risk occurring could be calculated as (0.01*£12m) = 
£0.12m.   Since the average of the risk increases presented in the survey (from table 7.1) was 
((5%+20%+50%+75%)/4) = 37.5%, the average Diff RISK likelihood percentage can therefore be 
presented as (0.375*£12m) = £4.5m in cost terms.       
  The Diff DeVALUE could be presented as the average of the development value increases 
(as shown in table 7.4) giving a value of ((£8.5m + £10.5m + £13.5m + £16m)/4) = £12.125m. 
  Equation 7.5 can therefore be rearranged and written as equation 7.6 to give the maximum 
acceptable increase in costs (AIC).  To derive the acceptable increase in costs, UTA is set to 0 as at 
the point of abandonment, the client has no utility 
0   = (£8.617m – (£9.75m + AIC) - 0.121*£4.5m + 0.383*£12.125m)  (7.6) 
∴ AIC  = £2.985m 
The clients’ acceptable increase in costs (AIC) based on the average differences in cost, risk 
and development value variables presented in table 7.1 is therefore £2.985m.  A sensitivity analysis 
based on these variable differences is outlined below. 
7.2.5.2  Sensitivity analysis of variables   
A Monte Carlo sensitivity analysis
31 was executed with triangular distributions being used to 
represent the variable inputs since the maximum, minimum and average of each variable was 
known (as defined in table 7.1).   The outcome was a simulated value representing the acceptable 
increase in costs of Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled walkway before the client would consider 
abandoning.  By running 5000 trials, a simulated value of £2.8226m is obtained and figure 7.7 
shows the 90% confidence interval where the results fall between £0.7799m and £4.7992m.   
 
Figure 7.7 Sensitivity analysis of the SP variables to give the acceptable increase in costs (AIC) 
                                                      
31 Simulation package available as a CD in Mun (2006a) Chapter 7  
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The sensitivity analysis result of £2.8226m representing the acceptable cost increases for 
Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled interchange is in effect a representation of the loss in value due to 
cost increases that the client is willing to accept before changing to construct the walkway 
interchange.  This loss in value can be taken forward and used to derive the lowest acceptable asset 
value (X).  As noted, the target construction value for Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled interchange 
is £45m (i.e. equivalent to the present value of construction costs of £45m).  Subtracting the loss in 
value due to cost increases of £2.8226m from the target construction value of £45m gives a lowest 
acceptable asset value (X) of (£45m - £2.8226m) = £42.177m for Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled 
interchange.  Therefore, if the asset value decreased below £42.177m due to cost increases with a 
real threat of further cost increases, then the client can exercise the option to abandon the 
construction of the tunnelled interchange.  The next section will place the value of £42.177 derived 
for X into an option valuation lattice in order to determine the cost of the payment that the client 
must make to the contractor for the right to exercise the option to abandon.  
 
 
7.3 Option Valuation Using the Binomial Lattice Approach 
A binomial lattice can be used to model the evolution of the asset value of Farringdon ETH with a 
tunnelled interchange over a six year period where the target construction cost of £45m is used as 
the target asset value.  The values of constants to be used in the lattices are defined below.   
7.3.1.1  Risk free rate 
The risk free rate of return is a rate of return on an investment with no risk where the rate is 
comparable to the rate of return offered on government treasury bonds.  The reason for this is that 
the government is considered to be the most creditworthy borrower.  Historically, the UK risk-free 
rate has been around 3.5-4.5% and is influenced by interest rate movements, although interest rate 
cuts have seen the rate as low as 0.5% in the UK in 2009 (www.bbc.co.uk).  European Central 
Bank risk free rates are usually higher than the UK, set at around 4-5% although this rate too has 
recently been cut to 1.25% in 2009.  With regards to this case study, the risk-free discount rate of 
3.5% is used.  It is possible for the risk free rate to vary over the 6 year construction period since its 
valuation is based around government bonds but 3.5% is assumed representative for this case study. 
7.3.1.2  Volatility 
Volatility is a measure of uncertainty and therefore a key input in real options modelling.  Its 
valuation is however difficult given the absence of many elements that allow its calculation in a 
financial options context (i.e. there are no stock market prices and trading data in real options 
modelling).  Whereas the analysis of options on commodities and stocks can be based on years of 
collected data on the volatility of these assets, no such data exists for real options in engineering 
and construction projects.  Chapter 7  
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With a lot of historical data available on the stock market, it is relatively trivial to get 
volatility for a financial stock option.  Analysts of financial assets can expect to use detailed and 
sophisticated descriptions of the risks associated with these assets and can thus aspire to great 
precision and accuracy in the volatility associated with any option.  Generally, this volatility is 
calculated by determining the average deviation from the average price of a financial asset over a 
historical time period.  Standard deviation is the most common (but not the only way) to calculate 
this historical volatility where in financial asset terms, the volatility refers to the standard deviation 
of the continuously compounded returns of the financial asset within a specific time horizon (Hull, 
2003).   
Given the lack of historical data, it is very hard to justify the choice of volatility for real 
options using the same methods of calculation used in a financial options context.  Since financial 
option volatility is distilled from market information, it is practically impossible to provide a 
similarly representative estimate for volatility for real option valuations.  The lack of historical data 
for establishing volatility for real option analysis is a common problem except for a few specific 
industries, such as pharmaceutical industry (Mun, 2006b).  A method of determining volatility in 
construction projects would be to analyse contractors’ cash flows during the construction of 
projects.  In effect, by assuming the construction period of a project to be a cash flow model, the 
volatility can be inferred using a method such as the logarithmic present value approach which is 
used mainly when computing the volatility on assets with cash flows (as suggested by Mun, 
2006b).  This would in effect allow volatility to be calculated using information of a similar detail 
to that used in some financial options analysis.  However, obtaining such cash flow information 
that is relevant to such analysis is extremely difficult since it is often confidential and sensitive to 
the parties that hold it.  Efforts were made to obtain information for application in this work but 
were unsuccessful.   
The analysis to obtain a volatility value for real options therefore leads to approximate 
rather than precise values (de Neufville, 2003).  Real options analysts thus have to use speculative 
assumptions. In these circumstances, they know their estimates of value are approximate within 
bands described by sensitivity analyses and recognise that the analysis typically associated with 
financial options that might lead to greater precision may be a waste of effort.   
Fortunately, the application of real options in engineering and construction projects does 
not require great accuracy because managers typically only need to make choices, not precise 
judgements.  In making a choice, one only needs to know the relative value of alternatives, not their 
precise value.  For example, to decide whether to abandon the tunnel interchange for a walkway 
interchange, managers only need to know if the value of abandoning is less than the cost of 
accepting the risks that will be avoided.  If yes, then they should make the one-off invest in the 
option to abandon in order to have the right to do so.  In this respect, the objective of doing an 
option analysis is quite different for engineering managers than for financial analysts; engineering Chapter 7  
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managers seek to avoid risks on a one-off basis whereas financial analysts have to decide on a 
precise price to pay for options as they trade them in seeking a profit on a daily basis.  
How to find the volatility is one of the key difficulties of application of real options given 
the absence of any market traded underlying asset.  Luehrman (1998a, 1998b) described three 
approaches to establishing volatility for application in real options, depending on the information 
available.  These amounted to: an educated guess using information such as industry or market data 
as a whole; historical data such as record of investment returns; and simulation of projected cash 
flows.  Copeland and Antikarov (2001) suggested estimating the stochastic properties of variables 
that drive volatility in a real asset and then using Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the volatility 
itself.   
A weakness of real options is the fact that volatility is one of the biggest drivers of the 
results obtained from real option valuation, yet the volatility has to be estimated by subjective 
judgement since no mathematical or econometric methods exist to link the physical risks and 
uncertainties associated with a real project to the volatility of its value.  The estimate of volatility is 
therefore one of the downsides of real options valuation since the valuation is sensitive to the 
volatility.  However, implied volatility can be used to give a reasonable value for volatility in real 
options.  In the context of financial options, implied volatility is a forward-looking measure and 
differs from historical volatility because the latter is calculated from the known past returns of a 
security.  Volatility for a real project is therefore best determined using implied volatility because it 
is: 
•  Relative to a short term look-back period over recent trends which may be relevant to the 
actual volatility since historical trends may not pick up on these (This could typically 
consider recent metro projects from the past 5 years that have experienced overruns and 
account for the impacts of the reasons for these overruns in the volatility);  
•  Relative to historical volatility since experts such as Mun (2006b) and Hull (2003) as well 
as various online authors suggest that historical and implied volatility can often be similar 
(This could typically involve considering the metro project overruns and associated reasons 
for them over a period of decades);  
•  Relative to potential future events as it accounts for specific risks and uncertainties which 
are known to exist in the project under consideration.  This uncertainty can be associated 
with the capital expenditure required for construction and can thus be accounted for in the 
volatility value used. 
 
A specific benefit of estimating implied volatility is that it is forward looking as well as 
backward looking (which historical volatility is by definition).  When evaluating implied volatility 
for real construction projects, upcoming issues in the construction methodologies can be accounted 
for in the volatility as well as potential events which are identified from consideration of previous Chapter 7  
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projects.  This work has identified three possible ways of implying volatility for use in real options 
valuation and uses the outputs from two of these to derive a simulated value for volatility in this 
case study, as detailed below.   
 
Management Assumptions 
As noted by Mun (2006b) and Luehrman (1998a, 1998b), volatility can be established from 
management assumptions and guesses.  While being subject to bias, this method of valuing 
volatility is practical in the context of construction since industry practitioners often have a good 
basis for assessing risks and uncertainties based on previous projects, and thus for defining 
volatility.   
Subjective probabilities that the worst case scenario will occur can be specified and used to 
impute volatility.  A subjective assumption was made in this work where it was assumed that a 
15% probability of the worst case scenario of a 50% cost increase could materialise at Farringdon 
ETH.  This probability could be any number that a practitioner deems appropriate although 15% 
was used here as it represented the risks and uncertainties associated with Farringdon ETH.  A 15% 
probability of a 50% cost increase were values that were handed to the author as the outcome of 
risk assessments being carried out by Crossrail (the author was not involved with these risk 
assessments and had no input into or access to their co-ordination, recording or interpretation).  
These assessments were carried out by experts who were evaluating the risks associated with 
Crossrail in a manner similar to that of the Delphi technique.  This occurred around the spring of 
2009.  The procedure for using the Delphi technique for risk assessment differs from the classical 
Delphi technique in that the use of surveys to collect opinions is replaced by drawing the groups of 
experts together into risk workshops (Smith et al., 2006).  The Delphi procedure is based around a 
group of experts that represent all aspects of the project and thus work together to assess risks.  
This is achieved by defining the risks and then considering the causes of each risk with regards to 
the project.  The general outcome is that an estimate of the probability and/or impact of the risks 
are obtained form experts.  The collective estimates are subsequently fed back to the experts and 
they provide revised estimates until a consensus estimate is reached.  A downside to this technique 
is that it relies heavily on the opinions of people and also assumes that these opinions are founded 
upon expert knowledge and understanding of the risks and their associated interaction with the 
project.  The results of this approach to risk assessment is very subjective and should thus be 
viewed with caution.  Smith et al. (2006) note that it is best used on projects where there is little 
information available or when the project has very little knowledge or experience of the risks it 
faces.  Despite these issues, this method was identified as the best way of deriving a volatility value 
for use in real options analysis since no similar data was available that was relative to Crossrail.  
A scenario analysis of the construction cash flows defined in figure 6.11 of Chapter 6 can 
therefore be formed where worst; best and nominal case scenarios are presented.  This is shown in Chapter 7  
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figure 7.8 where cumulative present values of the construction costs for Farringdon ETH with the 
tunnelled walkway are shown.   
  
 
Figure 7.8 Scenario analysis with best, nominal and worst case scenarios 
 
The nominal case scenario assumes that the target asset value of £45m is expected.  The 
worst case scenario represents a 50% overrun which subsequently gives a £22.5m cost increase in 
PV terms and thus an asset value of £22.5m to the client.   It was assumed that the project value 
fluctuated within a normal distribution because the distribution of the final nodes on a valuation 
lattice used in real options is normally distributed.  Moreover, when using simulations (such as 
Monte Carlo simulation), the distribution of the results will often converge on a normal 
distribution.  The result of this is that the best case scenario in figure 7.8 must also take a 50% 
deviation from the nominal scenario.  In effect, the best case scenario sees the PV of the 
construction costs halved, giving an asset value of £67.5m to the client which represents an asset 
value of £45m and the value of savings of £22.5m.  This is not realistic in practice since a 50% 
reduction on the construction costs of an already value engineered project would be unlikely.  
However, this approach is essential for the calculation of volatility for real options given that the 
use of other statistical distribution is this context often converge to the normal distribution too; a 
Binomial distribution becomes normally distributed when the number of trials increases; a Poisson 
distribution also becomes normally distributed with a high average rate; and a Triangular 
distribution is a normal distribution with truncated upper and lower values (although the Triangular 
distribution would be the best alternative to the normal distribution if needed).           
Providing the project value fluctuates within a normal distribution, the volatility could be 
implied using the following standard-normal equation which gives a rough estimate of the volatility 
Discount Rate = 3.5% 
Year 0  Year 1  Year 6  Year 5  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4 
Investment = £0 
CO = Cash Outflow = Payment by client 
CO1 = £-9.32m  CO2 = £-16.13m  CO3 = £-21.20m  CO4 = £-10.04m  CO5 = £-6.78m  CO6 = £-4.03m 
∑PV  = £-67.50m
Year 0  Year 1  Year 6  Year 5  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4 
Investment = £0 
CO1 = £-6.43m  CO2 = £-11.52m  CO3 = £-15.67m  CO4 = £-7.68m  CO5 = £-5.37m  CO6 = £-3.30 
∑PV  = £-45.00m
Year 0  Year 1  Year 6  Year 5  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4 
Investment = £0 
CO1 = £-3.11m  CO2 = £-5.38m  CO3 = £-7.07m  CO4 = £-3.35m  CO5 = £-2.26m  CO6 = £-1.34m 
∑PV  = £-22.50m
WORST CASE SCENARIO (50% Increase in Costs) 
NOMINAL CASE SCENARIO (Costs on budget) 
BEST CASE SCENARIO (50% Decrease in Costs) 
Values in PV   
Values in PV   
Values in PV   
Asset Value = £67.5m 
Asset Value = £45m 
Asset Value = £22.5m 
It was assumed that a 50% increase in costs occurred for each year whereas in reality, cost increases 
would occur at points corresponding to adverse events occurring in the construction lifecycle. Chapter 7  
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(from Mun, 2006b).  Assuming the percentile value represents the actual asset value x, μ represents 
the mean target asset value and Z the inverse of the percentile which represents the probability of 
the worst case scenario materialising; the standard-normal distribution Z-score is such that Z = (x – 
μ) / σ  which can be re-arranged to σ  = (x – μ) / Z.  Since the volatility is normalised as a 
percentage (σ*), this can be divided by the mean to give σ* = (x – μ) / Z μ.  The inverse of the 
percentile can be calculated using MS Excel’s NORMSINV function.  In effect, equation 7.7 is 
obtained; 
Volatility = Percentile Value – Mean     (7.7) 
Inverse of the Percentile × Mean 
 
The volatility of Farringdon ETH using the worst case scenario can therefore be calculated as; 
       Volatility = £22.5m – £45m      = 48.24%    (7.8) 
                Inverse (0.15) × £45m 
 
The 48.24% volatility value represents the volatility over the six year construction period 
and so this can be annualised to give an annual volatility value of [{(1+0.4824)
1/6}-1] = 6.78%.  
Outliers to this volatility value can be derived from assumed upper and lower probabilities of the 
worst case scenario occurring of 30% and 5% respectively.  This gives upper and lower volatilities 
of 11.81% and 4.52% respectively. 
The use of management assumptions is an effective way of calculating volatility for use in 
real options given the lack of data from which volatility can be derived.  The use of experts to give 
their opinions as to the probability of occurrence and impact of risk and uncertainties should they 
occur on a project is an effective use of historical, current and relative project knowledge in order 
to establish the volatility parameter in analysis.  Future volatility can also be defined by calculating 
the ratio of how projects perform with regards to their target asset value and actual asset values as a 
result of predicted risks and uncertainties.  However, the use of heuristics to quantify risk and 
uncertainties has associated issues in that they are subject to the views of the experts that provide 
them.  Hillson (2002) and Chapman and Ward (2003) both highlight the issues of risk analysis 
focusing on the downside rather than the upside, the result of which is that quantification of the 
downside risks tend to be overstated.  This is translated to an upward bias in volatility estimates as 
described by Godinho (2006).  Despite these issues, the use of volatility calculated in this way 
improves the confidence that can be placed in it since the use of expert defined information only 
serves to make the information upon which the volatility is based richer than it would be without it.  
This in turn can yield a similar increase in the confidence that can be placed in any real option 
values, yet these should be considered in light of the lack of tangible data analysis that would have 
been used to establish the volatility parameter.  Wang (2005) noted that sometimes the insights 
provided by a real options analysis are more important than a specific quantitative result and this is 
certainly true if the lack of precision in establishing the volatility parameter is considered.   Chapter 7  
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Uplift Values 
The above volatility assumption ties in with the work of Bruzelius et al. (2002), Mott MacDonald 
(2002) and Flyvbjerg and COWI (2004) in studying cost overruns in engineering projects within 
industry sectors.  The values derived by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003a) in particular are representative of 
average cost increases per project type and can be transformed to represent the volatility associated 
with the present value of the construction costs of Farringdon ETH.  The Farringdon ETH can be 
placed in a group of projects that Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) and Mott MacDonald (2002) consider to 
be fixed links (tunnels and deep shafts).  According to Flyvbjerg et al. (2003a), average cost 
increases of 34% can be expected for fixed links constructed in Europe with a standard deviation 
on this value of 62%.  These values can be interpreted as a form of volatility where the average 
increases in cost defined by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003a) represent a form of volatility in costs.   
Such a volatility representation therefore implies that the £45m construction cost of 
Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled interchange could escalate to around £45m*(1+0.34) = £60.3m 
(in present value terms) by the end of the six year construction period.   If an increase in costs of 
34% is inferred as a volatility value over a 6 year construction period, then an annualised volatility 
of [{(1+0.34)
1/6}-1] = 5% can be obtained.  Considering the standard deviation of 62% on the 34% 
average cost increases noted by Flyvbjerg et al., (2003), outlier volatilities of 2.15% and 7.51% can 
also be deduced.  
 
Risk Magnitude 
It should be noted that the risk magnitude calculation outlined in Chapter 5 can be used to impute 
the volatility definition.  The results gained in Chapter 5 have not been included in the volatility 
definition used for this case study as the work described in Chapter 5 only considered global and 
elemental risks.  Further work is required to the risk magnitude evaluation methodology in order to 
account for all of the risks and uncertainties associated with a project.  In addition, the result 
obtained in Chapter 5 is associated with the early design stages of Crossrail and therefore in order 
for the risk magnitude to be able to impute volatility, it would need to be simulated over time to the 
point where construction of the project begins (accounting for the fact that design and construction 
may overlap).   
  
To obtain a volatility estimate for inclusion in the binomial lattices used in this work, a sensitivity 
analysis can be executed on the volatility values derived by management assumptions and the uplift 
values defined by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003a).  The volatility value of 6.78% derived from 
management assumptions can be included in a Monte Carlo simulation.  Outliers to this volatility 
value of 11.81% and 4.52% respectively can also be included in a triangular distribution with 
6.78% as the mean value. 
  The 5% volatility value derived from uplift values (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a)  can be 
included with outliers defined using the standard deviations on the uplift values.  These were Chapter 7  
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previously identified as of 7.51% and 2.15% respectively and can be included as the upper and 
lower values of a triangular distribution.  Figure 7.9 shows the output of the Monte Carlo 
simulation of these values where a simulated volatility value of 6.24% is achieved with 90% 
confidence interval that outputs fall between 4.7890% and 7.9616%. 
 
Figure 7.9 Monte Carlo sensitivity analysis on volatility values 
 
  This volatility value can be included in the binomial lattices to calculate the evolution of 
the asset value over the 6 year construction period (Lattice 1) and subsequently the option valuation 
lattice (Lattice 2).  Due to the Brownian motion around which the binomial lattice approach is 
based, the larger the volatility the higher the option value will be.  This will be reflected in the next 
section where the 90% confidence outputs will be used in the binomial lattices to reveal the impact 
that variations in volatility has on the value of the payment to be made by the client to the 
contractor to abandon the tunnelled interchange for the walkway interchange.  
7.3.1.3  Binomial lattice inputs 
Equations 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 (from Chapter 6) can be used to calculate the up and down factors (u and 
d) as well as the risk-neutral probability (p).   
 
The binomial lattice input values for option valuation are therefore:      
•  S = £45m (representing the target asset value after construction)   
•  Volatility (σ) = 0.0624 (annualised) 
•  time to expiration in years (T) = 6, δt = 1;  
•  risk-free rate (rf) = 0.035  
•  from eqs. 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 from Chapter 6;  
o  u = e
σ√(δt) = e
0.0624√(1) = 1.0664  
o  d = e
-σ√(δt) = e
-0.0624√(1) = 0.9395 
o  p = e
rf(δt)  - d/(u - d) = e
0.035(δt) - 0.9395/(1.0664 - 0.9395) = 0.7696     Chapter 7  
Abandonment Conditions and Option Valuation 
  200
 
Figure 7.10 Lattice evolution of the asset value of Farringdon ETH over 6 years 
  
Figure 7.10 shows the evolution of the value of Farringdon ETH over the 6 year 
construction period with initial asset value based on the target asset value of £45m.  According to 
the inputs, a minimum asset value of £30.947m can be seen at node S0d
6 which represents a (£45m 
- £30.947m) = £14.053m overrun on the £45m asset value (in value terms).  On the other hand, a 
maximum asset value of £65.435m can be realised at node S0u
6.  This effectively represents a cost 
saving of (£65.435m - £45m) = £20.435m in value terms.  A saving of such magnitude (i.e. 
resulting in an approximate 45% increase in value) is unlikely during the construction period of 
ETH even if any opportunities to save on the £45m are taken. 
Figure 7.11 shows the option valuation lattice which values the option to abandon the 
tunnelled interchange for the walkway interchange.  As previously discussed, this option value 
represents the payment that a client must make to the contractor for the right to abandon.  The 
value is obtained by backward induction starting with the terminal nodes on the right and then 
working through the lattice by valuing the nodes to the left.  This ultimately results in an asset 
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value that includes the cost of the option to abandon.  The operations to obtain the values at each 
node for the determination of the option value are described below.       
 
Figure 7.11 Option valuation lattice 
 
The values shown at each node of the option valuation lattice in figure 7.11 are calculated 
using the abandonment put option payoff max[X,S].  X represents the lowest acceptable asset value 
calculated in section 7.2 and becomes the exercise condition of the put option.  S represents the 
asset value determined at the nodes of the asset value lattice shown in figure 7.10.     
 Figure 7.11 shows a terminal node denoted ‘A’ revealing a value of £42.177m.  This value 
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lowest acceptable asset value X be greater than the asset value S at this node.  Since max[X,S] = 
max[£42.177m, £30.947m] at node A, then the decision at this node is to abandon since the lowest 
acceptable asset value (£42.177m) is greater than the asset value (£30.947m).  
Considering the terminal the node denoted ‘B’ in figure 7.11, the value shown here is 
£50.981m.  This value is again obtained using the abandonment put option payoff max[X,S] where 
X remains as £42.177m and S is taken from node S0u
4d
2 of figure 7.10.  Since S has a greater value 
at this node (max[X,S] = max [£42.177m, £50.981m]) then the option to abandon is not exercised 
and the decision at this node is to continue since there is no loss in value (The term continue is used 
since node B is a terminal node and the strategic decision associated with the option therefore 
ceases to exist which necessitates the client to simply continue with the project).   
Considering the intermediate nodes of figure 7.11, node ‘C’ is calculated as £42.177m.  At 
this node, the client has 2 options, to abandon or not to abandon thereby keeping the option open in 
order to keep the option to abandon for the future, i.e. until the asset value decreases beyond the 
lowest acceptable asset value (X).  The asset value S at node ‘C’ is simply the discounted weighted 
average of the potential future option values using the risk neutral probability.  As the risk 
adjustment is performed on the probabilities of future option cash flows, the discounting can be 
achieved using the risk free rate.  The asset value S at node C is therefore [(P)(£42.915m) + (1 – P) 
(£42.177m)]exp[(- rf) (δt)] = £41.275m 
32.  The abandonment put option payoff max[X,S] = 
max[£42.177m, £41.275m] at node C gives the lowest acceptable asset value X (£42.177m) as the 
maximum between X and S and so the decision at node C is to abandon.   
Considering the above asset valuation calculation for node C, the £42.915m value is taken 
from the node to the upper right of node C on the lattice where the abandonment put option payoff 
presents the maximisation of max[X,S] = max[£42.177m, £42.915m] and thus a node value of 
£42.915m.  The £42.177m value is taken from the node to the downward right of node C where the 
abandonment put option payoff presents the maximisation of max[X,S] = max[£42.177m, 
£40.727m] and thus a node value of £42.177m.  Some of the asset values S at the intermediate 
nodes such as node C do not have values that correspond to the same nodes on the asset valuation 
lattice of figure 7.10.  This is because of the backward induction and the action of the abandonment 
put option payoff function max[X,S], where the intermediate nodes in figure 7.11 are changed to 
represent the maximum asset value that can be realised at each intermediate node.             
Backward induction from the terminal nodes on the right of figure 7.11 towards the left 
(and thus the starting point) of the option valuation lattice yields a single asset valuation which is 
higher than the target asset value of £45m shown in node S0 of figure 7.10.  The valuation at the 
node on the left of figure 7.11 shows the asset value and the value of the real option to abandon.  
Therefore, the value of the payment to be made by the client to the contractor for the right to 
                                                      
32 This assumes a 0.035% risk free rate (rf), a time step δt of 1 and a risk neutral probability p of 0.7696 (p 
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abandon the tunnelled interchange for the walkway interchange is (£45.178m - £45m) = £0.178m 
(where £45m is the target asset value).  This payment value of £0.178m is in effect the value of the 
strategic flexibility that having the abandonment option creates and is the right without obligation 
that allows the client to abandon if and when the loss in value due to cost increases crosses a trigger 
point, in this case lowest acceptable asset value X (i.e. £42.177m).         
This payment is the value of the agreement between the client and the construction 
contractor that allows the client to abandon the construction of Farringdon ETH with the tunnelled 
interchange to construct the walkway interchange.  The sum paid in effect compensates the 
contractor for the costs that would arise due to the client deciding to change the design.   
In the context of this example, the decision to change by the exercise of the option is 
specified to take place if needed at any point prior to the start of the excavation of the tunnelled 
link to LU Barbican.  As previously mentioned, a change at this point from a tunnelled interchange 
to a walkway interchange requires very little changes to the ETH construction site.   
Given that the tunnelled interchange is inherently more risky than the walkway 
interchange, the risk contingency for the walkway interchange would typically be less.  It should be 
noted that the option value does not represent the change in the risk contingency value that would 
occur due to abandoning.  The option value therefore represents the cost of the option to abandon 
and not the reduction in the risk contingency value that would typically be associated with 
abandoning the tunnelled interchange for the less risky walkway interchange.  
The ‘real’ present value of construction costs of Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled 
interchange is therefore £45m + £0.178 = £45.178m which includes a risk mitigation strategy to 
avoid cost overruns should risk and uncertainties be of such a nature that a large cost overrun 
would be likely (this cost of £45.178m excludes the £4.5m fee payable to the contractor under the 
cost reimbursable contract conditions).  Notably, this option payment and associated strategy 
provides an opportunity to completely avoid the most likely cause of a major cost overrun during 
the construction of Farringdon ETH and in doing so presents a reduction to the risk contingency 
sum required by the project.  It is not suggested that the presence of the option to abandon removes 
the need for a risk contingency since risk contingencies will always be required on a project such as 
Farringdon ETH.  What the option value does represent is the potential to reduce the size of the risk 
contingency if it was determined using reference class uplifts typically suggested by Flyvbjerg and 
COWI (2004) and Mott MacDonald (2002).   
Reference class uplift values such as those typically suggested by Flyvbjerg et al (2003a) 
and Flyvbjerg and COWI (2004) were used to calculate the volatility input for the real options 
binomial lattice which resulted in the valuation of an option to avoid (or mitigate) risks and 
uncertainties at Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled interchange.  This work believes this to be an 
appropriate use for these uplift values.   
It should also be noted that the option valuation process outlined in this section accounted 
for only one group of significant risks occurring at a certain point in the construction process.  Chapter 7  
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Other strategies could and should be created for other risks with the valuation of these strategies 
using real options theory being included in the overall budgets for projects.  Such risks include 
those outlined in section 6.2.1 of chapter 6 although some of these risks would be of such 
significance (e.g. tunnelling through an old plague pit) that they would naturally be mitigated by 
not basing a construction site around (or within) them at all.   
It is believed that this process of using real options to value strategies to avoid risks 
presents an element of efficiency to the setting of risk contingencies.  This efficiency relates to how 
options valuation requires the formulation of strategies to deal with risks and uncertainties and 
subsequently the cost of a payment to be made between actors in order to execute these strategies.  
This payment represents the right to avoid the risk and so would naturally be cheaper than paying 
to remediate the risk should it occur.  The payment for the strategy in conjunction with a specified 
contingency based on extensive risk assessments is also considered cheaper than using uplift values 
to determine a contingency value.  Should a client decide to use uplift values to establish the 
required contingency for constructing Farringdon ETH, then a minimum ~40% increase of the 
construction cost should be expected and this is considered considerably more expensive than the 
payment for the option to abandon and a lesser risk contingency for identified risks.  However, if 
the payment for abandonment was larger than the cost of remediating the risk then the strategy to 
avoid the risk is effectively worthless and would not be pursued.  As is mentioned by several 
authors (see Chapter 2) the fact that reference class uplifts do not account for any particular risk 
and thus do not provide any strategies to deal with them is a significant deficiency of the uplift 
method.  
The next section considers the variations and sensitivities around the option value of 
£0.178m derived for abandoning the tunnelled interchange at Farringdon ETH.  It subsequently 
discusses the benefit of abandonment to the client and how this benefit can be transferred into the 
margins realised by contractors. 
 
7.3.2 Consideration of option valuation 
The abandonment real option therefore allows the client to switch to the walkway interchange by 
making a payment to the contractor which in effect is the pre-agreed right but not the obligation to 
switch.  In switching from the tunnel to the walkway, the client; 
•  Avoids making uncertain ground conditions worse by excavating the tunnel interchange; 
•  Avoids the significant risks and uncertainties associated with constructing the tunnel; 
•  Mitigates any further impacts on 3
rd party infrastructure which may have been damaged;   
•  Avoids major cost overruns over and above the value of the damage caused by the initial 
impact of the original settlement. 
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While a sensitivity analysis using Monte Carlo simulation can be applied to simulate the 
volatility input to obtain the range of real option values, it can (theoretically) also solve the real 
options model through path-dependent modelling.  However, attempting to value real options 
through simulation without accounting for the Brownian motion which is included in the binomial 
option valuation lattice could result in an option being undervalued.  This is because the option 
value relies on the normal distribution of the asset values typically identified through the binomial 
asset value lattice.  Mun (2006b) noted that using Monte Carlo simulation to solve real option 
models could result in real option values being flawed.   Since volatility is accounted for in a 
binomial lattice as an input that captures the variability in the value of an asset over time, 
simulating real option values based on the outputs of binomial lattices using Monte Carlo may 
therefore end up double-counting a real options’ true variability.  Hence, Monte Carlo simulations 
of the real option value for Farringdon ETH are not made. 
However, the risk free rate and the volatility are two input variables (as used in figure 7.10) 
where simulations can be made to determine distributional assumptions for these two variables.  
The action of simulating one or more input variables results in a distribution of real option values.  
Section 7.3.1.1 assumed a realistic risk free rate for inclusion in the binomial lattices.  Section 
7.3.1.2 executed a sensitivity analysis on derived volatilities to yield a simulated volatility value for 
inclusion in the binomial lattices along with 90% confidence volatility values. 
Figure 7.12 is a plot showing the distribution of option values that can be realised by using 
the 90% confidence volatility values derived in section 7.3.1.2.  In this case, the 90% confidence 
intervals for volatility shown in figure 7.9 are applied to the asset valuation and option valuation 
lattices shown in figure 7.10 and 7.11.  In addition, these volatility distributions are applied to the 
lattices where the lowest acceptable asset value (X) is changed based on the 90% confidence 
intervals of the maximum acceptable cost increases derived in figure 7.8 (The 90% confidence 
values of the acceptable cost increases of £0.7799m and £4.7992m are subtracted from the target 
asset value of £45m to give X values of £44.2201m and 40.2008m respectively).  The risk free 
discount rate is held constant at 3.5% in all cases.  Table 7.7 shows the option value derived for 
each condition of volatility and X applied to the lattices shown in figures 7.10 and 7.11. 
Table 7.7 Option values based on volatility and lowest acceptable asset value (X)  
 Option  Value  (£m) 
Volatility %  X of £44.2201m  X of £42.1774m  X of £40.2008m 
0.048 0.204 0.030 0.004 
0.062 0.527 0.178 0.053 
0.080 0.968 0.491 0.236 
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Option Value (£m) vs Volatility (% ) (with rf at 3.5% )
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Figure 7.12 The effect of volatility and lowest acceptable asset value (X) on option value 
 
  Figure 7.12 shows an increasing relationship between the volatility and option value for all 
cases of X and this can be related to what the volatility represents.  The volatility is a measure of 
the risks and uncertainty associated with a project where in the case of this work it was simulated.  
As is typical of any type of insurance, the higher the risk the higher the premium payment and 
therefore when volatility increases, the option value increases since the option is the right to 
mitigate the risk (i.e. the insurance) and the value is the sum paid for this right (i.e. the premium). 
  An issue with the management assumption approach to deriving volatility is the subjective 
probabilities that are used in the scenario analysis.  The range of probabilities is often large and 
therefore there is great difficulty in placing any confidence in the probabilities.  While Monte Carlo 
simulation can be used to account for sensitivities, the probabilities used remain subject to bias 
which can ultimately impact their validity.   
The option value increases categorically whenever the lowest acceptable asset value X 
increases.  This can be attributed to how the abandonment option payoff works at each node of the 
option valuation lattice where the asset valuation is a weighting of the continuous probabilities that 
the asset value (S) at the node is higher than the lowest acceptable asset value (X) versus when it is 
not.  Therefore if (X) is generally set at a higher value then the option value is subsequently a 
higher sum. 
A relationship also exists between the discount rate and the option price.  A risk free rate of 
3.5% was used in the binomial lattice where the option value was derived using backward 
induction from the terminal nodes of figure 7.11.  The risk free discount rate is therefore critical.  
Figure 7.13 shows that the option value decreases with an increasing risk free discount rate (with 
volatility constant at 6.24%).  This applies to whichever lowest acceptable asset value (X) is used 
and table 7.8 shows the variation in option values with each condition (this is shown graphically on 
figure 7.13).  The decrease in option value with increasing discount rate can be attributed to how 
the discount rate operates in the binomial option valuation lattice where the backward induction Chapter 7  
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discounts from a fixed value terminal node.  This results in a lower option value if a higher 
discounting rate is used since greater discounting occurs. 
Table 7.8 Option values based on risk free rate and lowest acceptable asset value (X)  
 Option  Value  (£m) 
Risk free rate (%)  X of £44.2201m X  of £42.1774m X  of £40.2008m 
2.500 0.763  0.37  0.149 
3.500 0.527  0.178  0.053 
4.500 0.311  0.063  0.012 
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Figure 7.13 The effect of the discount rate on option value   
    
7.3.2.1  Benefit to the client 
The real option approach documented can be used by the client to counter a loss in value.  As 
described, a real option can be used as a strategy to ensure that a certain asset value is maintained 
even when events occur which result in cost increases and thus a reduction in the asset value.  
Figure 7.14 shows an S-curve of the cumulative construction costs to the client over the 6 year 
construction period of Farringdon ETH with the tunnelled interchange.  This S-curve is constructed 
using the present values of costs shown in figure 6.11 of Chapter 6 and shows how the costs 
accumulate to give a total present value of construction costs for the station of £45m.   
The second S-curve drawn on figure 7.14 represents the cumulative costs of Farringdon 
ETH with a tunnelled interchange after accounting for cost increases resulting from the remediation 
of risks where the costs are simulated costs
33 based on the budgeted costs of the station.  The 
increases in costs are associated with remediating settlement around the ETH site (as discussed in 
Chapter 6 and section 7.1) and also the remediation of the risks that would occur due to the 
tunnelled interchange being excavated at a time when significant uncertainties existed at the ETH 
site.  The costs of remediating the risks associated with the tunnelled interchange were at least 
£12m (as included in the SP survey).  The ‘50% Overrun’ curve on figure 7.14 accounts for these 
                                                      
33 The cost of remediating risks was calculated using the Expected Monetary Value method with the resulting 
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remediation costs and presents a 50% increase in construction costs which accounts for all the 
potential cost increases resulting from the occurrence of risks at Farringdon ETH.              
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Figure 7.14 Cumulative costs representing the budget and overrun condition for Farringdon ETH 
 
  The present value of construction costs shown in figure 7.14 can be converted to represent 
the asset value realised by the client.  The asset value is presented as a positive value with any 
increases in costs being presented as a loss in value.  Conversely, a reduction in costs is presented 
as an increase in value.  Figure 7.15 is presented in this way where the cumulative cost curves 
shown in figure 7.14 are converted to cumulative value curves that represent the aggregation of 
value to the client over the construction period of Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled interchange.  
The expected value curve in figure 7.15 is simply the aggregation of the value realised from the 
construction of Farringdon ETH where an asset worth £45m is delivered at the end of the 6
th year.  
The ‘value from overrun curve’ represents the loss in value realised by the occurrence of the cost 
increases associated with remediating risk events which include the extra damage resulting from 
the excavation of the tunnelled interchange (as shown in figure 7.14).  The cost increases ultimately 
impact on the value of the asset received by the client at the end of the 6 years. 
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Figure 7.15 Cumulative value curves Chapter 7  
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  A curve is drawn in figure 7.15 which represents the lowest acceptable asset value (X) 
relative to the expected value with tunnel curve.  The lowest acceptable asset value curve is fixed 
over time although it is only relevant to the period in the run-up to the construction of the tunnelled 
interchange at 35 months (as defined in a 3
rd party Farringdon ETH construction program).  Should 
the expected asset value curve cross this line at any point in time prior to the time to construct the 
tunnelled interchange at 35 months then the option to abandon will be exercised.  As shown on 
figure 7.15, the value from overrun curve crosses the lowest acceptable asset value line and so the 
option to abandon is exercised.     
The time at which the option is exercised is shown on figure 7.16 as the ‘option expiration’ 
line.  At this point, the tunnelled interchange is abandoned for the walkway interchange and 
therefore the asset value changes to reflect the asset value of the walkway interchange.  The 
‘expected value of the walkway’ curve effectively shows the value that can be achieved by the 
client if the construction of Farringdon ETH with the tunnelled interchange is abandoned in the 
construction period before the construction of the tunnelled interchange in favour of building the 
walkway interchange.   
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Figure 7.16 The change in asset value due to the exercise of the option to abandon  
 
Figure 7.16 shows that should the client decide to abandon the tunnelled interchange due to 
the potential occurrence of risks that would lead to cost further cost increases, the value that would 
be realised is less than what would be realised if construction of the station with a tunnelled 
interchange was to continue risk free.  However, the execution of the option to abandon also shows 
that the significant loss in value realised by potential cost increases during the construction of the 
tunnelled interchange can be avoided and therefore a level of value is preserved for the client.   
The projected asset value of Farringdon ETH with the walkway interchange at the end of 
the 6 year construction period is therefore the value of the target asset value of Farringdon ETH 
with the tunnelled interchange; less the value of the cost increases due to the settlement occurring 
around the Farringdon ETH prior to the tunnel construction; and less the difference of £7m in costs Chapter 7  
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between the tunnel and walkway.  Assuming that cost increases of £3m occur
34 before the 
construction of the tunnelled interchange begins, the final projected asset value after the 
abandonment of the tunnelled interchange for the walkway interchange is therefore (£45m - £3m - 
£7m) = £35m (providing no further risk events occur). 
The above calculated £35m asset value for Farringdon ETH with a walkway interchange 
can be compared to the asset value that would be realised if the tunnel interchange was not 
abandoned under risky and uncertain conditions.  Considering the ‘value from overrun’ curve from 
figure 7.16, the asset value of Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled interchange after a 50% cost 
increase is therefore (£45m - £22.5m) = £22.5m  This presents an extra (£35m - £22.5m) = £12.5m 
loss in value on top of the loss in value that would occur if the tunnel interchange was abandoned 
for the walkway interchange.      
  This is therefore the intention of applying real options in construction where a payment can 
be valued and made to the appropriate project actors (e.g. the construction contractor) in order to 
activate a change in a project’s construction plans so that risks can be avoided and thus a 
significant amount of project value can be preserved.  The application of a binomial lattice in 
previous sections showed that the value of the option to abandon the tunnelled interchange was 
£0.178m and in paying this sum, the client could avoid a £12.5m loss in value in the asset being 
built (based on the above example values and assuming the walkway construction costs do not 
overrun).  The avoidance of a £12.5m loss in value can be related to the minimum £12m required to 
remediate the risks that would occur if the tunnelled interchange was constructed under risky and 
uncertain conditions.  This therefore shows that the SP responses in the survey were sensitive to the 
likelihood of “a risk costing at least £12m occurring” and so it can be inferred that the sample of 
respondents to the SP survey were risk averse.   
7.3.2.2  Benefit to the contractor 
The previous section discussed how abandonment could be of benefit to the client where the asset 
value of Farringdon ETH could be preserved under risky and uncertain conditions.  Section 6.3.3 of 
Chapter 6 noted that a construction contractor may oppose the abandonment of the construction of 
Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled interchange for a walkway interchange as this would be a 
reduction on the margin that is earned on constructing a more expensive station.  It was previously 
noted that the Farringdon ETH project was being developed under a target cost reimbursable 
contract where the target cost was set at £45m.  The contractors’ fee for constructing Farringdon 
ETH with a tunnelled interchange was set at £4.5m, or 10% of the target construction cost.  Under 
a proposed 50/50 incentive scheme defined under the target cost contract, any difference between 
the actual (out-turn) construction cost and the target construction cost of £45m is shared between 
the client and the contractor in accordance with the incentive mechanism.  For example, a cost 
                                                      
34 The £3m is greater than the acceptable increase in costs of £2.8224m defined in section 7.2 and therefore 
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saving of £3m on the construction cost would be split 50/50 with the client and therefore the 
contractor would receive £1.5m. 
  Under the above incentive scheme and fee, if a contractor delivered Farringdon ETH with a 
tunnelled interchange for an actual construction cost of £45m then the total payment made to him 
would be (£45m + £4.5m) = £49.5m and his margin as a percentage of actual construction costs 
would be (£4.5/£45) = 10%. (These calculations are based on the target cost contract definition 
given by Smith (2008)).   
If the contractor delivered the project for an actual construction cost of £43m then the total 
payment made to him would be lower at (£43m + £4.5m + £2m/2) = £48.5m.  However,  his 
margin as a percentage of actual construction cost would be ((£4.5m + £2m/2)/£43m) = 12.79% 
since the project is delivered £2m cheaper than the target cost of £45m and so under the 50/50 
incentive agreement, the contractor is entitled to 50% of the positive difference of £2m.   
Conversely, if the project was delivered for £48m then the total payment made to the 
contractor would be (£48m + £4.5m - £3m/2) = £51m with the margin as a percentage of actual 
construction cost in this case being ((£4.5m - £3m/2)/£48m) = 6.25%.  Therefore, if actual 
construction costs exceed the target construction cost the contractor is partially protected by the 
incentive mechanism where the client has to accept responsibility for half of the cost increases.   
Figure 7.17 illustrates the change in margin for the contractor as a percentage of actual 
construction costs of Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled interchange based on a target cost 
reimbursable contract.       
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Figure 7.17 Contractors’ margin as a percentage of actual cost of Farringdon ETH with tunnel 
interchange 
 
The clients’ action of abandoning the tunnelled interchange for the walkway interchange is 
in effect a change in specification and thus a variation in the work that is required of the contractor 
(Murdoch and Hughes, 2008).  Variation clauses placed in contracts enable clients to refine designs 
as a contract progresses and this may include any alteration; modification to the design; and 
omissions.  (The definition of variations appear under clause 51 of ICE 7 (ICE, 1999)).  Chapter 7  
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Abandoning the tunnelled interchange therefore omits work that was included at the tender stage by 
the contractor.  As specified, Farringdon ETH with a walkway interchange is £7m cheaper 
compared to the tunnelled interchange which represents a reduction in work to the contractor.  The 
impact that omitting the tunnel interchange for the walkway interchange has on the contractors’ 
margin as a percentage of actual construction costs must therefore be considered.  This is crucial 
since it would be undesirable for the contractor to seek abandonment in order to realise an 
improved margin as a percentage of actual construction costs if the tunnelled interchange was 
overrunning slightly on construction costs, but not enough to trigger abandonment.  Conversely it 
would be undesirable for the contractor to suffer a significant loss in margin as a percentage of 
actual construction cost if the tunnelled interchange was abandoned for the walkway interchange 
since this could draw resistance from the contractor.      
If the clients’ acceptable increase in costs (£2.823m) is added to the target cost of 
Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled interchange (£45m) then this can represent the actual out-turn 
cost at which the client would decide to abandon the tunnelled interchange for the walkway 
interchange (i.e. (£2.823m + £45m)) = £47.823m.  The contractors’ margin based on this actual 
cost is ((£4.5m - £2.823m/2)/£47.823m) = 6.45%.  In effect, this is the lowest margin as a 
percentage of actual cost that the contractor can realise for constructing Farringdon ETH with a 
tunnelled walkway before the client can choose to exercise the option to abandon.   
If an increase in costs of £2.823m occurs in the run up to constructing the tunnel 
interchange then this increase will reduce the value of the asset to the lowest acceptable asset value 
(X = £42.177m) to the client.  While the client will decide to abandon the construction of the 
tunnelled interchange due to these cost increases (and any further potential increases due the 
occurrence of risks), the contractors’ margin as a percentage of actual cost will also change.  This 
change in margin as a percentage of actual cost is based on a new target cost of £38m for 
Farringdon ETH with a walkway interchange.  In changing the target cost, the percentage fee paid 
to the contractor will also change to £3.8m based on 10% of the target cost.  However, the 
increases in costs and the contractors’ obligations from the target cost contract set up to build 
Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled interchange must also be accounted for.   
In effect, the calculation for the contractors’ margin as a percentage of actual costs for 
Farringdon ETH with a walkway interchange must account for the cost increases that occurred to 
make the client decide to abandon the tunnelled interchange.  This margin would also include the 
payment of £0.178m received by the contractor from the client as the payment for the right to 
abandon.  The £0.178m in this case compensates the contractor for any transaction costs and costs 
associated with making administrative changes in order to build the walkway.  Therefore, assuming 
that the cost increases for Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled interchange total £2.823m which result 
in the client deciding to abandon for the walkway interchange, the contractors’ margin as a 
percentage of actual costs for Farringdon ETH with a walkway interchange is [(£3.8m – 
(£2.823m/2) + £0.178m)/(£38m + £2.823m)] = 6.29%.  This effectively represents the margin as a Chapter 7  
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percentage of actual costs that the contractor can receive for Farringdon ETH with a walkway 
interchange (providing further savings are not made on the £38m cost).   
Should the cost increases that trigger the abandonment be greater than £2.823m, then the 
margin as a percentage of actual costs for Farringdon ETH with a walkway interchange will 
decrease.  For instance, if cost increases of £4m occur prior to the excavation of the tunnelled 
interchange, then the client will abandon for the walkway interchange with the contractors’ margin 
as a percentage of actual costs being [(£3.8m – (£4m/2) + £0.178m)/(£38m + £4m)] = 4.71%.   
It has therefore been shown that the abandonment of the tunnel interchange for the 
walkway interchange impacts on the margin as a percentage of actual cost to the contractor.  In 
assuming that a cost increase of £2.823m occurs while constructing Farringdon ETH with a 
tunnelled interchange and that the client decides to abandon for the walkway interchange based on 
this cost increase, the minimum loss in margin as a percentage of actual cost that a contractor 
realises by abandonment under this condition is (6.45% - 6.29%) = 0.16%.     
This loss in margin can be weighed against the loss that the contractor would have to bear 
should the construction of Farringdon ETH continue with a tunnelled interchange and the 
subsequent occurrence of risks that result in large cost increases (i.e. at least £12m as detailed 
earlier).  However, incentive conditions can be imposed by the client should abandonment occur 
that would reward the contractor for constructing Farringdon ETH with a walkway interchange to 
the £38m target cost (while accounting for the cost increases that resulted in abandonment 
separately).  The intention of such an incentive would be to lift the margin as a percentage of actual 
costs realised by the contractor for constructing Farringdon ETH with a walkway but also to ensure 
that the contractor took no chances in trying to recover losses while completing Farringdon ETH 
with a walkway interchange.  In effect, the contractor is rewarded for delivering the asset to the 
£38m (excluding the cost increases) rather than by rewards drawn from any savings that could be 
realised according to the target cost contract based around £38m.    
7.3.2.3  Consideration of reality 
If a client has the option to abandon when conditions deteriorate and costs increase, possessing 
such an abandonment strategy may be valuable.  A major assumption made is that not only does the 
client have the flexibility to execute the option but also has the willingness to follow through with 
the abandonment strategy when the appropriate time comes.  A question therefore remains that 
when faced with an abandonment decision, even when it is clearly optimal to abandon a particular 
project, whether a client would still be inclined to keep the original project alive in the hopes that 
conditions would revert and opportunities would evolve to make the project a reasonable success.  
In this case, the clients’ psychology and project attachment come into play.  For example, if the 
successful execution of a project is tied to a wider political or economic drive; reputation; and/or 
strive for merit and achievement; then abandoning a project may be hard to do even when it is the 
optimal decision.   Chapter 7  
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  In addition, the contractor may oppose abandonment for reasons including material and 
labour procurement which may create further expense.  Third parties (such as sub-contractors) tied 
to the client or contractor may also have an impact on whether abandonment takes place. 
 
 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter continued from Chapter 6 and used a Stated Preference survey to calculate the lowest 
acceptable asset value (X) for the tunnelled interchange at Farringdon ETH.  The value obtained 
from the survey was a representation of the decrease in value that could occur while constructing 
Farringdon ETH with a tunnelled interchange before the client would see greater value in 
constructing the walkway interchange. 
  The lowest acceptable asset value (X) was subsequently used in a binomial lattice model 
which calculated the value of the option to abandon the tunnelled interchange for the walkway 
interchange.  The option to abandon was a strategy to avoid the risks and uncertainties that could 
occur at Farringdon ETH.  The option value derived from the binomial lattice model represented 
the payment to be made by the client for the right to abandon where the payment would be paid to 
the contractor. In making the payment, the client could change from the tunnelled interchange to 
the walkway interchange if he wished to do so in order to preserve value under risky and uncertain 
construction conditions.  Later sections considered the outputs of the binomial lattice and how the 
abandonment could benefit the client and contractor circumstances where cost increases had 
occurred.   Chapter 8  
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8 Conclusions and Further Work 
8.1 Overview 
The Department for Transport (DfT) (2004, 2007) acknowledged that the rail industry must get its 
costs under control and operate within available budgets in order for efficiency gains to be made as 
well as value for money to be realised from a increased level of investment.  This could be 
achieved through improved management of projects and thus the avoidance of cost overruns. 
Chapter 2 considered the effects of project actors; certain contractual relationships and the 
allocation of risk; and the impact of optimism on estimates of time and cost on the success of a 
project.  Chapter 3 sought to develop and apply a requirements process that could be used by 
project designers and associated 3
rd party interfaces to refine and define the scope, requirements 
and specifications associated with a project.  Subsequently, this was expanded in Chapter 4 to 
enable actors to link all risks associated with a project (or aspects of a project) so that designs could 
account for the effects of inter-related risks.  A further element was added to the assessment of 
risks in Chapter 5 where a fuzzy logic process was used to evaluate the global and elemental risks 
associated with a project.  This was seen as an innovative way of assessing risks that were difficult 
to qualify and quantify in traditional risk registers.  These processes were considered capable of 
closing the ‘gap’ between the clients objectives and the outputs of project actors by increasing 
communication of information relating to project scope, specifications, requirements and risks.  
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 thus completed the proactive approach to avoiding cost overruns outlined in 
this thesis. 
  Finally, Chapters 6 and 7 outlined a process whereby real options theory could be used to 
value the right to abandon an aspect of a design for an alternative during construction.  A case 
study was presented where a risk occurrence would necessitate a client to absorb the overrun that 
would result from the risk or abandon the design and avoid the risk altogether.  The decision to 
abandon was determined by how much cost increases a client could accept during the construction 
of his chosen design for an underground station before being willing to abandon for a less valuable 
but less risky pre-designed alternative for the same station.  This was in effect the reactive 
approach to cost overruns presented in this work.  Figure 8.1 lists the key outputs from each 
chapter and section 8.2 goes on to outline the conclusions.    
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Figure 8.1 Key outputs 
Key Outputs of the Work  Objectives from section 1.2 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 focused on the development 
of a requirements management process 
 
-  Capturing, reviewing, analysing, 
validating and baselining requirements 
is crucial to the success of a project 
where the failure to do so can result in 
the need for changes at a time when 
making alterations leads to an increase 
in costs.  Processes were outlined to 
allow the above to be executed by 
practitioners. 
-  The process documented allows 
requirement management to be 
achieved on a large metro megaproject 
where actors could interact to refine 
requirements and specifications during 
the design stages, before the start of 
construction activities. 
Chapter 4 considered the 
relationships between risks 
 
-  The identification, recording and 
communicating of networks of 
interrelated risks could contribute 
to the success of a project.  A 
process was outlined that would 
allow practitioners to record, link 
and communicate all risks 
identified on a project. 
-  In recognising networks of risks, 
decisions can be made with 
regards to designs so that such 
networks could be avoided and 
thus the impacts of a chain of risk 
occurrences.  The process 
outlined enabled practitioners to 
consider this.  
Chapter 5 evaluated global and elemental 
risks using a fuzzy logic process 
 
-  A fuzzy logic process was found to be the 
most effective way of evaluating global and 
elemental risks by using subjective 
judgements of experts.  The results were 
presented in numeric and linguistic terms and 
this could be used by practitioners as a form 
of risk management and decision making. 
-  The results of the evaluation process 
proposed could be used to inform of the 
status of threats posed by global and 
elemental risks.  Should these threats not 
diminish as the project progressed, then 
management attention could be directed 
towards their resolution or towards steering 
the project in a direction which would 
minimise the projects’ exposure to them.  
Chapters 6 & 7 considered the used of real options to mitigate risks 
 
-  It was shown that real options could be used to value the right to mitigate a risk before it occurs. 
-  The introduction of flexibility in designs allowed clients to make pre-defined changes before risks occur, thus preserving value since large cost increases would not 
result due to the need for remediation of damage caused by risk occurrences. 
-  The value of the right to mitigate a risk represented by a real option was a form of risk contingency.  Its payment between two actors enabled a pre-agreed decision to be 
made to change the construction process of a project in order to mitigate a risk.  This was a different type of risk contingency compared to a contingency fund used for 
remediation after the occurrence of a risk event.
1. To understand how cost overruns 
occur in a metro development and 
identify the major cost overrun causing 
factors and issues. 
2. To develop, apply and validate elements 
of management practice in the areas of 
project requirements management and 
project risk management which can be used 
to avoid cost overruns.
3. To develop and apply a process that can be 
used to mitigate risks through the 
introduction of flexibility in a design and 
thus to provide an opportunity to avoid cost 
overruns.
4. Derive the value of this flexibility 
and outline ways that this can be 
accounted for in risk contingencies. 
Chapter 2 sought to understand how cost overruns occur and the major factors that cause them 
-  Many of the technical failures that cause cost overruns have their roots in underlying project management failures. 
-  Management failures are often the result of human behaviour and the self interest of actors. 
-  A ‘gap’ can occur between clients’ objectives and what actors deliver and this gap can result in management failures unless it is closed. 
-  The number of interfaces on metro megaprojects means that management processes must be robust where communication, scope and 
risk management must be addressed continuously between all actors in order for success to be achieved. 
  Key 
  Links between Thesis Chapters 
 
  Links between Objectives and Chapters  
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8.2 Conclusions 
OBJECTIVE 1 
The first objective of this thesis was “to understand how cost overruns occur in a metro 
development and identify the major cost overrun causing factors and issues”.  Chapter 2 sought to 
address this objective and the findings are discussed below. 
•  Finding 
The causes of cost overruns in metro projects are often technical failures that commonly 
result in collapses during tunnelling activities or underground construction.  However, 
many of these technical failures have their roots in underlying project management failures 
which are the result of interface problems between actors on a project; the behaviour of an 
individual or group of actors; uninformed or inappropriate decision making and accounting 
for risks; poor communication of scope, specifications, requirements and risks; inaccurate 
estimating of cost and time; or combinations of the aforementioned. 
Significance 
The above issues are not technical in nature but are major contributors to the occurrence of 
cost overruns.  They relate to human behaviour where the tendencies of actors to act in 
self-interest should be closed out through robust management procedures that make the 
success of the project a top priority.  In taking such a management approach to resolve 
many of the above mentioned issues, management failures could be avoided which would 
subsequently reduce the chances of technical failures occurring to a level where only those 
technical failures that relate to genuine underground uncertainties occur.  While the control 
of all geotechnical or geological risks and uncertainties may be beyond engineers and 
managers, the control of a project’s management is not and thus efforts can be made to 
ensure that projects are managed to success with all actors buying-in to this. 
 
•  Finding 
Management failures in metro megaprojects can be traced to how the project is delivered.  
As a result and given the size of such projects, clients can lose control of the design and 
construction phases which in effect creates a ‘gap’ between the clients’ objectives; the 
design process run by the designer; the construction run by the contractor; and for many 
modern projects, the overall management of the project run by the executive project 
manager/delivery partner.  This ‘gap’ unnecessarily introduces problems with scoping and 
risks.  Furthermore, this ‘gap’ allows actors associated with a project to act in their own 
interest and thus place the projects’ success in the balance.  Such issues are only natural if 
the procurement structure is geared towards and based upon price rather than quality, 
effectiveness and safety. Chapter 8  
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A key aspect of this ‘gap’ is communication.  Many project actors only disclose 
information that is essential and thus do not portray ‘the full picture’ to other actors and 
interfaces that provide a similar service, mainly due to commercial interests and 
competition.  This is inappropriate in metro construction where the number of interfaces 
can be large and thus the disclosure of any type of information is crucial.  This also relates 
to the clarity of communication where poorly conveyed ideas, facts and details often 
contribute to management failures.  
Significance 
The management and retention of knowledge on metro megaprojects is a difficult matter 
since the planning, design and construction phases are so large that many people will not 
remain in their roles for the duration of the project.  It can therefore be suggested that 
metro megaprojects should be completed by single service providers within planning, 
design and construction disciplines.  However, as is currently seen on Crossrail, such 
projects are so large they require the inputs of a large number of service providers in order 
to make the project work since no single company (i.e. consultancies, contractors) in the 
United Kingdom could match the human resource demands of Crossrail on their own.  
Since no single service provider can provide a complete service within any discipline, this 
introduces the numerous interfaces and hence the need for robust management procedures 
for developing metro projects whatever the procurement structure (e.g. D&B) or service 
arrangements (e.g. JV).  Without such robust practices, ‘gaps’ can occur between the 
outputs of actors and hence the issues that cause cost overruns to occur can materialise. 
 
•  Finding 
Contracts provide opportunities for actors to foresee problems and to draft contractual 
provisions to take care of, or at least diminish, any problems and conflicts on a project if 
and when they occur.  The NEC3 group of contracts was identified as a typical foundation 
for the many good management practices that can result in successful projects.  However, 
such contracts continue to rely upon reasonable estimates being made for cost and time and 
thus the impacts of optimism in estimates is a significant issue that can result in cost 
overruns.  A reason for optimism is the lack of accounting for risks and their impacts, in 
terms of physical and commercial risks relating to the project and in terms of uncertainty 
relating to the poor definition and communication of project objectives, scope, 
requirements and specifications.   
Significance 
The existence of these risks and uncertainties during a project impacts on the behaviour of 
actors and thus creates the ‘gap’ between what is desired in the project and what is 
delivered by various actors.  Attempts to close this ‘gap’ often result in management 
failures where any project issues that are not closed out appropriately result in cost Chapter 8  
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overruns.  Hence it was this ‘gap’ between a client and project actors that resulted in the 
remaining objectives being defined (all objectives are listed in section 1.2).   
 
OBJECTIVE 2 
The second objective of this thesis was to “develop, apply and validate elements of management 
practice in the areas of project requirements management and project risk management which can 
be used to avoid cost overruns”.  Chapters 3, 4 and 5 sought to address this objective and the 
findings are listed below.   
Chapter 3 focused on the development, application and validation of a requirements 
management process.  This process could document the desired requirements of all actors 
associated with a project and thus close the ‘gap’ that can occur due to the need for changes in a 
project.  This process used Crossrail as a case study. 
•  Finding/Contribution 
Five sub-processes were outlined as the core activities of the requirements process; 
requirements capture; review; analysis; validation; and baselining.  These sub-processes 
were operationalised using the DOORS software which allowed a dynamic PC computer 
based interface between all actors that had an interest in the definition and subsequent use 
of requirements.   
Significance 
The use of DOORS to manage the five sub-processes in this context provided a 
development and a step forward from spreadsheet based requirements management which 
was identified to be slow and cumbersome, the use of which could result in the lack of 
identification of requirements and thus issues which ultimately result in management 
failures.   
 
•  Finding/Contribution 
The capture of requirements is a critical aspect of requirements management.  Identifying 
what is needed; what each stakeholder seeks from the project (whether it be the width of a 
river channel underneath a new bridge of the service intervals of trains); the 
requirements/specifications that must be considered and/or adhered to in design; and 
whether the project objectives correspond to what a wider group of stakeholders want can 
be realised during the capturing activities.   
Significance 
The capture process is a structured method of elicitating these requirements from 
stakeholders and communicating them to the wider project.  In the period that this was 
applied to Crossrail, it was realised that such efforts could reduce lead-in periods for design 
as well as providing robust specifications which reduced the costs associated with design Chapter 8  
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and re-design.  This was therefore a development to requirements management practice in 
its application to metro projects. 
 
•  Finding 
The review and analysis activities facilitated by DOORS provided an interface that allowed 
actors to communicate their views with regards to the captured requirements.   
Significance 
In doing this, the requirements process contributed to the refining of the requirements so 
that the associated specifications were agreed by all actors prior to their confirmation as 
official design requirements.  This reduces the need for changes in scope and specifications 
once project commitments have been made and thus reduces a significant cause of cost 
overruns in projects.  The reduction in the need for changes realised during the process’ 
application in the case study confirmed that the requirements management process worked. 
 
•  Finding 
The validation and baselining elements added two key capabilities to the requirements 
process.  Firstly, validation allowed project deliverables (e.g. designs) which used the 
requirements to be traced through verification and thus allowed hierarchies of requirements 
to be linked in order to provide satisfaction to relevant stakeholders that their needs had 
been addressed.  Baselining was a second capability that enabled a set of agreed 
requirements to be taken forward throughout a design process.   
Significance 
Providing validation by this method was a significant benefit of using the developed 
requirements management process in conjunction with DOORS because a spreadsheet 
based process would be adversely time consuming and may even be avoided by certain 
actors.  The benefit of baselining was that the communication between actors was 
improved to reduce the instances where a lack of clarity, differences of interpretation and 
inconsistencies due to a lack of traceability could be avoided.  These capabilities both 
avoided the introduction of practices which could result in management failures. 
 
•  Finding 
A drawback of the requirements process is that it could be seen as a waste of valuable 
resources by some practitioners.  While it is accepted that an increased level of input is 
required from all actors associated with a project, both in terms of time commitments and 
effort to attend requirements workshops and interface meetings, the benefits of doing so 
outweigh the consequences of not doing so.  In this sense, efforts to reduce the ‘gap’ that 
can occur between a client’s objectives and the various project actors through Chapter 8  
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identification, refinement and confirmation of what the client and relevant stakeholders 
want is a considerable step towards avoiding management failures and thus cost overruns.  
The requirements process documented can achieve this.  Another drawback of the 
requirements process documented is the current market price of the software licenses 
required to operate DOORS.  However, such costs will decrease over time and this will 
encourage company directors to invest in technology that would improve the delivery of 
their projects. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 focused on the development, application and validation of the risk management 
processes.  Chapter 4 focused on the identification, recording and communicating of inter-related 
risks that formed networks of dependent risks.   
•  Finding/Contribution 
This work recognised that the identification of risks was a critical part of the planning and 
design stages of a project, the lack of which being a major contributor to failures in that the 
application of any risk management processes was unable to pick up on risks that remain 
unidentified.  The key learning from the consideration of risk identification was that failed 
projects using traditional risk registers ignored the most significant aspect of risks – that 
they could be related to each other.   
Significance 
The risk network developed reflected the systemicity of risks; highlighted relationships 
between risks within different categories of risk; and was a practical tool that used the 
DOORS software as an interface that encouraged those evaluating risks to give 
consideration to the impacts on projects if a group of interrelated risks occurred.  In using 
DOORS to operationalise the recording of risk networks, this work thus provided the 
multi-disciplinary practitioner with a forum through which risks could be recorded and 
linked quickly.  In doing so, this enriched the information that would be fed into risk 
management processes, value management considerations and project decision making; 
and thus reduced the likelihood of failures due to risks. 
 
•  Finding 
The identification of risk networks can be seen as an incentive for further research by 
practitioners into risks; their causes; and particularly for the investigation of the systemic 
risks that can cause cost overruns.  In using the DOORS software to present a risk network, 
project decisions could be made with regards to the group of risks rather than individual 
risks.   
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Significance 
The rationale here was that the occurrence of a risk in a network could increase the 
likelihood or trigger the occurrence of other risks, hence the possibility of synergy in terms 
of risk impacts.  The process documented helps avoid this issue and has an application 
throughout the project phases.  It has a particular influence on value engineering activities 
where decisions seeking optimum value can be influenced by the relative risk exposure to 
networks of risks rather than individual risks.   
 
•  Finding 
The risk network provided a forum for organisational learning and knowledge 
management.   
Significance 
The human resource element of metro megaprojects is dynamic and therefore a traceable 
record of risks which can be accessed by all practitioners can only improve the chances of 
a project being a success.  While it can be appreciated that the process of documenting risk 
networks is non-trivial, the benefits (in terms of project success) realised through the effort 
of producing a risk network outweighs the resources required to build it and thus validates 
its use.  The risk network also facilitates organisational learning where records can be kept 
for future needs on how risks were dealt with.   
 
•  Finding 
A downside of the risk network is that some risks that may have significant impact on a 
project may be sensitive to certain parties.  In this case the risks may not be recorded and 
thus the quality and usefulness of the risk network is reduced due to the absence of 
potentially critical risks. 
 
Chapter 5 used a fuzzy logic process that could evaluate the impacts of external risks (referred to as 
global and elemental risks) on a project.  This chapter thus closed the ‘gap’ that could occur due to 
the lack of identifying and accounting for risk; and its subsequent communication.  
•  Finding 
The fuzzy process described could not be generic as it required research into the intricacies 
of the particular project under consideration.  This involved assessing which global and 
elemental risks were relevant to the Crossrail project.  By considering previous projects 
and their histories, the expertise, knowledge and wisdom gained could be drawn from 
practitioners and subsequently structured to produce a list of global and elemental risks for 
evaluation.  This was achieved in this work efficiently using personnel working on 
Crossrail.   Chapter 8  
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Significance 
Such a methodology may lack statistical robustness but this issue is countered by the 
practicality of determining the relevant risks in this way which encourages interest and 
participation from practitioners.  Participation in such activities is a barrier to its successful 
application and therefore anything that encourages it should be adopted. 
 
•  Finding/Contribution 
The aim of the fuzzy process was to evaluate global and elemental risks associated with 
Crossrail.  This was achieved by developing and distributing questionnaires to expert 
respondents working on Crossrail and then analysing their responses.  As noted earlier, 30 
full questionnaire responses were obtained from the first pass.  The questionnaire was 
distributed at a point in the Crossrail design where many major issues and risks remained 
to be addressed.   
Significance 
The application of a questionnaire was seen to provide developments to risk evaluation; 
firstly due to the sample of respondents not having evaluated risks by this medium 
previously and secondly because of the requirement to consider risks which were not 
traditionally part of a typical engineering risk analysis.  This only served to show the 
benefits of such a risk assessment and validated its use since risks not having been 
considered previously but known to have impacts on the success of projects were being 
evaluated. 
 
•  Finding 
The questionnaire used for evaluation was structured so that it could be used by 
practitioners without the need for a facilitator (although the author was available for the 
application in this work).   
Significance 
This was important since a view was taken that this evaluation could be applied at various 
points during a projects’ planning and design stages and would have to be used by 
practitioners seeking to evaluate risks in the course of their work.  An ideal scenario would 
be the application of the evaluation at fixed points in the project lifecycle, from project 
conception to the end of construction.  This would ultimately give a view on how the 
threats of various global and elemental risks change over time.   These applications would 
be critical because many of the project characteristics change as a project unfolds.  For 
example, the securing of finance for a project is a critical issue with associated risks during 
the early phases of a project’s lifecycle whereas human and material resourcing becomes a 
bigger issue later in the project in the run-up to and during construction.   Chapter 8  
Conclusions and Further Work 
  224
•  Finding 
The lack of application across the Crossrail lifecycle was a weakness of the fuzzy risk 
evaluation process documented although this was impractical as the Crossrail lifecycle far 
exceeded the period available for this study.  An associated strength of the work was 
however that it evaluated risks that would not otherwise be considered.  This alone was a 
step towards avoiding management failures and thus cost overruns on projects. 
 
•  Finding 
The evaluation process raised a number of issues; 
o  The need for a small sample of respondents.  A group of 5 experts gave a crisp set 
of outputs which could effectively provide the level of risk evaluation required.  
This was done for the second pass of the questionnaire survey.  A large sample of 
responses only served to dampen the quantitative evaluation through averaging and 
thus a potential loss in some of the detail in the results obtained.  A small sample 
should therefore be considered for any future applications. 
o  The use of workshops rather than the distribution of a survey to a wider sample of 
respondents would ensure that results were received from specifically targeted 
experts.  This would improve the results of the evaluation since the results would 
be derived from targeted knowledge.  Furthermore, workshops could be scheduled, 
thus providing a desirable periodical evaluation of the global and elemental risks. 
o  A risk filter should be employed to remove any risks which may have become 
irrelevant as a project moves through its phases.  The removal of certain risks 
would thus improve the output.  Leaving risks in the assessment for its duration 
only to be given ‘token’ or ‘null’ evaluation since they had no relevance would not 
be representative and would thus impact the overall output of the evaluation (This 
point is only relevant if the evaluation is applied over an extended period across 
many elements of a projects’ lifecycle).  
 
OBJECTIVES 3 & 4 
Chapters 6 and 7 sought to address the third and fourth objectives of this thesis which were closely 
related.  The third objective was “to develop and apply a process that could be used to mitigate 
risks through the introduction of flexibility in a design and thus to provide an opportunity to avoid 
cost overruns” and the fourth objective was to “derive the value of this flexibility and outline ways 
that this can be accounted for in risk contingencies”. 
This element of the work sought to close the ‘gap’ that ultimately opens between project 
actors when risks and uncertainties occur.  The process outlined was therefore reactive in nature 
where decisions that could be made to salvage value for a client when risks occur were planned Chapter 8  
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prior to construction and thus required actors to agree on a course of action prior to the potential 
occurrence of risk events.  Chapter 6 applied a process to identify the flexibility available in a 
design which could be used to mitigate risks during the construction phase of a metro project.  
Valuing this flexibility could be achieved using real options theory and Chapter 6 outlined this 
application with Chapter 7 deriving a value for the flexibility which could in turn take the form of a 
risk contingency. 
   
•  Finding 
Given the size of metro megaprojects; the number of interfaces; the intricacies of 
constructing under built up areas; and the number of actors involved in the development 
such projects; remediating damage caused by risks when they occur can not only be 
expensive but difficult given the potential for disagreements between actors.  In addition, 
by providing only one design solution to a project that has numerous uncertainties (which 
underground construction is), then cost overruns can spiral out of control when risks occur.   
This work identified that the provision of a number of designs could provide a satisfactory 
solution in that under certain circumstances, a selected design could be swapped for 
another design with different features in order to avoid a cost overrun.   
Significance  
The inclusion of flexibility in designs added value to project procurement by means of 
providing alternative designs that could be followed should circumstances unfold on a 
project where their inclusion would present best value to the client.  Crossrail Farringdon 
East Ticket Hall (ETH) station was used as a case study and a core design was chosen for 
this project with an alternative design also being developed which could be installed should 
the chosen design threaten to overrun on costs. 
 
•  Finding/Contribution 
An Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) was developed to evaluate six designs for 
Farringdon ETH.  Respondents successfully used the AHP to choose a design to proceed 
with and a second alternative design which could replace the chosen design if necessary.  
This in effect resulted in the identification of the flexibility that could be placed in the 
design for Farringdon ETH and thus the pre-defined changes that could be used to mitigate 
risks.   
Significance  
The use of an AHP on an active project resulted in the successful consideration and 
evaluation of the flexibility available and was a novel approach within the context it was 
applied.  
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•  Finding/Contribution 
The research used real options theory to value the flexibility desired ‘in’ projects.  It was 
identified that little work has been done for real options ‘in’ projects compared to the 
application of real options ‘on’ projects and thus this work was a contribution in that sense.   
Key difficulties facing the use of real options in projects were; 
o  The establishment of a robust volatility value.  Volatility had a critical impact on 
the option value and the absence of any reliable data that could be used for its 
valuation naturally reduced the confidence that could be placed in any real option 
values based on it. 
o  The establishment of a representative risk-free discount rate for modelling.  While 
having less of an impact than volatility, it had a critical role in the confidence that 
could be placed in option values. 
o  The application of real options in projects requires the use of binomial lattices.  
Despite being modelled as American options (which can be executed at any point 
in time), real options in projects can only be executed at specific points in time 
which are dependent upon certain points in the project’s construction programme.  
While not necessarily being a weakness, this however means that in the event of a 
risk occurrence being likely, the decision to mitigate the impacts of the risk can be 
made at any point in time but the physical action of making a change can only 
happen at a suitable point in time in the construction programme.  In this case, the 
opportunity to mitigate a risk could be missed thus resulting in the risk occurrence 
and subsequently nullifying the objective of having an option to mitigate the risk. 
 
•  Finding/Contribution 
This work managed to overcome the above difficulties to develop a process and 
subsequently show that real options could be used to value the flexibility available to 
mitigate risks in real projects.  The process allowed the decisions associated with risk 
mitigation to be made at or near the points where physical changes could be made to the 
project under construction and hence its suitability for application in the context of this 
work.  The opportunity to switch between the chosen design for Farringdon ETH to an 
alternative design was presented to Crossrail as a client.  This was achieved by developing 
a Stated Preference (SP) survey which sought to establish the clients’ tolerances to 
changes in cost, risk and value variables in the chosen design before making the choice to 
change to the alternative design.  The establishment of this tolerance formed the basis for 
the application of a decision process based on real options theory that could value the 
flexibility facilitated by the option to switch between designs. 
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Significance 
This was a novel application of the SP method of establishing human tendencies and 
acceptance, particularly as the survey was set up as a boundary value survey in order to 
determine the maximum acceptable increase in cost for the chosen design before 
respondents would make a choice to abandon their preferred option for an option they 
perceived to give better value.   
A number of expert researchers and practitioners using SP surveys in the transport 
sector question the validity of the boundary value survey method and the derivation of 
values for variables from this as the methodology is considered to produce biased results.  
A detailed appraisal of boundary-value methodologies was beyond the scope of this work.  
The merits of such an appraisal may however explain the decisions which were made by 
respondents in the SP survey and thus the bias in the results which suggested that 
respondents preferred the tunnel interchange included in the chosen design over the less 
risky walkway interchange included in the alternative design.  A separate reason for the 
tunnel interchange being more dominant may be that of inertia where most respondents to 
the SP survey believed that the tunnelled interchange was the option being delivered.         
 
•  Finding 
The results of the SP survey should therefore be considered for what they represent in the 
context within which the survey was applied.  While the application is robust, whether a 
client would abandon their chosen design at any point for any reason should be viewed 
from the perspective of reality.   
Significance/Contribution 
It is easy for individuals to respond to a survey about what they would do in a hypothetical 
situation but in reality, abandoning their chosen design may not be an acceptable approach 
since the value that they would perceive to lose in abandoning may not be intrinsically 
related to the value that they would lose in accepting a cost overrun.  If abandonment does 
not take place then a real option has no value since the client does not choose to mitigate 
the risks by abandoning but accepts the consequences.  The reality is that abandonment in 
construction is a rarity and thus while the SP survey delivered plausible results that 
suggested the point at which abandonment would occur, the feasibility of such an 
approach in reality may be non-existent since clients would not want to abandon an 
objective that could jeopardise their credibility. 
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•  Finding/Contribution 
It was determined in Chapter 6 that a binomial lattice provided the most appropriate 
graphical representation of the decision process to abandon where a put option placed at 
each node of the lattice presented a maximisation between the choice to abandon or 
continue with the chosen design.  Chapter 7 sought to apply the binomial lattice to the case 
study and this ultimately gave a value to the real option to abandon (£0.178m).  This was 
the price to be paid by the client to the contractor for the right to abandon the chosen 
design for the alternative.  The real option value was the result of the development and 
application of the real options process to derive a value for the flexibility that could 
mitigate the risk described in the case study. 
Significance 
The confidence that can be placed in this value is low based on the respective confidence 
that could be placed in the volatility, interest-rate and maximum acceptable cost increase 
parameters that were used to determine it.  It is however a value that suggests that the 
process can work and thus further improvements to the robustness of the inputs could 
make it feasible.  It is the concept that this option value represents that is the contribution 
of this work.  The value is the cost of the right to avoid a significant risk if this risk is 
deemed likely to occur.  In this sense, the payment of the option value represents greater 
value since it is significantly less than the cost of remediating the risk after it has occurred 
using a risk contingency fund.  The option value is in effect a low-cost contingency fund 
that allows a risk to be avoided by enabling an alternative construction strategy to be 
employed rather than holding a large contingency fund that may be under or over 
estimated due to the effects of optimism bias and reference forecasting techniques.  The 
option value can be accounted for within a project’s risk contingency sum or as a separate 
payment to be made between parties.  In effect, the value of the flexibility that is 
represented by the option value can be removed from a wider contingency fund or 
allocated as an additional sum to the risk contingency fund set for a project. 
 
•  Finding 
A difference between the option value and the standard contingency fund is that a 
contingency fund would be wholly held by an actor for use in the event of a risk 
occurrence.  The option however necessitates a contract between actors as it involves a 
payment at the start of the construction phase in order to obtain the right to change the 
paid and agreed work that another actor is doing.   
Significance 
This highlights the difference between these two types of contingencies where the option 
is pre-emptive and the standard contingency is not.  A pre-emptive approach necessitates a Chapter 8  
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contract which would allow the option to be executed as a form of risk contingency.  
However, no contract with such a specific purpose exists for real options application and 
thus this is a further barrier to the application of this process in reality. 
 
•  Finding 
The above points suggest that the mitigation of risks using real options as suggested in this 
work is currently of academic relevance only and not for practical application.  While the 
concept may be valid, several issues need to be resolved prior to any application in a real 
project.   
The issue of volatility and interest rate determination can be resolved (or at least 
improved upon) by using actual data relevant to real projects.  As previously suggested, 
volatility can be determined by a contractor using budgeted and actual construction cash-
flows from previous projects.  However, a further issue exists here in that a contractor may 
not disclose such information to a client and thus it can be suggested that the above 
process is best applied in PPP or BOOT arrangements (as examples) where such 
information can be shared between actors.  The interest rate can be realised by the 
arrangement used to finance the project and thus this information would be readily 
available on a real project. 
The establishment of a trigger value for abandonment could simply be set in reality 
whereby a client could specify an upper limit to cost increases.  This was discussed as too 
simplistic in the body of this work but in practice could be the most realistic approach.  
While confidence can be placed in the process of a SP survey, the data derived from it 
may not be representative of reality since the decision making of a client may not be the 
same in reality as what they state in a paper based survey.  To this extent, the whole 
application of real options in this context assumes that a client would be willing to make a 
decision and abandon.  Furthermore, if abandonment takes place, there is no guarantee that 
the alternative adopted would not overrun on costs other than the fact it mitigates the risks 
associated with the chosen design.   
A barrier to the realisation of such a process of risk mitigation in reality is the 
contractual relationship required to uphold a payment that represents the real option value.  
Until such an advance is made, the process documented will remain an academic subject 
without real application.  The above issues are subject to further work as outlined in the 
next section.    
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8.3 Further Work 
This work can be extended in many directions, some of more academic interest and some of more 
practical value.   
•  There is a certain need to expand the application of real options to mitigate risks.  This 
could be achieved on the Farringdon ETH case study where real options could be used to 
value the payments required to mitigate other major risks and uncertainties.  In doing so, a 
portfolio of payments could be obtained that would in effect represent a significant 
percentage of the risk contingency required for the project.  The result would be an 
efficient risk contingency where these payments would ensure that the project value is 
preserved for a client should the likelihood of major risk events indicate a potential for 
significant losses in value over and above that set by the normal risk contingencies. 
•  The legal and contractual conditions for abandoning would come under variations (see 
Murdoch and Hughes, 2008) although the framework for the application of the option to 
abandon needs to be considered with a focus on how the conditions that would trigger 
abandonment would be applied in a binding contract. 
•  Further consideration should be given to the £0.178m payment and whether this is realistic.  
Such consideration would involve further industry research to establish whether making 
such a payment would feasibly preserve value for a client or simply be a vehicle for further 
adversarial behaviour between actors when events occur that result in procurement 
difficulties.  This research would involve establishing and comparing the payment that 
clients would be willing to make for abandoning under set conditions with the payment that 
contractors would be willing to accept under the same conditions.  
•  Volatility was identified as a crucial driver of the option value realised.  Further work is 
suggested with regards to the modelling of the input variables which would subsequently 
refine the valuation of the option to abandon.  It would be possible to use a logarithmic 
present value returns approach (Mun, 2006b) to calculate volatility as this is often used to 
calculate the volatility on assets with cash flows (in this case, the construction outflows 
during previous projects could be used as the cash flows).  It achieves this by collapsing all 
future cash flows of the project into two present value sums; one for the first time period 
and one for the present time and then comparing these two values.  Such an application 
was not made in this work as the focus was on outlining the use of real options although 
future work should attempt to establish a volatility value in this way. 
•  The volatility values used can be manipulated to make a better representation of the option 
value where the volatility value is changed at the various time steps.  For example, if the 
risks associated with the period between years 2 and 3 is greater than between 5 and 6 then 
separate volatility values can be used to represent this.  In effect, an improved 
representation of the risks over the construction lifecycle of the project is made.  Chapter 8  
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•  Further work could optimise and expand the fuzzy methodology for assessing global risks.  
This could involve: 
o  Optimising the measurement functions used according to the sample of 
respondents.  Chapter 5, section 5.2.2 outlined method of achieving this.   
o  A development of the fuzzy process would be the capacity to include simple risk 
assessments made for categories of risk covered in standard project risk registers.  
This would allow a second risk magnitude score to be derived which could 
represent the risk magnitude for all risk types. 
•  A Bayesian network is a way of describing the relationships between causes and effects.  A 
feature of such a network is that it can model and reason about uncertainty.  Bayesian 
networks could be used to model the relationships between risks in the risk networks 
discussed in Chapter 4 which would result in the quantification of the risks.  This would 
ultimately add further information to support practitioners in their decision making.    Chapter 9  
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Glossary 
AHP (Analytical Hierarchy Process) 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a Multi Criteria decision making method that was originally 
developed by Prof. Thomas L. Saaty (see Saaty and Vargas, 2000).  It is a method to derive ratio 
scales from paired comparisons.  The input can be obtained from actual measurement or from 
subjective opinion such as satisfaction, feelings and preference.  The ratio scales are derived from 
the principal Eigen vectors and the consistency index is derived from the principal Eigen value.  
 
BOOT (Build Own Operate Transfer) 
A form of PFI in which a developer designs and builds a project and then operates the project as a 
business for a specified period of time (e.g. between 10 and 30 years) after which the project is 
transferred to the government (or another entity) at a previously agreed-upon (or then market) 
price. 
 
Brownian motion 
Brownian motion is a simple continuous stochastic process that is widely used in physics and 
finance for modelling random behaviour that evolves over time.  Examples of such behaviour are 
the fluctuations in an asset's price.  Norbert Wiener (1923) ultimately proved the existence of 
Brownian motion and made significant contributions to related mathematical theories, so Brownian 
motion is often called a Wiener process. 
 
DBFO (Design Build Finance Operate) 
With the DBFO approach, the responsibilities for designing, building, financing and operating a 
project are bundled together and transferred to private sector partners.  It is the most common form 
of PFI in which a private company is involved in the day-to-day running of the completed project.  
DBFO arrangements are commonly used for highway construction where the emphasis rests on the 
provision of an operating service rather than an asset over a typical 30-year contract.   
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test 
A test associated with regression models, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test provides a formal test for 
whether the predicted probabilities for a covariate match the observed probabilities. A large p-value 
indicates a good match.  A small p-value indicates a poor match. 
 
Mont Carlo Trials 
The Monte Carlo method provides approximate solutions to a variety of mathematical problems by 
performing statistical sampling experiments. The method applies to problems with no probabilistic 
content as well as to those with inherent probabilistic structure.  
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PFI (Private Finance Initiative) 
PFI was introduced by the Conservative government in 1992 as a way of generating new 
investment in public services without raising taxes.  When companies enter into a PFI agreement, 
they agree to build large-scale capital projects and lease them back to the public sector over a 
period of 30 years or more.  
 
PPP (Public Private Partnership) 
PPP is a form of PFI first used under the Labour government in the late 1990s.  PPPs are generally 
used to describe any collaboration between the public and private sector.  It is also used in a more 
narrow sense to describe a joint venture between a public body and a private company, where there 
is a shared financial risk - unlike PFI where projects are simply contracted out to the private sector.  
PPPs can also cover the management of services and small-scale projects, while PFI is normally 
just associated with big capital projects.  
 
Wiener process  
(See Brownian Motion) 
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APPENDIX A 
Appendix to Section 4.2 Value, Risk and Estimating 
 
1. Framing risk and uncertainty 
Risk and uncertainty are very different looking animals, but are of the same species.  Risk can be 
defined as an umbrella term, with two varieties: ‘opportunity’ which is a risk with positive effects 
and a ‘threat’, which is a risk with negative effects.  Indeed, the Guide to the Project Management 
Body of Knowledge (PMBoK) by the Project Management Institute (PMI) (2000) includes in its 
definition of the word ‘risk’ that it can exist as both upside and downside, or threats and 
opportunities.  These definitions embrace the welcome upside and the unwelcome downside effects 
of risk, yet as noted by Chapman and Ward (2003), there is still a tendency for practitioners to 
think of risk management in largely downside, threat management terms.  To counter this, 
contemporary practitioners use the term uncertainty in their discussions as the word ‘risk’ can 
simply imply the downside which may result in negative assessments being made.  In this case, 
Hillson (2002) discusses the difference between risk and uncertainty where uncertainty is defined 
as an overarching term with two varieties: ‘risk’ referring exclusively to a threat, i.e. an uncertainty 
with negative effects; and an ‘opportunity’ which is an uncertainty with positive effects.  However, 
this is inconsistent with the common definition of risk as it effectively says that risks and 
uncertainty are the same.  This is not the case as common literature distinguishes between risks, 
where probability is known and uncertainty where probability is unknown (Mun, 2006).  Fewings 
(2005) defines risk as something that arises out of uncertainty.  It is worth exploring the difference 
between risk and uncertainty at this point as the lines of differentiation are often blurred.  A 
description may expose the differences.   
 
Risk and Uncertainty Example 
Suppose a construction sub-contractor is about to commence the excavation of a 
tunnel which will link into an existing shaft.  The tunnel is being constructed 
through variable ground conditions.  Design engineers acting on behalf of the 
client and construction teams were given the responsibility to execute extensive 
ground surveys which would minimise the uncertainty regarding the ground 
conditions.  However, a low level of uncertainty was deemed to remain as is 
typical of underground conditions.  All actors were satisfied with the work 
carried out with regards to the assessment of ground conditions.  During the 
excavation of the tunnel, all actors associated with the job have the same level of 
uncertainty regarding the ground conditions.  While the ground investigations 
may have accounted for the many uncertainties such as the variation in soil types 
and proximity of other infrastructure, an element of uncertainty remains in that 
the ground investigations may have missed a key piece of information.  This Appendix A 
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could be a pocket of soft granular ground being exposed at the tunnel face which 
could trigger a collapse, an unidentified aquifer or unexploded ordnance.    
  
In the above example, the management of the uncertainty was allocated to the design 
engineers and was achieved through extensive ground investigations.  The responsibility for the 
cost and time risk which would result from the uncertainties associated with the tunnelling activity 
was allocated to the client given that he was deemed most capable of bearing the risk.  The health 
and safety risk associated with the tunnel was allocated to the construction team as it was deemed 
most able to deal with and administer the procedures associated with these risks.  Therefore risk is 
something one bears as the outcome of uncertainty.  In the above example, the uncertainty existed 
because of the ground conditions.  The risk was that the tunnel face could collapse due to an 
uncertainty becoming reality or the encountering of an unknown unknown such as unexploded 
ordnance.  This would inevitably resulted in damage to the working environment, thus 
compromising health and safety conditions and causing unforeseen increases in the project cost and 
schedule.                  
Hillson (2002) and Chapman and Ward (2003) both highlight the importance of treating 
the upside as well as the downside of uncertainty.  Chapman and Ward (2003) continue to note that 
risk management is not merely concerned with managing apparent threats and opportunities and the 
subsequent implications.  It is concerned with identifying and managing all possible sources of risk 
and uncertainty that give rise to threats and opportunity.   
In discussing risks, there are three levels of uncertainties in the world: the known, the 
unknown and the unknowable.  The known is what we know will occur and are certain of its 
occurrence (contractual obligations or a guaranteed event).  The risks associated with these 
uncertainties have a known downside and are often referred to as ‘pure’ risks which may include 
the chance of things going wrong or the possibility of incurring loss.  They can be identified with 
reference to previous projects, experience or history and are therefore risks which are easily 
controlled. 
The unknown is what we do not know and can be simulated.  These events will become 
known through the passage of time, events and actions (the uncertainty of whether a new rail 
network management program can operate successfully will become known after spending time 
and money on research and simulation – it will either work or not, and this will be known in the 
future).  These events carry with them risks, but these risks will be reduced or eliminated over time.  
Such risks are sometimes termed ‘speculative’, which are incurred as an accepted part of a project.  
In this sense, risk is a movement in either direction, because there is an uncertainty as to whether a 
gain or loss will occur.   
Unknowable events carry both uncertainty and risk that the totality of the risk and 
uncertainty may not change through the passage of time, events or actions.  These are events such 
as when the next train crash will happen or the next tunnel fire will occur.  When an event occurs, Appendix A 
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uncertainty becomes resolved, but risk still remains (e.g. another train crash may occur tomorrow).  
Traditional analysis considers the known factors whereas in risk analysis, the unknown and 
unknowable factors are considered.  The unknowable factors are easy to hedge by getting 
insurance.  Knowable uncertainties and associated risks can also be easily avoided; in other words, 
don’t do business with a client or contractors with poor credit history, don’t use unproven 
construction methods, avoid unstable economies and so on.  It is for the unknown factors that risk 
analysis will provide the most significant amount of value. 
Concerns about risk and uncertainty are an everyday worry for project managers – it is a 
fact of life in their estimates of resources, cost and time.  They recognise the uncertain nature of 
their undertakings and constantly seek to steer a project towards its objectives.  Clear definition and 
specification of objectives (see Chapter 3) is crucial for the identification and management of the 
associated uncertainties within a project.  These uncertainties may arise from any source related to 
the project e.g. market related (e.g. demand, financial, supply), completion (e.g. technical, 
construction, operational) and/or institutional (e.g. regulatory, political, social).   
However, the issue is not just that of risks and uncertainty recognition but also of 
measurement in terms of how to deal with risks and uncertainty in resource allocation and in 
managing the risk inherent in the estimates made relative to cost and time.  It is recognised that 
effective management of risks and uncertainty is closely related to project success (Williams 1995; 
Smith, 2008) and specifically how the responsibility for risk is allocated among project actors 
(Smith et al., 2006).  The crucial issue here is the ability to use the results of risk and uncertainty 
evaluation in conjunction with risk allocation to manage projects effectively to avoid cost and time 
overruns.   
 
2. Risk identification and valuation 
Risk reduction through risk identification, analysis, mitigation and contingency planning is a 
prudent and necessary management task.  There are several well established risk identification and 
management procedures and there are models for quantifying risk and the derivative cost and 
schedule probabilities (e.g. Programme Evaluation and Review Technique – PERT (a model for 
project management used to analyse and represent tasks involved in completing a given project); 
Anderson et al., 1999; Isaksson, 1998 & 2002; Reilly, 1999 & 2003a; Eskesen et al., 2002).  A 
systematic risk management approach is needed for the physical development of a project to 
address risks including (from Reilly and Brown, 2004):  
•  Risk of injury or catastrophic failure with the potential for loss of life, and personal injury, 
extensive material and economic damage and, loss of credibility for those involved; 
•  Risk of not meeting functional design, operational, maintainability and quality standards; 
•  Risks of a significant delay to project completion and start of revenue operations; 
•  Risks of significant increase of project and support costs. Appendix A 
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An effective risk management process (RMP) will initially involve a qualitative 
identifying-and-structuring process expanding to a more quantitative choosing-and-evaluating 
process which can be associated with value management.  For effective and efficient risk 
management, a rational, practical structure or framework should be provided to guide and 
encourage the development of best practice.  This formality in RMPs “is partly about making sure 
the right questions get asked and answered and partly about making sure everyone who needs to 
know understands the answers” (Chapman and Ward, 2003; p55). A formal process of risk 
identification is fundamental to the success of a project; it creates a wide and deep awareness of 
risk, and a common language for sharing perceptions and solutions.  
Of great relevance to risk management and value management (see Smith, 2008 and 
Fewings, 2005) is the measurement of risk, which is crucial to the effectiveness of all risk and 
value processes.  A generic RMP framework for projects, referred to as SHAMPU (Shape, Harness 
and Manage Project Uncertainty), is outlined by Chapman and Ward (2003).  There are nine phases 
to the SHAMPU process: define the project; focus the process; identify the issues; structure the 
issues; clarify ownership; estimate variability; evaluate implications; harness the plans; and 
manage implementation.  The SHAMPU framework has emerged from a mixture of other RMPs: 
the PRAM Guide (Simon et al., 1997) and the RAMP Guide (Simon, 1998).  Chapman and Ward 
(2003) discuss the weaknesses of other RMPs which vary in their attention to some of the concepts 
and issues involved in risk management compared to SHAMPU.   
The PMBoK (PMI, 2000) on the other hand deals with risk analysis in a different manner 
to SHAMPU.  Qualitative analysis is achieved in terms of Probability Impact Matrices (PIMs), 
produced as a first pass version of the estimate and evaluate SHAMPU phases.  Quantitative 
analysis using the PMBoK framework is achieved as a one shot numerical follow up to the use of 
PIMs.  Unfortunately, PIMs deliver very little useful information and even less insight into risks as 
the crude process involved assigns each issue to particular probability and impact bands (Chapman, 
2006).   Figure A.1 shows a typical PIM. 
 
Figure A.1 A PIM showing PI values 
(Source: Chapman (2006) p305) 
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Probability Impact Matrices have their roots in safety risk analysis existent several decades 
ago.  The classical view of probability meant that practitioners could not assign risks to boxes as 
well as define the probabilities, but could define impact scale values and an associated Probability 
Impact (PI) index to provide a crude measure of the relative importance of hazards, i.e. risk = 
probability × impact (r = p × i).  Such decisions under risk involved objectively determined 
probabilities (Chapman et al., 1987).  PMBoK seems to associate with this position where objective 
probabilities are replaced by subjective probabilities or ‘guestimates’ only when objective 
outcomes are not available.   
A more modern approach which is supported by many risk practitioners (Chapman, 2006; 
Ackermann et al., 2007; Williams, 1995; Atkinson et al., 2006) discards this approach in favour of 
subjective probabilities.  Subjective probabilities are therefore not seen as an alternative but 
identified as the only practical choice available by these authors.  They can be grounded on 
classical objective probabilities and in doing so provide an extension to the risk management 
process rather than an alternative.  This is not to say that objective probabilities should be ignored 
as these can effectively reflect the effects of any assumptions used to derive subjective 
probabilities.  Subjective probabilities interpreted in this inclusive manner have a wider span than 
objective probabilities.  This span includes judgement about the relevance of the data, the 
robustness of any assumptions and integrating the views of a variety of project parties to achieve 
internally consistent and coherent view on the risks within a project.  This also concerns global and 
elemental risks which are covered in Chapter 5 where the use of subjective probabilities in this 
sense allows decisions to be made upon all the expertise available as well as the data available, the 
effective use of which should contribute the reducing cost overruns.     
This view is taken because it is not the case that PIMs are not useful, it is that there are 
better ways of achieving the same ends where risks are at the mercy on the size of the bands used in 
PIMs and the risk indices used (Chapman, 2006).  Figure A.2 shows two examples of subjective 
probability assumptions which could be associated with the central box of figure A.1.   
 
Figure A.2 Two sample subjective probability distributions 
  (Based on Chapman (2006) p307) 
 
Considering figure A.2, PIM assumptions for a risk might involve a rectangular probability 
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which when used avoids working with PIMs.  This presumed reality model could be applied in 
place of the PIM boxes shown in figure A.1 with adjustments applied to deal with bounds 
associated with axes.  A key advantage of this simple subjective process is the use of standard 
probability combination procedures to aggregate across sources of risk which avoids the use of a 
one dimensional PI index.  Another advantage is that a pre-specified ‘box’ in a matrix is no longer 
needed.  A risk profile can therefore be created for whatever risk being considered, and this 
considerably increases the accuracy of any risk and uncertainty estimation process.  This approach 
to risk is crucial within the propositions of this work as it complements the requirements 
management process to give risk values for each requirement or set of requirements associated with 
each design element of a project.  The expected monetary value (EMV) (Fewings, 2005) is adopted 
in this case where a risk register is compiled and a value is attached to the consequences of things 
going wrong.  This results in the ability to compare alternative schemes or methodologies for 
certain design elements in order to minimise risk or to identify the most risk efficient designs.  
 
3. Risk efficiency and value management 
A central reason for employing risk management is the pursuit of ‘risk efficiency’.  Producing 
design options and refining these options in search of risk efficiency is fundamental aspect of value 
management where risk measurement is essential.  Risk efficiency as referred to by Chapman and 
Ward (2003) has to be addressed in terms of cost, time and all other measures of performance 
within a project context.  It involves a maximum level of expected performance for an appropriate 
level of downside risk.  In the context of this thesis where cost overruns are being considered, the 
achieved performance of a project design can be measured solely in terms of realised cost relative 
to some approved cost commitment, i.e. the project budget.  Effectively, when assessing a 
particular design option in relation to alternatives, the expected cost of an option can be considered 
as one basic measure of performance and the associated risk defined by the potential for costs 
greater than expected cost as a second basic measure of performance.  In this sense, some design 
options will involve less expected cost and less cost risk than others – they will be better in both 
respects and are referred to as ‘risk efficient’ as demonstrated by Chapman and Ward (2003) in 
figure A.3. 
  
Figure A.3 Risk efficient options 
   (Source: Chapman and Ward (2003), p40) 
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The most risk efficient option for any given level of expected cost will involve the 
minimum feasible level of risk.  The most risk efficient option for any given level of cost risk will 
involve the minimum feasible level of expected cost (Chapman and Ward, 2003).  Therefore, given 
a set of risk efficient design options, expected cost can only be reduced by increasing the cost risk 
and cost risk can only be reduced by increasing the expected cost as shown in figure A.3. 
Considering the set of design options shown in figure A.3 where options are portrayed in relation to 
expected cost and cost risk, a risk efficient boundary portrayed by the curve W-X-Y-Z is a set of 
feasible, risk efficient design options that provides a minimum level of cost risk for any given level 
of expected cost, or the minimum level of expected cost for any given level of cost risk.  Points 
such as U and V represent risk inefficient options where V is more efficient than U.  Risk efficient 
options can therefore be identified more clearly from a cost risk-expected cost plot with the most 
feasible design options being shown along a risk efficient boundary.  This boundary may not be 
clearly defined, but exists due to the relationship between cost risk and expected risk for each 
respective design option.  It is therefore essential that only design options along this boundary are 
considered for satisfying project stakeholder objectives as they present the best solution in terms of 
risk.  This is the essence of value management where the best value for money is sought for the 
client and stakeholders.  For further analysis in helping choose options, various design options can 
be plotted on a cumulative probability-cost plot in terms of cumulative probability cost 
distributions.  These can be analysed and compared to give expected costs, a measure of risk and an 
indication of the risk efficiency of the individual design options concerned.  Reilly and Brown 
(2004) present a risk based method that achieves this for the estimation and management of cost for 
complex infrastructure projects.  The procedure, called the Cost Estimate Validation Process 
(CEVP) uses standard risk and uncertainty methods to modify the normal cost estimate to produce 
a ‘range of probable cost’ estimate.  The use of this process does however require the user (a client 
and stakeholders in this case) to accept a completely different approach to valuations where a range 
of cost values has to be accepted rather than a single cost value.  This may be difficult to accept for 
some and also requires a certain level of trustworthiness between actors.  In other words, how could 
a client guarantee that a range of values is representative and not biased towards higher sums.     
It should be noted that only cost risk is considered above as it is the main point of interest 
in this work.  However, project management plans can be viewed in a portfolio analysis framework 
where profit risk is considered rather than cost risk, and time and quality risks are other attributes 
included within a process of identifying the profit risk.  Therefore, a portfolio risk management 
problem exists if overall risk is the concern.  The overall risk should also include risks which lie 
outside the technical and safety aspects of a project, but often they are not (Ackermann et al., 
2007).  These outside risks are of interest in this work and are discussed in Chapter 5.   
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APPENDIX B 
Appendix to Section 5.1.3 The concepts of fuzzy set theory 
This Appendix details the concepts of Fuzzy Set Theory.  
 
1. The Concepts of fuzzy set theory  
 
Membership functions 
Figure B.1 shows two membership functions, a bivalent membership function and fuzzy 
membership function.  The most obvious limiting feature of the bivalent membership function is 
that it is mutually exclusive, i.e. it is not possible to have membership of more than one function.  
However, the natural drift between the same information is shown by the fuzzy membership 
function, which is far more representative of the real world.  In the case of figure B.1, temperatures 
of cool warm and hot are shown.  Clearly, it is not accurate to define a transition from a quantity 
such as ‘warm’ (e.g. 29°C) to ‘hot’ (e.g. 31°C) by the application of one degree Centigrade of heat 
as would be the case with the bivalent membership function.  The fuzzy membership function 
therefore gives an improved account of the drift between measurement functions.  
 
   Figure B.1 Membership function  
 
A membership function is a function that maps a parameter onto a universe of discourse U 
in the unit interval [0, x]. χ is used to denote the width (i.e. interval) of the measurement function 
along the universe of discourse and y is commonly used to denote the centre of the measurement 
function along the universe of discourse.  μ(x) corresponds to the degree of membership under each 
parameter. The grades of membership μ(x) in fuzzy sets may fall anywhere in the interval [0, 1], 
measured off the y-axis.  A degree of 0 (zero) means that an element is not a member of the 
membership function at all whereas a degree of 1 (one) represents full membership.  In contrast 
with ‘crisp’ measurement functions that can only have one degree of membership, fuzzy 
membership functions can thus have varying degrees of membership.  In the case of risk 
assessment, the measurement functions would therefore represent the degrees of the risk 
parameters with fuzzy sets being derived from these measurement functions as representation of 
the actual risk. 
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Linguistic variable 
The concept of linguistic variables lies at the core of Fuzzy Set Theory since the basics of Fuzzy 
Set Theory is the manipulation of linguistic expressions as well as numbers (Baloi and Price, 
2003).  Linguistic variables are words and may assume different levels such as ‘very good’, ‘good’, 
‘average’, ‘poor’ and ‘very poor’.  These variables or words define the parameters that make the 
fuzzy membership functions and thus represent the perception that the decision-maker has 
regarding a risk under consideration. 
In mathematical terms, natural language is imprecise but in terms of conveying information 
it is extremely flexible.  When used under the right circumstances it can be extremely effective in 
conveying information which would be too complex to define in numerical terms.  For example, 
the modelling of an extensive network of related risks would take considerable time and effort to 
yield a measure while human consideration of all the issues associated with a network would be 
considerably faster.  Humans can intuitively account for factors that are ill-defined or impossible to 
model numerically which is typical of global and elemental risks and uncertainties.  The concept of 
linguistic variables therefore serves the purpose of providing a means of approximate 
characterisation of these risks in order to account for them in project decision making.  Any risk 
factor presented can be characterised using linguistic variables through its likelihood of occurrence 
and its impact.  Section 5.2.2 of Chapter 5 gives attention to the definition of linguistic variables in 
order to define the terms used in the global and elemental risk assessment detailed in this chapter.  
 
Fuzzy set 
Fuzzy sets are used to define the outcomes of assessments that have been imposed on to fuzzy 
measurement functions.  Suppose that a respondent is required to classify the temperature in a room 
by how they feel when standing in the room and then give an estimated temperature value.  The 
fuzzy measurement functions by which the respondent can give answers are shown in figure B.2 
where the ‘cool’, ‘warm’ and ‘hot’ parameters are shown.  In this experiment, the respondent 
should select the linguistic term (i.e. parameter) and give a value for what they think the 
temperature is in degrees centigrade as a response.  It should be noted that various forms of 
numerical answers can be taken including triangular and trapezoidal fuzzy sets (Zeng et al., 2007).  
Let’s say that the reply is that the temperature in the room is ‘cool’ at an estimated temperature of 
18
°C as is shown in figure B.2.    
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Figure B.2 Fuzzy measurement functions with measurement for temperature 
 
  Figure B.3 shows the two fuzzy measurement functions that are traversed by the 
measurement for temperature line in figure B.2.  This shows that while the respondent classified 
the room as ‘cool’ at 18
oC, it is actually at the high end of the ‘cool’ membership function and can 
be interpreted by others (if they were to provide a response) as the low end of ‘warm’.  This shows 
how Fuzzy Set Theory works by accounting for the overlap in definition that is possible in outputs 
from various individual respondents and is therefore highly relevant when multiple numbers of 
practitioners assess global and elemental risks.  The points at which the measurement for 
temperature intercepts the ‘cool’ and ‘warm’ measurement functions can be read off the y-axis 
where the degree of membership under each measurement function can be established.  These 
points therefore form the fuzzy set representing the measurement of temperature which can be 
written as {(Cool, 0.65), (Warm, 0.4)}. 
  Also shown in figure B.3 is the degree of membership that the measurement for 
temperature has under both the ‘cool’ and ‘warm’ measurement function. While this has little 
significance with a singular response, its relevance grows with multiple responses where a 
representative temperature value can be derived using defuzzification and the ‘centre of gravity’ 
method (defined in Appendix D).  
 
Figure B.3 Isolation of measurement with relative measurement functions and degree of membership 
under measurement functions 
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CROSSRAIL RISK FACTOR QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
This questionnaire is being circulated as part of an Engineering Doctorate research project which is 
looking at managing risks to avoid cost overruns in an underground rail project.  Crossrail is being 
used as a case study within this work.   
 
External risks or 3
rd party risks are known to have caused overruns in projects and contribute to the 
uncertainty or volatility of costs within projects. The outputs from this questionnaire will be 
analysed to give a measure of the uncertainty placed by these external risks on Crossrail with the 
corresponding volatility being used in a methodology for avoiding cost overruns.   
 
By completing this questionnaire, you will help establish the level of uncertainty for Crossrail with 
regards to the listed external risk factors.  MDC3 will receive feedback on their input into this work 
with regards to how it can assist the Crossrail project and how it fits into the research work.     
 
Instructions for evaluation are placed at the start of this questionnaire. 
 
Your input is greatly appreciated, 
 
 
 
Heulyn Thomas 
 
February 2008  
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Returned questionnaires will be treated with the utmost confidence and no identities will be 
included in any published material. 
 
Please provide the following information about yourself; 
 
 
Are you a Mott MacDonald employee?    Yes  No   
 
if Yes, please state your grade (e.g. C)  ______ 
 
 
Your professional role (e.g. Structural Engineer) ____________________      
  
 
The number of years experience that you have ______  
 
 
 
 
The questionnaire has been split into six separate project areas as outlined below.  Please highlight 
the areas with which you have knowledge of and provide responses in the relevant sections in the 
questionnaire. 
 
                  P a g e  
1. DESIGN  FACTORS............................................................................265 
2. PROCUREMENT  FACTORS.............................................................271 
3. CONSTRUCTION  FACTORS............................................................276 
4. CLIENT  FACTORS.............................................................................280 
5. ECONOMIC  FACTORS......................................................................283 
6. GOVERNMENT  FACTORS...............................................................285 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 
There are 3 steps to the assessments in this questionnaire;  
 
Step 1 
You are required to provide your judgements on how the Crossrail project is performing with 
regards to each risk factor.  You may provide your judgement by;  
•  Circling a single number or a range of numbers on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is very poor 
and 10 is very good  
or 
•  Circling a linguistic term from very poor, poor, fair, good, very good 
 
The examples provided below show the different ways of completing Step 1.  Numerical and 
linguistic scales are provided throughout the questionnaire;    
  
i)  Circling a single number   
 
ii)  Circling a range of numbers 
 
iii) Circling a range of numbers and identifying the most likely   
 
iv) Linguistic terms can be circled if you prefer these to numerical terms  
 
Descriptions of terms are shown below 
 
Term General  interpretation 
Very Poor (VP)  Involved factors highly impact on the project 
Poor (P)  Involved factors have significant impact on the project 
Fair (F)  Involved factors have average impact on the project 
Good (G)  Involved factors have low impact on the project 
Very Good (VG)  Involved factors have no impact on the project 
 
 
Step 2 
You are required to rate the importance of the risk factors.  This can achieved by identifying on a 
scale which of two given risk factors is more important, and by how much.   
An example is provided below using factors ‘X’ and ‘Y’.  In this example it can be seen that factor 
‘Y’ is weakly more important than ‘X’ by selecting a value of ‘3’.  As in step 1, a single value or a 
range of values can be circled. 
X   Y 
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The numerical scale for Step 2 is defined as follows;   
• A score of 1 would mean that the risk factors are of equal importance 
• A score of 3 would mean that a risk factor is weakly more important 
• A score of 5 would mean that a risk factor is strongly more important 
• A score of 7 would mean that a risk factor is very strongly more important  
• A score of 9 would mean that a risk factor is absolutely more important  
• 2,4,6,8 are intermediates. 
 
Step 3 
You are required to evaluate the risk impact and risk likelihood for each category of factors 
according to your experience on the Crossrail project.  You may score each risk factor using either; 
•  Numerical values in a range of 0 to 10 where 0 is very low and 10 is very high. When using 
numerical values, you have a choice of either stating a precise value or using a range of 
numerical values as outlined in Step 1.  
or  
•  A linguistic term from very low, low, medium, high and very high; 
 
The examples provided below show the different ways of completing Step 3.  
 
i)  Circling a single number or a range of numbers as in Step 1 
 
  
ii)  Circling a linguistic term as in Step 1 
 
 
Descriptions of Risk Impact and Risk Likelihood are provided below 
 
Description of Risk Impact  General Interpretation 
Very Low (VL)  Negligible increase in costs  
Low (L)  >1% increase in costs 
Medium (M)  >5% increase in costs 
High (H)  >15% increase in costs 
Very High (VH)  >40% increase in costs 
  
Description of Risk Likelihood  General Interpretation  Probability  
Very Low (VL)  Very unlikely to happen  <1% 
Low (L)  Occurrence is unlikely  >1% 
Medium (M)  Likely to occur  >10% 
High (H)  Very likely to occur  >50% 
Very High (VH)  Occurrence is almost inevitable  >90% 
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Please circle a number, a range of numbers, or a linguistic term as appropriate. 
 
1.  DESIGN FACTORS 
1.1. Subsurface design 
•  What is the quality of the subsurface (geotechnical) conditions in your design area? 
 
 
 
•  What is the quality of the site information that you currently hold for this area? 
 
 
 
•  What is the performance of the current design with regards to its interactions with existing 
underground assets? 
 
 
 
 
Please state which of the following factors are more important to your design at this stage by 
circling the appropriate number or range of numbers;  
 
Quality of 
subsurface 
conditions 
   
Quality of 
information held 
for the site 
 
 
Quality of 
subsurface 
conditions 
 
Interactions with 
existing 
underground assets 
 
 
Quality of 
information held 
for the site 
   
Interactions with 
existing 
underground assets 
 
 
Based on your current design; 
Please circle the risk impact that adverse subsurface design conditions could have on delivering the 
project 
 
 
 
Please circle the risk likelihood that adverse subsurface design conditions could affect the project  
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1.2. Design complexity 
•  What is the performance of the current design regarding the use of complex construction 
processes? 
 
 
 
•  What is the performance of the current design regarding the use of unproven engineering 
processes? 
 
 
 
•  What is the performance of the project timescale in adequately accounting for the time 
needed to include complexities in design?  
 
 
 
•  What is the performance of other project parties (e.g. the client) with regard to 
understanding any complex underground development that may be required?  
 
 
 
 
Please state which of the following factors are more important to your design at this stage by 
circling the appropriate number or range of numbers; 
 
Accommodating 
complex 
construction 
processes  
   
Accommodating 
the use of 
unproven 
engineering 
processes 
 
 
Accommodating 
complex 
construction 
processes  
   
Scheduling of 
sufficient time to 
include 
complexities in 
design 
 
 
Accommodating 
complex 
construction 
processes  
   
Understanding of 
complex design 
issues by other 
project parties 
 
 
Accommodating 
the use of 
unproven 
engineering 
processes 
 
 
Scheduling of 
sufficient time to 
include 
complexities in 
design 
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Accommodating 
the use of 
unproven 
engineering 
processes 
 
 
Understanding of 
complex design 
issues by other 
project parties 
 
 
 
Scheduling of 
sufficient time to 
include 
complexities in 
design 
 
 
Understanding of 
complex design 
issues by other 
project parties 
 
 
 
Based on your current design; 
Please circle the risk impact that design complexity could have on delivering the project  
 
 
 
Please circle the risk likelihood that design complexity could affect the project  
 
 
 
 
 
1.3. Contractor involvement in design 
•  What is the quality of design data provided by site based contractors (e.g. data from site 
surveys)? 
 
 
 
•  What is the performance of the project with regards to design changes necessitated by 
identified construction difficulties? 
 
 
 
•  What is the performance of current site based contractors with regards to their effect on 
design progress (e.g. delays from slow data feedback)? 
 
 
 
•  What is the performance of the project with regards to staff expertise being involved at the 
appropriate stage? 
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Please state which of the following factors are more important to your design at this stage by 
circling the appropriate number or range of numbers;  
 
Quality of data 
from construction 
contractors 
   
Accommodating 
design changes due 
to construction 
difficulties 
 
 
Quality of data 
from construction 
contractors 
   
Accommodating 
the effects of 
construction 
contractors on 
design progress 
 
 
Quality of data 
from construction 
contractors 
   
Expertise being 
involved at the 
appropriate stage 
 
 
Accommodating 
design changes 
due to construction 
difficulties 
   
Accommodating 
the effects of 
construction 
contractors on 
design progress 
 
 
Accommodating 
design changes 
due to construction 
difficulties 
   
Expertise being 
involved at the 
appropriate stage 
 
 
Accommodating 
the effects of 
construction 
contractors on 
design progress 
 
 
Expertise being 
involved at the 
appropriate stage 
 
 
 
Based on your current design; 
Please circle the risk impact that contractor involvement in design could have on delivering the 
project  
 
 
 
Please circle the risk likelihood that contractor involvement in design could affect the project  
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1.4. Design changes 
•  What is the performance of the procedures for placing and negotiating changes in design? 
 
 
 
•  What is the project performance with regards to the number of changes in design scope? 
 
 
 
•  What is the project performance with regards to how easily project parties agree upon 
required design changes? 
 
 
 
•  What is the quality of the current design in terms of its robustness to withstand significant 
design changes?    
 
 
 
 
Please state which of the following factors are more important to your design at this stage by 
circling the appropriate number or range of numbers;  
 
Procedures for 
placing and 
negotiating 
changes 
   
A low number of 
changes in design 
scope 
 
 
Procedures for 
placing and 
negotiating 
changes   
Agreeing upon 
design changes 
between project 
parties 
 
 
Procedures for 
placing and 
negotiating 
changes 
   
Development of a 
robust design 
 
 
A low number of 
changes in design 
scope 
   
Agreeing upon 
design changes 
between project 
parties 
 
 
A low number of 
changes in design 
scope 
   
Development of a 
robust design 
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Agreeing upon 
design changes 
between project 
parties 
   
Development of a 
robust design 
 
 
 
Based on your current design; 
Please circle the risk impact that design changes could have on delivering the project  
 
 
 
Please circle the risk likelihood that design changes could affect the project  
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2.  PROCUREMENT FACTORS 
2.1. Design Schedule  
•  What is the quality (workability) of the design schedule? 
 
 
 
•  What is the project performance with respect to design work keeping to its schedule? 
 
 
 
•  What is the project performance with respect to design progress being affected by variations 
to the design schedule? 
 
 
 
 
Please state which of the following factors are more important to your design at this stage by 
circling the appropriate number or range of numbers;  
 
Quality of the 
design schedule 
 
 
Keeping to the 
design schedule 
 
 
Quality of the 
design schedule 
 
Dealing with 
changes to the 
design schedule 
 
 
Keeping to the 
design schedule 
 
 
Dealing with 
changes to the 
design schedule 
 
 
Based on your current design; 
Please circle the risk impact that the design schedule could have on delivering the project  
 
 
 
Please circle the risk likelihood that the design schedule could affect the project 
 
 
 
 
 
 272 
2.2. Interfaces 
•  What is the performance of other parties (e.g. Local Authorities, other design teams etc.) 
regarding the release of information? 
 
 
 
•  What is the project performance with respect to access being granted to survey sites so that 
design work can progress as planned? 
 
 
 
•  What is the project performance regarding interactions with other 3
rd party services (e.g. 
London Underground, Network Rail etc.)? 
 
 
 
•  What is the project performance in terms of the transfer of project/design information 
between all project parties? 
 
 
 
 
Please state which of the following factors are more important to your design at this stage by 
circling the appropriate number or range of numbers;  
 
Release of 
information from 
project parties 
   
Access to sites for  
surveying 
 
 
Release of 
information from 
project parties 
 
Interactions with 
3
rd party services 
 
 
Release of 
information from 
project parties 
   
Effective transfer 
of information 
between all 
relevant parties 
 
Access to sites for 
surveying 
 
 
Interactions with 
3
rd party services 
 
 
Access to sites for 
surveying 
 
 
Effective transfer 
of information 
between all 
relevant parties 
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Interactions with 
3
rd party services 
 
 
Effective transfer 
of information 
between all 
relevant parties 
 
 
 
Based on your current design; 
Please circle the risk impact that project interfaces could have on delivering the project  
 
 
 
Please circle the risk likelihood that project interfaces could affect the project  
 
 
 
 
2.3. Project Programme 
 
•  What has been the performance of all project parties in contributing to an effective project 
programme?  
 
 
 
•  What is the performance of all 3
rd parties in keeping to the project programme?  
 
 
 
•  What is the performance of the project programme with regards to sufficient time being 
allowed for regulatory approvals to materialise? 
 
 
 
•  What is the performance of the project programme in terms of identifying critical interfaces 
during the projects’ development (e.g. interfaces with the Olympics or Thameslink)?   
 
 
 
 
Please state which of the following factors are more important to your design at this stage by 
circling the appropriate number or range of numbers;  
 
Development of a 
workable project 
programme 
   
3
rd parties 
conforming to the 
programme 
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Development of a 
workable project 
programme 
   
Getting regulatory 
approvals to 
materialise in time 
 
 
Development of a 
workable project 
programme 
   
Identifying time 
critical interfaces 
 
 
3
rd parties 
conforming to the 
programme 
   
Getting regulatory 
approvals to 
materialise in time 
 
 
3
rd parties 
conforming to the 
programme 
   
Identifying time 
critical interfaces 
 
 
Getting regulatory 
approvals to 
materialise in time 
   
Identifying time 
critical interfaces 
 
 
Based on your current design; 
Please circle the risk impact that the project programme could have on delivering the project  
 
 
 
Please circle the risk likelihood that the project programme could affect the project  
 
 
 
2.4. Contract 
 
•  What is the quality of the scope of work/requirements set for the project? 
 
 
 
•  What is the quality of risk transfer details within the project? 
 
 
 
•  What is the performance of the project in terms of the resolution of disputes between project 
parties? 
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•  What is the project performance with regards to making payments (in general) where 
required? 
 
 
 
 
Please state which of the following factors are more important to your design at this stage by 
circling the appropriate number or range of numbers;  
 
Having a clear 
scope of work 
 
Clarity of risk 
transfer details 
 
 
Having a clear 
scope of work 
 
 
Resolution of 
disputes between 
parties 
 
 
Having a clear 
scope of work 
 
 
Receiving 
payments for work 
done 
 
 
Clarity of risk 
transfer details 
 
 
Resolution of 
disputes between 
parties 
 
 
Clarity of risk 
transfer details 
 
 
Receiving 
payments for work 
done 
 
 
Resolution of 
disputes between 
parties 
   
Receiving 
payments for work 
done 
 
 
 
Based on your current design; 
Please circle the risk impact that contractual problems could have on delivering the project 
 
 
 
Please circle the risk likelihood that contractual problems could affect the project  
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3.  CONSTRUCTION FACTORS 
3.1. Resource Risks 
 
Labour 
•  What is the performance of the project with respect to identifying the amount of labour 
(skilled or otherwise) needed during construction? 
 
 
 
•  What is the performance of the project with respect to the recruitment of professionals (at all 
levels of experience) for design and planning related roles?  
 
 
        Material  
•  What is the performance of the project with respect to the identification of the quantities of 
construction material needed? 
 
 
 
•  What is the current quality of any logistical planning relating to the delivery of material to 
site(s) during construction?  
 
 
 
 
Please state which of the following factors are more important to your design at this stage by 
circling the appropriate number or range of numbers; 
 
Identifying the 
quantity of 
construction 
material needed 
   
Planning the 
delivery of 
material to site 
 
 
Identifying the 
quantity of 
construction 
material needed 
   
Identifying the 
amount of labour 
needed for 
construction 
 
 
Identifying the 
quantity of 
construction 
material needed 
   
Recruiting 
planning and 
design 
professionals 
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Planning the 
delivery of 
material to site 
   
Identifying the 
amount of labour 
needed for 
construction 
 
 
Planning the 
delivery of 
material to site 
   
Recruiting 
planning and 
design 
professionals 
 
 
Identifying the 
amount of labour 
needed for 
construction 
   
Recruiting 
planning and 
design 
professionals 
 
 
Based on your current design; 
Please circle the risk impact that resource risks could have on delivering the project 
 
 
 
Please circle the risk likelihood that resource risks could affect the project  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Health and safety 
•  What is the project performance with respect to maintaining set health and safety standards? 
 
 
 
•  What is the quality of project procedures for removal of any unexploded munitions or 
pollution hazards from sites?  
 
 
 
•  What is the current project performance with regards to the application of CDM regulations? 
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Please state which of the following factors are more important to your design at this stage by 
circling the appropriate number or range of numbers;  
 
Ensuring that 
health and safety 
standards are met 
   
Planning the safe 
removal of 
hazardous 
materials from 
site(s) 
 
 
Ensuring that 
health and safety 
standards are met 
   
Applying CDM 
regulations in 
design 
 
 
Planning the safe 
removal of 
hazardous 
materials from 
site(s) 
 
 
Applying CDM 
regulations in 
design 
 
 
 
Based on your current design; 
Please circle the risk impact that health and safety risks could have on delivering the project  
 
 
 
Please circle the risk likelihood that health and safety risks could affect the project  
 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Environment 
•  What is the quality of plans for the removal of spoil material from site(s)? 
 
 
 
•  What is the project performance with respect to mitigating the effects of construction 
pollution? 
 
 
 
•  What is the projects performance regarding its effect on natural and ecological areas? 
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•  What is the projects performance regarding the reduction of noise pollution and vibration 
during construction and operation? 
 
 
 
Please state which of the following factors are more important to your design at this stage by 
circling the appropriate number or range of numbers;  
 
Planning the 
removal of spoil 
material from site 
   
Mitigating the 
effects of 
construction 
pollution 
 
 
Planning the 
removal of spoil 
material from site 
   
Reducing the 
project’s effect on 
the natural 
environment 
 
 
Planning the 
removal of spoil 
material from site 
   
Reducing the 
effects of noise and 
pollution 
 
 
Mitigating the 
effects of 
construction 
pollution 
   
Reducing the 
project’s effect on 
the natural 
environment 
 
 
Mitigating the 
effects of 
construction 
pollution 
   
Reducing the 
effects of noise and 
pollution 
 
 
Reducing the 
project’s effect on 
the natural 
environment 
   
Reducing the 
effects of noise and 
pollution 
 
 
 
Based on your current design; 
Please circle the risk impact that environmental factors could have on delivering the project  
 
 
 
Please circle the risk likelihood that the project could adversely affect its surrounding environment 
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4.  CLIENT FACTORS 
4.1. Organisational capability of client 
•  What is the performance of the client regarding the organisation of its project team? 
 
 
 
•  What is the performance of the client with respect to the allocation of responsibility within 
its organisation? 
 
 
 
•  What is the performance of the clients’ organisation (in general) with respect to its ability to 
procure the project? 
 
 
 
•  What is the quality of communication within the clients’ organisation? 
 
 
 
Please state which of the following factors are more important to your design at this stage by 
circling the appropriate number or range of numbers;  
 
Organisation of 
the clients’ team 
 
 
Allocation of 
responsibility 
within the clients’ 
team 
 
 
Organisation of 
the clients’ team 
 
Ability of the client 
to procure the 
project 
 
 
Organisation of 
the clients’ team 
 
 
Communication 
within the clients’ 
organisation 
 
 
Allocation of 
responsibility 
within the clients’ 
team   
Ability of the client 
to procure the 
project 
 
 
Allocation of 
responsibility 
within the clients’ 
team 
   
Communication 
within the clients’ 
organisation 
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Ability of the 
client to procure 
the project 
   
Communication 
within the clients’ 
organisation 
 
 
 
Based on your current design; 
Please circle the risk impact that the organisational capability of the client could have on delivering 
the project  
 
 
 
Please circle the risk likelihood that the organisational capability of the client could affect the 
project  
 
 
 
 
4.2. Client Characteristics 
 
•  What is the quality of the attitude and motivation within the clients’ organisation towards 
making a success of the project? 
 
 
 
•  What is the quality of training given to clients’ staff to procure the project? 
 
 
 
•  What is the standard of the clients’ project management? 
 
 
 
•  What is the performance of the client in terms of design submissions being approved in 
order to proceed with design work? 
 
 
 
Please state which of the following factors are more important to your design at this stage by 
circling the appropriate number or range of numbers;  
 
Attitude and 
motivation of the 
clients’ team 
   
Training received 
by clients’ staff 
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Attitude and 
motivation of the 
clients’ team 
   
Client’s project 
management skills 
 
 
Attitude and 
motivation of the 
clients’ team 
   
Approvals of 
design so that work 
can proceed 
 
 
Training received 
by clients’ staff 
 
 
Client’s project 
management skills 
 
 
Training received 
by clients’ staff 
 
 
Approvals of 
design so that work 
can proceed 
 
 
Client’s project 
management skills 
 
 
Approvals of 
design so that work 
can proceed 
 
 
 
Based on your current design; 
Please circle the risk impact that client characteristics could have on delivering the project  
 
 
 
Please circle the risk likelihood that client characteristics could affect the project  
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5.  ECONOMIC FACTORS 
5.1. Financial 
•  What is the project performance with regards to the cost estimates made at hybrid bill stage? 
 
 
 
•  What is the project performance with respect to funding decisions made by public bodies 
involved with the project? 
 
 
 
•  What is the project performance with respect to funding decisions made in relation to the 
financial markets? 
 
 
 
•  What is the project performance with respect to changes in scope being prompted by 
changes in project costs? 
 
 
 
 
Please state which of the following factors are more important to your design at this stage by 
circling the appropriate number or range of numbers;  
 
Accurate cost 
estimates 
 
 
Reliable funding 
decisions by public 
bodies 
 
 
Accurate cost 
estimates 
 
 
Stability of 
financial markets 
 
 
Accurate cost 
estimates 
 
 
Project scope 
aligned with 
project costs 
 
 
Reliable funding 
decisions by 
public bodies 
   
Stability of 
financial markets 
 
 
Reliable funding 
decisions by 
public bodies 
   
Project scope 
aligned with 
project costs 
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Stability of 
financial markets 
 
 
Project scope 
aligned with 
project costs 
 
 
 
Based on your current design; 
Please circle the risk impact that economic factors could have on delivering the project  
 
 
 
Please circle the risk likelihood that economic factors could affect the project  
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6.  GOVERNMENT FACTORS 
6.1. Public Bodies 
•  What is the project performance with regards to permits and approval from public bodies 
being obtained in time for the project to proceed? 
 
 
 
•  What is the project performance with regards to the effect that public consultation has had 
on project designs? 
 
 
 
Please state which of the following factors are more important to your design at this stage by 
circling the appropriate number or range of numbers;  
 
Timely turn out of 
approvals by 
public bodies 
   
Incorporating the 
outcomes of public 
consultation 
 
 
 
Based on your current design; 
Please circle the risk impact that public bodies could have on delivering the project  
 
 
 
Please circle the risk likelihood that public bodies could affect the project  
 
 
6.2. Political Issues 
•  What is the project performance with respect to (any) support from major political parties? 
 
 
 
•  What is the project performance with respect to the level of support for the project from 
political shareholders? 
 
 
 
Please state which of the following factors are more important to your design at this stage by 
circling the appropriate number or range of numbers;  
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Support from 
major political 
parties 
   
Support from 
political 
stakeholders 
 
Based on your current design; 
Please circle the risk impact that political issues could have on delivering the project  
 
 
 
Please circle the risk likelihood that political issues could affect the project  
 
 
 
 
 Appendix D 
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APPENDIX D 
Appendix to Section 5.3 Fuzzy Reasoning to Evaluate Global Risks  
This Appendix details the methodology behind the application of the fuzzy logic process to assess 
the global and elemental risks associated with the Crossrail project.   
 
1. Evaluating and weighing risk factors to obtain the Factor Index (FI) 
There are six steps to calculate the Factor Index which is based on the methodology presented by 
Zeng et al. (2007).  These steps are outlined below in order to establish the Factor Index of global 
and elemental risks associated with Crossrail.  An application of the methodology to the Crossrail 
project is given in section 5.4 of Chapter 5. 
 
Step 1 Evaluate the project environment for each risk factor 
Each expert was required to assess the project environment within which each the global and 
elemental risk factor existed (defined Fij in this section) at the lowest level (see Level 3 risks in 
table 5.1 of Chapter 5) of the Factor Index (see figure 5.3 of Chapter 5) using the score system set 
out in section 5.2.5.1.  As specified earlier, an experts’ response could take the form of a linguistic 
term or a range of numerical responses.  Given that some experts would prefer to use linguistic 
terms and others numerical terms, the use of STFNs to convert all scores to a common format was 
invaluable where Sim was used to denote the fuzzy score from each respondent where i represents 
the risk factor and m the identity of the expert.  
Since the experts providing responses to the questionnaires were arranged into groups of 5, 
each individual assessment with regards to the project environment needed to be aggregated to 
represent a group score.  The aggregations of the scores from each expert could therefore be 
calculated using equation D.1 which multiplies each experts’ score (in its STFN format) by the 
contribution factor (cfm) of each expert.  This created an aggregated STFN which represented the 
group score for the global risk factor under consideration. 
m im i i i cf S cf S cf S S ⊗ ⊕ ⊕ ⊗ ⊕ ⊗ = ,..., 2 2 1 1    D.1 
where Si  is the fuzzy aggregated score of the global risk factor (Fi) being assessed, SS S ii i m 12 ,, . . . , 
are the STFN scores of the Fi measured by m experts E1, E2, …, Em respectively.  cf1, cf2, …, cfm are 
contribution factors allocated to the experts E1, E2, …, Em involved in the assessment where 
cf1 + cf2 +…+ cfm =1 (equation D.1 is taken from Zeng et al., 2007).  ⊗ denotes the fuzzy 
multiplication operator and ⊕ the fuzzy addition factor.    
 
Step 2 Complete pair-wise comparisons for each global risk factor 
Obtaining a assessment score in step 1 was however half the output required as experts were also 
required to compare each global risk factor.  An AHP was used to establish the priority of each risk 
factor using the pair-wise comparison process outlined in section 5.2.5.2 of Chapter 5.  In adopting Appendix D 
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the approach of Zeng et al. (2007), experts’ comparisons could then be converted by STFNs into 
uniform fuzzy numbers for all comparisons with fuzzy aggregation being used to obtain single 
number representing the comparison for each risk factor.  This therefore allowed experts to select 
numerous numbers in their comparisons in the questionnaire (defined aij) with subsequent 
manipulation giving a single number to represent the comparisons for analysis.  
The aggregations of the pair-wise comparisons from each expert could therefore be 
calculated using equation D.2 where the experts’ comparison (in its STFN format) is multiplied by 
their contribution factor (cfm).  This creates an aggregated STFN which is representative of the pair-
wise comparisons made by the expert group for risk factors Fi and Fj in a category of global risk 
factors
35. 
m ijm ij ij ij cf a cf a cf a a ⊗ ⊕ ⊕ ⊗ ⊕ ⊗ = ,..., 2 2 1 1    D.2 
where aij is the aggregated fuzzy scale of the global risk factor (Fi) being compared to another 
global risk factor Fj. i,j = 1,2…n.  aa a ij ij ijm 12 , ,..., are the corresponding STFNs of global risk 
factor Fi comparing to global risk factor Fj measured by experts E1, E2, …, Em respectively 
(equation D.2 is taken from Zeng et al., 2007).    
 
Step 3 Defuzzify the STFNs and calculate priority weights 
Equation D.3 is used by Zeng et al. (2007) to convert the aggregated STFNs established in Step 2 
into single ‘crisp’ numbers that can adequately represent the expert groups’ aggregated 
comparisons.  It is also mentioned by Lee et al. (2003) who use a median rule to defuzzify a 
trapezoidal fuzzy number.  In the case of this work and as proposed by Zeng et al. (2007), since an 
aggregated STFN with scale a
*
ij = (a
l
ij a
m
ij a
n
ij a
u
ij) (from figure 5.4 of Chapter 5) is known from 
Step 2, a matching crisp number can be obtained by equation D.3.  By using this equation on all 
aggregated fuzzy numbers for all global and elemental risk categories defined by Step 2 results in a 
series of crisp numbers representing the pair-wise comparisons.   
6
) ( 2
u
ij
n
ij
m
ij
l
ij
ij
a a a a
a
+ + +
=     D . 3  
  The calculation of the crisp numbers allows the calculation of the weights of each global 
risk factor since they are arranged in categories in the Factor Index.  If Fij1,Fij2,…,Fijn represents the 
global risk factors within a category, then the defizzified crisp numbers aij calculated by equation 
D.3 can be placed in a n-by-n matrix defined below in equation D.4 (taken from Zeng et al. 2007). 
                                                      
35 Zeng et al. (2007) include an equation that can account for an absent scale.  This can be used to aggregate 
the STFNs should experts provide no response and therefore accounts for zero values in the aggregation 
equation.  It effectively accounts for the absent numbers by removing the experts’ contribution factor from 
the aggregation as shown in the equation documented below where r is the identity of the absent expert. 
a
ac f ac f ac f
cf
ij
ij ij ijm m
r
* ,...,
=
⊗⊕ ⊗⊕⊕⊗
−∑
11 22
1
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 D.4 
where aij = 1, aji = 1/aij.  
  In forming this matrix, the calculation reverts to being the same as that for a standard AHP 
process where the priority weights of the factors in the matrix can be derived using the arithmetic 
averaging method (Saaty and Vargas, 2000).  The weight wi of a risk factor can therefore be 
calculated by equation D.5 where n is the number of global and elemental risk factors in a category. 
n j i
a
a
n
w
n
j n
j ij
ij
i ,..., 2   , 1 ,     
1
1
1
= = ∑
∑
=
=
   D.5 
Once the weights of individual risk factors have been calculated then its weight under a 
higher category weight can be established.  In the case of this work this is simply the weight of the 
level 3 risk category under the Level 1 and Level 2 categories (defined in table 5.1 of Chapter 5).  
This action in effect gives the Level 3 risk a weighting within the whole hierarchy of risks and can 
be shown by equation D.6 where w'i  represents the actual hierarchical weight of the level 3 risk wi 
considering the weight of a higher Level 1 and 2 risk categories w
(i)
level t. ∏ denotes multiplication 
between higher levels of t in number.   
∏
=
× =
t
i
i
levelt i i w w w
1
) ( '      D . 6  
 
Step 4 Calculating the Factor Index 
Using the assessment scores calculated by equation D.1 and the weightings derived by equation 
D.6, the Factor Index for each risk can be calculated by  
∑
=
=
n
i
i i w S
1
' FI n i ,..., 2 , 1 =     D . 7  
where the result is presented as a STFN.  This number can be included with STFNs representing 
the Risk Likelihood and Risk Impact, the calculation of which is defined in the next section. 
 
2. Measurement of Risk Likelihood and Risk Impact 
The measurement of Risk Likelihood and Risk Impact is similar to that of the Factor Index where 
questionnaire respondents provide ratings as outlined in section 5.2.5.3.  These ratings can be 
manipulated using the process outlined in figure 5.4 of Chapter 5 to obtain a STFN representing 
each respondent’s rating.  These STFNs can be multiplied by each respondent’s contribution factor 
(cf) which results in an aggregated STFN for Risk Likelihood (RL) and Risk Impact (RI) for each 
category of global risk factors.  Equations D.8 and D.9 can be used to aggregate the fuzzy ratings to Appendix D 
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represent an expert groups’ overall rating of the Risk Likelihood and Risk Impact for a category of 
global risk.     
m cf cf cf ⊗ + ⊗ + ⊗ = m 2 2 1 1 RL ... RL RL RL    D.8 
m cf cf cf ⊗ + ⊗ + ⊗ = m 2 2 1 1 RI ... RI RI RI     D . 9  
  The resulting STFNs from equations D.8 and D.9 can be multiplied by the hierarchical 
weightings of the risk factors obtained from equation D.6 which results in the Risk Likelihood and 
Risk Impact of each risk factor being represented according to its priority within the risk hierarchy. 
     
3. Fuzzy Inference to Derive a Measurement of all Global Risks 
Fuzzy inference is the process of formulating the mapping from a given input to an output using 
fuzzy logic. The mapping provides a basis from which decisions can be made, or patterns 
discerned.  The process of fuzzy inference firstly involves transforming the aggregated STFNs 
identified for the Factor Index, the Risk Likelihood and the Risk Impact into fuzzy sets using the 
membership functions defined in figure 5.1 of Chapter 5.  This can be achieved by taking the 
intersections of the aggregated STFNs when placed on the corresponding membership functions 
which define the risk parameters (i.e. Factor Index (FI), Risk Likelihood (RL) and Risk Impact (RI) 
in figure 5.1 of Chapter 5) to give fuzzy sets of Factor Index (FI*), Risk Likelihood (RL*) and Risk 
Impact (RI*).  The production of fuzzy sets is best explained by a practical example which is 
included in section 5.4 of Chapter 5 where the outcomes of the questionnaire in STFN form are 
manipulated into fuzzy sets using the measurement functions of FI, RL, RI and RM.   
This section will proceed by discussing two aspects of fuzzy inference, the first being the 
use of a rule base to define the relationships between all fuzzy sets.  The definition of these 
relationships results in an output fuzzy set representing the Risk Magnitude (RM*) under each of 
the Risk Magnitude measurement functions defined in figure 5.2 of Chapter 5.  This Risk 
Magnitude fuzzy set must be defizzified to yield a single value measure representing the magnitude 
of the global and elemental risks for Crossrail and so this forms the second part of this section. 
 
3.1 Fuzzy inference and the rule base 
As has already been seen, the fuzzy approach offers the possibility of handling vague or uncertain 
information.  The next step is to define the fuzzy rules.  The fuzzy rules are merely a series of if-
then statements which are in effect a mapping between the FI
* RL
* and RI
* and RM
* fuzzy sets. 
These statements can be derived using the knowledge and heuristics of experts working on 
Crossrail to achieve optimum results.  Some examples of these if-then rules are: i) If FI is ‘Fair’ and 
RL is ‘Very High’ and RI is ‘High’ then RM is ‘Critical’; ii) If FI is ‘Very Good’ and RL is ‘Low’ 
and RI is ‘Very Low’ then RM is ‘Negligible’.  The full set of rules is summarised in table 5.8 of 
Chapter 5.  Appendix D 
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In a fuzzy rule-based system, the degrees of membership μ(x) of the input fuzzy sets of FI
* 
RL
* and RI
* for each rule R can be represented to give an output degree of membership μRM for a 
fuzzy set of RM
* in the following way. 
    is   RM  then    is   RI   and     is RL   and     is FI   If   : * RM
  *
* RI
*
* RL
  * k
* FI
  * k k k k R μ μ μ μ D.10 
where      and   ,     ,   , * RM * RI * RL
k
* FI
k k k μ μ μ μ denote the degrees of membership of FI
*, RL
*, RI
*, and RM
* 
respectively.  R
k is the rule where k = 1, 2, …, K is the kth rule in the rule base (equation based on 
Zeng et al., 2007).   
Every rule has a weight (a number between 0 and 1) which is characterised by the degree 
of membership of the fuzzy sets that are attributed to that rule.  The weight of the rule μR
k  can 
therefore be used to represent the degree of membership μ
k
RM for a fuzzy set of RM
*.  This weight 
can be calculated using a fuzzy minimum operation (Klir and Yuan, 1995; Ruan and Kerre, 2000) 
which represents the compatibility between the input fuzzy sets of FI
* RL
* and RI
* to give a 
truncated output for μR
k and thus μ
k
RM.  This can be shown by equation D.11. 
  ,..., 2 , 1              * RI * RL * FI K k
k k k
R
k = ∧ ∧ = μ μ μ μ    D.11 
where ∧ represents the fuzzy minimum operation.   
Since decisions are based on all of the rules in a fuzzy inference system, the rules must be 
combined in some manner in order to make a decision.  Aggregation is the process by which the 
degrees of membership defined by each rule is combined into a single degree of membership 
representing each of the Risk Magnitude measurement functions Negligible (N), Minor (Mi), Major 
(Ma) and Critical (Cr).  The output of the aggregation process is therefore one Risk Magnitude 
fuzzy set for Negligible, Minor, Major and Critical which is achieved by the fuzzy maximum 
operation (Klir and Yuan, 1995) and is denoted by; 
( ) R
K
k RM μ χ μ 1 = ∨ =      D . 1 2  
where μRM  is the output fuzzy set for the risk magnitude and χ represents the intervals of RM 
measurement functions N, Mi, Ma and Cr.  ∨ is the fuzzy maximum operation.   
 
3.2 Defuzzification to give a Risk Magnitude  
The result of equation D.12 is a fuzzy set for each of the Risk Magnitude linguistic terms Ne, Mi, 
Ma and Cr, and so these must be aggregated and defuzzified in order to yield a single output value 
to represent the RM.   This is the case for most applications of fuzzy logic, which includes that of 
assessing global risks and elemental risks, where defuzzification of the fuzzy set is needed to yield 
a ‘crisp’ value.  There are various techniques available for defuzzification (see Lee, 1990) with the 
three main approaches being the max criterion, mean of maximum and the centre of area.  The max 
criterion method finds the point at which the membership function is a maximum.  The mean of 
maximum takes the mean of those points where the membership function is at a maximum.  The 
most common method is the centre of area method which finds the centre of gravity of the 
combined fuzzy sets.   Appendix D 
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The matching crisp value RM for global and elemental risks on Crossrail can be therefore 
be calculated by  
()
q i
y
q
q
,...., 2 , 1       RM
*
*
RM
RM
=
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
=
∑
∑
μ
μ
   D.13 
where y denotes the centre of the degree of membership of the combined FI
*, RL
*, RI
* fuzzy sets 
that make μRM*.  q is the number of fuzzy term sets which correspond to the Risk Magnitude 
measurement function intervals χ (i.e. Negligible, Minor, Major and Critical) (q therefore = 4)  
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APPENDIX E 
This appendix gives a brief account of the forms of real options most often encountered in the 
management of engineering projects as is noted in section 6.1.3 of Chapter 6.  The real options 
defined below relate to deferral of decisions, abandonment, contraction, growth, the switching of 
operational modes and the changing of operating scales.  
 
 
Option to defer. One of the options open to a manger is the option to defer a project.  This is an 
American call option on the value of a project which is effectively a choice that could be made by a 
project manager in light of a significant uncertainty.   
 
Option to abandon.  This is an American put option to close down a project.  The exercise price of 
the option ‘on’ a project is the liquidation (or resale) value of the project less any closing down 
costs.  Abandonment options often mitigate the impact of loss making situations.  Abandoning or 
postponing development of a project that yields benefits upon completion may be optimal if 
uncertainties evolve unfavourably during development (Majd and Pindyck, 1987; Carr, 1988). 
Similarly, shutting down permanently a project that loses money may be optimal if the probability 
of recovery is low enough.  Huang and Chou (2006) used a real option approach to value a 
minimum revenue guarantee and option to abandon in build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects.  The 
case study in Chapter 6 uses an abandonment option in a project. 
 
Option to contract.  This is the option to reduce the scale of a project’s operation.  It is an 
American put option on the value of the lost capacity.  The exercise price is the present value of the 
future expenditures saved as seen at the time of the exercise of the option. 
 
Options to grow.  This is the option to make further investments and increase output if conditions 
are favourable.  It is an American call option on the value of additional capacity.  The exercise 
price of the call option is the cost of creating this additional capacity discounted to the time of 
option exercise.  The exercise price often depends on the initial investment.  If management 
initially chooses to build capacity in excess of the expected level of output, the exercise price can 
be relatively small.   
The scale of a project makes sense when the expansion path of growth is a sequence of 
inter-related projects, where earlier stages enable the options to subsequent ones (Kester 1993).  
This may be true for the development of the whole urban rail network in London where projects 
such as Crossrail and the East London Line are interconnected and the relationship between these 
projects creates options for their development and operation.   
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Options to switch inputs or outputs enable the holder to observe the uncertainties as they evolve 
and make adjustments to the resources required by a project or the outputs produced.  A well 
known example is given in Kulatilaka (1993), where the value of a steam boiler that can switch 
from burning oil to gas and vice-versa is found as a function of the uncertainty in the prices of oil 
and gas.  Such a boiler represents the value of the option to switch production inputs as does the 
option of having rail network that can operate on electricity or diesel fuel. 
 
Options to alter operating scale are relevant for projects that can change the scale of production 
to match demand.  These options include the flexibility to temporarily shut-down entirely, perhaps 
incurring a running moth-balling cost in order to retain the option to resume production later.  In 
other words, these are reversible options just like options to switch inputs or outputs where 
reducing operating scale temporarily does not preclude resuming to full production in the future.  A 
typical example of this is a rail station which opens for special events (e.g. football matches) where 
a huge increase in ridership can be expected.  
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APPENDIX F 
Each safety risk/hazard identified for the tunnelled and walkway interchange was scored using the 
conditions defined below.  Numerical ratings for the probability of the risk/hazard occurring were 
multiplied by numerical ratings of the severity of the risk/hazard.  The risk score was therefore the 
product of the probability and severity ratings. 
 
1. Probability of safety risks/hazards occurring 
           Rating 
VL  1       So unlikely that probability is close to zero                      
L  2       Unlikely to occur, though conceivable                               
M        3       Likely to occur sometime                                                      
H       4       Occurrence not surprising.  May occur more than once       
VH     5      Occurrence inevitable. May occur many times                   
 
2. Severity of the occurrence of safety risks/hazards on operatives 
           Rating 
VL  1       Minor injury/illness, lost time less than 3 days 
L         2      Injury/illness causing lost time longer than 3 days 
M        3       Major injury/illness to one or more operatives but not causing permanent disability 
H        4      Single fatality or single/multiple permanent disability 
VH      5       Multiple fatalities 
 
3. The risk score was the product of the probability rating and the severity rating of the safety 
risk/hazard. 
If the product of likelihood and severity tolerances were: 
Red >=15             Risk is intolerable 
15> Amber > 4  Additional measures should be investigated 
Green <=4           Risk is tolerable  
 
The risk scores defined for each safety risk/hazard were collated to give a total safety risk score 
associated with the tunnelled and walkway interchange.  A total of 40 risks were included thus 
presenting a (40 × 25) = 1000 maximum score for the tunnelled and walkway interchange 
respectively (the higher the score the higher the safety risks/hazards associated with the interchange 
type).   Risk Description 
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1  Demolition Work 
Due to demolition works as 
per Pre-option study design  
Due to demolition works as 
per Pre-option study design 
excluding 3 Hayne Street, 
and Hayne Street Bridge 
a  Risk of injury 
from falling 
debris 
Mitigation as 6B 
L H  8 
Design demolition in 
agreement with LU/Network 
rail, including crash decking.   
VL H  4 
Due to instability and 
cracking of Hayne Street 
Bridge (HSB) following the 
demolition of the southern 
arch/span 
b  Risk of injury 
from falling 
debris 
Maintain strut load capable 
of reacting to north arch 
thrust adopting deck span 
with moment connections to 
contiguous pile foundations. 
Provide crash 
netting/decking over LU 
lines. Monitoring 
VL H  4  No demolition of southern 
arch/span 
N/A N/A  0 
             
2  Construction 
Due to tunnelling the 
interchange in faulted 
ground and due to de-
stressing of the ground. 
a  Risk of collapse 
of tunnelled 
interchange  
Interchange provided by 
walkway over LU lines. 
N/A N/A  0 
Close supervision, 
monitoring, EPP, probe 
drilling, face logging for 
faults and RES process. Pipe 
arching may be required, real 
time monitoring, felting. SI. 
L VH 10 
Especially at shaft 
intersections. Interactions as 
per Pre-option study design 
excluding Fox & Knot 
Especially at shaft 
intersections. More 
interactions than Pre-option 
study design excluding Fox 
& Knot 
b  Risk of collapse 
due to shallow 
tunnel on tunnel 
interaction 
Mitigation as 6B 
VL VH  5 
Planned phased working, 
additional support measures 
to existing tunnels, 
supervision, monitoring, EPP 
L VH 10 
Due to vehicle emissions, 
gases in the ground. Less 
underground tunnelling work 
so risk of asphyxiation is 
reduced. 
Due to vehicle emissions, 
gases in the ground. More 
underground tunnelling work 
so risk of asphyxiation is 
increased. 
c  Risk of 
asphyxiation  
Mitigation as 6B 
VL VH  5 
Routing monitoring and 
ventilation, availability of 
self rescuer respirators 
during construction, electric 
plant 
L VH 10 
Working in a confined space. 
Less confined working 
spaces with this option. 
Working in a confined space. 
More confined working 
spaces with this option. 
d  Injuries 
resulting from 
access/egress 
risks, conflict 
with plant  Mitigation as 6B 
VL VH  5 
Routine personnel access 
control during construction. 
Permit systems. 
L VH 10    Risk Description 
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Due to instability and 
cracking caused by piling 
through Hayne Street Bridge 
(HSB), stabilisation required 
before tunnelling and 
demolition works are carried 
out. 
Due to instability and 
cracking caused by piling 
through Hayne Street Bridge 
(HSB) for stabilisation 
required before tunnelling 
works are carried out. 
e  Risk of injury 
from falling 
debris onto LU 
lines 
Mitigation as 6B 
L H  8 
Monitoring. Propping and 
bracing. Rig size to be kept 
to a minimum. Crash 
netting/decking over LU 
lines. 
VL H  4 
Due to cranage as per Pre-
option study design. 
Due to cranage as per Pre-
option study design 
excluding the walkway 
interchange. 
f  Cranage: Risk 
from falling 
objects 
Mitigation as 6B 
L VH  10 
Best construction practice 
VL VH  5 
Due to lifting operations 
and/or failure of cranage 
foundation as per Pre-option 
study design.  
Due to lifting operations 
and/or failure of cranage 
foundation as per Pre-option 
study design excluding the 
walkway interchange.   
g  Cranage: 
Toppling failure 
Mitigation as 6B 
L VH  10 
Best construction practice 
VL VH  5 
             
3  Settlement  
As 6B  Due to settlement of LU 
tracks, platforms, structures 
or drainage caused by 
settlement from the running 
tunnels, ventilation tunnels, 
adits, ETH main shaft 
a  Risk of injury 
from train 
impact with 
platform edge, 
derailment, 
drainage repairs 
and/or trips 
(elements 
identical for 
both options) 
Mitigation as 6B 
L H  8 
Close supervision, 
monitoring, EPP, probe 
drilling, face logging for 
faults and RES process. Real 
time monitoring, felting. SI. 
Track stabilisation. TSR 
(speed restrictions). Piling 
and infilling of internal 
arches before running 
tunnels to stabilise HSB 
abutment/pier. Alternatively 
pipe arch and canopies 
installed from tunnel can 
provide the same role. 
L H  8 
Due to settlement of LU 
tracks, platforms, structures 
or drainage caused by 
settlement from excavating 
the temporary construction 
shaft at 33-37 charterhouse 
square.  
As 5D but shaft is larger and 
used permanently 
b  Risk of injury 
from train 
impact with 
platform edge, 
derailment, 
drainage repairs 
and/or trips (33-
37 charterhouse 
square shaft) 
Mitigation as 6B 
VL H  4 
Close supervision, 
monitoring, EPP, probe 
drilling, face logging for 
faults and RES process. Pipe 
arching may be required, real 
time monitoring, felting. SI. 
Track stabilisation. TSR 
L H  8    Risk Description 
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(speed restrictions). 
Due to settlement of LU 
tracks, platforms, structures 
or drainage caused by tunnel 
interchange and piled box in 
island platform 
c  Risk of injury 
from train 
impact with 
platform edge, 
derailment, 
drainage repairs 
and/or trips 
(tunnel 
interchange and 
piled box) 
No additional settlement not 
covered by 3a and 3b.  
N/A N/A  0 
Mitigation as above 
L H  8 
Due to settlement   d  Risk of injury 
from instability 
of temporary 
supports of 
walkway  
Conservative temporary 
works design. Monitoring 
VL M  3  No interchange walkway  N/A  N/A  0 
             
4  Utilities 
a  Risk to 
operatives with 
regards to 
striking utilities. 
Note: Hayne 
street utilities to 
be abandoned 
under both 
options apart 
from water main 
which is to be 
capped and 
protected. 
As 6B  L  VH  10  Permit to dig system to be 
complied with ensuring 
compliance with LU 
procedures and 
precautionary scanning by 
CAT tools 
L VH 10 
             
5  Operation and Maintenance 
a  Risk associated 
with inspecting 
interchange  
Ensure that interchange is 
designed so that visual 
inspection can be carried out 
during LU periods of 
operation and that fixtures 
are placed on the walkway to 
allow safe maintenance.  
L H  8  Water penetration. Confined 
space. Confined space 
procedures. 
L M  6 
b  Risk associated 
with 
demolishing 
interchange at 
the end of 
design life.  
Ensure that design allows for 
easy dismantling of structure 
at the end of its design life. 
L H  8  Decommissioning would be 
by infilling 
VL H  4 
c  Risks associated 
with stair access 
to LU platforms 
and OSD - slips, 
trips and falls 
Adequate lighting, 
maintenance, handrails and 
edge visibility. Steps 
required in OSD lobby 
M M  9  Adequate lighting, 
maintenance, handrails and 
edge visibility (very long 
stairs to platforms).  
M M  9    Risk Description 
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d  Fire evacuation 
risks 
No known weaknesses  N/A  N/A  0  The design is compliant with 
fire standards. Evacuation 
route from LU Barbican is 
indirect and counter-
intuitive. Provide appropriate 
signage and public 
information systems. 
VL VH  5 
e  Risk of collapse 
of Southern span 
of Hayne St 
Bridge 
Due to a vehicle breaching 
the bollards and overloading 
the span. Mitigate via 
signage and robust bollards. 
VL VH  5  Hayne Street remains open 
to traffic 
N/A N/A  0 
             
6  Access for Fire service 
a 
Conditions 
inside the station 
do not allow 
fire-fighters 
sufficient access 
to allow them to 
enter the 
building, leading 
to death of 
public/staff 
Fire strategy to define access 
and ventilation conditions 
L H  8  Fire strategy to define access 
and ventilation conditions 
L H  8 
b 
Facilities not 
present to assist 
the fire service 
in fighting a fire 
in the station, 
leading to death 
of public staff. 
Provision made  L  H  8  Provision made  L  H  8 
             
7  Evacuation of station staff, maintenance staff and the public 
 a 
Means of escape 
for maintenance 
staff working in 
the riser within 
the north west 
corner of the 
site. 
Allow staff working in this 
riser to have access to the 
Smithfield Market escape 
route which exits onto Hayne 
Street 
L H  8  Allow staff working in this 
riser to have access to the 
Smithfield Market escape 
route which exits onto Hayne 
Street 
L H  8 
 b 
Risk of severe 
injury or death 
to passengers 
due to the 
distance to point 
of evacuation 
This option has lower impact 
since the distance passengers 
have to walk to evacuation 
point in either the ETH or 
LU Barbican is shorter due 
to the location of the 
walkway interchange 
L H  8  This option has higher 
impact as passengers having 
to walk down into the tunnel 
interchange and then back 
out to reach a point of 
evacuation 
L H  8 
 c 
Risk of 
confusion due to 
non-intuitive 
escape route 
In the event of a train fire in 
LU Barbican, the walkway 
interchange would be a non-
intuitive means of escape as 
it would entail walking over 
the fire.  Risk can be 
mitigated by providing fire 
protection measures within 
the walkway structure and 
also by providing an 
emergency exit point from 
LU Barbican eastbound 
platform to Charterhouse 
Square.  
L H  8  In the event of a train fire in 
LU Barbican, the tunnel 
interchange would be a non-
intuitive means of escape as 
it would require passengers 
to walk through a tunnel to a 
point of safety.  Passengers 
are likely to move towards a 
point of safety outside the 
station.  This risk can be 
mitigated by providing an 
emergency exit point from 
LU Barbican eastbound 
platform which exits onto 
L H  8    Risk Description 
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Charterhouse Square. 
 d 
Risk of 
passengers/staff 
being trapped in 
LU Barbican in 
the event of a 
train fire 
Provide emergency exit 
points  - these exit points do 
not act as entry points to the 
station. 
L H  8  Provide emergency exit 
points  - these exit points do 
not act as entry points to the 
station. 
L H  8 
             
8  Fire protection during construction 
a  
Conditions 
during 
construction do 
not allow fire-
fighters 
sufficient access 
to allow them to 
enter the site, 
leading to death 
of workers. 
This risk is reduced with this 
option as the walkway 
interchange is effectively on 
the surface.  A portion of the 
interchange is covered under 
Hayne Street Bridge. 
L H  8  The construction shaft in 
Barbican station platform 
forms the fire escape for the 
tunnel interchange.  This 
presents more access and 
escape risks in the event of a 
fire as workers have to come 
up from underground while 
fire fighters have to gain 
entry through it.  A dry riser 
inlet can be located within 
the construction shaft. 
M H  12 
 b 
Access to fire 
hydrants 
Provide fire hydrants around 
the station site so that fire 
fighters can gain quick 
access 
L H  8  A fire hydrant can be located 
in the construction shaft 
located in Farringdon Station 
as well as hydrants around 
the ETH site. 
L H  8 
 c 
Protection of LU 
Barbican 
Platform  
If more than 50% of the 
platform is covered by a 
crash deck, then section 12 
of the fire standards will 
apply and specific means of 
evacuation will have to be 
developed. 
L H  8  If more than 50% of the 
platform is covered by a 
crash deck, then section 12 
of the fire standards will 
apply and specific means of 
evacuation will have to be 
developed. 
L H  8 
             
9  Fire Protection 
 a 
Risk that 
interchange 
layout may 
reduce the 
effectiveness of 
fire 
compartment-
ation within the 
station 
A fire shutter is provided in 
the entrance between the 
ETH and the Barbican 
station walkway interchange.  
This provides effective fire 
compartmentalisation for this 
option. 
L H  8  A fire shutter is provided in 
the entrance between the 
ETH and the Barbican 
station tunnel interchange.  
This provides effective fire 
compartmentalisation for this 
option. 
L H  8    Risk Description 
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 b 
Risk of serious 
injury/death due 
to smoke 
inhalation 
Provide a means of smoke 
control that keeps the 
walkway interchange free of 
smoke, although the 
walkway will be partially 
open to the air. 
L H  8  Given the higher risks 
associated with this option, 
smoke control will conform 
with any conditions set out 
in the fire strategy. 
L H  8 
 c 
Risk of fire 
damage to the 
walkway 
interchange 
which is acting 
as a means of 
escape 
Ensure that design and 
materials used conform to 
the 60 minute fire rating 
required. 
L H  8  No walkway in this option  N/A  N/A  0 
             
10  Ventilation/Fans 
a  
Potential for 
vibrations and 
noise from vent 
fans spreading 
through the 
OSD. 
Provide a gap between OSD 
structure and fans and ensure 
that appropriate sound 
proofing materials are used 
to insulate the fans. 
L H  8  Provide a gap between OSD 
structure and fans and ensure 
that appropriate sound 
proofing materials are used 
to insulate the fans. 
L H  8 
 b 
Risks of falls, 
injuries and/or 
falling objects 
due to 
maintenance and 
removal of the 
fans at high 
level.  
Ensure that safe access 
provision and any lifting 
requirements are designed 
into the building. 
L H  8  Ensure that safe access 
provision and any lifting 
requirements are designed 
into the building. 
L H  8 
 c 
Working at 
height in a 
confined 
environment to 
install and 
maintain 
services. 
Locate a ladder (or other 
suitable climbing apparatus) 
with stabilising wall fixture 
within the corridor at time of 
construction 
L H  8  Locate a ladder (or other 
suitable climbing apparatus) 
with stabilising wall fixture 
within the corridor at time of 
construction 
L H  8 
             
11  Passenger Movement 
 a 
Risk that 
passengers 
cannot see PRM 
lift at Crossrail 
platform level as 
this is hidden 
from view. 
Ensure that clear signage is 
provided and also CCTV to 
ensure for monitoring. 
L L  4  Ensure that clear signage is 
provided and also CCTV to 
ensure for monitoring. 
L L  4 
 b 
Risk of 
passenger 
congestion 
given the height 
of the stairs 
within the shaft 
accessing LU 
barbican from 
the tunnel 
interchange 
No stairs in this option  N/A  N/A  0  Carry out passenger flow 
calculations to determine the 
extend of this problem. 
H H  16    Risk Description 
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 c 
Risk of 
passenger 
congestion 
between LU 
Barbican 
platforms 
Low impact for this option 
since there is only a single 
flight of stairs 
L L  4  Higher impact within this 
option since passengers have 
to descend/ascend stairs to 
gain access to respective 
platforms. 
VH H  20 
             
12  Walkway interchange 
 a 
Risks to 
operatives on 
the walkway 
interchange 
between ETH 
and Barbican 
station 
Ensure that sufficient 
barrier/edge protection is 
provided on the walkway 
interchange to prevent 
operatives/cleaners from 
falling onto LUL tracks as 
well as preventing any 
items/tools being used from 
falling 
L L  4  No walkway in this option  N/A  N/A  0 
 b 
Risk of 
personnel/items 
falling onto the 
LUL 
tracks/trains 
from passengers 
or maintenance 
personnel using 
the interchange 
between ETH 
and Barbican 
Station  
Provide sufficient protective 
measures on or around the 
interchange to prevent this 
from happening. 
L L  4  No walkway in this option  N/A  N/A  0 
 c 
Risk falls and/or 
injury while 
cleaning and 
maintaining the 
walkway 
interchange. 
Ensure that 
support/maintenance 
platform can be attached to 
walkway for ease of 
maintenance and inspection.  
L L  4  No walkway in this option  N/A  N/A  0 
             
 Total  Scores      250       284 
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FARRINGDON EAST TICKET HALL STATED PREFERENCE SURVEY 
 
 
This questionnaire is being circulated as part of an Engineering Doctorate research project which is 
looking at avoiding cost overruns in large underground rail projects. The aim of this survey is to 
establish the preferences of professionals involved in the procurement of an underground railway 
project.   
 
The format of this survey is a series of hypothetical scenarios for a proposed underground station.  
Under each scenario, two options are presented which contain different levels of operation, cost, 
time, risk and development value for the station.  Respondents are required to trade-off between two 
options presented within each scenario and select which one they prefer.     
 
Information and instructions for respondents are placed at the start of this survey. 
 
 
 
 
Returned questionnaires will be treated with the utmost confidence and no identities will be 
included in any published material. 
 
Please provide the following information about yourself; 
 
Your role within your organisation (e.g. Design Manager)   ________________________________  
 
Your professional title (e.g. Architect, Civil Engineer etc.)  ________________________________
             
The number of years experience that you have  ______ 
 
 
 
Your input is greatly appreciated, 
 
Heulyn Thomas 
(The University of Southampton) 
 
February 2009  
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1.  Background 
Farringdon East Ticket Hall (ETH) is an underground station being proposed as one of several 
underground stations for Crossrail - a new underground railway system in London.    
 
Farringdon Crossrail Station Facts 
 
•  Two 250 metre long platform tunnels with 2 exit/entry ticket halls (North and South) 
•  Peak hour passenger flow of 35,000 people through the whole station  
•  New ticket halls 
•  Escalators and lifts to all levels 
•  Links to existing underground and over ground rail network 
 
This survey specifically concerns the Farringdon East Ticket Hall, which is independent of the 
West Ticket Hall (WTH).  Further information concerning the northern part of the station is 
presented below. 
 
Farringdon ETH Facts 
 
•  Peak hour passenger flow of 12,000 people 
through this portion of the station 
•  Over-site development (OSD) of 4 storeys 
high 
•  Draught relief vents exit through station with 
outlets at ticket hall level or in the OSD 
•  New connection constructed to link into 
existing railway infrastructure 
 
 
2.  Requirements of Survey Respondents 
Respondents of this survey are to assume the role of a client organisation that is developing 
Farringdon ETH.   
The current situation with regards to the development of the station is that an initial budget and 
timeframe for construction has been set but decisions regarding some key variables such as the 
interchange type remain to be made.  
 
Respondents are required to make decisions regarding these key variables by selecting one of the 
two options within the scenarios presented later in the survey.  Many of these variables are 
conflicting, thus necessitating respondents to trade-off between the variables. 
 
Selections should be made according to respondents’ views on the acceptable limits of the 
respective key variables.  It should be assumed that the client organisation seeks the optimum value 
for money at all times.  
 
Farringdon ETH is considered to be independent of Farringdon WTH and therefore any selections 
and decisions made have no impact on the development of Farringdon WTH.    
 
 
 
 
Image source: www.google.com   306
3.  Project variables 
The five project variables (station interchange, cost, time, risk and development value) associated 
with the development of Farringdon ETH are defined below.   
i.  Station Interchange  
A new pedestrian link is proposed at Farringdon ETH between the new rail services running 
through the station and the existing rail services nearby.  Interchange walk time within the 
station to the other rail services can vary according to the layout of pedestrian interchange 
routes within the station.  Tunnelled and walkway interchange options are proposed; 
1)  A tunnelled interchange  
i.  All other things being equal, this is at least £7 million more expensive than 
the walkway link giving an initial budgeted construction cost of £45 million 
for Farringdon ETH. 
ii.  A mean pedestrian interchange time of 100 seconds which is better than the 
walkway link 
iii.  Draught relief vents which exit through the ticket hall area thus having more 
impact on 3
rd parties at street level but increasing the rental value of the OSD    
 
 
 
 
 
2)  A walkway interchange  
i.  All other things being equal, this is at least £7 million less expensive than the 
tunnelled link giving an initial budgeted construction cost of £38 million for 
Farringdon ETH. 
ii.  A mean pedestrian interchange time of 180 seconds which is worse than the 
tunnelled link 
iii.  Draught relief vents which exit through the OSD thus having less impact on 
3
rd parties at street level but reducing the rental value of the OSD      
 
 
 
Tunnelled interchange 
Walkway interchange 
Street level 
Street level 
Pedestrian interchange route 
Pedestrian interchange route 
Over site development (4 floors) 
Over site development (4 floors) 
Escalator shaft 
Escalator shaft 
Escalators 
Walkway 
Platform for 
existing rail 
service 
Platform for 
existing rail 
service 
New 
Platform  
New 
Platform  
Ticket Hall 
Ticket Hall 
Draught relief 
vents in ticket 
hall area 
Draught relief 
vents in OSD 
area 
2D, Not to scale 
2D, Not to scale 
Platform for 
existing rail 
service   307
ii.  Cost & Time  
Cost represents the value of money required to build the station to completion and includes 
any lifecycle maintenance costs.  These are presented in present value terms to allow direct 
comparison with the development value.  The cost does not contain an allowance for risk. 
Time is representative of the time in months required to build the station to completion.   
 
The initial budgeted cost and time of Farringdon ETH with a;  
•  tunnelled interchange link is £45 million and 96 months respectively which is at least 
£7m more expensive than a walkway link;  
•  walkway link is £38 million and 93 months respectively which is at least £7m less 
expensive than a tunnelled link.   
 
The client is willing to accept variations to these budgets depending on how respondents value and 
trade-off the other variables in the survey.   
iii.  Level of Risk 
Level of Risk is a broad term which covers project engineering, construction and operational 
risks associated with the development of Farringdon ETH.  It is presented as percentage 
likelihood that risks will occur thus costing at least an additional £12 million to the budgeted 
cost.  A higher percentage value indicates a higher likelihood of risks occurring while a 
lower percentage value represents a lower likelihood of risks occurring.   
iv.  Development Value 
The value of Farringdon ETH is related to many factors including  
•  Its layout and functionality, taking account of the station interchange types and the 
interchange time (as defined in i.)  
•  The revenue generating capability of the OSD and associated lifecycle revenues 
•  The overall value of the station (including the OSD) and how marketable it is as a 
centrepiece for the business area it serves. 
 
The development value is presented in present value terms so that it can be directly 
compared with the costs.  This value accounts for the interchange type within the station, the 
interchange time, the value of the site and the rental value of the OSD. 
 
4.  Instructions  
Respondents are required to assume the role of the client and select their preferred options for 
Farringdon ETH by trading-off the variables defined above within the scenarios presented below. 
The client organisation seeks the optimum value for money.  For example, this may mean paying 
more and accepting more risk for a higher value station rather than paying less in return for a lower 
level of risk.  These decisions are left to the respondents’ preference.  
   
Example 
Below is a typical scenario within which the two options are; Tunnel Option and Walkway Option.  
Respondents are simply required to trade off between the variables and highlight the best option.  
 
   Variables 
    Cost (£m) & Time (mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing at least 
£12m occurring (%)  Development Value (£m) 
Choose Tunnel 
or Walkway 
  Tunnel Option  £50m & 104 mths  20  85  Tunnel 
               
  Walkway Option  £39m & 94 mths  15  70.5  Walkway   308
5.  Scenarios 
 
Please consider all scenarios independently of each other remembering to select only one option 
from each scenario.  
 
          
   Variables 
  
Cost (£m) & Time 
(mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing at 
least £12m occurring (%) 
Development Value 
(£m) 
Choose Tunnel 
or Walkway 
  Tunnel Option  £45.5m & 97.5 mths  5  82  Tunnel 
Scenario 1                
  Walkway Option  £38m & 93 mths  0  73.5  Walkway 
          
          
   Variables 
  
Cost (£m) & Time 
(mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing at 
least £12m occurring (%) 
Development Value 
(£m) 
Choose Tunnel 
or Walkway 
  Tunnel Option  £46.5m & 98.5 mths  30  81  Tunnel 
Scenario 2                
  Walkway Option  £39m & 94 mths  10  70.5  Walkway 
          
          
   Variables 
  
Cost (£m) & Time 
(mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing at 
least £12m occurring (%) 
Development Value 
(£m) 
Choose Tunnel 
or Walkway 
  Tunnel Option  £47m & 99.5 mths  55  83  Tunnel 
Scenario 3                
  Walkway Option  £39.5m & 95 mths  5  69.5  Walkway 
          
          
   Variables 
  
Cost (£m) & Time 
(mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing at 
least £12m occurring (%) 
Development Value 
(£m) 
Choose Tunnel 
or Walkway 
  Tunnel Option  £47.5m & 102.5 mths  90  79  Tunnel 
Scenario 4                
  Walkway Option  £40m & 98 mths  15  63  Walkway 
          
          
   Variables 
  
Cost (£m) & Time 
(mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing at 
least £12m occurring (%) 
Development Value 
(£m) 
Choose Tunnel 
or Walkway 
  Tunnel Option  £47m & 101 mths  10  80  Tunnel 
Scenario 5                
  Walkway Option  £38.5m & 94 mths  5  69.5  Walkway 
          
          
   Variables 
  
Cost (£m) & Time 
(mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing at 
least £12m occurring (%) 
Development Value 
(£m) 
Choose Tunnel 
or Walkway 
  Tunnel Option  £47.5m & 101 mths  45  79  Tunnel 
Scenario 6                
  Walkway Option  £39m & 94 mths  25  70.5  Walkway 
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   Variables 
  
Cost (£m) & Time 
(mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing at 
least £12m occurring (%) 
Development Value 
(£m) 
Choose Tunnel 
or Walkway 
  Tunnel Option  £48m & 102 mths  55  85  Tunnel 
Scenario 7                
  Walkway Option  £39.5m & 95 mths  5  69  Walkway 
          
          
   Variables 
  
Cost (£m) & Time 
(mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing at 
least £12m occurring (%) 
Development Value 
(£m) 
Choose Tunnel 
or Walkway 
  Tunnel Option  £48.5m & 105 mths  80  77  Tunnel 
Scenario 8                
  Walkway Option  £40m & 98 mths  5  63.5  Walkway 
          
          
   Variables 
  
Cost (£m) & Time 
(mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing at 
least £12m occurring (%) 
Development Value 
(£m) 
Choose Tunnel 
or Walkway 
  Tunnel Option  £49m & 104 mths  20  78  Tunnel 
Scenario 9                
  Walkway Option  £38.5m & 94 mths  15  64.5  Walkway 
          
          
   Variables 
  
Cost (£m) & Time 
(mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing at 
least £12m occurring (%) 
Development Value 
(£m) 
Choose Tunnel 
or Walkway 
  Tunnel Option  £49.5m & 105 mths  50  79  Tunnel 
Scenario 10                
  Walkway Option  £39m & 95 mths  30  63  Walkway 
          
          
   Variables 
  
Cost (£m) & Time 
(mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing at 
least £12m occurring (%) 
Development Value 
(£m) 
Choose Tunnel 
or Walkway 
  Tunnel Option  £50m & 105 mths  60  76  Tunnel 
Scenario 11                
  Walkway Option  £39.5m & 95 mths  10  67.5  Walkway 
          
          
   Variables 
  
Cost (£m) & Time 
(mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing at 
least £12m occurring (%) 
Development Value 
(£m) 
Choose Tunnel 
or Walkway 
  Tunnel Option  £50.5m & 108 mths  85  85  Tunnel 
Scenario 12                
  Walkway Option  £40m & 98 mths  10  74.5  Walkway 
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   Variables 
  
Cost (£m) & Time 
(mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing at 
least £12m occurring (%) 
Development Value 
(£m) 
Choose Tunnel 
or Walkway 
  Tunnel Option  £50.5m & 105 mths  30  78  Tunnel 
Scenario 13                
  Walkway Option  £38m & 93 mths  25  62  Walkway 
          
          
   Variables 
  
Cost (£m) & Time 
(mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing at 
least £12m occurring (%) 
Development Value 
(£m) 
Choose Tunnel 
or Walkway 
  Tunnel Option  £51m & 106 mths  40  80  Tunnel 
Scenario 14                
  Walkway Option  £38.5m & 94 mths  20  66.5  Walkway 
          
          
   Variables 
  
Cost (£m) & Time 
(mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing at 
least £12m occurring (%) 
Development Value 
(£m) 
Choose Tunnel 
or Walkway 
  Tunnel Option  £50.5m & 105 mths  75  81  Tunnel 
Scenario 15                
  Walkway Option  £38m & 93 mths  25  70.5  Walkway 
          
          
   Variables 
  
Cost (£m) & Time 
(mths)  
Likelihood of risk costing at 
least £12m occurring (%) 
Development Value 
(£m) 
Choose Tunnel 
or Walkway 
  Tunnel Option  £52.5m & 110 mths  85  87  Tunnel 
Scenario 16                
  Walkway Option  £40m & 98 mths  10  78.5  Walkway 
          
 
End 
 
Thank you for your time. 
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Table H.1 Stated Preference survey responses 
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Experience 
(yrs)  20 4 4 9 2 5  12 7 4  16  15  19 3 4 3 5 3 4 9 8 4 6 2 2  10  41  28 
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2  T W  T T T T W  T T T T W  T T T T T T W  T T T T T T T T 
3  W  W  T W  W  T W  T T T T W  T T W  T W  T W  T W  T W  T T T T 
4  W W W W W T  W W W W T  T  W T  W T  W T  W W W W W W W W W 
5  W  W  T W  T T T T T W  T T W  T T T T T T T T T T T T T T 
6  W W T  T  W T  W T  T  W T  W W T  W T  T  T  W W W T  W T  W W W 
7  W W T  W T  T  W W W T  T  W W T  T  T  W T  W W W T  T  W W T  T 
8  W W T  W W T  W W W W T  T  W T  W T  W T  W W W W W W W W W 
9  W  W  T W  T T T W  T T T T W  T T T W  T T T T W  T 0 T T T 
10  W  T T W  T W  W  W  W  T T W  T T T T W  T T T W  W  T 0 W  T T 
11  0  W T  W T  W W W W W W W W W W W W T  W W W W W W W W W 
12  0  W T  W W W W W W W W W W W W T  W T  W W W W W W W W W 
13  T T T T W  W  T W  T T T T W  T W  T T T T T T W  T 0 T T T 
14  W W T  W W W W W T  0  T  T  T  T  W T  W T  W T  W W W 0  W W W 
15  W W T  W W W W W W 0  W W W W W T  W W W W W W W W W W W 
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16  W W W W W W W W W 0  W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W  
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